State of New Hampshire v. Jeffrey Woodburn

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you haven't reserved any time. Is that right? One minute. One minute. Oh, thank you. If it may please the court. Uh, my name is Jeff Woodburn. I represent myself. I'm a non-lawyer, and I reserve one minute and welcome questions at any time. Uh, I'm gonna argue that the court here by not providing me a self-defense jury instruction, and that's a structural error requiring reversal. Over the past three decades, this court has clarified and reduced this court once called the self-Defense objection rubric, to a simpler framework, a laser focused on the search for some evidence restraining the urge of trial courts to decide the merits versus a simple search for some evidence. Is it your position that the trial court prevented you from putting in some evidence to support this defense or that there was evidence supporting a self, self-defense instruction re regard regardless, Uh, thank you. Um, uh, there, there was some evidence, um, of a struggle. There were words, the result of acts that by themselves should have justified self-defense and went beyond, um, the simple threat, but an actual assault. So we don't need to get to whether the trial court and not preventing you from putting in evidence of that prior occasion when the victim, the alleged victim was on your car. There's evidence in the record that supports the defense regardless. Is that your position? I'm not sure I understand your question, your honor. Well, you're challenging the, the fact that the court prohibited you from putting in certain evidence regarding prior acts of aggression. So my question is, do we need to resolve that question in order to get to the self-defense instruction? Well, I would hope you would. 'cause I think it's an important for the entire, uh, tee of the story. And if this is re um, reversed and there's a new trial, those issues would certainly, um, be, be raised again. So in terms of efficiency, I I would, I would think that would be helpful. I I do agree that, uh, the, the, it's a, it's, the simple piece is I was assault. That's my assertion. And there's words by the complainant that created an imminent threat. Um, those by themselves, uh, would are some evidence and should require it. So the discussion could stop at that point, your honor. And, and that is, in my belief, meets that requirement as, as stated in the case law and the precedent, uh, As I I had understood your argument to rely on the confinement wrong rather than assault. Can you clarify that? Yes, I can. Thank you, your Honor. Um, on the evening of December 15th, I was a passenger in, in a car. The complainant was driving. I, I asked that she let me out. It was a heated argument I grabbed at the steering wheel. Um, and to avoid veering off the road, she stopped the car. That by definition is simple assault confinement. Uh, the, the, the, the next event that occurred, uh, was a conversation because my mental, um, processing isn't questioned. Here is the reason I was denied. Um, if you look exclusively, the complaints were, it's not mine. Hers, what she says is, she's upset that I, um, informed her that I was gonna call a friend to pick me up. She reaches for the phone, again, her testimony, not mine. And those acts along with the history, um, of the difficulties in that relationship and are the, the personality issues that, that are important here, but also the presence of danger that is in the record, being in COAs County in December, in the middle of the night on a dirt road. Those together without any testimony from me, gives me the right to be able to defend myself. So you're saying there was both confinement and assault? I, I'm the, the, the, the definition of simple assault includes confinement, But there's no evidence that the, that the alleged victim touched You there. There doesn't, your, your Honor, it doesn't need to be, my testimony alone, um, is enough to warrant to let the jury decide whether those conflicting facts are a job for the jury to determine not the court. There was, there was what's described as tug of war about the phone. Exact. Is that right? What was, what was the testimony from the complainant and what was your testimony on that matter? The, the sequence of events is it went from that issue of confinement to stopping to the complainant's words, and then her testimony from reaching for a missed grab. At that point, my testimony, which is conflicting with the complaints, is a total war ensued where we struggled back and forth, and I incrementally increased force until the point that she let go. And that is the assault I occurred, that I admitted to and explained why I did it based upon the, all the circumstances. And, um, that's, that, that, that's, that's my testimony that there was a tough War. Well, the, the trial court seemed to find your testimony wanting in terms of the thought process. The, and, and that's an important, um, point, your Honor, is their focus was on my state of mind. And nowhere in the case law do I find that where a defendant was denied a jury instruction because of his state of mind, his mentally processing these assaults. Now, many of these are, uh, like the, the, the second one where I'm interpreting what is going on, but the other two are assaults on me by the complaint. And my testimony alone should bring that to a jury to decide that. Does It matter that you testified that you would get out of the car with or without your Phone? I, I don't think it matters at all, your Honor. Um, my mental state at that moment was to get away from that person, even at the risk of whatever harm that might be. And so at that point, I, I believe that that was, um, it doesn't change the nature. And again, it, through the focus of this process, it's for the jury to decide these, it's for the judge to say, is there some evidence? And I would argue that the judge did say there was some evidence in this case, and he noted it in his, um, his remarks that there was some evidence. But because my mental state wasn't sufficient, I didn't qualify. So he said a litmus test. I had to pass these levels of proving that my mental processing was accurate. They focused more on my mind, my state of mind than on the assault that was going on. What is the state of the record regarding the location of this incident and the particular weather and time? Sure. Uh, the, the, the, um, the record is, is clear, your Honor. Um, I'm just looking for the exact quotes, um, that I would, would rely that, um, in the middle of December in the, in the, uh, middle of the night, these are all in the record on a dirt road. Those are all there. And there's plenty of other words I don't have in front of me right here. But I would also say that an average co-op county juror would know, would know what these situations is like. They would know that a dirt road in Jefferson, they would know that it's cold in December. They would not need the definition of, of, of, of common, common knowledge to determine those things. Those were basic, basic knowledge outlined. I didn't need to say it was 32 degrees, uh, overcast. That the fact is I was, I was, I was contained. I responded to that containment. I had the right to respond to the way I did. And, um, and there's enough in the record to be able to, uh, put the situation, the presence of danger there. If I could just, I, I wanna make a distinction and make an important distinction whether a state calls this property, uh, a defensive property. And I, I would particularly point to clicker, uh, of that distinction because when someone takes something from you by force that's in your hand, and she testifies, the phone was always in my hand, and she grabbed at it sort of a missed punch, if you will. Um, those all create a situation that is very much akin to the difference between a shoplifter and a purse snatcher. When someone grabs something from your person, you get to respond. But was defensive property noticed at before trial, or was it, was it even argued during the trial? Uh, I'm sorry, I didn't, The defensive property that you're, you're arguing right now. Was that something that was brought up at trial? I, it was, my attorney brought that up and, and said, they're not required to notice them on the defensive property. This is not a defensive property case. And if you look at k clicker, the, the important issue of K clicker is he hands a check to his, to his client, for him to endure her, to endorse and give back to him when he lets go of the check. His situation changes. I never let go of the phone. It was taken from me, her words, she was upset that I was calling a friend to pick me up. She swiped at it. And in my testimony is we engaged in a tug of war. And, um, so I, I think that point is, is made clear, your honor. I, So I would just in terms of the, the, the overall case, I think this issue, um, my mental process and actions are the reason why the judge denied me a self-defense instruction. That's in the record. And I would also highlight to you that in rice actor's intent is aside by a jury, not by a judge. All these issues going on inside my head, how I'm processing it, um, may be important when someone is threatening in you and trying to interpret, do I use force? But it's very different when someone is assaulting you than that issue of intent. Um, really is, um, I think important to distinguish between what the state's arguments are. Well, And I'm also trying to square the judge's comment with, uh, your right not to testify at trial. So how would that work? Well, I mean, if you look at Chen, Chen never testified that's their best case. He never testified. Uh, the only evidence that was in that case was, uh, the metallic sound of an, of something, possibly a knife hitting a floor. So there, you don't have to testify. And I would say, even if you ignored my testimony, which I think is not the correct, because I have a chance to tell my side and let the jury decide, even if you look only at the complainant's arguments, what she said, her words, you know, she admitted that she upset with the situation. She thought it was ridiculous. She was, she grabbed at the phone. And that action does count and should qualify to allow me to respond to that based on the history and the relationship with that person and the presence of danger in that situation. It's not like K Ner where they were in a downtown location client, client lawyer meeting. This is a very different scenario, but I think instructs on the difference between defensive property and self defense. Thank you very much. Thank you. And we, you have your one minute reserved. Thank you. Appreciate that, Mr. Spicer. Good morning. May it please the court, Josh Spicer for the State of New Hampshire. Uh, the trial court properly denied the defendant's request for a self-defense instruction in this case where there was simply no evidence that would've supported a rational finding in favor of self-defense. There was no evidence that the victim in this case ever used or threatened to use force in an assault, uh, or a true assault as your honor noted. But there Is evidence that the complainant had confined the defendant in the past, correct? Uh, in the past, your Honor, I would say, I would say no. I don't believe that's what the evidence, um, was in The case. Well, Mr. Woodburn testified that, and I'm quoting, it's something there was constant problem of me trying to leave when things got too hot and Emily blocking me, preventing me. Why isn't that some evidence of prior confinement? Well, justice Stavin that was, uh, divorced and completely separate from the night of December 15th, Mr. Woodburn in that case was talking about his relationship. Generally. He was responding to a question about his therapy that he had engaged in and the, the couple's therapy with, um, the complainant. And so whether or not he reasonably, reasonably believed it was necessary for him to use force to defend himself from the imminent use of force against his own person on the night of December 15th is a separate issue that, um, supposed force, if it gets there that he mentioned was, was not related in time or, or in any way to the night of Incident. I don't see why that's a separate issue, because he brings that experience and that knowledge into this current, uh, incident. And so, uh, the interrelationship that they'd had in the past, I recall from the record there was one occasion where the complainant sat on the hood of a car. Why isn't that information that the jury should have the benefit of in sorting through these issues? Well, justice Bass, I would note the, the incident with the car, if you look at the record, occurred after December 15th after this incident. And so I don't think it, it should relate at all. And with regard to the other issues you mentioned, um, where Mr. Woodburn testified in this case, he took the stand and said, I don't remember the details that that is, I think the key point here. And so where, but We know on the 15th that he was prevented from getting out of the car. I I would just By her, so there was confinement that particular day. R respectfully justice, he, I would say he was not prevented. And the, the evidence child did not show that unless He wanted to jump out of a moving car. The, the car was stopped at the point, At that point, but he had wanted to get out and she wouldn't stop it. Your Honor, I would say that, uh, a driver, as the complainant was in, in position of being a driver, um, who refuses to immediately stop when the passenger says, stop, stop. I want to get out. Um, that, that does not equal confinement, uh, in any sense of the, and, and certainly not in the context of, of this case. Um, the, and does The interfering with calling for assistance, is that a continuation of perhaps confinement? Uh, I would say no, your Honor. And, and there was no confinement here according to the complainant's version. She, she did not testify that there was any grabbing of the wheel or any, any of that. And so, so there was that under Mr. Woodburn s uh, version of this, that he said that this did occur, but that the complainant did then stop the car. She didn't stop it immediately at the second he said, stop, stop, stop. But after he grabbed the wheel, she did. And if Mr. Woodburn is now claiming that that first incident, the alleged grabbing of the wheel and failure to stop the car at that moment, was the, um, the, the catalyst for his belief that he needed to, to bite, uh, the complainant on the hand? I would say that, that they're not related, because I guess I'm thinking of a bigger picture. If there's, if an individual's trying to get away from a situation and is prevented from doing so first by not being allowed out of the car allegedly, and then also by not being able to call for assistance or arrive so that they aren't left in the middle of nowhere. Can you put those two together Maybe in a, in a different context? But in context of, of these events and the testimony that is on record, I would say first, uh, Mr. Woodman was not prevented for calling for aid. There was testimony from, um, After he maintained control of his phone. The, the, the aversions differ on that, when that occurred. But the, the person who received that phone call did testify and said, I received a call from Mr. Woodburn, and he said, Hey, do you want to get a drink? Uh, Mr. Woodburn did not tell that individual, I'm on the side of the road. I have nowhere to go. I feel unsafe. Uh, it, it's cold, nothing of the sort. And, and so I would say there was no confinement. And I think Mr. Woodburn testimony is key here. Uh, and as I put in my brief, this issue was not preserved. There was, there was no testimony that Mr. Woodburn felt confined. He didn't believe, uh, he could leave the car without his phone, that it was unsafe. It was un it was too cold. He wasn't dressed, he didn't have the proper supplies. He was in an isolated or unsafe location. And in fact, he testified the opposite, that I would've left the car without my phone. I didn't need my, my phone to leave the car. So for him now to claim on appeal for the first time that he needed that phone to leave the car, and it was unsafe for him to do so without his phone, I think that that should not be considered. Well, can a jury draw inferences from the evidence to reach that conclusion? Well, there's simply, well, the evidence in this case, your Honor, was that there, there was, there, there was no evidence of that. Uh, I apologize if, if I'm seeming a little circular here, but where, Well, there was evidence that they were on a dirt road in Jefferson, correct? December 15th, middle of the night. Mm-Hmm. I think any rational juror could understand it if you're being left without a phone in the middle of nowhere, in the middle of December, that's a dangerous situation. Uh, perhaps, uh, your Honor. But in this case, I think the jury was not left with just that alone. And to the extent that, that Mr. Woodburn is asking this court to, to make, uh, findings or, or judicial notice of these facts, I think that's inappropriate at this time. But what the jury did have was Mr. Wood Burn's testimony that he would've left the car without the phone. So whether or not it was cold or unsafe, I think is, is a little bit putting the cart before the horse, there was no, but Without the jury instruction. Was the jury actually evaluating the correct relationship of these events? I, I think they were Justice Scard. And again, the issue, uh, that's before this court on appeal is whether or not there was any evidence in the record there would support, um, national fighting in favor of self-defense. In other words, was there any evidence, um, that Mr. Woodburn reasonably believed that arm non-deadly force was about, was imminently going to be used against him? He seems to have admitted, and I think the, the record bears out that, uh, assault style use of force is out of the question here. There was no testimony that the victim swung a, a, a fist or attempted to hit him. He bases in his argument entirely at this point on confinement. And, uh, again, I would say there was no confinement here. His own words, um, contradict that. But do you agree that the standard for getting the jury instruction is some evidence? All there has to do, all there has to be, is some evidence and then parties can argue about it and the jury can have, uh, legal framework to process the information that is before? I, I would agree with that, that the bar is low. It is only some evidence. And, uh, I would say in this case, there was none there. And if there is some evidence, then the court's required to give the instruction, right? I if there is more than a mesilla or a minutia, um, not any evidence, but, but higher than that admittedly low bar, then yes, uh, defendant would qualify the state's. Does it, does there need to be some evidence of the defendant's mental state in order to get the instruction as suggested by the trial court? Um, I don't believe that is an, an element of it, but I believe that is ultimately what the question is, not so many words. The the question for this court is, was there any evidence that the defendant reasonably believed that it force was imminently going to be used against him? That, of course, implicates his mental state. If this were a case where he had not testified, uh, and there was surveillance for the juror witness who said someone pointed a gun in his face, then a jury could from, uh, from circumstances like that reasonably infer the mental state of someone in that position. But I think when a defendant takes the stand and puts their own mental state in play and, and specifically says, I don't remember anything that becomes part of the totality of, of the evidence, and that's What the d doing, defendant doesn't even have to take the stand. So how, how does this inquiry into mental state occur when the defendant exercises their right not to testify? I, I think if a defendant exercises the right not, not to testify, it would of course be inappropriate to say there is no evidence of, of what the defendant, uh, directly thought. There's no evidence of what was in the defendant's mind. But when the defendant, as Mr. Woodburn in this case does testify and does say, I don't remember what happened, uh, so to speak, that becomes part of the evidence. And it is fair game for consideration by the court. And, uh, it becomes part of the record. But the nature of these events is that they're going to be, uh, uh, there's gonna be, time is of the essence and things are happening quickly. So it seems like a very artificial standard to say that that person has to recreate what their thinking was when they're having a fight over a cell phone in a car. Respectfully, I would disagree. There are other cases where I think, um, people in Mr. Woodburn situation do testify. Vassar and UCT are, and Hayward are all in that line where I believe, uh, the person claiming self-defense does testify and say, in, in Vassar, for example, the defendant in that case said, I reasonably believed that it was necessary to use deadly force because my brother said he was going to kill my mother. I thought he was going to kill my mother, and I had to, to shoot my brother to defend her. And that was based on his testimony that I thought he was gonna kill her or he was gonna kill me. Um, with The defendant who doesn't recall or say it's a blackout situation, then how is that not the same as a defendant who doesn't testify? How do you glean from they don't remember some kind of mental statement? Well, your Honor, I would say in this case, the, it's, it's not, um, necessary to glean things. In this case, the defendant's own words where I don't remember. And then if you take his testimony out of the picture and you look at the totality of the other evidence, even then there's no evidence from which, uh, a reasonable jury. So we could apply the same standard as we would if a defendant didn't testify. I think the standard is the same. If a defendant does testify, then that just adds further, um, further evidence to the record. But there was evidence of, about a tug of war over the cell phone There was in this case. Right? So Let's assume the complainant grabbed Mr. Woodburn jacket instead of the phone to prevent him from getting out of the car. Would that be some evidence that supports a confinement self-defense instruction? It, it, it might, I think in this case where, um, where there was no evidence from either side, there's no evidence in the record that the complainant ever touched Mr. Woodburn. And the the complainant actually said on direct and was not challenged that she never actually touched his phone. And there's difference of opinion about that. But where Mr. Woodburn testified I was leaving that car with her without my phone and failed to notice a defensive property, there's no evidence that he was confined. If the defendant in his situation had said, yes, I was trying to leave the car, and the complainant locked the doors or said, don't leave, or grab me by the arm, grab my coat. That would be different. That would be actual evidence that, that he was confined or from Mr. Juror could find that he believed it was reasonable to believe that he was confined based on those facts, but simply don't have those here. And we in fact have the opposite. Well, We have incons some inconsistencies here. Fair to say There are inconsistencies, your Honor, but I don't believe that, um, those inconsistencies, um, were, were such that they needed to be resolved by a jury because Right, I mean, just because the evidence is inconsistent or testimony is inconsistent, doesn't mean you don't get the self defense instruction. We've had, we've case law on that, don't we? You, you do. I I just think in this case, inconsistencies aren't, um, between, you know, the first party saying, I, I didn't confine him and the second party saying I did, that would be some evidence. Uh, in this case, there was no evidence. The inconsistency is whether or not the complainant touched the phone or whether or not there was a tug of war over the phone. But regardless of the, whether the tug of the war over the phone actually occurred, Mr. Woodburn told the court and told the jury I was not confined. I was going to leave that car with her without my phone. And So, but there's no dispute, as Justice Sons Marconi said that he asked to get out, and she did not exceed to that request immediately. Well, I apologize if I mischaracterized that she, she did exceed to that request. She did stop the car, uh, under either scenario. She did stop the car, the car came to arrest, uh, and then Mr. Woodburn exited and made that phone call. Uh, the, the complainant testified that she did not stop him from leaving the car, that she did stop the car at some point on her road, and that he, he made a phone call and he exited the car, um, Be before your Time's up. Let me just ask you about the Hayward case. It seems to me that it stands for the proposition that this evidence about the past incidents and the nature of their relationship, uh, Hayward stands for the proposition that that should actually have been admitted. How do you distinguish this from Hayward? I, I would distinguish this by saying that it's a, uh, a case by case. In fact, specific inquiry Hayward, I, I don't believe stands for the proposition that any defendant who claims self-defense, uh, automatically gets to admit evidence of prior, alleged prior accident aggression by the victim in Hayward. Uh, it was, I believe duress and it was imminent. Uh, the, the defendant, Hayward said I was, was forced to serve as, I guess, the getaway driver because the, um, the, the or the victim had held a knife to my throat previously and said, if you don't do what I tell you to do or ask you to do, I'm going to hurt you. But There were prior threats and prior violence Yes. That were were sometime prior. Yes. I, the, the temporal connection is not the issue here. It's the, the, the relevance and nexus to the charged conduct, um, evidence that, that the complainant here may have, um, blocked Mr. Woodburn from leaving a room at unspecified times for unspecified reasons, I don't think has any bearing or any probative value with regard to why he committed the acts that he admitted to Committing. Well, isn't that a great argument to make the jury once this instruction is in play rather than an argument for why the instruction shouldn't be given? I, I think there's a threshold there, your Honor, I think that simply that that threshold was not met. This is 4 0 4 B there, there's relevance prong. There's the, the, um, the balancing of, of probative value versus, um, danger of, of confusing the jury and those things. And that simply was not satisfied. Thank you. Your time's up. Thanks very much. Thank you. Mr. Woodburn. Do you wish to use your minute? Thank you very much. I would just add in terms of that last conversation in Vassar, it was the defendant's words. In this case, it is complainant's interviews with the state, um, as it relates to evidence, um, and conflicting evidence. It's very clear, um, that, um, contradicted overwhelming evidence is acceptable under peacock, inconsistent and numerous, um, um, occasions, um, is um, under pass. So those are all issues that jury should decide. Um, to the question about, uh, preservation of the danger, I did not add that I had in the record a long walk from anything giving a sense of isolation. And finally, I would share with you, um, the, the words of the judge, uh, that the court said. I understand there's plenty of testimony about the tug of wars in the phone, but there's no evidence that implicates the mental processes and actions that are necessary to entitle someone to a self-defense instruction. I think that's important. Thank you very much. Thank you very much, Mr. Woodburn Case submitted. The court is now in recess.