2025 N.H. 22, In re Guardianship of K.C.

We affirm. chapter 170 - C precludes her guardianship petitio n under RSA chapter 463. Division for Children, Youth and Families (DCYF) as K.C.’s guardian under RSA the trial court erred in determining that the appointment of the New Hampshire K.C., a minor child. See RSA ch. 463 (2018 & Supp. 2024). She argues that (Burke, R., approved by Tessier, J.) dismissing her petition for guardianship of [¶1] The p etitioner, J.B., appeals an order issued by the Circuit Court

Families. of law and orally), for the New Hampshire Division for Children, Youth and general (Mary A. Triick, senior assistant attorney general, on the memorandum John M. Formella, attorney general, and Anthony J. Galdieri, solicitor

brief and orally), for the p etitioner. Rath, Young and Pignatelli, P.C., of Concord (Cassandra A. Moran on the

Citation: In re Guardianship of K.C., 2025 N.H. 22 Case No. 2024 - 0680 8 th Circuit Court - Jaffrey Family Division

page is: https://www.courts.nh.gov/our - courts/supreme - court a.m. on the morning of their release. The direct address of the court’s home reporter@courts.state.nh.us. Opinions are available on the Internet by 9:00 to press. Errors may be reported by email at the following address: editorial errors in order that corrections may be made before the opinion goes Hampshire, One Charles Doe Drive, Concor d, New Hampshire 03301, of any Readers are requested to notify the Reporter, Supreme Court of New well as formal revision before publication in the New Hampshire Reports. NOTICE: This opinion is subject to motions for rehearing under Rule p. 2 22 as 2

case and dismissed her adoption petition. In May p. 2 2022, the trial court denied the p etitioner ’s motion to intervene in the RSA chapter 169 - C 1

matters of statutory interpretation, w e first examine the language of the review de novo. In re Guardianship of B.C., 174 N.H. 6 p. 2 28, 631 (2021). In interpretation. Statutory interpretation presents a question of law, which we RSA chapter 463. Resolving this issue requires that we engage in statutory chapter 170 - C precludes the p etitioner from petitioning for guardianship under [¶5] The issue on appeal is whether DCYF’s guardianship under RSA

schemes. This appeal followed. managing that relationship throu gh the application of separate statutory co - guardianship” with DCYF and the p etitioner and noted the difficulty of The court further identified the potential challenges posed by “the prospect of a allegations th at, pursuant to it, [K.C.’s] best interests are not being served.” proceeding when a guardianship is already in place and there are no court observed that “[i]t seems unreasonable to conduct a guardianship in October p. 2 2024. Following a hearing, the trial court granted the motion. The [¶4] DCYF again moved to dismiss the p etitioner’s guardianship petition

guardianship petition to proceed. chapter 170 - C. The parties agreed, however, to allow the p etitioner’s a guardian in RSA chapter 463 is not applicable to a guardianship under RSA court g ranted DCYF’s motion, concluding that any provi sion for the removal of which it was appointed, does not authorize the removal of a guardian. The trial could not be removed as K.C.’s guardian because RSA chapter 170 - C, under instead. At a hearing in August p. 2 2024, DCYF moved to dismiss, arguing that it remove DCYF as K.C.’s guardian and to appoint the p etitioner as his guardian under RSA chapter 463. The trial court construed the petition as seeking to [¶3] In March 2023, the p etitioner filed a petition for guardianship of K.C.

facility. removed K.C. from the p etitioner ’s home and placed him in a residential care p. 2 2019, and from June 2021 to January 2022. However, DCYF ultimately K.C. with the p etitioner on two occasions — from September 2018 to February the trial court ordered that K.C.’s permanency plan be adoption. DCYF placed 1 DCYF pursuant to RSA 170 - C:11, II (2022). In the RSA chapter 169 - C case, appointed DCYF as K.C.’s legal guardian and vested legal custody of K.C. in orders in an abuse and neglect case under RSA chapter 169 - C. The trial court 170 - C as a result of their failure to achieve compliance with dispositional court terminated the parental rights of K.C.’s parents pursuant to RSA chapter [¶2] The following facts are drawn from the record. In 2020, the trial

custody in such agency.” RSA 170 - C:11, II. Thus, when the parental rights of another authorized agency as guardian of the child’s person and vest legal relationship and appoint the department of health and human services or termination of the parent - child relationship, it shall terminate such [¶8] Under RSA chapter 170 - C, “[i]f the court finds grounds for the

or of the estate or both. See, e.g., RSA 170 - C:10 (2022); RSA 46 p. 3 3:8 (2018). provides a broader framework for the appointment of a guardian of the person petitions to terminate the parent - child relationship, whereas RSA chapter 463 of the child, RSA chapter 170 - C set s forth the procedures that apply to minor.” RSA 463:1 (2018). Although both chapters focus on the best interests estate for the proper management of the property and financial affairs of the interests of the minor” and “to provide for the appointment of a guardian of the appointment of a guardian of the per son when such appointment is in the best secure for a minor an environment of stability and security by providing for the (2022). The stated purpose of RSA chapter 463, on the other hand, is “to concerned and when it is in the best interest of the child.” RSA 170 - C:1 a judicial process which will safeguard the rights and interests of all parties is “to provide for the involuntary termination of the parent - child relationship by stated purposes of the two chapters differ. The purpose of RSA chapter 170 - C its intent for the two guardianship provisions to exist separately. Moreover, the Parental Rights,” in Title XII, entitled “Public Safety and Welfare,” demonstrates Conservators,” rather than alongside RSA chapter 170 - C, “Termination of Minors and Estates of Minors,” in Title XLIV, entitled “Guardians and schemes. The legislature’s placement of RSA chapter 463, “Guardianship of chapter 170 - C and RSA chapter 463 are fundamentally different statutory [¶7] Although they both provide for the guardianship of minors, RSA

We agree with DCYF. guardianship and a permanency plan of adoption has already been established. cannot be initiated when the child is already under an RSA chapter 170 - C arguing that a new petition for guardians hip of a child under RSA chapter 46 p. 3 3 appointment as K.C.’s guardian is in K.C.’s best interests. DCYF responds by court therefore erred by failing to consider the merits of whether her chapter 463 precludes her guardianship petition. She contends that the trial [¶6] The p etitioner asserts that neither RSA chapter 170 - C nor RSA

the statutory scheme. Id. statutory language in light of the policy or purpose sought to be advanced by the context of the statute as a whole, which enables us to interpret the Moreover, we do not consider words and phrases in isolation, but rather within effectuate its overall purpose and avoid an absurd or unjust result. Id. not see fit to include. Id. We construe all parts of a statute together to what the legislature might have said or add language that the legislature did ordinary meaning. Id. We interpret the statute as written and will not consider statute, and, if possible, construe that language according to its plain and p. 4 4

delaying t he finalization of the child’s permanency plan. This result would for guardianship under separate statutory schemes at this juncture would risk party”). Requiring the trial court to consider the merits of competing petitions rights” and “[g]uardianship with a fit and willing relative or another appropriate permanency include, inter alia, “[a]doption through termination of parent al permanency plan. See RSA 169 - C:2 p. 4 4 - b, II(a)(1) - (2) (2022) (options for interest. We agree. Adoption, not long - term guardianship, is K.C.’s could impede its efforts to obtaining permanency, contrary to K.C.’s best [this] burden of proof” because appointing the p etitioner as K.C.’s guardian maintains that the p etitioner would “as a matter of law . . . be unable to meet person is in the best interests of the minor.” RSA 463:8, III(a) (2018). DCYF “establish by a preponderance of the evidence that a guardianship of the guardianship under RSA chapter 463 in this case, the p etitioner must successor guardians.” RSA 463:2, IV (2018). To prevail on her petition for appointed by the court as provided in this chapter and includes joint and Under RSA chapter 463, “[g]uardian” is defined as “the individual or entity petitioned for guardianship under RSA chapter 463. See RSA 463:5 (2018). [¶10] The p etitioner, who is not a party to K.C.’s RSA chapter 169 - C case,

Families, 170 N.H. 633, 6 p. 4 42 (2018). terminated. Cf. Petition of New Hampshire Div. for Children, Youth and permanency plan is finalized and the abuse and neglect proceeding is permanency plan, which is adoption. DCYF serves as K.C.’s guardian until the this case, DCYF is tasked with making reasonable efforts to finalize K.C.’s to finalize the permanency plan that is in effect.” RSA 169 - C:24 - c, II (2022). In the court shall determine whether the department has made reasonable efforts under the original RSA Chapter 169 - C case.” “At a post - permanency hearing chapter 170 - C, “the matter returns to court for a post - permanenc y hearing of K.C.’s parents and appointment of DCYF as K.C.’s guardian under RSA (2022). As the trial court noted, following the termination of the parental rights welfare of the minor.” RSA 170 - C:2, V (2022); see also RSA 169 - C:3, XIV the life and development of the minor, and to be concerned about the general authority to make important decisions in matters having a permanent effect on [¶9] In its role as the guardian of the child, DCYF has “the duty and

appointment of another individual as the child’s guardian. contrary to the plain language of the statute, which does not contemplate the another authorized agency” be appointed as the child’s guardian would be clearly mandates that only “the department of health and human services or additional party — here, the p etitioner — as guardian when RSA 17 0 - C:11, II individual as co - guardian. See generally RSA ch. 170 - C. Appointing an contemplates the removal of the child’s guardian or the appointment of another individual or entity as guardian. Id. Nothing in RSA chapter 170 - C as K.C.’s guardian, and the court had no discretion to appoint any other “the department of health and human services or another authorized agency” K.C.’s parents were terminated, RSA 170 - C:11, II required the court to appoint p. 5 5

M AC DONALD, C.J.