2025 N.H. 49, State v. Laforest

and orally, for the defendant. Stephanie Hausman, chief appellate defender, of Concord, on the brief

orally), for the State. general (Robert L. Baldridge, assistant attorney general, on the brief and John M. Formella, attorney general, and Anthony J. Galdieri, solicitor

Citation: State v. Laforest, 2025 N.H. 49 Case No. 2024 - 0506 Hillsborough - northern judicial district

THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

page is: https://www.courts.nh.gov/our - courts/supreme - court a.m. on the morning of their release. The direct address of the court’s home reporter@courts.state.nh.us. Opinions are available on the Internet by 9:00 to press. Errors may be reported by email at the following address: editorial errors in order that corrections may be made before the opinion goes Hampshire, One Charles Doe Drive, Concor d, New Hampshire 03301, of any Readers are requested to notify the Reporter, Supreme Court of New well as formal revision before publication in the New Hampshire Reports. NOTICE: This opinion is subject to motions for rehearing under Rule p. 2 22 as 2

when the prisoner’s release is imminent.” Fex v. Michigan, 507 U.S. 43, 44 (1993). is incarcerated, asking that the prisoner be held for the agency, or that the agency be advised A detainer “is a request filed by a criminal justice agency with the institution in which a prisoner 1

entirely to the State or the defendant. service was made under the statute” and declining to attribute the delay The trial court granted the State a 1 p. 2 20 - day extension, finding that “adequate not demonstrate that good cause existed for extending the 180 - day limitation. docketing of this issue.” The defendant objected, arguing that the State could that an extension was warranted due to “the unforeseen delays and lack of that it was “unaware [that] the Court was served the paperwork,” and argued the 180 - day limitation for bringing the defendant to trial. The State claimed [¶4] On June 3, 2024, the State filed a motion seeking an extension of

the defendant’s request until May p. 2 2024. citing various reasons for delay, did not complete the IAD paperwork relating to forward it to the superior court in Manchester (Hillsborough - North). The State, Hillsborough - South took no action with respect to the request and did not 2023, t he State and Hillsborough - South received the defendant’s request. County (Hillsborough - South), by certified mail. On or about December 26, in Nashua, which is located in the southern judicial district of Hillsborough request to the Hillsborough County Attorney’s Office and to the superior court superintendent at the Pennsylvania correctional facility sent the defendant’s judicial district and one pending in the southern judicial district. The filed against him from Hillsborough County: two pending in the northern T he defendant’s IAD paperwork listed three charges for which detainers were disposition of the New Hampshire charges pursuant to Article III of the IAD. [¶3] On December 21, 2023, t h e defendant signed a request for final

him. 1 defendant’s incarceration in Pennsylvania, the State lodged a detainer against matter at a correctional facility in Penns ylvania. At some point during the appeal. In p. 2 2023, the defendant began serving a sentence for an unrelated County, indicted the defendant on the two charges that form the basis of this in Manchester, which is located in the northern judicial district of Hillsborough [¶2] The following facts are drawn from the record. In 2022, grand juries

requirements of the IAD. Accordingly, we affirm. court” pursuant to RSA 606 - A: p. 2 2 (2001) and, therefore, he complied with the We conclude that the defendant served his request upon the “appropriate his request for final disposition to the court where his charges were pending. the 180 - day limitation period began despite the defendant’s failure to deliver 606 - A:1 (2001). The State argues that the trial court erred by concluding that p. 3 3

State’s outstanding charges against a prisoner of another State.” Bjorkman, and the District of Columbia to establish procedures for resolution of one [¶9] “The IAD is a compact entered into by 48 States, the United States,

see New York v. Hill, 528 U.S. 110, 111 (2000). subject to federal construction. State v. Sprague, 146 N.H. p. 3 334, 336 (2001); a congressionally sanctioned interstate compact, the IAD is a federal law clearly erroneous standard. State v. Brown, 157 N.H. 555, 556 - 57 (2008). As (2018). We review the factual findings underlying the decision pursuant to a law, which we review de novo. See State v. Bjorkman, 171 N.H. 531, 535 [¶8] The dismissal of an indictment under the IAD presents a question of

charges with prejudice must be reversed. did not begin to run. It therefore contends that the order dismissing the limitation to bring the defendant to trial on the two Hillsborough - North charges rather than Hillsborough - North. As a result, the State claims, the 180 - day comply with the IAD because he served his request upon Hillsborough - South [¶7] The State’s sole argument on appeal is that the defendant did not

did not alter the reasoning in the court’s prior decision. This appeal followed. also styled as an objection to the motion to dismiss,” the State’s supplement although it considered “the content within the motion to reconsider as it was to reconsider and objection to the motion to dismiss. The court explained that, motion was untimely. The State subsequently filed a supplement to its motion 606 - A:1, Art. V (c). It also denied the State ’s motion to reconsider because the dismissed the two charges filed in Hillsborough - North with prejudice. See RSA motion to dismiss. The trial court granted the defendant’s motion and the defendant’s motion to reconsider and an objection to the defendant’s on June 22, 2024. The State filed a motion to reconsider the order granting failed to bring him to trial within the 180 - day limitation period, which expired [¶6] The defendant thereafter moved to dismiss, arguing that the State

prior to the expiration of the 180 - day tim e period.” late to complete the process to bring the defendant to New Hampshire for trial “allowed the paperwork to languish until such time as it was essentially too State received the defendant’s request on or about December 26, 202 p. 3 3, it request was sent to Hillsborough - South. It further found that, although the Hillsborough - North and Hillsborough - South, which could explain why his defendant’s paperwork referenced the charges against him in both another detaine r lodged against him in Hillsborough - South, and the warranted because, at the time the defendant made his request, there was cause to grant the extension. The court reasoned that the extension was not motion, agreeing with the defendant that the State failed to demonstrate good [¶5] The defendant moved to reconsider. T he trial court granted his p. 4 4

preserved by the arguments presented at the hearing on the State’s motion for [¶13] In its opening brief, the State asserts that its argument “was

articulated in its appellate brief before the trial court. Id. bears the burden of demonstrating that it specifically raised the arguments are presented to the appellate court. Id. The State, as the appealing party, should have an opportunity to rule on issues and to correct errors before they This preservation requirement reflects the general policy that trial forums presented to the trial court. State v. Batista - Salva, 171 N.H. 818, 822 (2019). [¶12] Generally, we do not consider issues raised on appeal that were not

served the appropriate court. the State purportedly changed its position on whether the defendant had pointing to the State’s failure to provide the transcript of the hearing at which provided this court with an adequate record for appellate review, specifically preserve its argument for appeal. In addition, he asserts that the State has not [¶11] As an initial matter, the defendant contends that the State failed to

Bjorkman, 171 N.H. at 535. effect”). The burden of showing compliance with the IAD is up on the State. prejudice, and any detainer based thereon shall cease to be of any force or Article IV hereof,” the court “shall enter an order dismissing the same with been lodged is not brought to trial within the period provided in Article III or indictment, information or complaint on the basis of which the detainer has period. Bjorkman, 171 N.H. at 535; see RSA 606 - A:1, Art. V(c) (if “the with prejudice if a prisoner is not brought to trial within the prescribed time stand trial, or a proper continuance, the pending charges must be dismissed RSA 606 - A:1, Art. III (a). In the absence of a waiver, the defendant’s inability to

information or complaint. . . . request for a final disposition to be made of the indictment, j urisdiction written notice of the place of his imprisonment and his officer and the appropriate court of the prosecuting officer’s da ys after he shall have caused to be delivered to the prosecuting lodged against the prisoner, he shall be brought to trial within 180 information or complaint on the basis of which a detainer has been pending in any other party state any untried indictment, during the continuance of the term of imprisonment there is penal or correctional institution of a party state, and whenever Whenever a person has entered upon a term of imprisonment in a

[¶10] Article III of the IAD provides:

N.H. at 33 p. 5 5 - 3 6. incarcerated in jurisdictions that have enacted similar statutes. Sprague, 1 p. 4 46 171 N.H. at 535. Its purpose is to secure the speedy trial of people 5

County Attorney ’s Office, was inadequate. that service upon the Nashua address, rather than the Manchester office of the Hillsborough Attorney’s Office in Nashua, which are located at the same address. T he State does not assert T he defendant’s request was mailed to the superior court and to the Hillsborough County 2

every word of a statute whenever possible and will not consider what the State v. Fortune, 177 N.H. 7, 8 (2024), 2024 N.H. p. 5 52, ¶4. We give effect to possible, construe that language according to its plain and ordinary meaning. interpretation, we first look to the language of the statute itself, and, if interpretation. It is well established that, when engaging in statutory [¶15] Resolving the parties’ dispute requires that we engage in statutory

speedy disposition of his charges in the northern judicial district.” the southern judicial district was effective for purposes of his request for sought final disposition we re pending. The defendant counters that “service on Hillsborough - North, the court where the charges for which the defendant that the “appropriate court” for purposes of Article III(a) of the IA D was Hillsborough - South rather than Hillsborough - North. See id. The State asserts appropriate court of the prosecuting officer’s jurisdiction” by sending it to defendant caused his request for final disposition “to be delivered to. . . the received the defendant’s request. The narrow issue before us is whether the parties do not dispute that the superior court, specifically Hillsborough - South, request as required by the IAD. See RSA 606 - A:1, Art. III(a). Further, the 2 officer,” here the Hillsborough County Attorney, received the defendant’s [¶14] T urning to the merits, t here is no dispute that the “prosecuting

understood and addressed” the issue). review when “the analysis articulated by the trial court demonstrate[d] that it (2017) (concluding argument raised by defendant was preserved for appellate argument is preserved. See, e.g., State v. Gross - Santos, 1 p. 6 69 N.H. p. 5 593, 598 imperfect and contrary to the statute.” W e therefore conclude that the State’s persuaded by, the State’s argument that “service upon this Court remains subsequent order, the court stated that it ha d considered, but was not Court finds adequate service was made under the statute.” Furthermore, in a prosecuting authority and a superior court within Hillsborough County, the narrative order, concluding that “given that service was made to the currently pending.” The court proceeded to address this argument in its South] rather than [Hillsborough - North] where the defendant’s cases are paperwork was sent to, and received by, the Clerk’s Office in [Hillsborough that “service in this matter has not been perfected as the defendant’s State’s motion for an extension, the court summarized the State’s argument court considered the issue the State now raises on appeal. In its order on the brief, there is nonetheless support in the record demonstrating that the trial the State has failed to provide this court with the hearing transcript cited in its defendant’s motion to dismiss.” Although the defendant correctly notes that an extension and in the State’s motion to reconsider and objection to 6

¶31 (per curiam). sees fit. See Attorney General v. Hood, 177 N.H. 17 p. 6 6, 188 (2025), 2025 N.H. 3, legislature disagrees with our interpretation, it is free to amend the statute as it jurisdiction in the matter involved.” (emphasis added)). Of course, i f the with reference to the courts of this state, mean any court with criminal (“The phrase ‘appropriate court’ as used in the agreement on detainers shall, Vermont charge is pending.” (emphasis added)); Utah Code Ann. § 77 - 29 - 6 reference to the courts of this State, means the Superior Court where the phrase ‘appropriate court’ as used in the Agreement on Detainers, with Other states have followed suit. See, e.g., Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 28, § 1531 (“The complaints, for which disposition is sought, are pending.” (emphasis added)). the courts of the District of Columbia, in which indictments, informations, or the courts of the United States, and with respect to the District of Columbia, app. 2 § 4 (defining “appropriate court” as, “with respect to the United States, court” for purposes of the IAD with reference to federal courts. See 18 U.S.C. done so. Indeed, Congress has crafted a narrower definition of “appropriate judicial district where the charges were pending, it presumably would have “appropriate court” and specify that a defendant must serve the court in the [¶18] Had the legislature intended to narrow the definition of

¶4. the legislature did not include. See id.; Fortune, 177 N.H. at 8, 2024 N.H. 52, the charges are pending — would require adding words to RSA p. 6 606 - A:2 that to deliver his or her request to the judicial dis trict of the superior court where pending. See id. The State’s interpretation of the IAD — requiring a prisoner specify that the request must be delivered to the court where the charges are within the prosecuting officer’s jurisdiction. See RSA 606 - A:2. Nor does it final disposition be sent to a particular judicial district of the superior court within its definition of “appropriate court” any requirement that the request for [¶17] Contrary to the State’s argument, the statute does not include

officer’s jurisdiction.” RSA p. 6 606 - A:1, Art. III(a); RSA 606 - A:2. the municipal court, the district court, or the superior court “of the prosecuting [his request for final disposition] to be delivered to the prosecuting officer” and defendant “shall be brought to trial within 180 days after he shall have caused superior court.” Therefore, within the context of Article III of the IAD, a to the courts of this state, mean the municipal court, the district court or the ‘appropriate court’ as used in the agreement on detainers shall, with reference “appropriate court” in RSA 606 - A:2. RSA 606 - A:2 provides: “T he phrase [¶16] In addition to adopting the IAD, the legislature has defined the term

scheme. Id. instead, we attempt to construe them in harmony with the overall statutory overall purpose. Id. However, we do not construe statutes in isolation; to include. Id. We also construe all parts of a statute together to effectuate its legislature might have said or add language that the legislature did not see fit p. 7 7

and effectuating its purpose.” (Emphasis added.) Although the State detainers and to cooperate with one another. . . in enforcing the agreement and employees of this state . . . are hereby directed to enforce the agreement on RSA 606 - A:3 (2001) requires that “[a]ll courts, departments, agencies, officers Hillsborough - South’s failure to promptly act upon the defendant’s request. [¶22] The delays in this case were caused by both the State ’s and

bears burden of showing compliance with IAD). against him. See RSA 606 - A:1, Art. III(a); Bjorkman, 1 p. 7 71 N.H. at 535 (State State had 180 days to bring the defendant to trial on the charges pending County Attorney’s Office and Hillsborough - South served as notice that the outstanding”). The delivery of the defendant’s request to both the Hillsborough purpose of the Agreement is to protect prisoners against whom detainers are at 536 (recognizing that the IAD’s legislative history “emphasizes that a primary informations or complaints.” RSA 606 - A:1, Art. I; see also Bjorkman, 171 N.H. the proper status of any and all detainers based on untried indictments, the expeditious and orderly disposition of such charges and determination of [¶21] Our conclusion is consistent with the IAD’s purpose: “to encourage

[were] lodged aga inst” him. Id. disposition of all the New Hampshire charges “on the basis of which detainers South. T hus, the defendant’s IAD forms constituted a request for final “directed” to the Hillsborough County Attorney and delivered to Hillsborough - Hillsborough - South. As previously mentioned, t he defendant’s request was third charge. That third charge, as the trial court observed, was pending in disposition of those charges identifies another detainer “on file” based upon a pending in Hillsborough - North, Form III o f the defendant’s request for final added). A lthough the two charges forming the basis of this appeal were final disposition is specifically directed.” RSA 606 - A:1, Art. III(d) (emphases against the prisoner from the state to whose prosecuting official the request for informations or complaints on the basis of which detainers have been lodged operate as a request for final disposition of all untried indictments, final disposition made by a prisoner pursuant to paragraph (a) hereof shall [¶20] Moreover, p ursuant to Article III(d) of the IAD, “[a]ny request for

days thereafter. See RSA 606 - A:1, Art. III(a). December 26, 2023, and the State was required to bring him to trial within 1 p. 8 80 upon Hillsborough - South and the Hillsborough County Attorney’s Office on the defendant complied with the IAD’s requirements by serving his request Attorney’s jurisdiction. S ee RSA p. 7 7:34 (2020); RSA 496:1, I(f) (2010). Therefore, court in Nashua, Hillsborough - South, which is within the Hillsborough County III(a); RSA 606 - A:2. The defendant’s request was delivered to the superior within the Hillsborough County Attorney’s jurisdiction. See RSA 606 - A:1, Art. delivered” to the Hillsborough County Attorney’s Office and the superior court within 180 days after he. . . caused [his request for final disposition] to be [¶19] In this case, the State was required to bring the defendant “to trial 8

M AC DONALD, C.J., and COUNTWAY and GOULD, JJ., concurred.

trial within prescribed time limitation). Accordingly, we affirm. A:1, Art. V(c) (requiring dismissal with prejudice if defendant not brought to entered an order dismissing the two indictments with prejudice. See RSA 606 prescribed time period. W e therefore conclude that the trial court properly defendant to trial on the two charges pending in Hillsborough - North within the the 1 p. 8 80 - day limitation was triggered. See id. Here, the State did not bring the jurisdiction in compliance with the IAD, the trial court properly concluded that the prosecuting officer and appropriate court of the prosecuting officer’s [¶24] Because the defendant deliver ed his request for final disposition to

trial within 1 p. 8 80 days thereafter. See RSA 606 - A:1, Art. III (a). provisions of RSA chapter 606 - A, and the State was required to bring him to his request for final disposition to Hillsborough - South was adequate under the northern judicial distric t of Hillsborough County), the defendant’s delivery of which the offense was committed”); RSA 496:1, I(f) (Goffstown is in the (“Offenders shall be prosecuted and tried in the county or judicial district in from offenses allegedly committed in Goffstown, see RSA 602:1 (2001) Hillsborough - South on the charges filed in Hillsborough - North, which arose North does not alter our conclusion. Although the defendant cannot be tried in jurisdiction over the two charges filed against the defendant in Hillsborough - [¶23] The State’s argument that Hillsborough - South does not have

effectuate the IAD’s purpose. statutory directive that New Hampshire courts cooperate with one another to the defendant’s request as to the two other pending charges contravenes the as to the charge pending in that court and to forward to Hillsborough - North never docketed the request. Hillsborough - South’s failure to docket the request which a detainer was lodged against him was pending, Hillsborough - South request for final disposition upon Hillsborough - South, where a charge for on June 22, until June 3. In addition, although the defendant served his nor did it request an extension of the 1 p. 8 80 - day period, which was set to expire late December 2023, it did not complete the IAD paperwork until May 2024, acknowledged that it received the defendant’s request for final disposition in