State of New Hampshire v. Jessica Warren

A Merrimack County grand jury indicted the defendant, Jessica Warren, on one count of driving after revocation or suspension, death resulting, in violation of RSA 263:64, V-a. A 1 3. Following a jury trial, the defendant was found guilty. T5 709. The trial court (Attorri, J.) sentenced her to a stand-committed term of 3.5 to 7 years. S at 36-37. “T1-T5” refers to the transcript to the trial.

“S” refers to the transcript to the sentencing hearing. “A” refers to the appendix to the defendant’s brief. “Def. Br.” refers to the defendant’s brief.

“SA” refers to the appendix to the State’s brief.

Betten was taken to the hospital, where he was pronounced dead. T1 at 121. At the time of the accident, the defendant’s license was suspended. T3 at 415. The State charged her with driving after revocation or suspension, death resulting. A at 3.

Betten was “obviously, not good” and asked the defendant if she was the driver of the van. T at 61. The defendant, in a voice Lavoie described as “very flat, not much emotion, just very matter of fact, ” admitted she was the driver of the van. T at 61. Lavoie testified that the defendant then “just walked away.” T at 61.

Jeffrey Noonan testified that he was driving behind the defendant when the collision occurred. T1 at 77-78. He stated that Betten was “just ahead” of the defendant’s van, and he initially “thought the van was going to hit the UPS truck” because the defendant left “very little room between.” T1 at 78. Noonan testified that moments after the defendant passed the UPS truck her van “just began bouncing” T1 at 78. Noonan saw the van run over Betten’s body “like a speed bump, ” repeatedly going “up and down, up and down, up and down.” T1 at 79. Noonan saw Betten’s body and debris coming from out of the defendant’s van, but he never saw any brake lights. T1 at 79-80.

Like Lavoie, Noonan got out of his car to check on Betten. T1 at 82. He testified that there was little he could do for Betten, whose “foot was ripped off” with “a bone sticking out” and his chest was “compressed so he was more oval.” T at 82. An off-duty EMT arrived at the scene and called an ambulance. T1 at 83. Noonan testified that he also asked the defendant if she was driving the van, and the defendant claimed that “it was a different car” that struck Betten. T1 at 86.

Michael Langille, an off-duty EMT, testified that he was driving on State Street when he saw Betten lying in the road and used his car to shield Betten from traffic. T at 112. Langile secured Betten’s head and neck to prevent further injury and “could feel crepitus, which is like the rubbing of bones together.” T at 116. Langille stayed with Betten until an ambulance arrived, but Betten had stopped breathing at that point. T1 at 119-20. Because he was an EMT, Langille accompanied Betten in the ambulance and attempted chest compressions. T1 at 119. Once they arrived at the hospital, Betten was pronounced dead. T1 at 120-21. Charles Janssen, the driver of the Chevy box truck, testified that the defendant’s van “just veered off the side of the road into the yard” before turning back on to the road, crossing the center line, and colliding with his truck. T1 at 138-39. He explained that the defendant then tried to back up before he told her, “Nope, you’re not going anywhere.” T1 141. Janssen heard the defendant exclaim, “Can you believe this?” T 2 at 143 Jeffrey Pike saw the defendant’s van strike the box truck and spoke to her after she got out. T2 at 166-68. He testified that he told the defendant, “You just hit somebody back there, ” and she responded, “It wasn’t me. It was the person in front of me.” T2 at 168. Pike also heard the defendant talking on her phone after the collision and recalled the conversation “didn’t have anything to do with, like, somebody being hurt.” T2 at 173-74.

Michael Graves, the UPS driver, testified that he did not see the collision but heard a loud crash as he was making a delivery. T2 at 208. He looked up and saw parts of a bike in the road and a minivan driving away. T2 at 208. Graves testified that he heard a female voice inside the car shout, “Oh, no. Oh. no. Oh, no.” T2 at 208-09. He explained that he kept watching the van as it drove away, “and that’s when I saw the body come underneath.” T2 at 209.

Multiple police officers also testified about the steps they took while the fatal collision was being investigated. Detective Joseph Chaput explained that he photographed Betten’s body at the hospital and ascertained his identity. T2 at 267-74. Detective Chaput testified that the police seized the defendant’s phone but were unable to locate any evidence that she was using it at the time of her collision with Betten. T2 at 275. Officer Brian Cook spoke to the defendant at the scene of the collision. T2 at 287-88. The defendant claimed that she saw a person lying in the street and was forced to swerve off the road. T2 at 287. The defendant admitted to Officer Cook that she did not have a valid driver’s license. T2 at 288. Officer Cook testified that he asked the defendant if she remembered hitting a cyclist, and she stated that she thought another minivan struck Betten. T2 at 288-89.

Detectives Julie Curtin and Chris DeAngelis, as well as Officers Patrick Ofrias and Christian Lovejoy, testified and explained how the police obtained statements from the witnesses to the collision and seized the defendant’s phone and the van she was driving. T3 at 316-18, 345, 351. Detective DeAngelis testified that he also spoke with the defendant, and she told him that she remembered seeing Betten’s face before the collision. T3 at 351. Detective DeAngelis further explained that the defendant remembered giving Betten “a thumbs up” before the collision. T3 at 351- 52.

Detective Michael Cassidy testified that he reviewed the defendant’s driving record and learned that her license had been suspended for cancellation of insurance. T3 at 415-16. The State then published to the jury the notice that was mailed to the defendant’s home address, on letterhead from the New Hampshire Department of Safety, that her driving privileges had been suspended. T3 at 415-17. Detective Cassidy also spoke to the defendant after the accident, and she admitted that she knew her license had been suspended. T3 at 417.

Denis Laliberte, a bicycle expert, testified that he inspected Betten’s bicycle after the collision at the request of the Concord Police Department. T3 at 456. His inspection determined that the brakes were functional with no leaks in the hydraulics, the steering unit was still secured and attached, and there was adequate tread on the tires. T3 at 456-63. In Laliberte’s opinion, there were no mechanical issues with Betten’s bicycle that could have contributed to the collision. T3 at 463.

Jennifer Williams testified that she was the owner of the van and that she lent it to the defendant without knowing the defendant’s license was suspended. T4 at 489-90. Williams explained that she had purchased the van “about a month” before the collision and that it had passed State inspection. T4 at 496. Williams testified that the defendant called her and said she was in an accident but “didn’t really go into details of how severe it was.” T4 at 495. It was only after going to the scene herself that Williams understood the severity of the defendant’s collision with Betten. T4 at 495. Officers Bryan Plamondon and James O’Leary performed the post- collision inspection of the van. T4 at 510, 537. Officer O’Leary explained that the van’s steering system was in operating condition, the windshield wipers were functional, and the tires had sufficient tread to pass a state inspection. T4 at 545-51. There was a crack in the busing to the control arm, and Officer O’Leary surmised, “It would be tough to tell just by looking at it” if the control arm would have passed state inspection. T4 at 552. However, the brakes were working properly and nothing significant was found after examining the exhaust system. T4 at 451-55 Doctor Jennie Duval, the Chief Medical Examiner for the State of New Hampshire, performed Betten’s autopsy. Doctor Duval testified that the toxicology results showed that the only substance in Betten’s system was caffeine. T4 at 586. Her autopsy determined that Betten was in good health prior to the collision but he suffered multiple rib fractures that “made it impossible for normal breathing” and caused “bleeding and air leak into the chest.” T4 at 595. Doctor Duval determined that Betten ultimately succumbed to respiratory failure caused by multiple rib fractures puncturing his lungs. T4 at 595.

T4 at 478.

The trial court acknowledged the jury had to find that the defendant knew her license was suspended but questioned why the State had to prove the defendant knowingly violated a rule of the road as well. T4 at 478. It noted that violation level offenses for violating the rules of the road do not require any mens rea. T4 at 478-84. The State agreed, stating that “violation-level offenses don’t have a mental state. And so it logically does not apply to the unlawful operation.” T4 at 484.

The next day, the trial court informed the parties that it would not be providing the defendant’s requested “knowingly” instruction. T5 at 645. It stated that “[t]o the extent I haven’t pointed it out, I think it would mean that causing death while driving under suspension would require a more culpable mental state than causing death while driving negligently. I don’t think that makes sense under the statutory scheme.” T5 at 645. The trial court then instructed the jury that it could find the defendant guilty only if the State proved the following:

resulting in a person ’s death or serious bodily injury. Three, that the Defendant operated the motor vehicle in an unlawful manner. And four, that the Defendant’s unlawful operation caused or materially contributed to the collision.

T5 at 694.

The trial court instructed the jury on the statutory definition of “knowingly” and stated that “in this case, in order to find the Defendant guilty, you must find that she knew she was operating a motor vehicle and that she knew her driver’s license was suspended or revoked at the time.” T5 at 695. The trial court also instructed the jury that “unlawful operation” means “operation in violation of a rule of the road, ” which “relates to conduct that causes the collision and is not satisfied merely by showing the defendant’s suspension status.” T5 at 695.

The trial court further instructed the jury that “to satisfy the unlawful operation element, the State must prove that the Defendant violated a rule of the road.” T5 at 696. The instructions stated the applicable rule of the road was that every driver “shall exercise due care by leaving a reasonable and prudent distance between the vehicle and the bicycle. The distance shall be presumed to be reasonable and prudent if it is at least three feet when the vehicle is traveling at 30 miles per hour or less, with one additional foot of clearance required for every 10 miles per hour above 30 miles per hour.” T5 at 696 The jury found the defendant guilty. T5 at 709. This appeal followed.

The trial court did not err by declining to instruct the jury that it had to find that the defendant knowingly engaged in conduct that violated a rule of the road. Because RSA 263:64 does not contain a required mens rea, the State need only prove a culpable mental state that is appropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the policy considerations for punishing the conduct in question. Under these considerations, the only element that requires a knowingly mens rea is the defendant’s act of driving with a suspended or revoked license.

The statutory scheme and the legislative history show that the legislature had two goals in enacting RSA 263:64, V-a: removing unsafe drivers from the road and closing a loophole in negligent homicide law that prevented the State from charging anything above a violation-level offense when there were no witnesses to a fatal accident caused by a person who drove knowing her license had been suspended. However, a person who knowingly drives with a suspended license is not less dangerous because she does not also know her conduct violates a rule of the road. Requiring the State to prove such knowledge would frustrate the statutory goal of deterring these drivers from getting on the road in the first place. The defendant’s proposed construction of RSA 264:63 would also require a more culpable mental state then negligent homicide, which does not require the State to prove a defendant “knowingly” did anything. The trial court correctly instructed the jury, and the defendant’s conviction should be affirmed.

The culpability required for a particular offense is a question of statutory interpretation that is reviewed de novo. State v. Riendeau, 160 N.H. 288, 292 (2010). This Court’s task “is to construe Criminal Code provisions according to the fair import of their terms and to promote justice.” Id. at 293. The Court looks “first to the plain language of the statute to determine legislative intent.” Id. The goal “is to apply statutes in light of the legislature’s intent in enacting them, and in light of the policy sought to be advanced by the entire statutory scheme.” State v. Furgal, 161 N.H. 206, 210 (2010).

If the language of a statute is ambiguous, the Court may review the legislative history to aid its analysis. State v. Folds, 172 N.H. 513, 521 (2019). “Where legislative history plainly supports a particular construction of the statute, [this Court] will adopt that construction, since [this Court’s] task in interpreting statutes is to determine legislative intent.” Id. at 526 (quotation omitted).

Driving with a suspended or revoked license is a class B felony “where such person’s unlawful operation of the motor vehicle caused or materially contributed to the collision.” RSA 263:64, V-a. “Evidence that the driver violated any of the rules of the road shall be prima facie evidence that the driver caused or materially contributed to the collision.” Id.

The parties agreed that an element of the offense is that the defendant operated a motor vehicle in an “unlawful manner” and further agreed that unlawful operation includes “operation in violation of a rule of the road.” A5, A8. The parties disagreed about whether a knowingly mental state applied to the violation of a rule of the road “element.” T4 at 477-484. The trial court ruled that a knowingly mens rea does not apply to this agreed upon element. T5 at 645. The trial court did not err. Although RSA 263:64 does not contain a culpable mental state, a person can be convicted of a felony or a misdemeanor only if he acts “purposely, knowingly, recklessly or negligently, as the law may require, with respect to each material element of the offense.” RSA 626:2, I. “When the law defining an offense prescribes the kind of culpability that is sufficient for its commission, without distinguishing among the material elements thereof, such culpability shall apply to all the material elements, unless a contrary purpose plainly appears.” Id. However, “[w]hen the culpable state of mind has been omitted from a statute, the State must prove the existence of the mental state which is appropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the policy considerations for punishing the conduct in question.” Riendeau, 160 N.H. at 293.

In State v. Curran, this Court held that a conviction for driving after suspension or revocation requires the State prove the defendant drove with knowledge of the revocation or suspension. 140 N.H. 530, 532 (1995). The defendant contends that this holding, along with RSA 626:2, imposes a knowingly mens rea to every element of RSA 263:64. Def. Br. at 24-25. According to the defendant, this includes the element requiring the State prove an offender’s “unlawful operation of the motor vehicle caused or materially contributed to the collision.” Def. Br. at 25. This Court rejected a similar argument in Riendeau.

Riendeau concerned the interpretation of RSA 262:23, I, which prohibited a habitual offender from driving “on the ways of this state while an order of the director or the court prohibiting such driving remains in effect.” Id. at 293. (emphasis added). The statute omitted the culpable mental state, but the Court had previously held that the State had to prove the defendant drove with knowledge of his status as a habitual offender. Id. at 292. However, the Court rejected the defendant’s argument that 626:2, I also required the State prove the defendant knowingly drove on a “way.” Id. at 294. It explained: Similarly unavailing is the defendant’s assertion that RSA 626:2, I, requires application of the same mental state to all material elements of this offense. This provision is inapplicable on its face, since the law defining the offense at issue, RSA 262:23, I, does not prescribe the kind of culpability that is sufficient for its commission. The defendant’s attempt to read this provision as embodying “a general principle favoring consistency in the application of a mental state to the several elements defining a single crime” does not dictate our result.

Id. Instead, the Court determined that it had to consider the “nature of the offense and the policy considerations for punishing the conduct in question” to decide if any mental state was required to satisfy the “way” element of the statute. Id. at 294-95.

The Court concluded that the primary purpose of the statute was to “foster safety by removing irresponsible drivers from the highways of the State.” Id. at 295. The Court found that this purpose “is best served by interpreting the statute as prohibiting the action itself — driving on a ‘way’ — irrespective of the defendant’s awareness of his presence on a ‘way.’” Id. at 297. To find otherwise “would permit defendants who have demonstrated their indifference for the safety welfare of others to elude punishment by asserting that they were unaware that they were driving on a ‘way.’” Id. Thus, “the State need prove only that the defendant did in fact drive on a ‘way’ as defined by the statute.” Id. at 298. Similarly, RSA 263:64 does not prescribe a culpable mental state. As a result, RSA 626:2, I does not require a “knowingly” mens rea be applied to every element of the offense just because Curran held that the State must prove the defendant drove with knowledge of the suspension. Instead, requiring the State to prove a defendant knowingly violated a rule of the road is necessary under RSA 264:63, V-a only if requiring such a mens rea is necessary given the “nature of the offense” and the “policy considerations for punishing the conduct in question.” The statutory scheme and legislative history show that it would frustrate the purpose of RSA 263:64 to require the State prove the defendant knowingly engaged in conduct that violated a rule of the road.

License suspension “serves the purpose of removing irresponsible drivers from the State’s highways for the public’s protection[.]” State v. Drewry, 141 N.H. 514, 516-17 (1996). Like habitual offenders, those who drive with knowledge of a suspension are not any less dangerous when they do not actually know they are engaging in conduct that violates a rule of the road. Further, the State never needs to prove a driver knowingly violated a rule of the road because violation level offenses to not have any mens rea.

RSA 626:2, I. Requiring the State to prove such knowledge only in the context of RSA 263:64, V-a would frustrate the statutory goal of promoting public safety by getting drivers with suspended licenses off the road. Moreover, a negligent homicide conviction does not require the State prove the defendant did anything “knowingly, ” only that the defendant “fail[ed] to become aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the material element exists or will result from his conduct[.]” RSA 626:2, II(d). As the trial court correctly recognized, accepting the defendant’s proposed construction of RSA 264:63 would require a more culpable mental state for driving after revocation or suspension, death resulting, then a conviction for negligent homicide. Thus, the language of RSA 263:64, V-a and the overall statutory scheme unambiguously show that a “knowingly” mental state applies only to the defendant’s knowledge of their suspension. Even if there was any ambiguity in the statute, the legislative history supports the State’s construction of RSA 263:64, V-a. The legislative history confirms that the legislature did not intend that obtaining a conviction for driving after revocation or suspension should be more difficult than negligent homicide with a vehicle. It also shows that the legislature viewed the act of driving with knowledge of the suspension—not a violation of the rules of the road—as the dangerous conduct that made a person more culpable when the person caused a collision resulting in death.

The statement of intent following the House Committee of Criminal Justice and Public Safety’s vote on House Bill 204, which enacted subpart V-a, explained that the bill “establishes penalties for collisions resulting in injuries or property damage when the collision was caused or contributed to by a driver whose license is under revocation or suspension.” See Minutes on Hearing on HB 204-FN: An act relative to driving after revocation or suspension.: Hearing Before House Committee on Criminal Justice and Public Safety (February 24, 1999) (Committee Report); SA at 3-4.2 The bill’s sponsor, Representative Robert Letourneau, testified before the Committee. SA at 26. He testified that the bill was intended to close a “loophole” that occurred when there were no witnesses to a fatal collision involving a driver with a suspended or revoked license. House Committee. HB 204-FN: An act relative to driving after revocation or suspension: Hearing Before House Committee on Criminal Justice and Public Safety (1999) (Testimony of Robert J. Letourneau); SA at 26. As Representative Letourneau explained, the State could not prove the necessary intent to convict for negligent homicide in this scenario, and the offending driver would be liable only for a violation. SA at 26.

Representative Letourneau then cited an actual case in which a woman was killed by a driver who knew his license was suspended and asserted, “Why was the driver who killed Mrs. Stowers only charged with a violation-level offense. This driver was not supposed to be on the road. He was already proven to be a danger by being convicted in excess of 25 miles per hour[.]” SA at 26.

Representative Letourneau continued: This bill addresses the loophole that deals with the conduct of knowingly operating a motor vehicle while under suspension or revocation. It simply provides notice to all drivers who know their license is under suspension or revocation that they may be subjected to a greater offence than a simple violation if they choose to drive and disregard the law. It places the decision in their hands. This is the essence of self- responsibility. Be mindful that the Department of Motor Vehicles has already taken action in these cases by suspension or revocation. In this state we do not revoke someone’s license unless there is a problem. The common denominator here is safety. These drivers are suspended or revoked for the public safety. This bill will provide teeth in the law to adequately enforce societies right to public safety on the highways. Thus this bill is crafted to make those who are driving after suspension or revocation think twice before they get behind the controls of a vehicle.

SA at 27.

Thus, the overall statutory scheme and the legislative history show that the twin goals of RSA 263:64, V-a are to deter persons with a suspended license from getting on the road in the first place and to permit a felony conviction when such a driver causes a fatal accident. Neither goal is advanced by requiring the State to prove that such a driver knowingly engaged in conduct that violated a rule of the road. The only element of RSA 264:63, V-a that requires a knowing mens rea is the defendant’s knowledge of her suspended license. The trial court did not err by instructing the jury accordingly. The defendant’s conviction should be affirmed.

For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests that this Honorable Court affirm the judgment below.

The State requests a fifteen-minute oral argument.

I, Robert L. Baldridge, hereby certify that pursuant to Rule 16(11) of the New Hampshire Supreme Court Rules, this brief contains approximately 4, 900 words, which is fewer than the words permitted by this Court’s rules. Counsel relied upon the word count of the computer program used to prepare this brief.

November 13, 2024 /s/ Robert L. Baldridge Robert L. Baldridge

I, Robert L. Baldridge, hereby certify that a copy of the State’s brief shall be served on, counsel for the defendant, through the New Hampshire Supreme Court’s electronic filing system.

November 13, 2024 /s/ Robert L. Baldridge Robert L. Baldridge