2026 N.H. 11, State v. Clegg

murder, see RSA 630:1 - b, I(a) (2016), four counts of falsifying physical Logan Clegg, appeals his convictions on two counts of knowing second degree [¶1] Following a jury trial in Superior Court (Kissinger, J.), the defendant,

brief and orally, for the defendant. Thomas Barnard, deputy chief appellate defender, of Concord, on the

for the State. general (Audriana Mekula, assistant attorney general, on the brief and orally), John M. Formella, attorney general, and Anthony J. Galdieri, solicitor

Citation: State v. Clegg, 2026 N.H. 11 Case No. 2024 - 0034 Merrimack

https://www.courts.nh.gov/our - courts/supreme - court release. The direct address of the court’s home page is: Opinions are available on the Internet by 9:00 a.m. on the morning of their may be reported by email at the following address: reporter@courts.state.nh.us. order that corrections may be made before the opinion goes to press. Errors Charles Doe Drive, Concord, New Hampshire 03301, of any editorial errors in are requested to notify the Reporter, Supreme Court of New Hampshire, One as formal revision before publication in the New Hampshire Reports. Readers NOTICE: This opinion is subject to motions for rehearing under Rule p. 2 22 as well 2

his alias. area, CPD found no evidence of a person using either the defendant’s name or Kelly” had traveled to Burlington, Vermont. Despite an investigation of that [¶4] On October 3, p. 2 2022, CPD discovered that, on May 15, an “Arthur

of the shooter that was consistent with the defendant’s appearance. officers while at a tent site near the crime scene, and an eyewitness description following the victims’ deaths, his provision of the false Arthur Kelly identity to other things, his purchases at nearby businesses prior to and immediately ultimately identified the defendant as the murder suspect based upon, among he had previously travel ed to Europe. After further investigation, CPD he had been in possession of a firearm at the time of two prior arrests, and that outstanding warrant for his arrest for absconding from probation in Utah, that CPD also learned that the defendant had a criminal history, including an that the man who identified himself as Arthur Kelly was, in fact, the defendant. from nearby businesses and through subsequent investigation, CPD concluded found that it had been “completely cleared.” By reviewing surveillance footage [¶3] The next day, officers returned to the Arthur Kelly tent site and

depression under leaves and other debris in a wooded area of the trail system. Kelly. On April p. 2 21, officers discovered the victims’ bodi es hidden in a natural located a tent site that was occupied by a man who identified himself as Arthur During a search of the trail system and surrounding area on April 20, officers Concord Police Department (CPD) began investigating their disappearance. who were husband and wife, were reported missing on April 20 and the trail in the Broken Ground Trail System (trail system) in Concord. The victims, afternoon of April 18, 2022, the victims were fatally shot while walking on a suppression record. See State v. Ruiz, 170 N.H. 553, 555 (2018). On the suppress, we accept the trial court’s findings where supported by the [¶2] For the purposes of reviewing the trial court’s denial of the motion to

I. Factual and Procedural Background

ruling and remand. exigency grounds to deny his motion to suppress, we vacate the suppression Because we agree with the defendant that the trial court erred in relying upon certification testing performance of a police dog trained to detect gunpowder. about certain photographs; and ( p. 3 3) struck certain testimony about the data from his cell phone carrier; ( p. 2 2) admitted at trial lay opinion testimony motion to suppress evidence obtained as a result of the warrantless search es of the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement to deny his victims. On appeal, he argues that the trial court erred when it: (1) relied upon of a firearm, see RSA 159:3, I (2023), arising out of the fatal shooting of the two evidence, see RSA 641:6, I (2016), and one count of being a felon in possession 3

the phone. CPD did not use the RTT data to locate the defendant. time for “Range to Tower” (RTT) data, to determine a more precise location for morning of October 12, CPD made a third exigency request to Verizon, this him, arrested him for the Utah probation violation. Meanwhile, a lso on the defendant at the grocery store at approximately 9: p. 3 30 a.m. and, after tracking message from a n employee at a Burlington grocery store. Officers located the second exigency request that the defendant’s phone had received a text [¶9] By th e next morning, October 12, CPD had learned through the

never used that device. could help pinpoint the location of the defendant’s phone. CPD ultimately to use a cell site simulator device belonging to federal law enforcement, which hours of October 11, a detective applied for, and was granted, a search warrant then slept for “a few hours at a hotel.” Also during the evening and late night area, however, as such a search was deemed unsafe at that time. The officers defendant, including the bus station. T he officers did not search in the wooded officers arrived there at 11:00 p.m. and searched certain locations for the At around the same time, CPD dispatched two officers to Burlington. The texted, or received texts from, the defendant’s phone number (historical data). seeking “text messaging details” that would identify any phone numbers that [¶8] CPD made a second exigency request to Verizon around 7:00 p.m.,

every fifteen minutes. area near hiking trails. Verizon then sent CPD emails with updated ping data data showing that the phone was active in Burlington, Vermont in a wooded it most recently connected to.” Verizon approved the request and provided ping phone numbe r. Ping data provides “the radius from the phone to the cell tower submitted an exigency request to Verizon for “ping” data connected to the [¶7] Within thirty minutes of learning of the phone number, CPD

to Verizon through its exigency hotline over the next 17 hours. (Emphasis added.) Consequently, CPD submitted three warrantless requests or weeks to process before cell phone location data would be produced.” the impression that a request to Verizon made with a warrant could take days from Verizon location data connected to his phone number. CPD was “under approximately 56 hours, CPD attempt ed to ascertain his location by requesting [¶6] Believing that the defendant intended to leave the country in

phone number, which CP D confirmed belonged to a legitimate Verizon account. booking information included a n address of a Burlington post office and a defendant’s flight booking information at p. 4 4:41 p.m. that afternoon. The October 14, 2022 at 12: p. 3 30 a.m.” Homeland Security then sent CPD the to Berlin, Germany from JFK airport in New York scheduled to depart on Homeland Security had informed him that the defendant had “booked a flight approximately noon that day, a Utah police detective notified CPD that [¶5] A s of October 11, CPD had not located the defendant. At 4

cites Part I, Article 19 and Part I, Article 2 - b of the State Constitution in to aid our analysis. State v. Ball, 12 p. 4 4 N.H. 226, 231 - 33 (1983). The defendant defendant’s claim under the State Constitution and rely upon federal law only CONST. pt. I, art s. 2 - b, 19; U.S. CONST. amend. IV. We first address the the search es violated his state and federal constitutional rights. See N.H. search es of data from his cel l phone carrier. Consequently, he contends that motion to suppress because no exigency existed to justify the warrantless [¶13] The defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying his

II. Appellate Arguments and Standard of Review

appeal followed. defendant’s possession. The jury convicted the defendant of all charges. This defendant’s apprehension was admitted, including a firearm found in the [¶12] At the subsequent jury trial, e vidence obtained as a result of the

the inevitable discovery doctrine. State’s alternative argument that the contested evidence was admissible under court relied upon exigency grounds to deny the motion, it did not address the destroyed” or that the defendant would evade apprehension. Because the trial imminent danger to life or public safety and a likelihood that evidence would be hours caused by seeking a search warrant w ould create a substantial threat of immediate action” and that “there was a grave risk that the delay of even a few circumstances, the trial court ruled that “the police faced a compelling need for requests” to Verizon; and the exigency was not foreseeable. Based upon these endanger others”; the officers “acted reasonably leading up to the exigency given the random nature of the murder s, the defendant might “randomly discard the murder weapon before fleeing; the defendant was likely armed; apprehension; the re was a substantial likelihood that the defendant would would soon attempt to flee the country or otherwise continue to avoid was a “strong suspect” for the victims’ murders; there was evidence that he that an exigency existed based on the following circumstances: the defendant the defendant’s apprehension. It further determined that the State had prov ed cell phone location dat a of the phone number” and that the data would aid in cause to believe that the defendant’s location “would be found from a search of [¶11] Specifically, the trial court found that the police had probable

circumstances exception to the warrant requirement. hearing. It concluded that the searches were lawful pursuant to the exigent carrier. The trial court denied his motion following a three - d ay suppression warrantless ping, historical data, and RTT searches of data from his cell phone trial, the defendant moved to suppress all evidence obtained as a result of the evidence, and one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm. Prior to counts of reckless second degree murder, four counts of falsifying physical indicted on two counts of knowing second degree murder, two alternative [¶10] The defendant was later arrested for the victims’ murders and p. 5 5

required to obtain a warrant to seek the defendant’s cell phone data from Verizon. It is worth noting that the State does not contest that, absent exigent circumstances, CPD was 1

circumstances existed. The State contends that this court has long recognized review we should apply in reviewing the trial court’s ruling that exigent [¶16] As a threshold matter, t he parties disagree about the standard of

circumstances analysis). No single factor controls. See Gay, 169 N.H. at 241. exigency test but considering relevant factors as part of totality of the Robinson, 1 p. 5 58 N.H. at 799 - 801 (declining to adopt six - factor “fleeing suspect” danger to the police or other persons. See Gay, 169 N.H. at 241; see also s uspect is armed; the need to prevent a suspect’s escape; and the risk of imminent destruction of evidence; the gravity of the offense; the likelihood the conduct a warrantless search to apprehend a suspect include: the danger of circumstances that may be especially relevant where, as here, the police conduct prior to the search. See Robinson, 158 N.H. at 798. Other how the exigency came about and the overall reasonableness of the officers’ . . .” Id. Our totality of the circumstances review includes an examination of to permit a warrantless search depends upon the totality of the circumstances . (quotation and emphasis omitted). “Whether a situation is sufficiently urgent or public safety or likelihood th at evidence will be destroyed.” Id. at 241 a search warrant would create a substantial threat of imminent danger to life need for immediate official action and a risk that the delay caused by obtaining [¶15] “Exigent circumstances exist where the police face a compelling

circumstances existed. 1 address probable cause, and we instead focus upon whether exigent that the State satisfied the probable cause element. Accordingly, we need not 169 N.H. at 240. The defendant does not challenge the trial court’s conclusion exception has two elements: probable cause and exigent circumstances. Gay, State v. Graca, 142 N.H. 670, 673 (1998). This “exigent circumstances” for exigent circumstances that make it impracticable to obtain a warrant.” one of these exceptions. See Gay, 169 N.H. at 240. “One such exception exists preponderance of the evidence that a warrantless search or seizure falls within v. Gay, 169 N.H. 232, 240 (2016). T he State bears the burden of proving by a warrant requirement. See State v. Robinson, 1 p. 5 5 8 N.H. 792, 797 (2009); State seizure fall s within the narrow confines of a judicially crafted exception to the derived from such a search or seizure is inadmissible, unless the search or provision, a warrantless search or seizure is per se unreasonable, and evidence his papers, and all his possessions.” N.H. CONST. pt. I, a rt. 19. Under this secure from all unreasonable searches and seizures of his person, his houses, [¶14] Part I, Article 19 provides that “[e] very subject hath a right to be

under Part I, Article 19, we need not address his claim under Part I, Article 2 - b. support of his arg ument. Because we conclude that the defendant prevails p. 6 6

Robinson, 158 N.H. at 795; cf. Ford, 144 N.H. at p. 6 62 - 63. upon the totality of the circumstances, exigent circumstances existed. See now review de novo the trial court’s ultimate determination of whether, based unless they lack support in the record or are clearly erroneous, and we will brackets omitted). Accordingly, w e will accept the trial court’s factual f indings determination of the historical facts.” Ford, 144 N.H. at 62 - 63 (quotation and question in which the crucial question entails an evaluation made after 436 (1966), whether exigent circumstances exist “is a law - dominated mixed person is in custody for Miranda purposes, see Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. determinations on similar grounds). Similar to our analysis of whether a 144 N.H. 57, 62 - 63 (1999) (clarifying standard of review applicable to custody inquiry therefore presents a mixed question of fact and law. Cf. State v. Ford, situation he encountered presented some meaningful exigency”). The exigency a reasonable officer would have thou ght, given the facts known to him, that the (explaining that “bottom - line question” in exigency inquiry “is whether time” (emphasis added)); Morse v. Cloutier, 869 F.3d 16, 24 (1st Cir. 2017) of the emergency was reasonably grounded in the facts known to them at the entry may be sustained under the exigency exception if “the officers’ perception State v. Theodosopoulos, 119 N.H. 573, 580 (1979) (stating that a warrantless requires the application of a n objective legal standard to historical facts. See [¶18] Although highly fact - specific, a determination of exigency ultimately

opportunity to clarify our standar d of review for exigency determinations. previous cases” in a manner akin to de novo review). We therefore take this (200 p. 6 6) (comparing “facts of this case” to “the level of u rgency demonstrated in 804 (1991) (omitting the word “largely”); State v. Pseudae, 154 N.H. 196, 201 standard set forth in MacDonald. See, e.g., State v. Santana, 133 N.H. 798, question of law, and we have, at times, inconsistently stated or applied th e never clarified whether and to what extent this determination involves a involve questions of law.” Graca, 142 N.H. at 673. We have since, however, “implying that determinations of whether exigent circumstances exist also exigency is “largely a question of fact” and characterized MacDonald as in MacDonald, relying upon federal law. Id. We subsequently reiterated that applied the “clearly erroneous” standard of review to exigency determinations [¶17] W e first stated that exigency “is largely a question of fact” and

exigent circumstances existed — de novo. court’s factual findings for clear error and its ultimate legal conclusion — that decisions applies equally here and, accordingly, we s hould review the trial analysis. He asserts that our general standard of review for suppression points out that th is phrase implies that there is a legal component to the (198 p. 6 6). The defendant concedes that exigency is “largely” a question of fact but finding “unless clearly erroneous.” State v. MacDonald, 129 N.H. 13, 21 determined by the trial court” and that we therefore will not disturb that that “[w]hether exigent circumstances exist is largely a question of fact to be p. 7 7

were mutually exclusive — that is, that officers could not request ping data via apparent belief that using the exigency hotline and obtaining a search warrant [¶22] T here is not, however, an objective basis in the record for CPD’s

exigency hotline. it was necessary under the circumstances presented to request data via the request almost immediately. Thus, it was reasonable for CPD to conclude that the ping data for days or weeks, whereas Verizon would respond to an exigency through the ordinary search warrant process, Verizon would not have produced supports CPD’s belief that, if it had submitted a search warrant to Verizon process for responding to search warrants and subpoenas. The record information, including an exigency hotline that is “staffed 24/ p. 7 7” and a separate employees designated to respond to law enforcement requests for cell phone [¶21] The record reflects that CPD was aware that Verizon has a team of

experience. We agree with the defendant. counters that such belief was reasonable based on the officers’ personal utilize Verizon’s exigency hotline if it first obtained a warrant. The State erroneous because there was no basis for CPD to believe that it could not have been days or weeks. The defendant argues that this reasoning was officers reasonably believed the delay caused by obtaining a warrant would could not make an exigency request while having a warrant and that the thereby implicitly conclud ed that it was reasonable for CPD to believe that it how long it would take to receive location data from Verizon.” The trial court reasonable for the officers to rely on their personal experience in determining exigency requests,” the trial court rejected that argumen t by saying that “it was because the officers “could have obtained a warrant and then made the same Although the defendant argued t hat the officers’ impression was mistaken before cell phone location data would be produced.” (Emphasis added.) request to Verizon made with a warrant could take days or weeks to process prior to making the exigency request, officers were under the impression that a The trial court explained that “[w]hile police could have applied for a warrant assessment of the delay that would have been caused by obtaining a warrant. leading up to the initial exigency request was reasonable and the court’s [¶20] We first consider the trial court’s finding that CPD’s conduct

court erred in determining that the circumstances were exigent. circumstances at that point in time. W e agree with the defendant that the trial CPD’s initial exigency request to Verizon, we also examine the totality of the parties focused upon whether exigen t circumstances existed at the time of ruling; the State argues to the contrary. B ecause the trial court and the the totality of the circumstances does not support the trial court’s exigency applying the legal standard of exigency to this case. The defendant argues that [¶19] Having clarified the applicable standard of review, we turn t o

III. Analysis p. 8 8

few hours.” Indeed, i n less than six hours, an officer drafted an application for that the delay caused by obtaining a search warrant alone would have been “a ordinary search w arrant process, t he record reflects, as the trial court found, [¶24] Setting aside the delay of days or weeks inherent in Verizon’s

not take a third party to respond to a warrant. governmental intrusion might be curtailed by virtue of how long it may or may CONST. pt. 1, art. 19. It is unreasonable that any individual’s freedom from Article 19 protects against “unreasonable sea rches and seizures.” N.H. third party ’ s response to the warrant may be delayed. Put another way, Part I, 169 N.H. at 241. It is immaterial to the application of the exception that a considers only the cons equences of a delay in obtaining a warrant. See Gay, via exigency request). The exigency exception to the warrant requirement been “impractical to obtain a warrant” for real - time location data police sought warrant for historical location data did not bear upon whether it would have (observing that fact that it took cell phone carrier two weeks to respond to (emphasis added); cf. State v. Murphy, 292 A.3d 660, 675 - 76 (Vt. 2023) likelihood of destruction of evidence or a suspect’s flight. Gay, 169 N.H. at 241 warrant would” give rise to a substantial threat of imminent danger or a consideration of whether “the delay caused by obtaining a search cell phone carrier, to respond to a search warrant has no bearing upon our [¶23] Moreover, the length of time it would take for Verizon, or any other

determin ed that CPD’s impression about Verizon’s policy was reasonable. warrant. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court erred when it CPD from request ing data via the exigency hotline while in possession of a information, a reasonab le officer would have inferred that nothing prevented location data for more than 4 p. 8 8 hours without a warrant. Based on this the detective observed that the form states that Verizon will not provide enforcement from utilizing the exigency process if officers have a warrant, and form that CPD used to submit its exigency requests does not prohibit law having a warrant. Additionally, a CPD detective conceded that the Verizon Verizon’s exigency hotline, he had never attempted to use the hotline while also CPD lieutenant also acknowledged that, although he had experience using obtaining a warrant and then making an exigency request is prohibited. The and admitted as an exhibit, albeit outdated, neither states no r suggests that for law enforcement and the version of the guidelines offered by the defendant warrants. The State did not, however, offer into evidence Verizon’s guidelines guidelines describe separate processes for exigency requests and search testified that he believe d that this limitation is “implied” by the fact that the prohibit police from using the exigency hotline if they have a warrant. He conceded that Verizon’s guidelines for law enforcement do not expressly Furthermore, t he CPD lieutenant who made the decision to forgo a warrant prioritize warrantless requests over those accompanied by a warrant. reasonable basis for believing in the existence of a Verizon policy that would the exigency hotline with a warrant in hand. T he State has not demonstrated a p. 9 9

that the defendant could disable or discard his phone “at any moment.” We t he critical urgency relied upon by the trial court and the State was the fact [¶28] On the other hand, if the defendant did not appear for his flight,

this scenario. the cell phone data would not have frustrated the defendant’s apprehension in facilitate his apprehension at the airport, so any delay to obtain a warrant for in the record that CPD needed the defendant’s then - current whereabouts to the highly regulated setting of an international airport. There is no indication opportunity to work with federal or local law enforcement to apprehend him in information about the defendant’s upcoming flight, which provided it an defendan t ’s evading apprehension. As to the first possibility, CPD had concrete believe that under either scenario a delay of a few hours would risk the another unknown location. There was not, however, an objective basis to airport, instead remaining at his current unknown location or travel ing to board the international flight in 56 hours; or he would not appear at the position, there were two likely scenarios: either the defendant would attempt to accorded th ese facts. From the perspective of a reasonable officer in CPD’s [¶27] We disagree with the trial court’s reasoning and the weight it

finding of exigency.” apprehended [the defendant] at JFK airport does not weigh strongly against a court consequently concluded that “the fact that police could have potentially travel, and he might therefore skip the flight and travel elsewhere. The trial upcoming flight, he had previously abandoned prior planned international impossible to collect.” It also reasoned that, notwithstanding the defendant’s his phone “at any moment . . . making real - time location information defendant] to escape [CPD’s] reach” because the defendant could have disabled the delay of a few hours to obtain a warrant “could have permitted [the had booked an international flight leaving in approximately 56 hours, and that the defendant had a demonstrated history of evading apprehension, that he that the defendant w ould evade apprehension. The trial court reasoned that risk that the delay occasioned by obtaining a warrant would create a likelihood [¶26] We next consider the trial court’s determination that there was a

remainder of the trial court’s exigency reasoning with this timeframe in mind. focus of the court’s analysis and is supported by the record, we review the have been caused by obtaining a warrant. Because this timeframe was the exigency analysis ultimately focused upon the delay of “a few hours” that would [¶25] Notwithstanding the above - discussed error, the trial court’s

less than thirty minutes. Verizon responded to CPD’s request for ping data via the exigency hotline in granting the warrant after business hours. T he record also demonstrates that submitted the warrant application, and received a decision from a court a warrant to search for the phone using cell site simulator technology, p. 10 10

ping of defendant’s cell phone was justified by exigent circumstances where 120 N.E.3d 1183, 11 88 - 89, 1198 - 1200 (Mass. 2019) (concluding warrantless believe that the defendant still possessed it. Cf. Commo nwealth v. Almonor, during th ose five months, there appears no objective basis in the record to (1990). Additionally, other than the fact that CPD had not recovered the gun overruled on other grounds by Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 13 7 - 41, “already had ample opportunity to destroy any” incriminating evidence), vehicle in part because defendant was aware he was a murder suspect and had (1971) (holding exigent circumstances did not justify warrantless search of a exigency request. Cf. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 460, 46 4 objectively less likely that the defendant still had the gun at the time of the evidence shortly after the murders, the passage of five months made it the murders. G iven that there was proof that the defendant destroyed other request; and how quickly the defendant had destroyed other evidence following length of time that had elapsed between the murders and the initial exigency flight. This reasoning gave insufficient weight to two important facts: the likelihood” that the defendant would discard the gun prior to his scheduled the murder weapon and the court’s determination that “there was a substantial argument is the trial court’s implicit finding that the defendant still possessed [¶30] Also critical to the trial court’s exigency ruling and to the State’s

will not support a finding of exigency. from any specific circumstances demonstrating that it is likely to be realized frustrated its efforts to locate him elsewhere. A theoretical risk untethered have prevented CPD from intercepting him at the airport or meaningfully defendant to continue to evade apprehension because such delay would not a risk that a few hours ’ delay to obtain a warrant would likely have allowed the situation. In short, we disagree with the trial court’s conclusion that there was the defendant might not board his flight did not heighten the urgency of the the few hours needed to obtain a warrant and, therefore, the possibility that believe CPD woul d lose the ability to collect ping data from the phone within Accordingly, f rom a reasonable officer’s perspective, there was no reason to defendant knew law enforcement had obtained his phone number. State conceded at oral argument that the record contains no evidence that the the murders, and that he was generally adept at evading apprehension, the probation violation, that he had presumably fled New Hampshire in relation to to believe that the defendant was on the run from Utah authorities on the imminently disable or discard his phone. Although i t was reasonable for CPD that provided reasonable grounds to believe that the defendant would [¶29] Moreover, the State has not identif ied any facts specific to this case

sufficient to give rise to exigency. Cf. State v. Morse, 125 N.H. 403, 409 (1984). mere possibility that a suspect could disable or discard his cell phone is not See Commonwealth v. Reed, 647 S.W.3d 237, 246 (Ky. 2022). However, t he preventing the collection of ping location data by simply turning off the phone. acknowledge that an individual can “disable” any cell phone for the purposes of p. 11 11

exception which by its nature can very easily swallow the rule unless applied in exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement because “it is an N.H. at 673. Court s must exercise particular caution when applying the circumstances did not “make it impracticable to obtain a warrant.” Graca, 142 evidence or imminently endanger life or public safety. In short, the risk of the defendant’s escape or the risk that the defendant would destroy hours,” the trial court did not properly weigh the circumstances relevant to the polic y. Moreover, even after limiting the relevant delay timeframe to “a few obtaining a warrant would have be en days or weeks due to Verizon’s internal court erred in treating as reasonable CPD’s belief that the delay occasioned by existed at the time of the first exigency request. As explained above, the trial circumstances, we disagree with the trial court that exigent circumstances [¶32] In sum, applying our exigency standard to the totality of the

commit another serious crime”). hours of delay to obtain a warrant would have . . . permitted [the defendant] to suspect’s whereabouts rendered it extremely unlikely that an additional several nearly two weeks between the commission of the crime and the discovery of the 512 N.E.2d 677, 686 (Ill. 1987) (concluding that in “this case, the lapse of in the immediate vicinity and could continue shooting), with People v. White, who fired shots into police station two hours earlier and who they believed was of apartment when police were attempting to apprehend unidentified sniper 580 - 82 (affirming ruling that exigent circumstances justified warrantless entry ongoing threat to public safety. Compare Theodosopoulos, p. 11 119 N.H. at 577, distinguishes this case from those involving a demonstrated immediate and five months without any indication of further violent or dangerous behavior or a person using the alias Arthur Kelly, committed any crimes. This lapse of reques t and that there was no evidence that, during that time, the defendant, that five months had elapsed between the murders and the initial exigency unpredictable, violent behavior. Yet, the trial court did not address the fact been a random act of violence, the defendant might engage in other defendant might be armed, and that, because the murders appeared to have committed the victims’ violent murders, that CPD reasonably believed the supportably found that there was probable cause to believe the defendant the defendant posed a substantial threat of danger to the public. It acknowledge that there was considerable evidence before the trial court that imminent and substantial threat of danger to life or public safety. We a delay of a few hours under the se circumstances would have posed an [¶31] Finally, we conclude that the trial court improperly determined that

would destroy or discard the murder weapon, even assuming he still had it. was a risk that a delay of a few hours would make it likely t hat the defendant that the trial court erred in concluding that, under these circumstances, t here of defendant’s phone approximately seven hours later). We thus determine witness helped defendant fle e the scene and police requested warrantless ping witness told police that defendant still possessed the murder weapon when p. 12 12

concurred. M AC DONALD, C.J., and DONOVAN, COUNTWAY, and GOULD, JJ.,

See Gay, 169 N.H. at 252. defendant raised in the notice of appeal but did not brief are deemed waived. trial court completes its review in accordance with this opinion. Any issues the rulings to this court. All further processing of this appeal is stayed until the proceedings it deems necessary to resolve this issue and report its findings and (2015). On or before June 15, 2026, the trial court shall hold any further the inevitable discovery doctrine. See State v. Broadus, 167 N.H. 307, 313 - 15 the defendant’s motion to suppress should have been denied on the basis of remand this case to the trial court for the limited purpose of deciding whether [¶33] We vacate the trial court’s denial of the motion to suppress and

IV. Conclusion

237. State Constitution, we need not reach the federal issue. See Ball, p. 12 124 N.H. at Pseudae, 154 N.H. at 200 - 01. Because the search es w ere unlawful under the circumstances were sufficiently exigent to justif y the warrantless searches. See determination of exigency, w e conclude that it erred when it ruled that the For all these reasons, upon our de novo review of the trial court’s ultimate only restricted circumstances.” Santana, 133 N.H. at 804 (quotation omitted).