2020-0518, Anna Carrigan v. New Hampshire Department of Health and Human Services & a.

asserted, retaliated against her for publicly complaining about the Department’s alleged individual defendants, in their official capacities as employees of the Department, who, she Alleging violations of various statutory and constitutional provisions, t he plaintiff also sued other 1 decisions. She asserted standing under Part I, Article 8 of the New Hampshire 1 statutory and constitutional duties as a result of their “irresponsible” spending and the Department’s commissioner, alleging that they are failing to meet their defendants, the New Ham pshire Department of Health and Human Services DONOVAN, J. The plaintiff, Anna Carrigan, filed suit against the

the defendants. Ramsey, assistant attorney s general, on the brief, and Mr. Garland orally), for Office of the Attorney General, (Samuel R.V. Garland and Jennifer S.

brief and orally), for the plaintiff. Rath, Young and Pignatelli, P.C., of Concord (Michael S. Lewis on the

NEW HAMPSHIRE DEPART MENT OF HEALTH AND H UMAN SERVICES & a.

No. 2020 - 0518 Merrimack

http://www.courts.state.nh.us/supreme. release. The direct address of the court ’ s home page is: Opinions are available on the Internet by 9:00 a.m. on the morning of their reported by e - mail at the following address: reporter@courts.state.nh. us. corrections may be made before the opinion goes to press. Errors may be Doe Drive, Concor d, New Hampshire 03301, of any editorial errors in order that requested to notify the Reporter, Supreme Court of New Hampshire, One Charles as formal revision before publication in the New Hampshire Reports. Readers are NOTICE: This opinion is subject to motions for rehearing under Rule p. 2 22 as well 2

not before us. shortcomings. These claims were dismissed with prejudice by agreement of the parties and are

approval of a particular, identifiable expenditure.” (Emphases omitted.) challenge “the lawfulness of a particular, identifiable expenditure or the asserting that, to have standing under Part I, Article 8, the plaintiff must The d efendants moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of standing,

constitutional rights of abused and neglected children. comply with various child welfare statutory provisions and are violating the defendants, as a “product” or “result” of th eir spending policies, are failing to these allegations, the plaintiff sought a declaration to the effect that the abused and neglected children, though such funds are available.” In light of substantial sums of state allocated funds available to address the needs of enacted by the legislature at levels that faci litate legal functioning”; or “spent “funded the agencies with responsibility for abiding by the legal requirements address its documented shortfalls in rega rd to child protective services”; further allege d that the Department has not: “invested sufficient resources to inability of New Hampshire to abide by its mandated legal obligations.” She evidence regarding the connection between the absence of resources and the “unconstitutional budgetary decision - making in the fa ce of uncontroverted spending decisions [the Department] has made and continues to make” and its Department’s “poor allocation of resources,. . . which relate to a series of Her complaint ti es these, and other, alleged shortcomings to the

agency is understaffed, and its existing staff is under trained. backlog of thousands of abuse and neglect cases, the State’s child welfare and unconstitutional.” According to the plaintiff, the Department has a that the Department’s “response to the child abuse and neglect crisis is illegal children who are subject t o . . . child abuse and neglect.” She seeks a ruling mandatory, substantive, and procedural obligations to respond to and protect defendants alleging, in essence, “that the State has failed to abide by its Department employee. In February p. 2 2020, she filed a complaint against the is a taxpaying resident of F armington, a n eligible New Hampsh ire voter, and The following facts are drawn from the plaintiff’s complaint. The plaintiff

under Part I, Article 8. spending approval, by the Department, as necessary to maintain standing We affirm because the plaintiff fails to challenge any specific spending a ction or defendant s ’ motion to dismiss for want of standing, and the plaintiff appeals. CONST. pt. I, art. 8. The Superior Court (Schulman, J.) granted the spent, or has approved spending, public funds” in violation of the law. N.H. with standing to seek a declaration that the State or a local government “has C onstitution, which provides New Hampshire taxpayers who are eligible to vote p. 3 3

with regard to an actual, not hypothetical, dispute, which is capable of judicial must allege a concrete, personal injury, implicating legal or equitable rights, which the law was designed to protect. See Teeboom, 172 N.H. at p. 3 307. A party requires that we focus on whether the party has alleged a legal injury against In a typical case, determining whethe r a party has standing to sue

(2019); Duncan, 166 N.H. at 642 - 4 p. 3 3. interests are at stake. See Teeboom v. City of Nashua, 172 N.H. 301, 307 judicial resolution through an adversarial process in which their actual (1969). Rather, we have held that those other parties must present claims for may not. See Duncan, 166 N.H. at 640; Piper v. Meredith, 109 N.H. 328, 330 may request our advisory opinion on import ant questions of law, other parties respective branches of the legislature, the governor, and the executive council N.H. CONST. pt. II, art. 74; see Duncan, 166 N.H. at 642 - 43. Thus, while the supreme court upon important questions of law and upon solemn occasion s.” council shall have authority to require the opinions of the justices of the which provides: “Each branch of the legislature as well as the governor and t raditional sense is grounded in Part II, Article 74 of the State C onstitution, v. Driehaus, 573 U.S. 149, 157 (2014). In New Hampshire, standing in the State, 166 N.H. 630, 643 (2014) (quotation omitted); see Susan B. Anthony List thought to be capable of resolution through the judicial process.” Duncan v. system of separated power s, to addressing those matter s that are traditionally The doctrine of standing “limits the judicial role, consistent with a

See i d. at 607. and eligible voter — we review the trial court’s standing determination de novo. facts are not in dispute — here, that the plaintiff is a New Hampshire taxpayer Avery v. N. H. D ep’ t of E duc., 162 N.H. 604, 606 - 07 (2011). When the relevant alleged, wh ether the plaintiff has demonstrated a right to claim relief. See court must look beyond the allegations and determine, based upon the facts plaintiff’s claim, but instead challenges the plaintiff’s standing to sue, the trial When a motion to dismiss does not contest the sufficiency of the

complaint. This appeal followed. programs that it runs.” Accordingly, the trial court dismissed the plaintiff’s judicial determination of whether the government has sufficiently funded the the text of Article 8 suggests that it grants every taxpayer the right to seek a The trial court agreed with the defendants, concluding that “[n]othing in

lacked standing under Part I, Article 8. money in the manner she believes is required, the defendant s argued that she Because the plaintiff merely challenged the defendants’ failure to spend public p. 4 4

statute permitted court s “to render to private individuals advisory opinions, actions without having to claim a concrete, person al injury, the amended observed.” Id. at 6 p. 4 43. By allowing parties to bring declaratory judgment satisfied by the abstract interest in ensuring that the State Constitution is 643 - 45. We explained that “[t]he standing required by our constitution is not In Duncan, we analyzed the constitutionality of RSA 491: 22 as amended. Id. at prejudiced.” Duncan, 166 N.H. at 637 - 38 (quotation and emphasis omitted). shall not have to demonstrate that his or her personal rights were impaired or conduct that is unlawful or unauthorized, and in such a case the taxpayer alleged that the taxing district . . . has engaged, or proposes to engage, in taxpayer sta nding to petition ers seeking declaratory judgment “when it is The legislature responded to Baer by amend ing RSA 491:22 to provide

otherwise were, therefore, overruled. Id. at 731. to confer standing. See Baer, 160 N.H. at 730 - 31. Our prior cases concluding was personal to the party; a party’s mere status as a taxpayer was insufficient to allege the impairment or prejudice of a present legal or equitable right which Id.; see RSA p. 4 491:22 (Supp. 2020). Under this standard, a party was required consistent with the language of RSA 491:2 2,” our declaratory judgment statute. we concluded that “our more recent analysis of taxpayer standing [was] more prejudiced in order to maintain a declaratory judgment action.” Id. In Baer, cases, “requir ed taxpayers to demonstrate that their rights are impaired or I n tension with the first line of cases, the second, more recent line of

purse is immediately touched.” Id. (quotation omitted). preservation of an orderly and lawful government regardless of whether his we “reasoned that every taxpayer has a vital interest in and a ri ght to the of their public officials.” Id. In those cases, taxpayers had standing because rights or question the validity of a law — to seek “redress for the unlawful acts bring a declaratory judgment action — which allow s parties to establish their in Duncan, 166 N.H. at 638. Under the earlier line of cases, taxpayers could N.H. Dep’t of Educ., 160 N.H. 727, 730 (2010), superseded by statute as stated their status as taxpayer s, a doctrin e known as taxpayer standing. See Baer v. not allege a personal injury in the traditional sense, had standing based up on t w o conflicting line s of cases determining whether certain plaintiffs, who did decision in Baer v. New Hampshire Department of Educ ation, we had decided unique type of standing, the history of which we briefly recount. Prior to our This is not, however, a typical case for standing purposes; it involves a

6 p. 4 4 7 - 4 8 (quotation omitted). appreciation of the c onsequences of judicial action.” Duncan, 166 N.H. at 643, of a debating society, but in a concrete factual context conducive to a realistic questions presented to the court will be resolved, not in the rarified atmosphere “capable of being redressed by the court tends to assure that the legal 43. Requiring that a party claim a personal injury to a legal or equitable right redress by a favorable decision. See id. at 307, 309; Duncan, 166 N.H. at 642 - p. 5 5

http://www.gencourt.state.nh.us/bill_status/HearingReport.aspx?id=1 p. 5 5052&sy=2018. Available at 2

Part I, Article 8. We review the t rial court’s interpretation of the constitution de Determining whether the plaintiff has standing requires us to interpret

N.H. CONST. pt. I, art. 8.

statute or otherwise by the parties to that proceeding. administrative decision from which there is a right of appe al by challenged governmental action is the subject of a judicial or taxpayer. However, this right shall not apply when the rights were impaired or prejudiced beyond his or her status as a taxpayer shall not have to demonstrate that his or her personal law, ordinance, or constitutional provision. In such a case, the spent, or has approved spending, public funds in violation of a State or political subdivision in which the taxpayer resides has standing to petition the Superior Court to declare wh ether the individual taxpayer eligible to vote in the State shall have orderly, lawful, and accountable government. Therefore, any unreasonably restricted. The public also has a right to an governmental proceedings and records shall not be and responsive. To that end, the public’ s right of access to Government, therefore, should be open, accessible, accountable substitutes and agents, and at all times accountable to them. people, all the magistrates and officers of government are their All power residing originally in, and being derived from, the

Part I, Article 8 provides: on CACR 1 p. 5 5, at 1 - 2 (Mar. 29, 2018) (Remarks of Rep. Berch). As amended, 2 in Baer and Dun can. See Senate Rules and Enrolled Bills Committee Hearing return taxpayer standing in New Hampshire to its status prior to our decisions le d to the amendment being put to the voters, the amendment was intended to from Representative Berch, who co - sponso red the House B ill which ultimately According to testimony before the Senate Rules and Enrolled Bills Committee (establishing the methods by which the constitution may be amended). § 36.06, at 11 (4th ed. 2020 Supp.); see also N.H. CONST. pt. 2, art. 100 Hampshire Practice: Wiebusch on New H ampshire Civil Practice and Procedure 8 of the New Hampshire C onstitution. See 5 Gordon J. MacDonald, New In 2018, New Hampshire voters adopted an amendment to Part I, Article

was unconstitutional because it “violates Part II, Article 74.” Id. (quotation omitted). “In doing so,” we concluded, RSA 491: 22, I, as amended outside the context of concrete, fully - developed factual situations.” Id. at p. 6 6 44 6

of “governm ental action.” has approved spending” must be understood as referencing a s pecific category added). When Part I, Article 8 is read as a whole, the phrase “has spent, or from which there is a right of appeal.” N.H. CONST. p t. I, art. 8 (emphasis governmental action is the subject of a judicial or administrative decision created by Part I, Article 8 “shall not apply when the challenged by t he final sentence of the provision, which provides that the right to standing interpretation of the phrase “has spent, or has approved spending” is confirmed whether a specific act or approval of spending conform s with the law. This with standing under Part I, Article 8 can c all on the courts to determine or approva l of spending. Id.; s ee Duncan, 1 p. 6 66 N.H. at 640. That is, a plaintiff approved spending” is that it refers to a specific governmental spending action The simplest, most obvious reading of the phrase “has spent, or has

spent, or has approved spending, public funds in violation of” the law. Id. permits courts to adjudicate: whether the plaintiff allege d that the State “has of the plaintiff’s standing turns on the scope of the issue s that Part I, Article 8 decision from which there is a right of appeal.” Id. In this case, the question challenged governmental action is the subject of a judicial or administrative violation of a law, ordina nce, or constitutional provision,” unless “the taxpayer resides has spent, or has approved spending, public funds in court to adjudicate “whether the State or political subdivision in which the CONST. p t. I, art. 8. The article also provides that a party may request a impaired or prejudiced beyond his or her status as a taxpayer.” N.H. State,” who need not “demonstrate that his or her personal rights were his or her complaint to a court: “any individual taxpayer eligible to vote in the Part I, Article 8 identifies the type of party who may invoke it to pre sent

consideration of every part.”). (“The whole is to be considered, and the true meaning to be drawn from the Trustees, 1 p. 6 61 N.H. at 53 - 54; see Thompson v. Kidder, p. 7 74 N.H. 89, 91 (1906) considered as a whole, as if each provision w ere enacted at one time. Bd. of N.H. at 640. Furthermore, the constitution as it now stands is to be sensible, is most likely that meant by the people in its adoption. Duncan, 166 N.H. at 53. The simplest and most obvious interpreta tion of the constitution, if to the electorate when the vote to adopt them was cast. Bd. of Trustees, 161 we give the word s in question the meaning they must be presumed to have had Below, 151 N.H. 135, 139 (2004) (quotation and ellipsis omitted). Ac cordingly, used at the time when the constitution and the laws were adopted.” Petition of people, is to be always understood and explained in that sense in which it was people in the great paramount l aw which controls the legislature as well as the purpose and intent. Duncan, 166 N.H. at 640. “The language used by the (2010). When interpreting a provision of the constitution, we look to its novo. Bd. of Trustees, N.H. Judicial Ret. Plan v. Sec’y of State, 161 N.H. 49, 53 7

prejudiced, to challenge various governmen tal actions. That line of cases the absence of an allegation that their personal rights were impaired or our pre - Baer decisions in which we determined that taxpayers had standing, in who challenge s a particular governmental spending action is consistent with Our conclusion that Part I, Article 8 confer s standing upon a plaintiff

approved spending” in violation of the law under Part I, Article 8. may bring when she alleges that a governmental body “has spent, or has Id. at 382, 389 - 90. There, w e did not decide the sco pe of a challenge a plaintiff money than appropriated by the legislature to accomplish legislative objectives. under Part II, Article 56 of the New Hampshire Constitution, to spend less specific governmental action and addressed the executive branch’s discretion, amounts.” New Hampshire Health Care, however, involved a challenge to a spend, broadly, to include government spending at lesser, rather than greater, v. Governor, 161 N.H. 3 p. 7 78 (2011), we “d efined the constitutional power to The plaintiff also argues that in New Hampshire Health Care Association

Chamber/Commerce v. Pataki, p. 7 798 N.E.2d 1047, 1053 (N.Y. 2003). wisely is patently insufficient to” confer standing. Saratoga County Law § 123 - b (McKinney 2021), “a claim that state funds are not being spent other illegal or unconstitutional disbursement of state funds,” N.Y. State Fin. challenge “a wrongful expenditure, misappropriation, misapplication, or any interpreted New Yo rk’s taxpayer standing statute, which allows taxpayer s to CONST. pt. I, art. 8. As the New York Court of Appeal s observed when it resources are prudent or sufficient to comply with legal requirements. N.H. body to determine whether its policy decisions regarding the allocation of “governmental action,” and does not empower courts to audit a government al action “about spending.” The provision’s language applies to a specific does not state that a plaintiff has standing to bring a declaratory judgment enough [] ’ . . . r emains a lawsuit abou t spending.” Part I, Article 8, however, The plaintiff argues that “a lawsuit alleg[ing] that the State ‘has not spent

by the legislature at levels that facilitate legal functioning.” the ag encies with responsibility for abiding by the legal requirements enacted sufficient resources to address” alleged shortcomings or has properly “funded requests, decide whether the State or a local government has “invested therefore, does not provide the judiciary with the authority to, as the plaintiff discrete act s or decisions approving certain spending. Part I, Article p. 8 8, functions, including its allocation of appropriations, as opposed to one or more to mean a government al body’s overall management of its operations and would not have understood t he phrase “has spent, or has approved spending” well as decisions not to spend or approve spending. Accordingly, the people welfare, which encompasses many decisions to spend or approve spending, as governmental body’s comprehensive response to a complex issue, such as child I, Article 8, would have understood “governmental action” to mean a We cannot conclude that the people, in adopting the amendment to Part 8

illegal appointment and payment of justices of the peace and the unlawful have standing to challenge discrete government al actions, such as an alleged P.3d p. 8 81, 86 (Colo. 2019) (collecting cases). And, in North Carolina, taxpayers nontherapeutic abortions. See Reeves - Toney v. School Dist No. 1 Denver, 442 money between particular government funds and the public financing of they challenge d specific government al expenditures, such as a transfer of legislative act). In Colorado, taxpayers have been held to have standing when (Missouri taxpayers had standing to challenge the constitutionality of a specific Commissioners of Franklin County, 422 S.W.3d 284, 286 - 87, 290 (Mo. 2014) Louis Cty., 781 S.W.2d 43, 47 (Mo. 1989) (emp hasis added); see LeB eau v. demonstrate a direct expenditure of funds.” E. Mo. Laborers D. Coun. v. St. taxpayer standing the plaintiff, among other things, “must be able to doctrine. The Missouri Supreme Court, for example, has held that to have the decisions of other state courts examining their state’s taxpayer standing standing must challenge a specifi c government al act ion is also consonant with our conclusion that a plaintiff relying upon Part I, Article 8 to establish In addition to being consistent with the pre - Baer cases discussed above,

illegal or unconstitutional conduct. allocation of appropriations were i mprudent or insufficient, thereby resulting in does here, allege that a gove rnment al body ’s policy decisions regarding its holding liquor permits). In none of these cases did the parties, as the plaintiff the issuance of liquor li censes to corporations owned by other individuals permits had standing to challenge the Liquor Commission’s policy regarding Commission, 100 N.H. 5, 6 - 7 (1955) (association of taxpayers holding liquor Austin v. New Hampshire, 420 U.S. 656 (1975); N. H. &c. Beverage Ass’n v. New Hampshire’s Commuters Income Tax), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. earned in New Hampshire ha d standing to challenge the constitutionality of Comm’ n, 114 N.H. 137, 13 p. 8 8 - 39 (1974) (Maine residents paying taxes on income alleged that specific government al action s were illegal. See Austin v. State Tax to bring claims based, in part, upon their status as taxpayer s, the plaintiffs In each of these cases, and others in which we similarly allowed plaintiffs

revenue surplus account without city council approval. purchasing a truck and police cruiser, and had illegally drawn from the city’ s officials had illegally expended money for various specific expenses, such as in Green v. Shaw, 114 N.H. 2 p. 8 8 p. 9 9, 290 - 91 (1974), taxpayers alleged that city to, or perform services for, private individuals on their private properties. And brought an action to determine whether a town could lawfully rent equipment Jaffrey, 97 N.H. 456, 458 - 6 1 (1952), addressed claims by taxpayers who decision to build a baseba ll park on a common area with city funds. Clapp v. Portsmouth, 72 N.H. 539, 540, 543 - 44 (1904), taxpayers challenge d a city’s streetlight operating contract for a term of ten years. Similarly, in Sherb urne v. brought suit in equity to challenge a city council’s decision to enter into a example, i n Blood v. Electric Company, 68 N.H. 340, 340 - 41 (1895), taxpayers involved challenge s to the legality of specific government al action s. For 9

appropriations). standing doctrine allows taxpayers to challenge the constitution ality of specific government Hosp. Dist. v. Fornes, 476 So. 2d 154, 155 - 56 (Fla. 1 p. 9 985) (recognizing that Florida’s taxpayer gambling laws and the expenditure of state funds in furtherance of those laws); North Broward Pataki, 798 N.E.2d at 1050, 1053 - 54 (New York taxpayers had standing to challenge particul ar taxpayers had standing to challenge the constitutionality of a specific civil forfeiture scheme); not exhaustive. See, e.g., Horner v. Curry, 125 N.E.3d 584, 587, 596 (Ind. 2019) (Indiana This survey of cases requiring taxpayer plaintiffs to challenge a specific governmental action is 3

also Parents Against Realignment v. GHSA, 516 S.E.2d 528, 52 p. 9 9 (Ga. 1999) nothing to do wit h the propriety, expediency, or policy of any law. . ..”); see (Stanley, J.) (“[W]e recognize the doctrine, so often expressed, that we have meet an agency’s objectives. See State v. Express Co., 60 N.H. 219, 234 (1880) sufficiently funded or whether appropriated funds are being wisely spent to equipped to wade into policy debate s as to whether g overnmental bodies are enterprises.” Pataki, 798 N.E.2d at 1053 (quotation omitted). C ourts are ill plaintiffs and the courts into the management and operation of public action and quite another to have stand ing in order to interpose litigating “[I]t is one thing to have standing to correct clear illegality of official

approval of spending is illegal. Cf. id. at 642 - 43. them issue an authoritative adjudication of whether any specific act or the Department is allocating its legislative appropriations, rath er than having courts beyond the judicial power by having them assess the manner by which abuse and neglect crisis is illegal and unconstitutional” — would take the undertake — determin ing whether the Department’s “response to the child 64 0, 64 3 (quotation omitted). The task that the plaintiff asks the courts to be capable of resoluti on through the judicial process.” Duncan, 166 N.H. at separated powers, to addressing those matters that are traditionally thought to 74, “in practical effect, limits the judicial role, consistent with a system of Part II, Article 72 - a vests the courts with “judicial power.” Part II, Article

provisions: Part I, Article 37, Part II, Article 72 - a, and Part II, Article 74. branches of government would conflict with at least t hree other constitutional has standing to challenge the overall spending policies of one of our co equal in Primary Elections II), 158 N.H. 661, 671 (200 p. 9 9). Concluding that a plaint iff conflict with one another. See id.; see also Opinion of the Justices (Voting Age principle is that we must construe constitutional provisions so as to avoid enacted at one time. See Thompson, 74 N.H. at 91. A corollary of this that we interpret the constitution as a whole, as it now stands, a nd as if Furthermore, our reading of Part I, Article 8 is informed by the principle

polemic s on government al bodie s ’ general spending policies. standing to challenge specific government al action s, not to launch broad relates to standing, running through the se cases is that taxpayers h ave S.E.2d 876, 87 p. 9 9 - 81 (N.C. 2006) (collecting cases). The unifying theme, as it 3 expenditure of public funds to build a museum. Se e Goldston v. State, 637 p. 10 10

enactment and executive order were consti tutional). decisions. Cf. id. at 385 - 400 (determining whether a specific legislative our coequal branches of government regarding the prudence of their spending particular act or approval of spending is lawful, we cannot provide advice to branch’s authority to expend funds). Although we may determine whether any the legislative branch’s authority to appropriate funds and the executive branches. See New Hampshire Health Care, 161 N.H. at 386 - 87 (discussing appropriated and spent rests, respectively, with the legisla tive and executive In short, t he authority to determine how public funds are generally

of coordinate branches of government.”). courts from reviewing political, social and economic actions within the province N.E.2d 40, 44 (Ind. 1988) (“The separation of powers doctrine forecloses the where they of right belong.”); see also Peavler v. Monroe Cty. Bd. of Com’rs, 528 paramount law, leaving all other considerations with the legislature and people, ascertain and declare whether it conflicts with the constitution as the 234 (“[O]ur sole duty, when the validity of any statute is challenged, is to infringes on executive or legislative p r erogatives. See Express Co., 60 N.H. at decisions, if any, are caus ing injury exceeds the bounds of our role and spending activity, on the other hand, to determine what aspec t s of its spending for the judiciary. S crutinizing the entire realm of a government al body’s the remedy, if the action is illegal, is quotidian, though often difficult, business Analyzing the legality of a discrete government al action and determining

above. the State’s overall approach to child welfare implicates each concern discussed judiciary to adjudicate, as the plaintiff requests, a challenge to the prudence of v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962); see Burt, 173 N.H. at 525. C alling upon the expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government.” Baker impossibility of a court’s undertaking independent resolution without policy determination of a kind clearly for non judicial discretion; or the standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial other possibilities, it presents “a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable 525 (2020) (quotation omitted). A controversy is nonjusticiable when, among government.” Burt v. Speaker, N.H. House of Representatives, 173 N.H. 522, certain matters that lie within the province of the other two branches of judicial vi olation of the separation of powers by limiting judicial review of President, 152 N.H. 124, 128 (2005). “The justiciability doctrine prevents constitutional principle of separation of powers. See Baines v. N.H. Senate standing would present with Part I, Article 37, which espouses the We are also aware of the conflict that ruling in favor of the plaintiff ’s

confer standing on a plaintiff who challenges governmental spending policies. is specifically conferred by our constitution, we do not read Part I, Article 8 to policy determinations” (quotation omitt ed)). Thus, although taxpayer standing (explaining that courts are improper forums in which to resolve “discretionary p. 11 11

HICKS, BASSETT, and HANTZ MARCONI, JJ., concurred.

defendant s ’ motion to dismiss. For the reasons stated above, we affirm the trial court’s grant of the

not have standing under Part I, Article 8. legality of any discrete act or approval of spending by the defendants, she does are failing to meet lega l obligations. Because she does not challenge the as a “product” or “result” of the Department’s spending policies, the defendants identified in her complaint was illegal; rather she requests a declaration that, spending. She does not seek a declaration that any of the specific expenditures complaint as challenging the legality of any specific acts of Departmental instances of spending related to the Department. However, we do not read her We acknowledge that the plaintiff’s complaint references several specific