2021-0032 and 2021-0036, In the Matter of Matthew Routhier and Kelly Routhier

to rule on her proposed findings of fact and rulings of law. The husband cross request for alimony without providing adequate just ification; and (4) declining support guidelines without provi ding adequate justification; (3) denying her property that he owned jointly with his parents; (2) deviating from the child (1) concluding that it lacked jurisdiction to divide the husband’s i nterest in real Matthew Routhier (husband). The wife argues that the circuit court erred by: decree of the Circuit Court (Sadler, J.) in her divorce from the petitioner, DONOVAN, J. The respondent, Kelly Routhier (wife), appeals a final

Health Systems, filed no brief. Cullen Collimore PLLC, of Nashua (Kevin G. Collimore), for intervenor Elliot

for the respondent. Marshall Law Office PLLC, of East Kingston (Keri J. Marshall on the brief),

Matthew Routhier, self - represented party, by brief.

2021 - 0036 No s. 202 1 - 0032 6th Circuit Court - Hooksett Family Division

page is: https://www.courts.nh.gov/our - courts/supreme - court a.m. on the morning of their release. The direct address of the court’s home reporter@courts.state.nh.us. Opinions are availabl e on the Internet by 9:00 to press. Errors may be reported by email at the following address: editorial errors in order that corrections may be made before the opinion goes Hampshire, One Charles Doe Drive, Concord, New Hampshire 03301, of any Readers are requested to notify the Reporter, Supreme Court of New well as formal revision before publication in the New Hampshire Reports. NOTICE: This opinion is subject to motions for rehearing under Rule p. 2 22 as 2

him and by attempting to interfere with his parenting time. H e requested, temporary order by attempting to enroll the child in school without consulting schooling. The husband alleged, among other things, that the wife violated the parenting schedule, the parties’ parenting responsibilities, and the child’s three emergency motions requesting expedited hearings to address the which consisted of five days of testimony. During that time, the husband filed Between June p. 2 2019 and Sept ember 2020, the court held a final hearing,

pay $4 p. 2 21 biweekly in child support. denying the wife’s request for temporary alimony, and ordering the husband to order establishing the same parenting schedule with “a slight modification,” the child. In January 2019, following a hearing, the court issued a temporary husband was entitled to spend one weeknight and every other weekend with child to reside primarily with the wife. The court further determined that the hearing, the court awarded joint decision - making authority and ordered the and increased parenting time with the child, among other things. Following a husband filed an ex parte motion requesting joint decision - making authority In July 2018, the parties filed for divorce. In September 2018, the

party ha d relocated. moved into his parents’ house in Manchester. As of the final hearing, ne ither the child moved in to the wife’s parents’ house in Hampstead, and the husband about May p. 2 2018, the parties separated. Following the separation, t he wife and In 2013, the parties married. In 2015, their only child was born. In or

parents — but not the wife — as joint tenants with rights of survivorship. the purchase. The deed to the property listed the husband and both of his Manchester. Neither the husband nor the wife contributed any money toward purchase by securing a home equity line of credit (HELOC) on their house in an in - law apartment for his parents. The husband’s pare nts fina nced the intended to build a house on the property for himself and the wife, as well as acquired a piece of property in Dunbarton (Dunbarton property). The husband p. 2 2011, they engaged to marry. Shortly ther eafter, t he husband and his parents address specific issues raised by the parties. The parties met in 2003. In undisputed. Additional facts are drawn from the record as necessary to The following facts are supported by the record or are otherwise

and remand. litem from attending part of the final hearing. We affirm in part, vacate in part, testi fying at the final hearing; and (4) barring the court - appointed guardian ad distributing the parties’ firearms; ( p. 3 3) preventing one of hi s witnesses from attend public school in the district serving the wife’s residence; ( p. 2 2) improperly plan. He argues that the circuit court erred by: (1) ordering the parties’ child to appeals the final divorce decree as well as the cir cuit court’s final parenting 3

the court denied the motions. These appeals followed. Aside from correcting minor errors in the final decree and parenting schedule, value between the two firearms. Both parties filed motions for reconsideration. the husband, and ordering the husband to pay the wife for the difference in awarding the lower - priced firearm to the wife and the more expensive firearm to claim.” As relevant here, the court also divided two of the parties’ firearms, jurisdiction to determine ownership interest in prope rty if there is a third party interest, the court concluded th at “the Family Division does not have property from the marital estate. C iting the husband’s parents’ ownership In dividin g the parties’ property, the court excluded the Dunbarton

addition, t he court denied the wife’s alimony request. deviation from the $412 figure set forth by the child support guidelines. In also ordered the husband to pay $200 biweekly in child support — a downward attend the public school serving the wife’s residence in Hampstead. The court authority and approximately equal parenting time, and ordered the child to parenting schedule. The court awarded the parties joint decision - making In November 2020, the court issued the final divorce decree and

the wife requested both child support and alimony. if she found employment elsewhere. Based upon the parties’ income disparity, had no full - time po sitions available, and that she would likely earn less money due to financial constraints caused by the COVID - 19 pan demic, her employer technician, earning about $2,700 to $2,900 per month. The wife testified that, was working approximately twenty - five to thirty hours per week as a pharmacy as a landscape architect, earning approximately $5,440 per month. The wife circumstances. At the time of the hearing, the husband was employed full time The court also heard testimony about the parties’ financial

time equally between the parties. the husband’s role as a parent. The GAL also recommended splitting parenting wife’s family’s connections to the Hampstead school system would undermine relationship with the child, and, for that reason, she was concerned that the believed the wife and her family were unsupportive of the husband’s connections to the Hampstead school system. The GAL explained that she child attending school there, in part because the wife’s family had multiple concerns about the Hampstead school system, she recommended against the Montessori school in Manchester. The GAL testified that, although she had n o serving her residence in Hampstead, while the husband preferred a private where the child should attend school. The wife preferred the public school about the parties’ struggles with co - parenting and their inability to agree upon At the final hearing, a court - appointed guardian ad litem (GAL) testified

reserving the issues raised in the motions for the final hearing. enroll the child in school in Manchester. The court deni ed all three motions, among other things, increased residential parenting time and permission to p. 4 4

and his parents held title to the Dunbarton property as joint tenants with Here, there is no dispute that, at the time of t he divorce, the husband

division. Sarvela, 15 p. 4 4 N.H. at 431; see RSA 458:16 - a, I - II. whom it was acquired, but rather assumes that all property is susceptible to relevan t statutory scheme does not classify property based upon when or by when and by whom pro perty was acquired in distributing that property, the property. Id.; see RSA 458:16 - a, I. While the court has discretion to consider source, all property owned by each spouse at the time of divorce is marital In the Matter of Sarvela & Sarvela, 154 N.H. 426, 431 (2006). Regardless of the does it exclude property given to one spouse during the course of the marriage. brought to the marriage by the parties and tha t acquired during marriage, nor parties.” RSA 458:16 - a, I. The statute makes no distinct ion between property parties, whether title to the property is held in the name of either or both intangible property and assets, real or personal, belonging to either or both Pursuant to RSA 458:16 - a, I, m arital property includes “all tangible and

a q uestion of law, which we review de novo. Id. determination as to whether certain assets constitute marital property presents distribute those assets pursuant to RSA p. 4 458:16 - a, II. Id. The circuit court’s under RSA 458:16 - a, I. Id. Then, the court exercises its discretio n to equitably court determines, as a matter of law, which assets constitute marital property In the Matter of Chamberlin & Chamberlin, 155 N.H. 13, 16 (2007). F irst, the 458:16 - a (Supp. 2021). When doing so, the court employs a two - step analysis. responsible for equitably dividing the parties’ marital property. See RSA upon the family division). In divorce proceedings, the circuit court is 2021) (granting the circuit court jur isdiction that was previously conferred jurisdiction over matters involving “[p]etitions for divorce”); RSA 490 - F:3 (Supp. RSA 490 - D:2, I (2014) (providing the former family division exclusive T he circui t court has exclusive jurisdiction over divorce proceedings. See

not look beyond it for further indications of legislative intent. Id. not see fit to include. Id. When the statute’s language is unambiguous, we do what the legislature might have said or add language that the legislature did interpret legislative intent from the statute as written, and we will no t consider construe that language according to its plain and ordinary meaning. Id. We whole. Id. We first look to the statutory language, and whenever possible legislature’s intent as expressed by the words of the statute considered as a Id. at 7 p. 4 43. When interpreting a statute, we are the final arbiter of the Statutory interpretation presents a question of law, which we review de novo. of statutory interpret ation. Rogers v. Rogers, 171 N.H. 738, 74 2 - 4 3 (2019). property. Whether the circuit court has subject matter jurisdiction is a mat ter that it lacked jurisdiction to divide the husband’s interest in the Dunbarton The wife argues that the court erred as a matter of law by concluding

the husband p romised to repay his parents for financing the purchase and funds to finance improvements to the Dunbarton property. To the extent that secured additional HELOCs on their Manchester home and used part of the used to purchase the Dunbarton property. The husband’s parents later property by securing a HELOC on their own home in Mancheste r, which they p. 5 514 - 15. The husband’s p arents financ ed the purchase of the Dunbarton mortgage to his parents, the Dunbarton property is unencumbered. Cf. id. at Muller, which was encumbered by the husband’s promissory note and second Muller is distinguishable from this case. Unlike the property at issue in

the husband’s parents’ interest in the property. Id. at p. 5 518 - 20. Id. at 518. Thus, we concluded that the court lack ed jurisdiction to invalidate division to distribute marital property only to t he divorcing parties themselves.” belongs to the divorcing parties,” while RSA 458:16 - a, II “allows the family that RSA 458:16 - a, I, “allows the family division to distribute only property that third party’s claim of interest in m arital property.” Id. at 519 - 20. We reasoned a, the family division does not have the jurisdiction to disregard or invalidate a decree, holding that “when dividing [marital] property pursuant to RSA 458:16 mortgage. Id. at 515. W e vacated the property division portion of the divorce property and divide the proceeds equally without satisfying the second second mortgage were invalid, the trial court ordered the parties to sell the purchase of their house. Id. at 514 - 15. Finding that the promissory note and repayment of money that the parents gave to the husband and his wife f or the promissory note and second mortgage to his parents guaranteeing the Muller & Muller, 164 N.H. 512 (2013). In Muller, the husband executed a In reaching its decision, the court relied, in part, upon In the Matter of

portion of the property is not authorized in this type of case.” property “is beyond the jurisdiction of this court” and that “granting [the wife] a proper ty “with third party ownership.” Thus, the court concluded that the property in the [marital] estate that is owned by one or both parties,” not the court determined that RSA 4 p. 5 58:16 - a “only allows the court to include property. Citing the husband’s parents’ concurrent ownersh ip of the property, concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to distribute his interest in the D unbarton The husband nonetheless argues that the circuit court properly

Sarvela, 1 p. 5 54 N.H. at 431. the husband lacked “unilateral control” over improvi ng the property. See intended to reimburse his parents for their investment in the property; or that property or contribute d any money toward the purchase; that the husband before the marriage; that neither the husband nor the wife lived on the husband’s argument, it makes no difference that the property wa s purchased the divorce, it was marital property. See RSA 458:1 p. 6 6 - a, I. Contrary to the occu py and use all of it.” Because the husband held this interest at the time of tenancy, he owned “an undivided interest in the property and the full right to rights of survivorship. The husband concedes that, pursuant to the joint 6

circumstance pursuant to RSA 458 - C:5 justifies an adjustm ent from the child from the guidelines, it must “make a written finding as to why a special C:5, I. See RSA 458 - C:4, II; RSA 458 - C:5, I - II. If the circuit court deviates RSA 458 - C:4, II, based upon “[s]pecial circumstances” set forth in RSA 458 evidence that application of the guidelines would be “unjust or inappropriate,” court may deviate from the guidelines, when it finds by a preponderance of the support. RSA 458 - C:4, II. T his presumption may be overcome, and the circuit calculated under the child support guidelines is the correct amount of child support awards. Id. There is a rebuttable presumption that an award 458 - C (2018 & Supp. 2021), establish a uniform system for determining child New Hampshire’s child support guidelines, codi fied in RSA chapter

sustain the court’s discretionary judgment. Id. determine whether the record establishes an objective basis sufficient to the Matter of Silva & Silva, 171 N.H. 1, 4 (2018). Accordingly, we must support absent an unsustainable exercise of discretion or an error o f law. In We agree. We will not disturb the circuit court’s rulings regarding child child support guidelines without providing adequate justification for doing so. The wife next argues that the circuit co urt erred by deviating from the

consistent with this opinion. portion of the circuit court’s order and remand for a new property division the court erred as a matter of law. Accordingly, we vacate the property division RSA 458:1 p. 6 6 - a, II. See RSA 490 - D:2, I; RSA 490 - F:3. By concluding otherwise, circuit court had jurisdiction to distribute the husband’s inte rest pursuant to property was marital pr operty under RSA 458:16 - a, I, we conclude that the Therefore, because the husband’s ownership interest in the Dunbarton

19. but, rather, by the parents’ Manchester residence. Cf. Muller, 1 p. 6 64 N.H. at 518 outstanding HELOC debt, which is not secured by the Dunbarton property, would allocating the value of the husband’s interest affect the paren ts’ other joint tenants continue to hold their interests in joint tenancy.”). Nor conveyed, which is then held by the grantee as a tenancy in common, while the conveyance by one to a stranger severs the joint tenancy only as to the share Ownership § 23, at 152 (2005) (“[I]f there are three or more joint tenants, a ownership interest. Cf. id. at 519; 20 Am. Jur. 2d Cotenancy and Joint not sever his joint interest from the whole and would not invalidate his parents’ undivided interest in the Dunbarton property as part of the marital estate does Moreover, c ontrary to the husband’s argument, including the value of his

tenants with rights of survivorship. Cf. id. interest in the Dunbarton property is limited to their undivided interest as joint exists. Thus, unlike the parents in Muller, the husband’s parents’ ownership Dunbarton property. Nor does the husband claim that such a security interest improvements, there is no evidence that such promise wa s secured by the p. 7 7

unsustainable exercise of discretion, and we will uphold its factual findings 1 p. 7 72 N.H. 78, 92 (2019). W e review the court’s alimony determination for an broad discretion to award alimony. See In the Matter of Cohen & Richards, for alimony without adequately explaining its decision. T he circuit court has The wife als o argues that the circuit court erred by denying her request

of Gordon and Gordon, 14 p. 7 7 N.H. 693, 700 (2002). explaining any adjustment that it makes from the guidelines. See In the Matter application of the guidelines would be unjust or inappropriate, and, if so, and remand for the court to make specific findings explaining whether guideline amount”). Accordingly, we vacate the court’s child support award appropriate and just to decrease the . . . child support payment . . . below the co nsequences’ result from this payment and why it [was] consequently fund for the children’ was not legally sufficient to explain what ‘economic ‘remainder of child support obligation will continue to go to the college trust N.H. 463, 465 (2005) (holding that the court’s “simple statement that the from the child support guidelines.” In the Matter of Forcier & Mueller, 152 relative to why [that] particular special circumstance justified an adjustment that both parties live with their parents, it failed “to provide written findings To the extent that the circuit court based its decision upon its finding

style” to that she enjoys with the husband. (Quoting RSA 458 - C:5, I(h)(2)(C)). was necessary to allow the child to enjoy “a similar or approximately equal contrary, the cou rt determined that awarding “some” child support to the wife special circumstances under RSA 458 - C:5, I, justifying the deviation. To the constitute ground for an adjustment.”). The court did not identify any other itself shall not eliminate the need for child support and shall not by itself (“Equal or approximately equal parenting residential responsibilities in an d of alone does not justify a deviation” from the guidelines. See RSA 458 - C:5, I(h)(1) 458 - C:5, I(h), the circuit court correctly observed that “[t]he parenting schedule RSA 458 - C:5 identifies the parenting schedule as a special cir cumstance, RSA justify its downward deviation from the child support guidelines. Although We conclude that the circuit court’s written findings were insufficient to

be in the near future.” parents” and “are not currently supporting their own households but they will 19 pandemic. In addition, the court observed that both parties “live with their not voluntarily underemployed “at this time due to the impact” of the COVID - “the disparity in income” between the parti es and determined that the wife was its decision, the court considered the parenting schedule. T he court also noted Nonetheless, the court ordered the husband to pay $200 biweekly. In reaching decree list s the husband’s child support obligation as $412 biweekly. Here, the child support guidelines worksheet attached to the divorce

at 4 (quotation omitted); see RSA 45 p. 8 8 - C:4, II; RSA 458 - C:5, I. support guidelines to avoid an unjust or inappropriate result.” Silva, 1 p. 7 71 N.H. 8

the public school serving the wife’s residence in Hampstead, instead of his The husband argues that the court erred by ordering the child to attend

likewise explained.” Id. (quotation omitted). may be done in the narrative form, and the essential rulings of law may be Magrauth v. Magrauth, 136 N.H. 757, 76 0 (1993) (quotation omitted). “This or essential facts that are sufficient to support the ultimate decision.” [for findings and rulings] filed by a party,” it must “make findings of the basic that, although the court “need not respond expressly to every specific request alimony portions of the court’s order on other grounds. However, w e reiterate alimony, and, as explained above, we vacate and remand the child support and limits her argument on this issue to the court’s o rders on child support and declining to rule on the wife’s proposed findings and rulings b ecause the wife based its Orders.” We need not decide whether the circuit court erred by Orders without the specific findings and rulings on which the [circuit] court and alimony” and that “[t]he Supreme Court cannot properly review those “committed unsustainable exercises of discretion in its Orders on child support on her proposed findings of fact and rulings of law. She asserts that the court Finally, the wife argue s that the circuit court erred by declining to rule

45 p. 8 8:19 - a, VI(b)(1). remand for the court to reconsider its decision to deny alimony. S ee RSA Accordingly, we vacate the alimony portion of the circuit court’s order and would assist the wife in meeting her reasonable needs. See RSA 458:19 - a, I. wife’s health insurance, nor did it explain how providing health insurance insurance to the wife for three years, it made no findings about the cost of the was not voluntarily underemployed and that the husband must provide health to . . . deny the requested alimony.” Id. While the court noted that the wife not explain how any of the factual findings in its order “support[] [its] decision insufficient to supp ort its decision. S ee RSA 458:19 - a, VI(b)(1). The court did We again conclude that the circuit court’s written findin gs are

court denied the alimony request. income of almost $2000 per month between the parties.” Nonetheless, the increase her hours to full - time (40 hours) there would still be a disparity in The court found that “even at her current hourly rate, if [the wife] were to that the wife “could be more self - sustaining if she were to work a full time job.” Here, the husband objected to the wife’ s request for alimony, arguing

requested alimony.” RSA 45 p. 8 8:1 p. 9 9 - a, VI(b)(1). “shall include . . . [f]indings supporting the court’s decision to . . . deny the 458:19 - a (Supp. 2021). In a contested proceeding, an order denying alimony are based primarily upon the parties’ income and need. Id. at 83; see RSA unless they are unsupported by the evidence. See i d. A limony determinations 9

. . . .

child or to a parent. including whether contact is lik ely to result in harm to the each other, and make joint decisions concerning the children, (i) The ability of the parents to communicate, cooperate with

significantly affect the child. (h) The relationship of the child with any other person who may

in harm to the child or to a parent. the other parent, including whether contact is likely to result (g) The support of each parent for the child’s relationship with

to the child or to a parent. contact, including whether contact is likely to result in harm other parent as shown by allowing and prom oting such (f) The support of each parent for the child’s contact with the

parent. whether contact is likely to result in harm to the child or to a and telephonic contact with the other parent, including relationship and frequent and contin uing physical, written, (e) The ability and disposition of each parent to foster a positive

community and the potential effect of any change. (d) The quality of the child’s adjustment to the child’s school and

parent to meet them, both in the present and in the future. (c) The child’s developmental needs and the ability of each

environment. adequate food, clothing, shelter, medical care, and a safe (b) The ability of each parent to assure that the child receives

affection, and guidance. of each parent to provide the child with nurture, love, (a) The relationship of the child with each parent and the ability

interest standard, listing factors the court must consider, including: Kurowski, 161 N.H. 578, 585 - 88 (2011). RSA 461 - A:6, I, codifies the best interest standard to resolve the dispute. See In the Matter of Kur owski & authority cannot agree about their child’s schooling, the court applies the best (Bolding omitted.) When, as here, two fit parents who share decision - making attempts to minimize [his] time with the child and .. . his role as a co - parent.” preferred school in Manchester, despite evidence of the wife’s “continued p. 10 10

dispute. See id. schooling, the court properly utilized the best interest standard to resolve the See id. Becaus e the parties could not agree about the location of the child’s parents involving parental rights in ac cordance with the child’s best interests. divorce, the circuit court has authority to adjudicate disputes between two fit his or her child.” Id. at 590 (quotation omitted). However, in the context of cannot abrogate a fit p arent’s constitutional right to direct the upbringing of disagree. We have observed that the best interest standard “does not and Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution. We Hampstead violated his constitutional rights under Part I, Article 2 of the State The husband further argues that ordering the child to attend school i n

education tilts in favor of Hampstead.” smaller class size, teacher to student ratio and the consistency of friends and she would if s he attends in Hampstead.” Thus, the court determined that “the a certain level” and that “it is unclear if [the child] would attend with friends as further found that the husband’s preferred school in Manchester “only goes to go if he decides to secure a residence on his own after the divorce.” The court parents and it is unclear how long that arrangement will last and where he will residence.” The circuit court also observed that the husband “lives with his other things, the wife’s intent “to remain in the Hampstea d area as her town of discretionary decision. In its written decision, the circuit court cite d, among court’s findings of fact provide an objective basis sufficient to sustain its child’s schooling and the parties’ struggles with co - parenting, the circuit residence in Hampstead. Notwithstanding the GAL’ s testimony about the discretion by ordering the child to attend the public school serving the wife’s We conclude that the circuit court did not unsustainably exercise its

evidence and assessing the credibility and demeanor of witnesses. See id. court’s discretion necessarily extends to matters such as assigning weight to determination if it could reasona bly have been made. See id. The circuit discretionary judgment made, and we will not disturb the circuit court’s only whether the record establishes an objective basis sufficien t to sustain the unsustainable exercise of discretion. Kurowski, 161 N.H. at 585. We consider We review decisions regarding parental rights and responsibilities for an

share in the rights and responsibi lities of raising their children”). contact between each child and both parents” and “[e]ncourag[ing] parents to state” includes, among other things, “[s]upport[ing] frequent and continuing RSA 461 - A:6, I (2018); see RSA 461 - A:2, I (2005) (stating that “the policy of this

(m) Any other additional factors the court deems relevant. parental rights and responsibilities described in RSA 461 - A:2. (l) The policy of the state regarding the determination of p. 11 1 1

Rogers, 171 N. H. at 743. Because the plain meaning of the statute’s language add language to the statute that the legislature did not see fit to include. See firearms — from this definition. See RSA 458:16 - a. To hold otherwise would categorically exclude certain types of tangible personal property — such as parties.” N othing in the statute suggests that the legislature inten ded to parties, whether title to the property is held in the name of either or both intangible property and assets, real or personal, belonging to either or both RSA 458:16 - a, I, defines the term “property” as “all tangible and

N.H. 540, 543 (2020). arise on remand, we briefly address that argument. See State v. Williams, 173 of judicial economy, and because the husband’s statutory argument is likely to court’s order and r emand for further proceedings. Nonetheless, in the interest Dunbarton pro perty, we vacate the property division portion of the circuit erred by declining to di stribute the husband’s undivided interest in the Constitution. Because, as explained above, we conclude that the circuit court Constitution as well as the Second and Fourteenth Amendments to the Federal division violated his right to bear arms under Part I, Article 2 - a of the Stat e that, even if it did, awarding the wife one of the firearms as part of the property the meaning of the word “property” in RSA 458:16 - a, I, to include firearms, and parties’ two firearms. Specifically, he argues that the legislature did not intend The husband next argues that the circuit court erred in dividing the

the parties’ parenting responsibilities. See id. not present a justiciable controversy, as the temporary order no longer governs challenges specific provisions in the temporary order, any such argument does become merely academic. See id. Similarly, t o the extent that the husband Thus, even if the court e rred by refusing to address the motions, the issue has hearing and in the final divorce decree and accompanying parenting schedule. child’s schooling, and the parties’ struggles with co - parenting — at the final in the husband’s emergency motions — including the parenting schedule, the N.H. 615, 624 (2010). Here, the circuit court addresse d a ll of the issues raised involved have become academic or dead. In the Matter of O’Neil & O’Neil, 159 moot when it no longer presents a justiciable controversy because the issues We conclude that these arguments are moot. In general, a matter is

decision making” when she attempted to enroll the child in school. “allowed the [respondent] to violate the [temporary] order regarding joint court violated “his rights as a parent for over two years” and, consequently, parenting schedule in place during the pendency of the proceedings, the circu it motions as submitted.” He further contends that, by leaving the temporary the circuit court unsustainably exercised its discretion “by not addressing the parties’ parenting responsibilities, and the child’s sch ooling. He argues that three emergency motions regarding the temporary parenting schedule, the child’s schooling is particularly problematic in light of its refusal to address his The husband also argues that the circuit court’s decision regarding the p. 12 12

concurred. M AC DONALD, C.J., and HICKS, BASSETT, and HANTZ MARCONI, JJ.,

See LaMontagne Builders v. Brooks, 154 N.H. 252, 258 (2006). unpreserved for appellate review. Accordingly, w e decline to address them. raises both arguments for the first time on appeal, we conclude that the y are final hearing in September 2020. (Bolding omitted.) B ecause the husband hear” one of his witnesses and by “not allowing” the GAL to attend part of the Finally, t he husband argues that the circuit court erred by “ref using to

(quotation omitted)). support by legal argument or authority warrants extended consideration.” constitutional claims nor off - hand invocations of constitutional rights without Oak Point Assocs., 167 N.H. 459, 464 (2015) (“[N]either passing reference to insufficiently developed on appeal to warrant further review. See Lennartz v. possess (and bear) them. Moreover, t he husband’s constitutional claims are which firearm the husband was entitled to possess (and bear), not his right to to the parties’ firearms, the circuit court’s property division award addressed awarded one of the parties’ firearms to the wife. We observe that, with respect possess and bear arms und er the State and Federal Constitutions when it The husband also argues that the circuit court violated his right to

RSA 458:16 - a, I, includes firearms. intent.”). Accordingly, we conclude that the meaning of the word “property” in is unambiguous, we do not look beyon d it for further indications of legislative statut es cited in the husband’s brief. See id. (“When the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, we need not consider the other state and federal