2025 N.H. 45, Ball v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Manchester

Manchester and Camp Bernadette and Camp Fatima, Inc. (collectively, the (Leonard, J.) dismissing his complaint against the Roman Catholic Bishop of [¶1] The plaintiff, Randy Ball, appeals an order of the Superior Court DONOVAN, J.

Be n singer on the brief, and Olivia F. Be n singer orally), for the defendant s. Shaheen & Gordon, P.A., of Concord (James J. Armillay, Jr. and Olivia F.

the plaintiff. Weiss LLP, of Ridgefield Park, New Jersey (Stephen A. Weiss on the brief), for Harris and Jesse J. O’Neill on the brief, and Scott H. Harris orally), and Seeger McLane Middleton, Professional Association, of Manchester (Scott H.

ROMAN CATHOLIC BISHOP OF MANCHESTER & a.

Citation: Ball v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Manchester, 2025 N.H. 45 Case No. 2024 - 0606 Belknap

page is: https://www.courts.nh.gov/our - courts/supreme - court a.m. on the morning of their release. The direct address of the court’s home reporter@courts.state.nh.us. Opinions are available on the Internet by 9:00 to press. Errors may be reported by email at the following address: editorial errors in order that corrections may be made before the opinion goes Hampshire, One Charles Doe Drive, Concor d, New Hampshire 03301, of any Readers are requested to notify the Reporter, Supreme Court of New well as formal revision before publication in the New Hampshire Reports. NOTICE: This opinion is subject to motions for rehearing under Rule p. 2 22 as 2

of Manchester” to refer to this entity in the past and present. Manchester. For ease of identification, this opinion uses the designation “Roman Catholic Bishop At the time, the Roman Catholic Bishop of Manchester conducted business as the Diocese of 1

assault and related offenses); RSA 639: p. 2 2 (2016) (defining incest). Except for its (e mphasis added); see RSA ch. 632 - A (2016 & Supp. 2024) (governing sexual RSA 639:2 may commence a personal action at any time.” RSA 508:4 - g to have been subjected to any offense under RSA 632 - A or an offense under [¶5] T he current version of RSA 508:4 - g provides that “[a] person, alleging

limitations period. Laws p. 2 2020, 24:11; RSA 508:4 - g. the legislature amended RSA 508:4 - g to, as relevant to this appeal, remove the 508:4 - g to extend this limitations period. Laws 2008, 193:1. Then, in 2020, related offenses. Laws 2005, ch. 283. In 2008, t he legislature amended RSA distinct limitations period for personal actions based up on sexual assault and [¶4] In 2005, the legislature enacted RSA 508:4 - g, which set forth a

limitations period expired in 1986. appeal that the plaintiff, born in 1966, did not file a complaint before the Norton v. Patten, 1 p. 2 25 N.H. 413, 414 (1984). Nor do the parties dispute on action — provided the limitations period that governed the plaintiff’s claim. S ee minor has until two years after reaching the age of majority to bring a personal occurred, a generally applicable statute of limitations — establishing that a [¶3] N o party disputes the trial court’s conclusion that when these events

priest, who served as t he camp direct or, sexually abused the plaintiff. Manchester managed, maintained, operated, and controlled the camp. A 1 child in the mid - 1970s. Employees of the Roman Catholic Bishop of Dover, 175 N.H. 4 p. 2 24, 425 (2022). The plaintiff attended Camp Fatima as a assumed to be true for the purposes of this appeal. See Barufaldi v. City of [¶2] The following facts are derived from the plaintiff’s complaint and are

See N.H. CONST. pt. I, art s. 14, p. 2 2 p. 3 3. We affirm. in a statute of limitations defense outweig hed the plaintiff’s right to recover. retrospective laws were subject to a balancing test, the defendant s ’ vested right art. 23; and (2) conclud ing that, even if the constitutional protection against unconstitutional retrospective application of the law, see N.H. CONST. pt. I, related offenses, to revive the plaintiff ’s time - barred claim would be an statute of limitations defense in personal actions alleging sexual assault and applying RSA 508:4 - g (Supp. 2024), which was amended in 2020 to remove the appeal, the plaintiff argues t he trial court erred in: (1) determin ing that employee who sexual ly abuse d him when he attended camp in the 1970s. On defendants) that alleg ed negligent hiring, retention, and supervision of an 3

legislature’s police power. The defendant s counter that applying RSA 508:4 - g retrospectively to revive his time - barred claim is a constitutional exercise of the time - barred claim. T he plaintiff argu es that apply ing RSA 508:4 - g constitutionality of retroactively applying RSA 508:4 - g to revive the plaintiff’s retroactively, and we turn to the parties’ arguments regarding the the plaintiff’s favor that the legislature intended RSA 508:4 - g to apply [¶9] For purposes of this case, however, we assume without deciding in

review de novo. Id. permissible. Id. A statute’s constitutionality is a question of law, which we then inquire whether such retroactive application is constitutionally whether the legislature intended the law to apply retroactively. Id. If so, we retrospective. State v. Fournier, 158 N.H. 214, 218 (2009). First, we discern conduct a two - part analysis to determine if it is unconstitutionally punishment of offenses.” When testing legislation against Part I, Article 2 p. 3 3, we laws, therefore, should be made, either for the decision of civil causes, or the “[r] etrospective laws are highly injurious, oppressive, and unjust. No such [¶8] Part I, Article 23 of the New Hampshire Constitution provides that

A. Part I, Article 2 p. 3 3 of the New Hampshire Constitution & RSA 508:4 - g

statute of limitations applied as a matter of law, our review is de novo. See i d. applies. Id. Because the trial court granted the motion upon finding that the affirmative defense and the defendants bear the burden of proving that it based upon the statute of limitations. The statute of limitations is an Resort, 159 N.H. 42, 45 (2009). The defendants, however, moved to dismiss of a construction that would permit recovery. State v. Lake Winn i pes aukee generally consider whether the p laintiff ’s allegations are reasonably susceptible [¶7] When reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a motion to dismiss, we

plaintiff’s motion. T his appeal followed. Constitution. The plaintiff moved to reconsider, and t he trial court denied the barred claim would violate Part I, Article 2 p. 3 3 of the New Hampshire expired in 1986 and that applying RSA 508:4 - g t o revive the plaintiff ’s time ruling that the plaintiff failed to pursue his claim before the limitations period a hearing, the trial court issued an order grant ing the defendants’ motion, 508:4 - g should apply retrospectively to revive his time - barred claim. Following plaintiff ’s claim. The p laintiff objected, arguing that the current version of RSA defendants moved to dismiss, arguing that the statute of limitations barred the [¶6] On August 18, 2023, the plaintiff filed his complaint. The

applies prospectively or retrospectively. See RSA 508: p. 4 4 - g. effective date of September 18, 2020, RSA 508:4 - g is silent as to whether it 4

under Part I, Article 23. We disagree. law impairs contractual rights and instead is applicable to all cases arising the exercise of the police power” is not limited to cases where a retrospective “must yield where it is reasonable for [s]tate government to regulate activities in N.H. at 1 p. 4 45, that the prohibition in Part I, Article 23 against retrospective laws power. Specifically, the plaintiff asserts that the proposition in Hayes, 114 yield because RSA 508:4 - g is a reasonable exercise of the legislature’s police N.H. 141 (1974), the constitutional prohibition against retrospective laws must [¶13] T he plaintiff nevertheless argues that under Hayes v. LeBlanc, 114

the case before us. court did not err in hold ing that RSA 508: p. 4 4 - g cannot operate retrospectively in defendants ’ vested right to a ssert a limitations defense). Accordingly, the trial to statute of limitations when retrospective application would impair (unconstitutional under Part I, Article 23 to retrospectively apply amendment unconstitutional. See Gould v. Concord Hospital, 126 N.H. 405, 408 (1985) barred claim would interfere with this vested right and would therefore be Builders, 165 N.H. at 108. Applying RSA 508:4 - g to revive the plaintiff’s time statute of limitations defense vested. See Hamel, 138 N.H. at 395; Maplevale claim expired in 1986. At that point, the defendant s’ right to rely upon the [¶12] Here, the limitations period that originally governed the plaintiff’s

right . . . it is unconstitutional and void.”). applying to the remedy only, practically deprives either party of any vested also Willard v. Harvey, 2 p. 4 4 N.H. 344, 353 (1852) (“[I] f a law, though in form right that cannot be taken away by legislative enactment. See i d. at 395; see 392, 394 (1994). After the limitations period has run, however, it is a vested constitutional bar to apply ing it retrospectively, s ee State v. Hamel, 138 N.H Builders v. Town of Danville, 165 N.H. 99, 108 (2013), and there is no brought has to do only with the remedy for existing rights, see Maplevale provision that reduces or enlarges the time within which an action may be [¶11] Generally, i n the context of statutes of limitations, a statutory

Id. assess whether its application to a particular matter offends the constitution. 219. Ultimately, we must discern the nature of the rights affected by the act to liabilities or solely affects procedures or remedies enforcing those rights. Id. at a guidepost, we inquire whether the statute affects substantive rights and transactions or considerations already past. Fournier, 158 N.H. at 21 8 - 1 9. As obligation, imposes a n ew duty, or attaches a new disability, with respect to impairs vested rights, acquired under existing laws, or creates a new constitutionally permissible, we consider whether the statute takes away or [¶10] When determining whether retroactive application of a statute is

I, Article 23 of the New Hampshire Constitution. We agree with the defendant s. to revive the plaintiff’s time - barred claim would be un constitutional under Part p. 5 5

its reserved police power”). constitutionally protected contract rights and the [s]tate’s legitimate exercise of involved in resolving Contract Clause claims [is] striking a balance between (articulating State Contract Clause analysis and explaining that “t he core task State Contract Clause jurisprudence. See, e.g., Tuttle, 1 p. 5 59 N.H. at 641 - 42 cases arising under Part I, Article 23. This conclusion is consistent with our Justices (Furlough), 135 N.H. at 630, and not, as the plaintiff argues, to all retrospectively applying a law impairs contractual rights, see Opinion of the Accordingly, the rule we set forth in Hayes is applicable only to cases where from amending laws which regulate contracts. . .” (emphasis added)). prohibition [in Part I, Article 23] was not intended to prevent the legislature legislature’s exercise of its police power is reasonable. See id. (“This the legislature’s authority to regulate contracts must yield where the an absolute bar to governmental regulation of contracts, and its limitation on United States Constitution — th e protection against retrospective laws is not that we extended to Part I, Article 23 is that — like Article I, S ection 10 of the [¶16] When our statements from Hayes are read in context, the principle

I, art. 23 against retrospective laws.” Id. (emphasis added). “[t] his principle is also applicable to the general prohibition in N.H. C ONST. pt. exercise of the police power.” Id. at 14 p. 5 5. Next, we proceeded to explain that yield where it is reasonable for [s] tate government to regulate activities in the not an absolute bar to governmental regulation,” and that “this limitation must prohibits a [s]tate from passing laws impairing the obligation of contracts, it is reaching this conclusion, we explained that “[a]lthough U.S. C ONST. art. I, § 10 Article 23 of the New Hampshire Constitution. Hayes, 114 N.H. at 144 - 46. In C lause of the Federal Constitution, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1, or Part I, amendment that impaired contractual rights did not violate the C ontract [¶15] In Hayes, we held that retrospectively applying a statutory

13 p. 5 5 N.H. at p. 6 630. whether legislation impairs contract rights); Opinion of the Justices (Furlough), Contract Clause analysis applicable under Part I, Article 23 to determine Underwriting Assoc., 159 N.H. 627, 641 - 42 (2010) (setting forth a distinct State the “State Contract Clause[].” S ee Tuttle v. N.H. Med. Malpractice Joint protections found in the C ontract C lause of the United States Constitution as have thus designated the portion of Part I, Article 23 which duplicates the a contract. Opinion of the Justices (Furlough), 135 N.H. 625, 630 (1992). We law impairs a contract, or where a law abrogates an earlie r statute that is itself protections to Article I, Section 10 of the United States Constitution where a Fournier, 158 N.H. at 2 21, we have held that this provision offers equivalent Hampshire Constitution does not expressly reference existing contracts, impairing the obligation of contracts.” Although Part I, Article 23 of the New CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1, declares that “[n]o state shall. . . pass any. . . law [¶14] T he Contract Clause of the United States Constitution, U.S. 6

decision would create a special hardship for those affected. Appeal of N. H. action in reliance upon the challenged decision and, therefore, overruling that members of society may have developed operations or planned a course of [¶21] Th e second stare decisis factor concerns situations in which

and this factor weighs against overruling Woart. 408. Therefore, we cannot conclude that the rule defies practical workability, across multiple centuries. See, e.g., Woart, 3 N.H. at 482; Gould, 12 p. 6 6 N.H. at we have consistently and effectively applied this rule to resolve numerous cases limitations period has run is simple to apply and understand. See id. In fact, defendant has a vested right in a statute of limitations defens e once the overruling when a rule is easy to apply and understand. Id. The ru le that a difficult or impractical for trial courts to apply. Id. This factor weighs against [¶20] The first stare decisis factor examines whether a rule has become

rigidly applied or blindly followed. Id. at p. 6 616. determinative, because the doctrine of stare decisis is not one to be either Although these factors guide our judgment, no single factor is wholly differently, as to have robbed the old rule of significant application. Id. abandoned doctrine; and (4) facts have so changed, or come to be seen so have so far developed as to have left the old rule no more than a remnant of special hardship to the consequence of overruling; (3) related principles of law workability; (2) the rule is subject to a kind of reliance that would lend a whether: (1) the rule has proven to be intolerable simply by defying practical [¶19] Accordingly, w e will over rule a decision only after considering

very reason doomed. Id. ruling has come to be seen so clearly as error that its enforcement was for that not whether we would decide the issue differently de novo, but whether the p. 6 610, 615 (2021). When we are asked to reconsider a holding, the question is arbitrary and unpredictable results. Appeal of N.H. Dep’t of Transp., 174 N.H. every case, deciding cases becomes a mere exercise of judicial will with by the rule of law, for when governing legal standards are open to revision in [¶18] The doctrine of stare decisis demands respect in a society governed

assault.” For the following reasons, we decline to do so. vested right to a statute of limitations defense in actions based on sexual overrule or, alternatively, limit this rule to recognize that “there can be no 35 4; Maplevale Builders, 1 p. 6 65 N.H. at 108. The plaintiff argues that we should Woart v. Winnick, 3 N.H. 473, 481 - 83 (1826). S ee, e. g., Willard, 24 N.H. at 126 N.H. at 408; Maplevale Builders, 165 N.H. at 108. This rule derives from statute of limitations defense once the limitations period has run. See Gould, our precedent establishing that a defendant has a vested right to rely upon a [¶17] Next, we address the plaintiff’s argument that we should overrule

B. Stare Decisis p. 7 7

changed, or come to be seen so differently, as to have robbed the old rule of issues of delayed disclosure that often accompany sexual assault ha s so [¶25] The plaintiff also argues that the factual understanding of the

relies upon justify departure from the rule we set forth in Woart. persuaded that the advancements in evidence preservation that the plaintiff for minority and individual rights” (quotation omitted)). Accordingly, we are not restraining document establishing that “we have majority rule with protection p. 7 793, 813 (2020) (observing that the New Hampshire Constitution is a about fair governance continue to exist today. See State v. Mack, 173 N.H. been rested.” Id. at 481 - 82. These underlying and fundament al concerns cause, arbitrarily repeal the law, upon which the action or the defen [s] e ha d should step in, an d, without any examination of the circumstances of the of existing laws, brought his action, or prepared his defen [s] e, the legislature injurious, oppressive, and unjust, that after an individual has, upon the faith [¶24] Specifically, the Woart C ourt explained that “it is most manifestly

against governmental overreach. Id. at 4 p. 7 77, 481. Woart C ourt primarily based its d etermination on protecting the individual preservation that no longer exist. See Woart, 3 N.H. at 481 - 83. Rather, the Woart suggests that the court premised its holding o n obstacles to evidence preserve evidence.” We disagree. No thing in the language or reasoning of “was likely informed by the very different ability that parties in 1826 had to First, the plaintiff argues that we should over rule Woart because th at decision arguments with respect to the fourth factor, which we will address in turn. has run, nor do we find any upon our own review. He does, however, raise two has a vested right in a statute of limitations defe n se once the limitations period law has developed in such a manner as to undercut the rule that a defendant [¶23] The plaintiff points to no New Hampshire cases to suggest th at the

departures from existing decisions.” Id. (q uotation and brackets omitted). understand principles of law that elude d our predecessor and justify justification. Id. “We are sometimes able to perceive significant facts or seen so differently, as to have robbed the old rule of significant application or Id. The fourth factor concerns whether facts have so changed, or come to be whether the law has developed in such a manner as to undercut the prior rule. Corp. v. Town of Salem, 1 p. 7 73 N.H. 345, 353 (2020). The third factor concerns [¶22] We consider the third and fourth factors together. Union Leader

Woart. See Appeal of N. H. Dep ’ t of Transp., 1 p. 7 74 N.H. at 616. legitimate reliance interests, and th is factor also weighs against overruling the right to rely upon a vested statute of limitations defense implicates Rochester v. Marcel A. Payeur, Inc., 169 N.H. 502, 50 p. 8 8 (2016). Accordingly, period has run, removes the incentive to preserve evidence. See City of unenforceability of a stale claim, which arises when a statute of limitations De p’t of Transp., 174 N.H. at 616. W e have recognized that reliance on the 8

the plaintiff ’ s invitation to overrule nearly two hundred years of precedent. stale claim. Absent such a demonstration, stare decisis compels us to decline statute of limitations creates a vested right in defense against enforcement of a demonstrate that Woart and its progeny incorrectly concluded that an expired Roman Catholic Archbishop of Washington, the plaintiff does not argue or limitations period has run.”). Aside from urging us to adopt the reasoning of right to rely upon a statute of limitations as a defense vests . . . after the cannot be deprived by legislation.”); Maplevale Builders, 165 N.H. at 10 p. 8 8 (“The the statute of limitations, once established, is a vested right, of which a party See, e.g., Willard, 24 N.H. at 354 (“It may be deemed settled, that a bar, under held that the expiration of a statute of limitations does create a vested right. not create a vested right. Id. at 1085, 1087. We, conversely, have consistently then determined that the expiration of an ordinary statute of limitations does time - barred by an ordinary statute of limitations abrogates a vested right,” and observed that it “has never squarely addressed whether reviving a claim that is [¶28] In reaching its conclusion, however, the Maryland Supreme Court

Washington, 330 A.3d at 1075, 1 102. Constitution and Declaration of Rights.” Roman Catholic Archbishop of claims “did not retroactively abrogate vested rights in violation of the Maryland a law that abolished such statutes with respect to childhood sexual abuse assault. In that case, the Maryland Supreme Court held that the enactment of vested right to a statute of limitations defense in actions based on sexual Washington v. Doe, 330 A.3d 1069 (Md. 2025), and determine that there is no Maryland Supreme Court ’s decision in Roman Catholic Archbishop of [¶27] The plaintiff next argues that we should nevertheless follow the

for that very reason doomed.” Id. (quotation omitted). its progeny “ha s come to be seen so clearly as error that its enforcement was stare decisis factors, we cannot conclude that the rule set forth in Woart and limitations defense continues to exist today. Based upon our review of the omitted), for the rule recognizing a defendant’s vested right in a statute of justification,” Appeal of N.H. Dep’t of Transp., 174 N.H. at 615 (quotation assault cases. Accordingly, we hold that “significant application and by the developments in societal understanding of delayed disclosure in sexual [¶26] T hese legal principles remain deeply held today and are not altered

N.H. at 4 p. 8 8 1 - 82; se e also City of Rochester, 16 p. 9 9 N.H. at 508. of society to rely upon a defense based upon the existent laws. S ee Woart, 3 Woart, 3 N.H. at 48 1 - 8 2; Mack, 173 N.H. at 813; and (3) the right of members appropriate balance of power between the government and the individual, civil causes,” N.H. CONST. p t. I, a rt. 23; Woart, 3 N.H. at 474, 477; (2) the Constitution prohibiting the enactment of retrospective laws “for the decision of include d: (1) the explicit language in Part I, Article 23 of the New Hampshire disagree. The factor s that we considered in setting forth the rule in Woart significant application or justification in the context of sex - based offenses. We 9

limitations period has run, is grounded in principle s of stare decisis. See, e.g., that a defendant has a vested right in a statute of limitations defense once the Our determination, premised upon our long - standing precedent establishing precludes application of RSA 508:4 - g to revive the plaintiff’s time - barred claim. [¶31] W e hold that the trial court correctly ruled that Part I, Article 23

State v. Express Co., 60 N.H. 21 p. 9 9, 234 (1 880).

right belong. all other considerations with the legislature and people, where they of whether it conflicts with the constitution as the paramount law, leaving when the validity of any statute is challenged, is to ascertain and declare considerations concern the legislature, and not us; that our sole duty, do with the propriety, expediency, or policy of any law; that these [W]e recognize the doctrine, so often expressed, that we have nothing to

court, from over a century ago: Monier v. Gallen, 122 N.H. 474, 47 6 (1 p. 9 982). We reiterate the words of this is to interpret the c onstitution and resolve disputes arising under it. S ee RSA 508:4 - g. Our role, however, in our co - equal, tripartite form of government claims when the statute of limitations has expired before the effective date of been impacted by sex abuse — during childhood or adulthood — from bringing Further, we recognize that th e result here may prevent some victims who have available in our judicial system. See State v. Besk, 138 N.H. 412, 414 (1994). the most vulnerable victims who deserve all of the protections and remedies [¶30] We are acutely aware that victims of child sex abuse are some of

plaintiff’s right to recover. See N.H. CONST., pt. I, art. 14. under Part I, Article 23 of the New Hampshire Constitution to yield to the further not persuaded that such balancing would require the rights guaranteed protection against retrospective laws is subject to a balancing test, we are here and, even assuming for the sake of argument that the constitutional records case). Thus, we are not persuaded that such balancing is applicable against constitutional right of access, N.H. CONST. pt. I, art. 8, in public case. See Sumner, 168 N.H. at 66 p. 9 9 - 71 (weighing state constitutional interests involved a conflict of distinct constitutional rights not at issue in the instant Secretary of State, 168 N.H. 667 (2016). Sumner is inapposite here. T hat case however, the only support he relies upon is Sumner v. N ew Hampshire conflict, courts must engage in a balancing test.” In making this argument, The plaintiff contends that “[w]hen competing constitutional rights are in outweighs the defendants ’ vested right in their statute of limitations defense. [¶29] Lastly, we consider the plaintiff’s argument that his right to recover

C. Part I, Article 23 & the Right to Recover p. 10 10

not participate in the final vote. justice, specially assigned under RSA 490:3, II, sat for oral argument but did COUNTWAY and GOULD, JJ., concurred; T EMPLE, J., superior court

Accordingly, we affirm. Gould, 126 N.H. at 408. We decline to overrule or limit this precedent here.