2026 N.H. 17, In the Matter of Stansfield & Patti

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to motions for rehearing under Rule 22 as well as formal revision before publication in the New Hampshire Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter, Supreme Court of New Hampshire, One Charles Doe Drive, Concord, New Hampshire 03301, of any editorial errors in order that corrections may be made before the opinion goes to press. Errors may be reported by email at the following address: reporter@courts.state.nh.us. Opinions are available on the Internet by 9:00 a.m. on the morning of their release. The direct address of the court’s home page is: https://www.courts.nh.gov/our-courts/supreme-court. THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE ___________________________ 9th Circuit Court-Nashua Family Division Case No. 2024-0715 Citation: In the Matter of Stansfield & Patti, 2026 N.H. 17 IN THE MATTER OF JILL STANSFIELD AND TODD PATTI Submitted: October 15, 2025 Opinion Issued: April 23, 2026 Shanelaris Schirch & Warburton PLLC, of Nashua (Jennifer E. Warburton on the brief), for the petitioner. Todd Patti did not appear. John M. Formella, attorney general, and Anthony J. Galdieri, solicitor general (Mary A. Triick, senior assistant attorney general, on the brief), for the New Hampshire Department of Health and Human Services, Bureau of Child Support Services, as amicus curiae. GOULD, J. [¶1] The petitioner, Jill Stansfield (mother), appeals an order of the Circuit Court (Rauseo, J.) approving a parenting plan but ruling that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to both award child support and issue other support-related orders. We reverse and remand. I. Background [¶2] The following facts are drawn from the trial court order and the record. The mother and the respondent, Todd Patti (father), are the unmarried parents of two children. The parties separated in January 2023. In March 2023, the father stopped depositing his pay into the parties’ joint account and stopped contributing to any expenses. Sometime thereafter, the father informed the mother that he was relocating to Florida. In October 2023, the mother, a resident of New Hampshire, filed a parenting petition seeking final orders, including an order requiring the father to pay child support. [¶3] The father did not file an appearance, and the trial court held a final default hearing on August 12, 2024. The trial court then issued a final parenting decree and a parenting plan but declined to issue a child support order. The mother filed a motion to reconsider, and the court scheduled a hearing. At the hearing, the trial court agreed that it had personal jurisdiction over the father but stated that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to award child support because of language contained in RSA 546-B:31, a provision of the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (UIFSA). See RSA 546-B:31 (2021). In its narrative order denying the motion to reconsider, the trial court explained that it “does not have subject matter jurisdiction under RSA 546- B:31, which requires that a responding tribunal such as New Hampshire having personal jurisdiction over its parties may only issue a Support Order if the individual seeking the order resides outside of New Hampshire.” The mother argues on appeal that the trial court erred when it declined to issue a child support order for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. We agree. II. Analysis [¶4] A court does not have power to hear a case concerning subject matters over which it lacks jurisdiction. Colburn v. Saykaly, 173 N.H. 162, 164 (2020). Whether a trial court has subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law. Id. Our standard of review is de novo. Id. [¶5] Because the jurisdiction of the family division is conferred entirely by statute, “we look to the relevant statutes to determine whether the family division ha[s] subject matter jurisdiction.” In the Matter of Muller & Muller, 164 N.H. 512, 517 (2013). RSA 490-D:2 provides that the family division has exclusive jurisdiction over “[p]etitions for divorce, nullity of marriage, alimony, custody of children, support, and to establish paternity.” RSA 490-D:2 (Supp. 2025). By its plain language, RSA 490-D:2 provides the family division with the authority to issue orders for child support, and with the creation of the circuit court, RSA 490-F:3 conferred that authority on the circuit court. See RSA 490-F:3 (Supp. 2025). [¶6] The question we address in this appeal is whether RSA 546-B:31 divests the circuit court of subject matter jurisdiction conferred by RSA 490- D:2 when a person seeks support from someone who resides in another state, even when the trial court has personal jurisdiction over both parties. For the reasons discussed below, we conclude that RSA 546-B:31 has no effect on the circuit court’s subject matter jurisdiction in this case. [¶7] We rely on our ordinary rules of statutory construction to interpret UIFSA. In the Matter of Penichet & Corroon, 177 N.H. 227, 230 (2025). Accordingly, we first look to the language of the statute itself and, if possible, construe that language according to its plain and ordinary meaning. Id. In doing so, we will not consider what the legislature might have said or add language that the legislature did not see fit to include. In the Matter of Scott & Pierce, 160 N.H. 354, 359 (2010). We consider words or phrases within the context of the statute as a whole rather than in isolation, and we construe all parts of a statute together to effectuate its overall purpose. Id. at 359-60. Doing so enables us to interpret statutory language in light of the policy or purpose sought to be advanced by the statutory scheme. Id. at 360. [¶8] Because UIFSA is a uniform law, we may also take into account the official comments to UIFSA, later amendments to UIFSA when “they provide insight into the intended meaning of New Hampshire’s existing statute,” and the interpretation of UIFSA by courts in other jurisdictions. In the Matter of Ball & Ball, 168 N.H. 133, 137 (2015) (quotation omitted) (observing that “uniform laws should be interpreted to effect their general purpose to make uniform the laws of those states that enact them” (quotation omitted)); see RSA 546-B:56 (2021) (stating that, in applying and construing RSA chapter 546-B, “consideration must be given to the need to promote uniformity of the law with respect to its subject matter among the states that enact it”). [¶9] “UIFSA is a model act adopted by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws at the behest of Congress. . . .” Scott & Pierce, 160 N.H. at 358 (quotation omitted). It applies when more than one jurisdiction is involved in child support proceedings, and its purpose is to avoid conflicting child support orders issued by courts in different states. Ball, 168 N.H. at 138. UIFSA has been enacted in all fifty states and the District of Columbia. Scott & Pierce, 160 N.H. at 359. It is divided into nine articles that provide the procedural and jurisdictional rules for “establishing, enforcing, and modifying child and spousal support orders and for determining parentage when more than one state is involved in these proceedings.” Id. at 359-60. [¶10] We begin our analysis with the language of the provision on which the trial court relied when it ruled that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to issue a child support order in this case. RSA 546-B:31 (Establishment of …