2025 N.H. 52, State v. Sleeper

brief and orally, for the defendant. Christopher M. Johnson, chief appellate defender, of Concord, on the

for the State. general (Audriana Mekula, assistant attorney general, on the brief and orally), John M. Formella, attorney general, and Anthony J. Galdieri, solicitor

Citation: State v. Sleeper, 2025 N.H. 52 Case No. 2024 - 0035 Merrimack

THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

https://www.courts.nh.gov/our - courts/supreme - court release. The direct address of the court’s home page is: Opinions are available on the Internet by 9:00 a.m. on the morning of their reported by email at the following address: reporter@courts.state.nh.us. corrections may be made before the opinion goes to press. Errors may be Doe Drive, Concord, New Hampshire 03301, of any editorial errors in order that requested to notify the Reporter, Supreme Court of New Hampshire, One Charles as formal revision before publication in the New Hampshire Reports. Readers are NOTICE: This opinion is subject to motions for rehearing under Rule p. 2 22 as well 2

State Police trooper spoke with the defendant in an interview room at the [¶5] At approximately 4: p. 2 29 a.m., a State Police detective sergeant and a

with the defendant. later briefed members of the State Police major crimes unit on his discussion subsequently transported to the Hooksett police station. The Bow police officer okay, and the officer re plied that he did not know. The defendant was he punched and kicked someone.” The defendant asked if the “other guy” was defendant responded that “he was waiting for a ride and got into a fight where officer again asked where the vehicle was and asked what had happened. The defendant where his car was. The defendant replied that he had no car. The the impression that a vehicle collision had occurred, he first asked the stopped him, and the defendant answered “yes.” Because the officer was under [¶4] The officer asked the defendant if he knew why the officer had

rights. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 478 - 79. the police cruiser. The officer did not notify the defendant of his Miranda turn around, handcuffed him, and then directed him to sit on the bumper of halted and put his hands in the air. The officer instructed the defendant to the officer stopped his police cruiser behind the defendant, the defendant walking along the road and who fit the description of the fleeing man. When officer soon encountered a man, later identified as the defendant, who was on foot. The officer was near by and began looking for a damaged vehicle. T he The officer also received a description of another male who had fled the scene was instructed to be on the lookout for a vehicle with heavy front - end damage. received a report that there was a “male down” on Main Street in Hooksett and [¶3] At approximately 1 p. 2 2:18 a.m. on July 24, 2022, a Bow police officer

of the suppression hearing.”). 555 ( p. 2 2018) (“We accept the trial court’s findings where supported by the record procedural history supported by the record. See State v. Ruiz, 170 N.H. 553, relevant to this issue, which either were found by the trial court or re flect conducted in violation of his Miranda rights. We recite t he following facts rights were voluntary despite a preceding roadside interrogation that was statements to law enforcement at the police station after waiving his Miranda when it denied in part his motion to suppress and determined that h is [¶2] We first address the defendant’s argument that the trial court erred

I. Admission of Post - Miranda Statements

was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, w e affirm. suppression record and that any error in the court’s admission of the jail calls voluntariness finding is not against the manifest weight of the evidence in the he made in recorded jail calls. Because we conclude that the trial court’s p. 3 384 U.S. 436 (1966); and ( p. 2 2) admitted into evidence at trial certain statements voluntarily made post - Miranda statement s to police, see Miranda v. Arizona, 3

defendant’s answers; the four - hour time lapse, change in location, and change Bow police officer’s roadside questioning and the lack of detail in the trial court ’s ruling was based on the following factors: the limited nature of the doubt that the defendant made the interview room statements voluntar il y. T he prior roadside Miranda violation, the State had prove d beyond a reasonable the police station (interview room statements). It determined that, despite the statements he made during the 4:29 a.m. interro gation in the interview room at [¶9] The trial court, however, denied the defendant’s request to suppress

right to remain silent. court also suppressed all statements the defendant made after in voking his to a custodial interrogation without providing him Miranda warnings. The (unwarned roadside statements), ruling that the officer subjected the defendant statements he made to the Bow police officer on the roadside in Hooksett partially granted and partially denied his motion. The court suppress ed the made to law enforcement on July 24, 2022. Following a hearing, the trial court [¶8] Before trial, the defendant moved to suppress all statements he

b, I (2016). count alleged that he engaged in the same conduct knowingly. See RSA 6 p. 3 30:1 recklessly caused the victim’s death by stabbing him with a knife and the other alternative counts of second degree murder — one count alleged that he he was under arrest. A grand jury subsequently indicted the defendant on two admissions. Later that day, the detective sergeant informed the defendant that accused him of stabbing the victim. The defendant then made several defendant in the booking room, notified him that the victim had died, and [¶7] Several hours later, the investigators reinitiated contact with the

interview. defendant invoked his right to remain sil ent and the investigators ended the inculpatory statements. Approximately forty minutes into the interview, the how the injuries had occurred. The defendant subsequently made additional was injured and at the hospital and explained that she wanted to understand just leaving.” The detective sergeant informed the defendant that the victim forward two or three steps; he ended up going to the ground and I ended up “something happened” while they were walking: “he went forward, I went Manchester and that they were walking to Concord together. He reiterated that defendant explained that he and the victim met at a homeless shelter in up running off; I don’t know what happened to him. That’s about it.” The as the victim, “were walking down the road; we had a little argument; I ended had happened. The defendant stated that he and another man, later identified [¶6] The detective sergeant began questioning the defendant about what

waiver form with the defendant, which he signed. State Police investigators introduced themselves and reviewed a Miranda Hooksett police station. The interview was audio and video recorded. The p. 4 4

could not be used against him; and (5) whether the defendant was advised that defendant; ( p. 4 4) whether the defendant was advised that his prior admission during that period of time; (3) the degree of police influence exerted over the statements; (2) the defendant ’ s contacts, if any, with friends or family members (1) the time lapse between the initial confession and the subsequent whether the second admission was voluntary in light of the Miranda violation: have articulated five factors to guide the analysis under P art I, A rticle 15 as to by an earlier admission that was obtained in violat ion of his Miranda rights, we [¶13] When, as here, a defendant’s post - Miranda admission is preceded

— here, the State, s ee State v. Carrier, 173 N.H. 189, 205 & n. p. 4 4 (2020). viewed in the light most favorable to the party that prevailed in the trial court contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence,” id. (quotation omitted), as will not reverse the trial court’s determination as to voluntariness “unless it is is voluntary is a question of fact for the trial court to determine. See id. We improper influence or coercion. Ruiz, 170 N.H. at 560. Whether a confession violence, direct or implied promises of any sort, or by the exertion of any essentially free and unconstrained choice and not be extracted by threats, N.H. at 418. To be voluntary, a confession must be the product of an confession was voluntary before it can be admitted at trial. See Hinkley, 174 provision, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant’s see also State v. Hinkley, 174 N.H. 414, 418 (2021). Under this constitutional and guarantees every citizen due process of law. N.H. CONST. pt. I, art. 15; subject shall . . . be compelled to accuse or furnish evidence against himself” [¶12] Part I, Article 15 of the State Constitution provides that “[n]o

v. Ball, 12 p. 4 4 N.H. 226, 231 - 33 (1983). the State Constitution and rely upon federal law only to aid our analysis. State State and Federal Constitutions. We first address the defendant’s claim under their admission at trial therefore violated his due process rights under the roadside statements, his interview room statements were involuntary and that denied his motion to suppress. He asserts that, given the prior unwarned [¶11] The defendant argues that the trial court erred to the extent it

second degree murder. This appeal followed. the defendant of reckless second degree murder and acquitted him of knowing the defendant’s interview room statements into evidence. The jury convicted [¶10] During the subsequent eight - day jury trial, the State introduced

investigators during the interview room questioning. reference to or reliance upon the defendant’s unwarned roadside statements by questioning during th e interview room interrogation; and the absence of any interview room interrogation; the non - accusatory and uncoercive nature of interrogation; the defendant’s waiver of his Miranda rights at the start of the in intervi ewers between the roadside questioning and the interview room p. 5 5

questioning by referencing the defendant’s unwarned roadside statements. [¶17] Critically, the inves tigators did not begin the interview room

recorded and by their provision of Miranda warnings. that the investigators notified the defendant that their conversation would be turn” in his encounter with law enforcement was further evidenced by the fact distinct experience” from tainted questioning at defendant’s home). This “new that a reasonable person could view police station questioning as a “new and (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring); cf. id. at 61 p. 5 5 (plurality opinion) (observing enforcement had “taken a new turn,” Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 622 407 (2003), and alerte d him to the fact that his interaction with law reflect on the seriousness of [his] situation,” State v. Fleetwood, 149 N.H. 396, “opportunity to be free from the pressure of continuous interrogation and to temporal break and change in circumstances provided the defendant a n morning hour and the fact that the defendant remained in police custody, this different location by different law enforcement personnel. Despite the early questioning and the interview room interrogation, which was conducted in a [¶16] There was then a four - hour break between the unwarned roadside

interview). repeatedly accused defendant of sexual assault during first unwarned fight. Cf. id. at 196, 209 - 10 (affirming involuntariness finding when police the defendant for further details when he mentioned that he had been in a identity. The officer was not aware of the status of the victim and did not press had transpired, whether the defendant needed medical attention, and his not a stabbing. C onsequently, his inquiries w ere limited to discovering what officer was under the impression that he was investigating a vehicle collision, unwarned roadside questioning as non - accusatory and open - ended. T he evidence. The record supports the trial court’s characterization of the initial trial court’s voluntariness finding is not against the manifest weight of the circumstances in the light most favorable to the State, we conclude that the video of the interview room interrogation and considering the relevant [¶1 p. 5 5] After reviewing the transcript of the suppression hearing and the

circumstances. Id. at 208. voluntariness inquiry, the trial court must analyze the totality of the the second confession. See id. at 208 - 10. Ultimately, as with any how the police utilized the defendant’s prior unwarned admissions in obtaining complied with Miranda in obtaining the second admission, and whether and made promises, threats, or engaged in displays of force, whether the police identified as relevant to the voluntariness analysis, such as whether the police above factors. See id. at 20 7 - 09. It may consider other factors that we have [¶14] The trial court is not, however, limited to considering only the

dispositive. Id. his prior admission could be used against him. Id. at 20 p. 6 6. No single factor is 6

concedes that the portions of the jail calls that contain his statements about if none of the four blood spots was “a hit” he would be “scotch free.” H e For example, he discussed the evidence of blood on his belongings, saying that on the night of the victim’s deat h and the charges and evidence against him. family and other individuals in which he made statements about his conduct incarcerated pending trial, the defendant had recorded conversations with admitted into evidence at trial excerpts of his recorded jail calls. While [¶20] The defendant next argues that the trial court erred when it

the Federal Constitution as we do under the State Constitution. circumstances, see Hinkley, 174 N.H. at 418, we reach the same resu lt under defendant no greater protection than does the State Constitution under these statements. See id. at 5 p. 6 60. Because the Federal Constitution offers the hold that the court did not err in refusing to suppress th e interview room voluntariness finding is not against the manifest weight of the evidence and in the light most favorable to the State, we conclude that the trial court’s [¶19] In sum, based on our review of the suppression record considered

court. See id. at 5 p. 6 61 - 62. not meaningfully alter the totality of the circumstances considered by the trial unwarned roadside statement s could not be used against him, that fact does address the fact that investigators failed to advise the defendant th at his prior Ruiz, 170 N.H. at 560 - 62. Finally, although the trial court did not directly of the questioning was polite and not accusatory, coercive, or overbearing. See finding that the investigators made no threats or promises and that the nature during the second interview). Further, the record supports the trial court’s same detective and detective referenced prior unwarned statement repeatedly (affirming involuntariness finding when both interviews were conducted by the the defendant’s prior statement), with Carrier, 173 N.H. at 195 - 96, 209 - 10 voluntariness finding even though second interview was scheduled to “go over” Compare State v. Aubuchont, 141 N.H. 206, 209 - 10 (1996) (affirming that he had gotten “into a fight and he punched and kicked” someone. mentioned any of his unwarned roadside statements, including the admission [¶18] T he investigators neither confronted the defendant with nor

over the course of the interview. ensued. The investigators then sought additional details a bout the incident admitted that he had been walking with another person and an argument the defendant’s prior unwarned admissions). In response, t he defendant than twenty seconds after providing Miranda warnings, the officer referenced Cf. Carrier, 1 p. 7 73 N.H. at 209 - 10 (affirming finding of involuntariness when, less defendant tell them the background of “why we are here and what’s going on.” investigators began the interview with the open - ended request that the Instead, after providing Miranda warnings and securing a waiver, the 7

something more than that the defendant was merely “aware of and consciously indifference to the value of human life,” however, the State must show person acts recklessly under “[c] ircumstances manifesting an extreme or will result from his conduct.” RSA 626:2, II(c) (2016). To prove that a disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the material element exists to a material element of an offense when he is aware of and consciously victim with a knife. RSA 630:1 - b, I(b). “A person acts recklessly with respect manifesting an extreme indifference to the value of human life” by stabbing the defendant cause d the victim’s death “recklessly under circumstances indictment, the State had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the [¶23] To convict the defendant of second degree murder as charged in the

may be implicated in a given case. Id. dispositive. Id. We may consider factors not listed above and not all factors defendant ’ s guilt is of an overwhelming nature. Id. at 12. No one factor is of an inflammatory nature; and (9) whether the other evidence of the trial; ( p. 7 7) whether the court took any curative steps; (8) whether the evidence is the defense; (6) the circumstances in which the evidence was introduced at contradicting the erroneously admitted or excluded evidence; (5) the nature of of the error; (4) the presence or absence of evidence corroborating or inconsequential in relation to the strength of the State ’ s case; (3) the frequency State’s case; (2) whether the admitted or excluded evidence is cumulative or did not affect the verdict include, but are not limited to: (1) the strength of the [¶22] The factors that we have considered in assessing whether an error

character of the erroneously admitted evidence itself. I d. at 11. 12. In doing so, we consider the other evidence admitted at trial as well as the burden, we must evaluate the totality of the circumstances at trial. Id. at 11 and exclusion of evidence. Id. To determine whether the State has met its 1 p. 7 76 N.H. 1, 11 (2023). This standard applies to both the erroneous admission reasonable doubt that the error did not affect the verdict. State v. Bo u dreau, [¶21] To establish harmless error, the State must prove beyond a

N.H. 13, 2 p. 8 8 (2020). agree with the State that any error was harmless. See State v. Papillon, 1 p. 7 73 court’s admission of the disputed portions of the jail calls was error because we harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. We need not decide w hether the trial court erred in admitting some or all of the challenged evidence, that error was consciousness of guilt.” Alternatively, the State asserts that, even if the trial portions were relevant to “both the defendant’s mens rea. . . and his inadmissible. See N.H. R. Ev. 401, 402. The State counters that the contested strategy options,” arguing that such statements were irrelevant and therefore contain ing “musings about his legal predicament or about various defense however, the admission of other portions of the calls that he identifies as legitimately infer consciousness of guilt” were properly admitted. He contests, “the underlying events” and “statements from which a factfinder could 8

the defendant’s consciousness o f guilt. wasn’t in the river.” This evidence strongly supported a reasonable inference of did not tell him specifically where the knife was but that the defendant “said it murder weapon and testimony from the defendant’s father that the defendant the considerable but unsuccessful efforts of law enforcement to locate the not flee but waited for the police to arrive. The jury also heard testimony about instead of taking off. Conversely, in another call, he falsely claimed that he did portion of a jail call that it would have been “better” if he had called the police with the victim. Similarly, the defendant acknowledged in an unchallenged corroborated the defendant’s admission that he “ran off” after his argument defendant’s appearance when he was stopped by the police. This evidence found, and provided consistent descriptions of the man that matched the case, three witnesses observed a man fleeing the location where the victim was 152 N.H. 233, 243 (2005); State v. Evans, 150 N.H. 416, 421 (2003). In this exculpatory statements, or efforts to avoid suspicio n. See State v. Fernandez, consciousness of guilt from, among other things, evidence of flight, false consciousness of guilt. A jury can reasonably infer the defendant’s [¶26] The jury also heard substantial evidence of the defendant’s

homicide caused by a stab wound in his neck. the State’s chief medical examiner testified that the victim’s death was a “possible contributor” to a blood sample found on the defendant’s jeans. And concluded with a high degree of statistical probability that the victim was a expert testimony. Both the State’s and the defendant’s DNA analysis experts [¶25] These admissions were corroborated by other evidence, including

63 p. 8 8 (2019). used in speaking about his own conduct. See State v. Colba th, 171 N.H. 626, allowed the jury to hear and evaluate the language and tone the defendant These recorded admissions were particularly strong evidence given that they of jail calls, he described the large amount of blood he observed at the scene. a dude to death” and “I just murdered somebody.” In other unchallenged parts defendant admitted to causing the victim’s death by stabbing, saying “I stabbed inside out.” Similarly, in unchallenged portions of recorded jail calls, the mother that he “stabbed [the victim’s] neck” and that the victim “blee d [sic] admissions about the “something” that happened: He wrote in a letter to his the ground, and the defendant walked away. The defendant later made the two men got into an argument, “something happen[ed],” the victim fell to question, he had been walking with the victim from Manchester to Concord, guilt. The defendant admitted to State Police investigators that, on the night in [¶24] Here, there was overwhelming other evidence of the defendant’s

omitted). with “a blatant disregard of an unjustifiable risk of death.” Id. (quotation 101, 105 (1 p. 9 996) (quotation omitted). It must prove that the defendant acted disregard [ed] a substantial and unjustifiable risk.” State v. Schultz, 141 N.H. 9

unchallenged admissions about stabbing the victim to death and his [¶30] Moreover, as compared to evidence like the defendant’s

N.H. at 243 - 45. challenged portions of the jail calls were inconsequential. See Fernandez, 152 the expert testimony, and the evidence of consciousness of guilt — the overwhelming evidence discussed above — namely the defendant’s admissions, disputed jail calls only once during the witness’s testimony. Against the jail calls, last ed approximately 25 minutes. The State played each of the approximately three minutes. The wife’s testimony, including the playing of the short in duration: T he shortest clip was 38 seco nds and the longest was identified the defendant’s voice in each call. The challenged excerpts were all into evidence through the testimony of the wife of the defendant’s father, who excerpts of recorded jail calls introduced at trial. The State offered the jail calls defendant challenges on appeal the admission of portions of seven of the ten of the jail calls were inconsequential. See Boudreau, 176 N.H. at 12, 14. The intent and the other evidence of the defendant’s guilt, the challenged portions [¶2 p. 9 9] As compared to the strength of this evidence of the defendant’s

slashed his face deep enough to cut facial muscles). defendant stabbed the victim in the stomach, cutting his pancreas, and conviction was supported by overwhelming other evidence, including that admitting expert medical testimony was harmless whe n second degree murder the victim. See Fernandez, 152 N.H. at 235, 241, 245 (concluding any error in the defendant acted with a blatant disregard of an u njustifiable risk of death to spine. The location and depth of the stab wound provided strong evidence that and the common carotid artery and stopped just short of hitting the victim’s create th e wound, the knife cut through layers of skin, fatty tissue, muscle, his neck with a knife, that the stab wound was seven inches deep, and that, to chief medical examiner testified that the victim was stabbed on the left side of [¶28] On that issue, the evidence of guilt was equally compelling. The

murder and reckless manslaughter). N.H. 413, 416 (1 p. 9 979) (comparing and contrasting reckless second degree the value of human life.” RSA 630:1 - b, I(b); see also State v. Howland, 119 acted “recklessly under circumstances manifesting an extreme indifference to defendant’s intent to commit reckless second degree murder — that is, that he defendant of knowing second degree murder, we focus on the evidence of the (defining reckless manslaughter). Because the jury ultimately acquitted the and reckless second degree murder variants), with RSA 630:2, I(b) (Supp. 2024) had proven the requisite intent. Compare RSA 630:1 - b, I (defining knowing reckless manslaughter. Thus, the only contested issue was whether the State degree murder and instead find him guilty of the lesser - included offense of defense counsel argued that the jury should acquit the defendant of second the defendant caused the victim’s death by stabbing him. Indeed, in closing, [¶27] Given this overwhelming evidence, there was no real dispute that p. 10 10

M AC DONALD, C.J., and DONOVAN and GOULD, JJ., concurred.

Blackmer, 149 N.H. 47, 49 (2003). his notice of appeal but did not brief are deemed waived. See State v. reckless second degree murder conviction. Any issues the defendant raised in harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. We therefore affirm the defendant’s it committed in admitting the challenged portions of the jail calls at trial was finding was not against the manifest weight of the evidence and that any error [¶31] In sum, we conclude that the trial court’s pretrial voluntariness

jail calls did not affect the verdict. See Boudreau, 176 N.H. at 11 - 12. reasonable doubt that any error in the trial court’s admission of the contested circumstances at trial, we conclude th at the State has prove d beyond a evidence had been excluded. Based on our consideration of the totality of the been aware of the defendant’s pretrial incarceration even if the disputed jail calls were admitted that are not challenged on appeal, the jury would have is presumed to follow the trial court’s instructions.”). Further, given that other status at the time of the recordings.” See Colbath, 171 N.H. at 637 (“The jury it could not “draw any negative inference from the [d]efendant’s incarceration it revealed his pretrial incarceration, we note that the jury was instructed that extent the defendant argues that the disputed evidence was prejudicial because “so inflammatory” that error in admitting it was not harmless). Finally, to the describing “defendant’s graphic boasting about killing a police officer” — was (1993) (concluding that admission of other bad act evidence — testimony evidence was not inflammatory. Cf. State v. Richardson, 138 N.H. 162, 168 - 69 description of the amount of the victim’s blood at the scene, t he disputed