2022-0253 and 2022-0589, State of New Hampshire v. Julie Hellinger

(class A misdemeanor), and driving after suspension, see RSA 263:64, I, VII Court (Lown, J.) on charges of disobeying a police office r, see RSA 265:4 (2014) HANTZ MARCONI, J. The defendant, Julie Hellinger, was tried in Circuit

orally), for the defendant. Sakellarios Legal, of Manchester (Olivier Sakellarios on the brief and

for the State. general (Audriana Mekula, assistant attorney general, on the brief and orally), John M. Formella, attorney general, and Anthony J. Galdieri, solicitor

No. 2022 - 0589 Rockingham

No. 2022 - 0253 10th Circuit Court - Salem District Division

page is: https://www.courts.nh.gov/our - courts/supreme - court a.m. on the morning of their release. The direct address of the court’s home reporter@courts.state.nh.us. Opinions are available on the Internet by 9:00 to press. Errors may be reported by email at the following address: editorial errors in order that corrections may be made before the opinion goes Hampshire, One Charles Doe Drive, Concor d, New Hampshire 03301, of any Readers are requested to notify the Reporter, Supreme Court of New well as formal revision before publication in the New Hampshire Reports. NOTICE: This opinion is subject to motions for rehearing under Rule p. 2 22 as 2

court denied the motion, stating: initiated the motor vehicle stop and impermissibly expanded the stop. The trial defendant again moved to suppress, arguing that the officer unlawfully We next consider the interlocutory appeal from the superior court. The

to the circuit court. concession, we reverse the conviction for driving after suspension, and rema nd is, or is about to be engaged in criminal activity). In light of the State’s rational inferences drawn from those facts, that the person stopped has been, reasonable suspicion, based upon specific, articulable fa cts taken together with 697, 701 ( p. 2 2023) (to undertake a lawful traffic stop, the officer must have a support a motor vehicle stop of the defendant. See State v. O’Brien, 175 N.H. that the officer did not have the reas onable, articulable suspicion necessary to motion to suppress. The State concedes that the trial court erred, and agrees suspension. The defendant argues that the trial court erred by denying h er We begin with the appeal from the conviction for driving after

the... officer from properly identifying the person”). .. or any other false information to a law enforcement officer that would hinder while driving or in charge of a vehicle, shall “[g]ive a false name, dat e of birth,. allegedly given by the defendant to the officer. See RSA p. 2 265:4, I(b) (no person, disobeying a police officer is based upon the false identifying information and date of birth, and that her license had been susp ended. The complaint for and date of birth. The officer subsequently learned the defendant’s real name 15, 2020. At some point, the defendant allegedly gave the officer a false name it is undisputed that a Salem police officer stopped the defendant’s car on July We need not set forth the facts in detail. For purposes of th ese appeal s,

and remand both matters. suspension, vacate the superior court order denying her motion to suppress, two appeals. We now reverse her circu it court conviction for driving after interlocutory appeal from this ruling. See Sup. Ct. R. 8. We consolidated the Court (Ruoff, J.) denied the motion without a hearing. The defendant filed an In the superio r court, the defendant again moved to suppress. The Trial

appealed her conviction for driving after suspension directly to this court. appealed her conviction for disobeying an officer to the superior court, and Her motion was denied, and the defendant was convicted on both charges. She to suppress, arguing that the motor vehicle stop by the police was unl awful. (Supp. p. 2 2022) (violation - level offense). Prior to trial, the defendant filed a motion p. 3 3

between the police illegality and the acquisition of the evidence sought to been purged, we consider the following factors: (1) the temporal proximity In determining whether the taint of a Part I, Article 19 violation has

taint. instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary objection is made has been come at by exploitation of that illegality or establishment of th e primary illegality, the evidence to which instant Accordingly, the question to be resolved is whether, granting

be suppressed. Id. obtained only through the exploitation of an antecedent illegality, then it must search of th e car. Id. at 771. We explained that if the evidence in question was committed after the stop, and were unconnected to both the stop and the physical evidence. Id. The State argued that the defendant’s illegal acts were the unlawful search. Id. at 768. As a result, he was charged with falsifying removed and swallowed marijuana that had been seized by the po lice during 72 (2008). There, following an allegedly illegal initial search, the defendant the “fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine. State v. McGurk, 157 N.H. 765, 771 considered whether evidence of a new crime ought to be excluded by applying analytical framework governing the defendant’s motion. I n McGurk, we We agree with the defendant that McGurk provides the appropriate

Pa narello supports the trial court’s decision. committed against law enforcement. Thus, we are not persuaded that (quotation omitted). As the defendant correctly notes, here there was no crime committed a crime against police officers in response to police misconduct.” Id. rule would not be served by applying it “in case s where the accused has found persuasive the rationale that the deterrent purpose of the exclusionary admissible.” Panarello, 157 N.H. at 208 (quotation and ellipses omitted). We same) upon an officer, court s have held that the evidence of this new crime is to an unlawful entry, search or seizure has been a physical attack (or threat of rule, which we described as follows: “Under this exception, where the response I n Panarello, we adopted a “new crime” exception to the exclusionary

(2008). subject to exclusion. See also, State v. McGurk, 157 N.H. 765, 771 - 72 to the police about her identity came after the “stop” and is, thus, not to have occurred after the motor vehicle stop. The defendant’s alleged lie case, the defendant is charged with committing an offense that is alleged police presence purges the taint of any antecedent illegality). In this Panarello, 157 N.H. 20 p. 4 4 (2008) (holding that a new crime committed in illegal “stop” is not subject to the Exclusionary Rule. See State v. “illegal,” evidence of a new crime that is committed after the alleged this issue. Assuming without deciding that the “stop” in this case was Upon review, the Court finds that a hearing is not necessary to resolve 4

concurred. M AC DONALD, C.J., and HICKS, BASSETT, and DONOVAN, JJ.,

motion to suppress and remand. Accordingly, we vacate the trial court’s ruling denying the defendant’s

need to consult decisions from other jurisdictions. however, that this case is governed by our own precedent; thus, we have no stop fall under the new crime exception to the exclusionary rule. We conclude, supp ort a holding that false - identification crimes committed after an unlawful The State cites cases from other jurisdictions that it contends would

in ruling upon the defendant’s motion to suppress. following an evidentiary hearing, consider the three factors set forth in McGurk facts of [that] case.” Id. We reiter ate that, on remand, the trial court shall, McGurk, 157 N.H. at 771. That conclusion, however, was based upon “the test, concluding that the second factor was “sufficient to purge the taint.” that we had no need to discuss the first and third factors of the three - factor must first hold an evidentiary hearing. We note that in McGurk, we concluded that in order to undertake the required analysis, the trial court in this case court failed to undertake this analysis. We further agree with the defendant the officer, the three factors identified in McGurk must be considered. The trial of the evidence of the false identifying information provided by the defendant to purged, with the result that the exclusionary rule does not require suppression To determine whether the taint of the illegal stop in this case has been

misconduct). intervening circumstances, and the purpose and flagrancy of the official between the police illegality and the consent to search, the presence of detention followed by a consent to search, co urt considers temporal proximity 7 p. 4 46, 750 (2001) (in determining whether State has purged taint of an unlawful Id. (quotations, ellipsis, and brackets omitted); see also State v. Hight, 146 N.H.

purp ose and flagrancy of the official misconduct. be suppressed; (2) the presence of intervening circumstances; and (3) the