2025 N.H. 24, In the Matter of LeGault & LeGault

and Stephanie K. Annunziata orally), for the responde nt. Shaheen & Gordon, P.A., of Concord (Tracey Goyette Cote on the brief,

and orally), for the p etitioner. Welts, White & Fontaine, P. C., of Nashua (Israel F. Piedra on the brief

IN THE MATTER OF CLAYTON LEGAULT, JR. AND LISA LEGAULT

Citation: In the Matter of LeGault & LeGault, 2025 N.H. 24 Case No. 2024 - 0051 9th Circuit Court - Manchester Family Division

THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

page is: https://www.courts.nh.gov/our - courts/supreme - court a.m. on the morning of their release. The direct address of the court’s home reporter@courts.state.nh.us. Opinions are available on the Internet by 9:00 to press. Errors may be reported by email at the following address: editorial errors in order that corrections may be made before the opinion goes Hampshire, One Charles Doe Drive, Concor d, New Hampshire 03301, of any Readers are requested to notify the Reporter, Supreme Court of New well as formal revision before publication in the New Hampshire Reports. NOTICE: This opinion is subject to motions for rehearing under Rule p. 2 22 as 2

portion of [Husband’s pension] from consideration in the equitable distribution distribution, “[a]pplication of the Hodgins formula to exclude the prema rital Hodgins, provides that all property acquired prior to the marriage is subject to She further argu ed that because RSA 458:16 - a, I, which was enacted after and awarding [Husband] the benefits that were earn ed prior to the marriage.” dividing only the portion of the benefit that was earned during the marriage, pension to an application of the Hodgins formula in this case “results in [¶5] Wife contend ed, however, that limiting division of Husband’s

Sutton, 148 N.H. 676, 680 - 81 ( p. 2 2002). actual and contingent values are unascertainable,” In the Matter of Sutton & (2) established “a formula for equitably apportioning pension benefits when the or her former spouse,” Hodgins, 126 N.H. at 715 - 16 (quotation omitted); and the pension rights the recipient pay a portion of each payment received to his that case, we: (1) approved the use of “a decree providing that upon maturity of proposed an initial division in accordance with our decis ion in Hodgins. In the marital estate,” use of a formula to divide the pension was necessary. Wife pension has such significant value that it cannot be offset with other assets in memorandum, Wife argued that because Husband had not yet retired and “the 74% of the pension was earned during the parties’ marriage.” I n her trial “premarital” portions of Husband’s pension and “concluded that approximately [¶4] Wife’s expert witness calculated values for both the “marital” and

$7 5,000.00.” 100% of [Husband’s] Deferred Compensation Plan, and a cash settlement of she is seeking an ‘offset’ of other assets, which includes but is not limited to not seeking any part of [Husband’s] premarital pension specifically, but that and clear of any right, title, or interest of [Wife].” Wife “explained that she is balance in the account, including the premarital portion of the pension, free Hodgins, 1 p. 2 26 N.H. 711 (1985), and would award Husband “the remaining Husband’s pension, calculated using the formula we announced in Hodgins v. compensation plan. It would also award her 50% of the “marital portion” of other things, would award her 100% of both her 401(k) and Husband’s deferred for divorce followed. Wife proposed a division of marital assets which, among [¶3] The parties separated in May 2022, and a petition and cross - petition

employer since 1995. Compensation Plan. Wife has been contributing to a 401(k) plan through her also participates in the State of New Hampshire Public Employees Deferred Husband had been contributing toward his pension for six years. Husband defined - benefit pension plan”). Prior to the parties’ marriage on April p. 2 22, 200 5, New Hampshire Retirement System “is a contributory, public employee, of T ea ch e rs — N.H. v. State of N.H., 167 N.H. 294, 297 (2015) (noting that the pension plan through the New Hampshire Retirement System. See Am. Fed ’ n New Hampshire Department of Corrections and contributes to a defined benefit p. 3 3

Hodgins a portion of each benefit payable to him. Id. at 715 - 16. direct that, upon maturity of the pension benefit, Mr. Hodgins pay Mrs. to compute the foregoing amounts in any meaningful w ay,” the decree could then stated, however, that if “the nature of [the] pension will make it impossible and contingent values for Mr. Hodgins ’ s pension,” if possible. Id. at 715. We (quotation omitted). We remanded for the trial court to “ascertain the actual allocate them in an equitable division of property is most difficult.” Id. at 715 have value realizable after the husband’s death, the ability of the trial court to parties’ marriage. Id. We recognized that “when retirement benefits do not that beg a n after the parties were married; no portion was earned prior to the retired. Hodgins, 126 N.H. at 71 p. 3 3. His pension was based on his employment 458:16 - a. In Hodgins, the husband had a fully - vested pension but had not yet [¶8] Before addressing Wife’s arguments, we examine Hodgins and RSA

decision.” division, whether RSA 458:16 - a, I, “abrogate [s] or derogate [s] the Hodgins the premarital portion of a pension from the property subject to equitable marital estate; and (2) t o the extent Hodgins has been interpreted to exclude court err ed in excluding the premarital portion of Husband’s pension from the [¶7] On appeal, Wife presents two issues for review: (1) whether the trial

(Citations omitted.) This appeal followed.

assets, the Court is not persuaded. pre - marital portion that must be divided or offset by other marital into its marital portion (divided pursuant to Hodgin s) and also a Court to binding precedent that separates a defined benefit plan been superseded on this point. Because [Wife] has not directed the case law is not so clear that the Court considers Hodgins to have overruled. The conflict between [the] statute and its application in However, this Court is bound to follow precedent that has not been intent of RSA 458:16 - a are well - reasoned and well - founded. [Wife’s] arguments about the incompatibility of Hodgins and the

explained: predecease Wife prior to commencing receipt of his pension benefits. The court pension and assignment of pre - retirement death benefits should Husband Wife as the 100% beneficiary of the 50% survivor option benefit in Husband’s Hodgins formula. I t also adopted Wife’s proposal with respect to designation of equally between the parties and divided Husband’s pension according to the 202 p. 3 3. It divided Wife’s 401(k) and Husband’s deferred compensation plan [¶6] T he court issued a narrative order and final decree on November 7,

disproportionate and inequitable award to [Husband].” of assets would directly conflict with . . . RSA p. 4 458:16 - a, I, and would result in a 4

Chamberlin, 155 N.H. 13, 16 (2007). unsustainable exercise of discretion.” In the Matter of Chamberlin & divisions of property pursuant to RSA p. 4 458: 16 - a, II are reviewed for an determinations under RSA 458:16 - a, I, are reviewed de novo, while equitable pursuant to RSA 458:16 - a, II.” Id. at 11 - 12 (citation omitted). “Trial court Then, the court exercises its discretion to equitably distribute those assets matter of law, which assets constitute marital property under RSA 458:16 - a, I. Routhier & Routhier, 175 N.H. 6, 11 (2022). “First, the court determines, as a equitably divid ing the property of divorcing parties. See In the Matter of [¶11] Thereafter, we directed courts to employ a two - step analysis in

RSA p. 4 458:16 - a, I (2018).

veterans ’ disability benefits. federal law, property shall include military retirement and retirement benefits, or savings plans. To the extent permitted by employment benefits, vested and non - vested pension or other parties. Intangible property includes, but is not limited to, whether title to the property is held in the name of either or both assets, real or personal, belonging to either or both parties, Property shall include all tangible and intangible property and

N.H. p. 4 427, 430 (1990); Laws 1987, 278:1. Paragraph I of t hat statute provides: division in a New Hampshire divorce action. See Blanchard v. Blanchard, 133 which, for the first time, statutorily defined property subject to e quitable [¶10] After Hodgins was decided, the legislature enacted RSA 458:16 - a,

Id. at 716 (citations omitted).

earned toward his pension as of the date benefits commence. proceedings, by the total number of months of credits he will have during the marriage and prior to commencement of the divorce by dividing the number of months Mr. Hodgins was employed, benefit payable to him, less taxes. The percentage would be derived thereafter to pa y for Mrs. Hodgins one - half of a percentage of each direct Mr. Hodgins, upon commencement of his pension benefits, that an equal distribution were to be called for, the decree would find such a decree appropriate in this case, and similarly assuming Assuming arguendo that, on remand, the trial court were to

during the marriage are subject to distribution. pension benefits which are attributable to the retiree ’ s employment Such a decree must take account of the fact that only those

[¶9] We further stated: p. 5 5

those benefits was earn ed prior to marriage. See Hodgins, 126 N.H. at 713. does not address how to apportion pension benefits when some portion of formula”). However, because the issue was not before us in Hodgins, th at case marriage. See Rothbart, 141 N.H. at 76 (describing Hodgins as a “default for cases where, as in Hodgins, no portion of the pension was earn ed prior to [¶14] We now clarify that Hodgins continues to provide the default rule

trial court should enter a decree . . . per Hodgins”). and remanding with instruction that if “buyout is not a feasible option . . . the where husband’s employment began in 1987 and the parties married in 1992, 32 p. 5 5, 330 - 31 (2007) (vacating division of husband’s retirement benefits in case had a vested pension). But cf. In the Matter of Costa & Costa, 156 N.H. 323, employed almost fourteen years with his current employer, through which he that parties had been married twenty - three years and that husband had been through employment); Rothbart v. Rothbart, 141 N.H. 71, 73 (1996) (noting married in 1 9 70 and, as of 1981, husband had a defined benefit pension prior to marriage. See, e.g., Sutton, 148 N.H. at 677 (noting that parties or how Hodgins should apply when some portion of a pension has been earned statement in subsequent decisions. We have not, however, addressed whether marriage are subject to distribution.” Id. at 716. W e have repeated that pension benefits which are attributable to the retiree’s employment during the maturity of the pension benefit “must take account of the fact that only t hose distribution to the wife of a portion of each benefit payable to the husband at after divorce. See id. at 713. We therefore noted that a decree providing for prior to marriage but toward which the employee would continue to earn credit method to equitably apportion a pension benefit that had no portion earned Hodgins, 126 N.H. at 715. We were tasked in Hodgins with determining a an asset that should be considered in any equitable property distribution.” 458:16 - a, I, that “an unmatured pension, particularly when it is fully vested, is the Hodgins formula’s applicability. In Hodgins we held, consistently with RSA Hodgins. We conclude that it does not, but we now clarify the limitations on [¶13] We now consider whether RSA 458:16 - a, I, overrules or abrogates

Preston & Preston, 147 N.H. 48, p. 5 50 (2001). up to the date of a decree of legal separation or divorce,” In the Matter of property of the parties is subject to distribution, provided that it was acquired distribution,” In the Matter of Sarvela & Sarvela, 154 N.H. 42 p. 6 6, 431 (2006), “all “consider when and by whom property was acquired in determining its Crowe, 148 N.H. 218, 222 (2002). While the court, in its discretion, may the parties and that acquired during marriage . . . .” In the Matter of Crowe & 458:16 - a, I, makes no distinction between property brought to the marriage by portion of a pension from the definition of marital property.” We agree. “RSA 458:16 - a “does not permit an interpretation that excludes the premarital [¶12] Wife argues that the clear and unambiguous language of RSA 6

M AC DONALD, C.J., and BASSETT and DONOVAN, JJ., concurred.

remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinio n. th ese alternatives formed the basis for its property division, we vacate and [¶1 p. 6 6] Because we cannot determine from the trial court’s order which of

own and half of the marital portion of [Husband’s] pension. portion of the marital estate, including retirement assets of her been separately divided, [Wife] is moving forward with a significant Although the premarital portion of [Husband’s] pension has not considering the parties’ assets and the length of the marriage. The Court finds this distribution to be the most equitable

with other assets, on the other, the order states: have believed it lacked authority to divide the premarital portion or to offset it 175 N.H. at 11. While, on the one hand, the order suggests that the court may H usband, without offset, as part of an overall equitable division. See Routhier, as it had the discretion to do, awarded the entire premarital portion to apportion the marital portion, as both parties asked the court to do, and then, of Husband’s pension, or whether the court used the Hodgins formula to erroneously interpreted Hodgins to require exclusion of the premarital portion estate.” It is unclear from the narrative order, however, whether the trial court include the premarital portion of [Husband’s] pension benefits in the marital [¶15] Wife argues that in this case, the trial court erred by “failing to