2025 N.H. 10, Appeal of Estate of Menke

the brief and orally), for the respondent. Devine, Millimet & Branch, P.A., of Manchester (Richard P. Driscoll on

brief and orally), for the petitioner. Douglas, Leonard & Garvey, P.C., of Concord (Benjamin T. King on the

(New Hampshire Compensation Appeals Board) APPEAL OF ESTATE OF GILBERT MENKE

Citation: Appeal of Estate of Menke, 202 5 N.H. 10 Case No. 2023 - 0323 Compensation Appeals Board

THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

page is: https://www.courts.nh.gov/our - courts/supreme - court a.m. on the morning of their release. The direct address of the court’s home reporter@courts.state.nh.us. Opinions are available on the Internet by 9:00 to press. Errors may be reported by email at the following address: editorial errors in order that corrections may be made before the opinion goes Hampshire, One Charles Doe Drive, Concor d, New Hampshire 03301, of any Readers are requested to notify the Reporter, Supreme Court of New well as formal revision before publication in the New Hampshire Reports. NOTICE: This opinion is subject to motions for rehearing under Rule p. 2 22 as 2

injury, leaving the application of RSA p. 2 281 - A:21 - a as the sole issue for the DOL disputing that Beh was the decedent’s common law spouse at the time of the RSA 281 - A:21 - a. At the DOL hearing, the Carrier clarified that it was no longer statute of limitations for filing a workers’ compensation claim, as an issue. See the DOL. Prior to the hearing, the Carrier moved to add RSA 281 - A:21 - a, the [¶6] Beh challenged the Carrier’s denial and requested a hearing before

decedent, she could not “be added to the Allocation of Death Benefits.” time of the injury, [Beh was] not recognized as the common law spouse of” the dependents is fixed by the statute at the date of injury,” and because “[a]t the law spouse. The Carrier denied Beh ’s request, stating that “the status of the December p. 2 2017 probate court order recognizing her as the decedent’s common and receive appropriate allocation of death benefits.” She enclosed a copy of a injury — Beh requested to “be added to the list of [the decedent’s] dependents [¶5] On October 19, 2020 — more than three years after the decedent’s

dependent benefits. New Hampshire Department of Labor (DOL) authorized the payment of daughter] and begin issuing her regular payments of the death benefit.” T he certificate and requested that the Carrier “pay the back benefits due to [our Beh sent the Carrier the decedent’s death certificate and their daughter’s birth [¶4] On May 15, p. 2 2017 — less than a year after the decedent’s injury —

to workers’ compensation benefits.” of your daughter and a marriage certificate” in order to establish “entitlement instructed Beh to provide the decedent’s “death certificate, the birth certificate entitled to workers’ compensation benefits, pursuant to RSA p. 2 281 - A:26” and decedent’s] behalf.” The letter stated that Beh “and/or [her] daughter may be Truck Traders ha[d] submitted a Workers’ Compensation claim on [the Global Truck Traders (collectively, the Carrier) — informing her that “Global Auto mobile Dealers Association — the insurer of the decedent’s employer, [¶3] Beh received a letter dated July 14, 2016 from New Hampshire

of one member of a couple). forth the requirements for recognition of common law marriage upon the death death she became his common law spouse. See RSA 457:39 ( p. 2 2018) (setting and their daughter. Although Beh was not marr ied to the decedent, upon his following a work - related injury. The decedent was survived by his widow, Beh, by the record, or are undisputed. On July 13, 2016, the decedent died [¶2] The following facts are derived from the CAB’s orders, are supported

and remand. to request allocation of benefits under an open death benefits claim, we reverse C ompensation L aw sets no time limit for the dependent of a deceased employee does not constitute a separate claim, and that the New Hampshire W orkers’ Because we conclude that adding a dependent to an open death benefits claim p. 3 3

review de novo. In re Guardianship of D.E., 176 N.H. 284, 288 (202 p. 3 3). In [¶10] The interpretation of a statute is a question of law, which we

RSA 281 - A:21 - a (e mphas es added).

possible relationship to the employee ’ s employment. reasonable diligence should know, of the nature of the injury and its II. In the event of death, the date any dependent knows, or by

. . .. earlier of the following: to the employee, the time for filing a claim shall not begin to run until the the injury and its possible relationship to the employment are not known p. 3 3 years after the date of injury; provided, however, that if the nature of benefits under this chapter shall be barred unless a claim is filed within Compensation for disability, rehabilitation, medical benefits, or death

A:2 1 - a provides that: compensation claim for death benefits has previously been filed. RSA 281 years of the employee’s injury, regardless of whether a timely workers’ work - related fatality must request allocation of death benefits within three RSA 281 - A:21 - a to require that every dependent of an employee suffering a [¶9] The question before us is whether the CAB erred when it construed

burden to show reversible error. See id. at 806. the CAB’s legal rulings de novo. Id. Here, as the appeali ng party, Beh has the will uphold them unless the evidence does not support them. Id. We review Doody, 172 N.H. at 805. We review the CAB ’ s factual findings deferentially and (2021). The CAB ’ s factual findings are prima facie lawful and reasonable. unreasonable. Appeal of Doody, 172 N.H. 802, 805 (2020); see RSA 541:1 p. 3 3 unless, by a clear preponderance of the evidence, we find it to be unjust or [¶8] We will not disturb the CAB’s decision absent an error of law, or

denie d. T his appeal followed. by the statute of limitations. Beh filed a motion for rehearing, which t he CAB [Beh ’s] and decedent’s minor daughter” that was filed outside the time allowed separate and additional [death benefits] claim from the original claim filed for the list of dependents was barred by RSA 281 - A:21 - a because it “was a denying Beh ’s request. The CAB concluded that Beh ’s request to be add ed to a de novo hearing. O n March p. 3 30, 2023, t he CAB issued a written decision [¶7] The Carrier appealed the DOL’s decision to the CAB. T he CAB held

A:26,” and, therefore, her request was not barred by RSA 281 - A:21 - a. dependents was “not a new and separate death benefit claim under RSA 281 been timely filed and that Beh ’s request for allocation of death benefits between to decide. T he DOL ruled that a claim for the decedent’s death benefits had p. 4 4

employee’s dependents who request an allocation of the benefit s under an open RSA 281 - A:26 mandates that death benefits be paid to any of the deceased a timely claim for workers’ compensation death benefits is filed by a dependent, Carrier’s assertions, we read these provisions together to mean that, as long as the deceased employee.” RSA 281 - A:26 (emphasis added). Contrary to the results from an injury, weekly compensation shall be paid to the dependents of knowledge of the injury. See id. RSA 281 - A:26 in turn provides that “[i]f death death benefits, the time limitation starts to run when any one dependent has dependent” or “each dependent” knows of the injury; rather, for purposes of a, II (emphasis added). The statute of limitations is not triggered when “the dependent” has actual or constructive knowledge of the injury. RSA 281 - A:21 three - year statute of limitations for death benefits begins to run “the date any years satisfies the statute. Additionally, RSA 281 - A:21 - a, II provides that the claim in RSA 281 - A:21 - a demonstrates that filing a single claim within three 281 - A:21 - a. The fact that the legislature chose to use the singular form of states that “a claim” must be filed within “3 years after the date of injury.” RSA Markievitz, 135 N.H. p. 4 455, 457 (1992) (quotation omitted). RSA 281 - A:21 - a mean “a demand for compensation, benefits or payment.” Petition of [¶12] We have construed “claim” in the W orkers’ C ompensation Law to

281 - A:21 - a. We agree with the Estate. interpretation improperly hinges on the use of the singular “a claim” in RSA claim for death benefits. The Carrier also argues that the Estate’s statutory request, which came outside the limitations period, was a new and separate 281 - A:21 - a bars Beh’s request to be allocated death benefits because that run. RSA 281 - A:21 - a. The Carrier counters that the plain language of RSA dependents request allocation of the benefits after the statute of limitations has dependent” entitles all dependents to benefits, regardless of whether other of “a claim” for workers’ compensation death benefits by “any [individual] RSA 281 - A:21 - a and RSA 281 - A:26 together demonstrates that the timely filing [¶11] The decedent - employee’s estate (the Estate) argues that reading

worker. Id. Thus, we resolve all doubts in statutory interpretation in favor of the in jured broadest reasonable effect to its remedial purpose. Doody, 172 N.H. at 80 p. 5 5. statute. Id. We construe the Workers’ Compensation Law liberally to give the scheme. Id. Absent an ambiguity, we will not look beyond the language of the intent in light of the policy or purpose sought to be advanced by the statutory the statute as a whole, which enables us to better discern the legislature’s do not consider words and phrases in isolation, but rather within the context of effectuate its overall purpose and to avoid an absurd or unjust result. Id. We not see fit to include. Id. We construe all parts of a statute together to what t he l egislature might have said or add language that t he legislature did ordinary meaning. Id. We interpret the statute as written and will not consider itself, and, if possible, construe that language according to its plain and matters of statutory interpretation, we first look to the language of the statute 5

liability within the limitations period. See RSA 281 - A:23, I (2023) (requiring common and foreseeable that a carrier will not know the full extent of its period. Indeed, the very nature of the W orkers’ C ompensation Law makes it its exposure under a workers’ compensation claim within the limitations benefit). However, a carrier is not entitled by statute to know the full extent of (providing that, unlike a child, a widow or widower does not age out of the which a carrier must pay the weekly benefit. See RSA 281 - A:26, II - III, VI dependent outside the limitations period may extend the length of time during [¶16] It is true that allocating a portion of the dependent benefits to a

compensation is set as a percentage of employee’s average weekly wage). compensation schedule in RSA 281 - A:28); RSA 281 - A:28 (2023) (providing that amount of compensation paid to decedent’s dependents is determined by the amount of weekly compensation to be paid. See RSA 281 - A:26 (stating that allocating death benefits between dependents d oes not change the total be given by a qualifying dependent within the limitations period. Additiona lly, meaningless because it requires that timely notice of a claim for death benefits A:21 - a serves this purpose and does not render the statute of limitations Perez v. Pike Inds., 1 p. 5 53 N.H. 158, 160 (2005). Our construction of RSA 281 notice of possible liability and to eliminate stale or fraudulent claims. See [¶15] The primary purpose of a statute of limitations is to ensure timely

We are unpersuaded by the Carrier’s arguments. may not know the extent of its potential liability within the statutory period. purpose of statutes of limitations because, under our construction, a carrier Compensation Law renders RSA 281 - A:21 - a meaningless and undermines the the Estate here. The Carrier asserts that our construction of the Workers ’ [¶14] T he Carrier nonetheless argues that we should not find in favor of

period. dependent to file a separate claim for death benefits within the statutory invitation to construe the statute in a manner that would require each Generation Servs. Co., 1 p. 5 56 N.H. 656, 667 (2008). We decline the Carrier’s lost due to a workplace injury. See Doody, 172 N.H. at 805; Alonzi v. Northeast those who were dependent upon an employee’s wages that were diminished or Law gives the broadest reasonable effect to its remedial purpose — to protect Co., 162 N.H. 91, 95 (2011). Our co nstruction of the Workers’ Compensation sought to be advanced by the entire statutory scheme. Appeal of Hartford Ins. in light of the legislature’s intent in enacting them, and in light of the policy requirement, it could have done so. Additionally, our goal is to apply statutes period. See RSA 281 - A:21 - a. If the legislature had intended to include such a of the deceased employee’s dependents file separate claims within the statutory [¶13] Indeed, there is no language in RSA 281 - A:21 - a requiring that each

limitations period. See RSA 281 - A:21 - a, :2 p. 6 6. death benefits claim, regardless of whether that request is made within the 6

personal in the sense that it expires upon the death of the dependent and does 19 p. 6 6. In Diamond, we held that a dependent’s right to death benefits is separate and distinct from that of the deceased employee. Hubert, 1 00 N.H. at dependent spouse or child of a deceased employee has a right to compensation [¶19] Hubert and Diamond are ina pposite. In Hubert, we held that a

worker’s injury. We disagree. is required to bring his or her own claim within three years of the deceased case law supports an interpretation of the statute under which each dependent distinct from the claims of other dependents. The Carrier contends that this dependent’s claim for death benefits is a personal right, which is separate and Brown v. Hubert, 100 N.H. 194 (195 p. 6 6), stand for the proposition that each decisions in Diamond v. Employers’ &c. Company, 97 N.H. 510 (1952), and adopt its interpretation of RSA 281 - A:21 - a. T he Carrier argues that our [¶18] Nonetheless, the Carrier asserts that our case law require s that we

statutes of limitations. 281 - A:21 - a meaningless, nor is it in tension with the public policy underlying 153 N.H. at 1 p. 6 60. Accordingly, our statutory construction does not render RSA against a new claim for benefits outside of the limitations period. See Perez, p rejudice to a carrier as there would be if a carrier were required to defend dependent is not likely to become stale and there is not the same risk of (quotation omitted)). The documentary evidence relevant to qualifying as a claims after “evidence disappears and memories fade with the passage of time” public policy underlying statutes of limitations is, in part, to prevent trial of Rochester v. Marcel A. Payeur, Inc., 169 N.H. 502, 508 (2016) (stating that that becomes less probative or accessible with the passage of time. See City of orders, adoption records, and sim ilar documents are not the kind of evidence individual is a qualifying dependent. M arriage and birth certificates, court outside the limitations period is documentation demonstrating that the an open and active claim, the only evidence that a carrier must evaluate “death results from an injury”). When an individual requests allocation from 281 - A:26 (providing for payment of dependent death benefits if the employee’s (defining compensable injury in Workers’ Compensation Law); see also RSA dependency — will already have been gathered and evaluated. RSA 281 - A:2, XI the course of employment,” and the initial claimant’s proof of qualifying death certificate, proof that the injury resulting in death “ar[ose] out of and in establish a valid claim for death benefits — su ch as the decedent employee’s be given within the limitations period, the necessary documentation to stale or fraudulent claims. Because the statute requires that notice of a claim [¶17] Nor woul d our statutory interpretation require a carrier to entertain

up to four years after the denial of benefits or the last payment of an award). petition the commissioner to review the denial or award of benefits for disability nature of the injury may require”); RSA 281 - A:48, I (2023) (allowing party to employer to furnish injured employee with medical care “for such period as the p. 7 7

vote. HANTZ MARCONI, J., sat for oral argument but did not participate in the final M AC DONALD, C.J., and DONOVAN and COUNTWAY, JJ., concurred;

(2012). the partie s ’ remaining arguments. See Antosz v. Allain, 163 N.H. 298, 302 period. Because our holding on this issue is dispositive, we need not address regardless of whether those requests are made within the statute of limitations subsequent requests for allocation of death benefits by qualifying dependents dependent and the claim remains open, RSA 281 - A:21 - a does not bar that a timely claim for workers’ compensation death benefits is filed by a [¶21] Accordingly, we reverse the CAB’s ruling. We hold that, provided

established by RSA 281 - A:21 - a. request by Beh for allocation of benefits w as not barred by the time limitation valid claim for benefits under RSA 281 - A:26 was made and the subsequent A:26 for payment of death benefits to the decedent’s daughter. Therefore, a decedent’s death — was a timely claim under RSA 281 - A:21 - a and RSA 281 - 15, 201 p. 7 7 letter from Beh to the Carrier — filed less than a year after the [¶20] Finally, we apply the law to the facts of this case. Here, t he May

for benefits. See Hubert, 1 00 N.H. at 196; Diamond, 9 p. 7 7 N.H. at 511 - 12. of action from other dependents or discuss the timeliness of dependents’ claims n either case did we state that each dependent has a separate and distinct right not pass to the dependent’s estate. See Diamond, 97 N.H. at 51 1 - 1 2. I n