Quentin H. White v. Brigitte Augur F/K/A Brigitte Gaudreau et al.

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Your eyes back session Afternoon, Afternoon, afternoon. See it. This is case 2018 0 0 0 6. Quentin H. White versus Bridget Auger, FKA. Bridget Goro Etal. Alright, Benley and the record should reflect that Justice Hicks, who is not here today will participate in the case. He will listen to the oral arguments and he's, he's either read or will read the briefs. Thank you, your Honor. Uh, may it please the court.

I'm Michael Bentley. I represent Quentin White. Um, 46 years ago, my client received a deed from Pearly Sweat for 10 acres of Landon started New Hampshire. This deed is found at page 32 of our brief, and it's the document which causes us to be here today. Uh, Quentin White exercised dominion control over this land for past, uh, 46 years, including the payment of all real estate taxes on it until a year ago today, as fate would have it, which is the date of Judge Ru's decision sitting in the Cheshire County Superior Court, which, uh, awarded the property to JE oer, who's here today. I'm here today specifically requesting this court to restore to Quentin White, the benefit of the grant that he got from Ley Sweat 46 years ago. In New Hampshire, property owners are free to draft their own deeds and Pearly Sweat was fond of doing just that. Such homemade deeds can cause problems, which again, is why we're here today. That said, is the position of Quentin White that the intent of pearly sweat and executing, delivering the deed to him back in 1972, as found on page 42 of the brief, uh, clearly unambiguously vested in him the property that we're talking about today. The law, I think, regarding the construction of deeds is clear and unambiguous. The interpretation of a deed is clearly a questionable law for this court to decide if the language of the deed is clear and unambiguous, you resort to the deed. Your review of Judge OL's decision is de novo, uh, and the interpretation of the deed is ultimately a question of law for this court to decide by, in, by determining the intent of the parties at the time that the deed was signed. The relationship between Purley Sweat and Quentin White has been chronicle chronicled by this court in its December 30th, 1977 decision. In the case of Kenneth Arley versus Quentin White found at one 17 New Hampshire, 10 25. And yes, the Quentin White who's before you today, is the same Quentin White whose name appears in that earlier decision. It's the one and the same person. Judge Ru's decision also discusses the relationship at length, uh, in its early decision. This court found that Purley Sweat maintained a rather centric lifestyle, yet he was clear in his thoughts and he wanted things done the way he wanted things done, uh, whether by deed or by his last will and testament, which you'll also find in our brief, the deed at page 32 of my, my brief indicates the land was conveyed on the condition that he, Quentin White may desire to erect some building on said land and live there either part-time or year round. Does the deed state what happens to the land if Quentin White doesn't build? No, it doesn't tell us what happens. The deed goes on to say there is no requirement that he live or build on the land on, on the south side of the road. If he were to acquire one or more acres on the north side of the road, Which would be a far better building location, since Quentin White never acquired any land on the north side of the road. It doesn't help you and it doesn't help me because he never got any other land. The deed goes on to say the main condition being that this be done within 10 years and that he, Quentin White has not in some way acquired title to any other area of pearly sweats home farm. Again, does the deed tell us what happens if to the land if Quentin White fails to build on the land? The answer remains, no, it doesn't. The most important language in the deed is the next sentence, which clearly states, in case Quentin White does acquire a more attractive land area to live on or to build a house on this land should be transferred to Je Gaudreau. Now Oja, if she is available, this language is clear and in our opinion, unambiguous, say, Quentin White had gotten some other land from Pearly sweat. Would I be standing here today? I think the answer is clearly no. Does it have to be land of Mr Sweats or could it be land of any land in the area? I, I think in viewing the deed in the context of the parties and the relationship, it had to be land from Purley sweat with without any question. What do you say? The, the, if if it doesn't mean what your opponent says it means, then what does the, if you don't do something within 10 years mean what, what is the, what are the consequences of not doing something within 10 years? I think, I think the answer to that, Mr. Chief Justice is simply this pearly sweat in this very deed said, this is what happens if you get some other land. So he knew about putting wording in a deed that says it goes to Burette If Quentin got something else, the fact that he didn't say what happens to the land if he, if Quentin White didn't build, doesn't mean that Pearly sweat never thought about it because he used language about the disposition of the land. If Quentin White got something else. And I think, and if you take a look at page, uh, and page 27 of our brief, um, there's a footnote five where Judge Roff talks about that and what he talks about is the possibility of reverter that if the Quentin didn't build, uh, that the land reverted to the estate. And we say in our brief, and we think it's borne out by the documents in our brief that had, that happened because of the settlement that was reached between Quentin White and the heirs of Pearly Sweat, which is the stipulation found at pages 47 through 50 of our brief, when the issues in the estate of Purley Sweat and Quentin White got settled, uh, there was a release, there was a release from the estate and from the heirs of Purley Sweat to Quentin White in exchange Quentin White gave both the estate and the heirs a release. Did you, did you make that argument below? Yes. And and the only mention of it in the order is footnote five, is that right? I'm sorry? The, the footnote five in Judge OL's order talks about that scenario? Yes. And that's the only place it's discussed in the order, right? Yes, Yes. To the best of my knowledge. That's, that's correct. And, and so in your view, can we, on the basis of the record we have in front of us and Judge Ru's order, say that that's what happened, that it reverted back to the estate and there therefore got resolved through that release? Do we have We do that? I don't, I don't think, I don't think you can come to that conclusion based upon Judge Ru off's order, because what he did is he linked the failure to build to the language that said, Right. Well, if we were to read it differently than him and say that it went back to the estate, would we have to remand it back? Can we do that on the record that we have And, and if we were to agree with that interpretation, what would we do? Can we resolve the case or do we send it back to Judge Rua? I I would think that you could resolve it directly here without remanding it, because under the terms of that stipulation in the probate court, which resolved those claims, which settled those matters, our position is that it would be an impossibility for this land to have reverted to the estate because of those releases. Because Quent, this deed in question was recorded prior to the date of that stipulation having been approved by the probate court, uh, such that it was not an unrecorded deed as referred to in that stipulation. And, uh, it would, to me it would be like a dog chasing its tail. You send it back to the Superior Court, uh, and then we we're, we're back here again because there, there is no, there's no, there's no estate for this property to revert to based upon that release. So again, had, had Quent gotten something, uh, something else, some other land from Purley Sweat, I'm not here today. The simple fact of the matter is that Quentin White never got any other land from Purley sweat other than the land that was conveyed to him by the deed. Now in question, and as a result, the executory interest that Perche OER had failed because that condition was never met perfectly Perfect. Try that again. Purley Sweat knew perfectly well how to control the disposition of this land, and he did just that. He could have easily stated that Quentin, that if, if Quentin didn't build on it in 10 years, it went to Ms. oer. He didn't say that. He said nothing about what, if anything should happen to the land if Quentin White failed to build. He clearly didn't say that the land should go to Ms. Oer yet Judge Roff said exactly that, and that is the heart of the appeal that's here today. There is simply no way than our opinion that Judge Roff could judicially win the failure to build to the express wording that Pearl Sweat used in his deed, uh, regarding the circumstance by which Ms. Oser could acquire an interest in the real estate in question. Um, So counsel, you referred a couple times to the fact that Mr. Sweat knew how to express the, uh, deed and deed property to other people. What evidence came before the trial court regarding Mr. Sweat's abilities to draft deeds? I think the, the only evidence was this deed in question because in this deed, he, he said What would happen if Purley, if Quentin White got some other land? It's, it's not ambiguous to me as to what would happen if my client had gotten something else. And because if you look at that, the early decision of this court in back in 1977, there was another deed that gave to Quentin White. He was one of the four grantees in that deed. That deed, if you take a look at the earlier decision was found in November, uh, November 21st, 1974, a year after the stipulation, the 1973 stipulation. And in that deed, Quentin White was getting a one-fourth interest in pearly sweats home fart while had Quentin White not entered into the stipulation. And had he gotten that interest in that home farm, um, I'm not here today arguing over this one, but Right. But how does that influence our interpretation of this deed? I'm sorry? How does that influence our interpretation of this deed other than other, the client got sort of the raw end of the deal. All, all I'm saying is that in this deed, Purley Sweat was crystal clear as to what would happen with this land if Quentin White got some other land, and I'm saying, isn't it from Purley Sweat isn't, isn't It pretty clear that what he wanted to do was to give the land to Mr. Mr. White either make sure that Mr. White got some land, uh, and and if he built on there and if he didn't build on there, then he wasn't gonna, then he wasn't gonna be able to, then the land was gonna go to, uh, the other, uh, Ms. Auger and the other people I agree with the first part of what you said, and I disagree with the last part. Quentin Pearl Sweat wanted Quentin White to get something. And then what is the idea? What, what, what is the purpose of the build language that just sort of, you, you, you seem to be saying we should just sort of ignore it. That doesn't mean anything. It, I I don't, I'm not sure how you can ignore it because it's in the deed. Right. And I'm not ignoring it either. Well, what do you say? How, what do, what are, what are the consequences you say of not doing that? I, I'm saying there are no consequences at the end of the day because if Judge Roff is right about the reverter, as I mentioned before, the reverter gains nobody anything because of the settlement between Purley, between, But I mean, to read it, it doesn't, if, if you acknowledge that under your interpretation there would be no consequences, doesn't that sort of suggest, that sort of suggests that you're saying that was really kind of superfluous? Well put That in. There's it's no consequence because of the settlement. Only because of the settlement. That That's what you're saying, right? That's right. And I'm saying you gotta take it all in context over the overall relationship between Quentin White and Purley Sweat and subsequently my client and the heirs of Purley Sweat and his estate, and that that's the context under which I believe this deed needs to be construed. Can I ask you to, on the, uh, statutory argument about 4 77 Yep. Three B, um, under your interpretation, how, what do we make about the purpose of section three of that statute? It seems to me that you render it nullity with your argument. I I don't follow My, my only issue regarding Judge Ru or Ju Judge Ru's order and that statute where we talked about the statute was only applicable to deeds executed after December 31st. Yes. Uh, as to the issue as to whether the applicability of the statute as to executory interest that may have been in existence as of the date of the effectiveness of the statute, in my argument, I think I sent, I think I clearly said that they were all void. I think that's, think That's wrong. But section three, how, how do what sense do we make of, uh, section three of the statute section and it talks about, and that The renewal declarations and that the, that if an executory interest is held by a natural person. I agree with Attorney Del's argument in that regard, so that to the extent that there was an executory interest in existence as of the effective date of the statute and it was a natural person, I think the, the refiling requirements or the filing requirements are set forth in section three would be applicable. So. Okay. Alright. Thank you counsel. Thank you Mr. Dele. Good afternoon, your honors. May it please the court. I'm attorney Robert Dele with me is attorney Charlie Donahue, who is trial counsel below and also on the brief. And Ms. Aer is here with us today. Um, my remarks this afternoon are brief and I say that because Judge Ru Roth's order I think is an excellent decision. It's very well reasoned, it's very detailed. He clearly examined the facts and gave them great weight and carefully reached his decision. And he correctly ruled that this deed when red holistically can be easily understood to have a main condition. And that's exactly what Purley Sweat stated it was, which is that Mr. White was to build and live on this land within 10 years. And if he didn't, the property was intended to go to Miss Aer, But it can't. Uh, following up on the discussion we had about Footnote five, isn't it the case that if he didn't build within 10 years, perhaps it wasn't to go to massager, but back to, um, him or his estate? There's a few problems with that argument. One is it wasn't preserved, although, um, this only came up frankly today. Really, this wasn't addressed in detail in the brief in any way that I recall. Um, but beyond that, this is a footnote that Judge Roff put in there. What's apparent is that he didn't think that was the outcome, and I don't think that's the outcome. And the reason being is we know there was a main condition that you build and live on the land within 10 years. But what's interesting here is that Professor White through his counsel, is raising an argument that raises a number of questions about the interpretation of this deed. If we adopt the interpretation he's put forward, then we have to ponder why was the 10 year limitation put in there as the main condition? Whereas if we read it consistent with Judge Ru's reading of it, read it holistically, those questions don't arise. It's a cohesive document under Judge Ru's reading. So we shouldn't seek to find ambiguity in the document when it's not actually ambiguous. That leads me to my second point that I want to impress upon the court, which is Judge Ru Ross's factual findings are entirely unchallenged on appeal as this court is well aware. In the case of disputed deeds, we looked to the facts at the time that the parties drafted and we looked to the trial court's findings of fact. And here the trial court found that when it looked to those facts that this deed can easily be understood because he made a factual finding that Quentin, that sorry Purley sweat when he drafted this deed, was doing so as part of an effort to encourage and incentivize his friend Quentin White, to move near him and not just to move near him, but to move near him during his lifetime. In 1972 when this deed was drafted, Purley Sweat was living alone in a cabin in the woods with sheep. And Quentin White was acting in some capacity as a caretaker. So it's entirely consistent with the deed that this condition was intended to take effect under a certain timeline, and that was the main condition. But beyond that, we also know that there were factual findings from the trial court that the decision to ensure that some property passed to Ms. Aer was consistent with his intent and his desire. He had developed an affection for her. He had made an at least one occasional promise to give her some property. And when we look at all of these things, both the deed and the facts, there's no genuine question that this is being interpreted correctly by Judge Roff. But he clearly had a relationship with Mr. White as well. He did, your Honor. And and so is, are we to understand that his intention was that all of the kindness and the efforts that Mr. White put in for years would not be compensated for in any way? Not as stated, your Honor, if we pull back a little bit further on the facts of this case, which we can look at both through the trial court's order and this court's prior decision, what we know is that at the time this deed was drafted in 1972, Perley Sweat had already prepared a deed that was giving Quentin White a one quarter interest in the sweat home farm, which is referenced in this deed. So at the time he sits down and drafts this deed in 1972, he knows that upon his death, Quentin White is supposed to take some property. Now what happens is, is after his death, Quentin White, because he's in a dispute with the heirs, disclaims that interest. And so he wants now for this court to come back and say, well, because I disclaimed that interest, I didn't take anything and therefore I unilaterally sort of wiped out Ms ER's executory interest in this property even though she was not a party to that decision. Um, that logically doesn't make sense. What also doesn't make sense is that the interpretation he's advancing would basically turn this deed on its head. He's saying to this court, the main condition wasn't the 10 year limitation. The main condition was that Quentin White acquire some property. Well, if that was the main condition, Purley Sweat should have said that was the main condition. Additionally, um, justice Marconi asked a question about when it referred to so other land to live on, there's no finding that that other land had to be purley sweat's other land. And in fact, judge Roff found that Professor White chose to live on a different property in Keen and ultimately moved back to his home state of Utah. So that sentence doesn't have the meaning partic that's afforded to it, particularly when we apply the facts of this case. What do we do with the years of taxes paid on the land by Mr. White? It's an interesting question and it's one that first came to my mind when I was introduced to this case, but it wasn't addressed without, frankly, it wasn't preserved in any way. Um, so it's not before this court, but to go to the substance of your question, I mean that's ultimately an equitable argument. And our position would be that if you get into the equities and dig down into this, Quentin White had this property, this deed in his possession in the early 1970s. He knew that there was an interest, or he should have known that Ms. Ager may have an interest in this property. Her interest vested in 1982 when the 10 year period came to an end. So while he incurred taxes that he paid, she should have been the owner of that property. She was deprived use of that property since 1982. So I think ultimately the equities at a minimum balance out, but they really should tip in her favor in that regard. I'm happy to touch on any questions that the court may have if there's any about the statutory questions. Otherwise I'll rest On my brief. I would like to ask you about the statute and, uh, the word retain and section two A mm-Hmm. Um, how are we to read that? So retained refers to the interests that are cited in the statute, so it refers to rights of reentry, reverters tho those are things that in the language of property law, as I believe this court is aware, are referred to as retained interests. Executory interests are interests that are created. And so when we read that section, what the legislature is doing there is, it's saying rights of reverter, um, rights of reentry, retained interests. If a grantor today wants to draft a deed and retain those types of interests or create some other future interest, that's not gonna be possible. But it's not meant to be read to exclude and wipe out all prior existing interests and it can't be read that way if this next section three is to make any sense. So, And can I ask for my colleague who's not here, whether this case implicates the doctrine of springing use? Frankly, I'm not sure. I have not considered that question. The law school exam. Right, exactly. Well, thank you. Thank You, counsel. Thank you. Thank you. Alright, case submitted. Yes, your honor. And, um, may I ask counsel to come forward please? On the matter of Lorraine McDonald versus Lisa j.