

New Hampshire Supreme Court
Professional Conduct Committee

a committee of the attorney discipline system

4 Chenell Drive, Suite 102
Concord, New Hampshire 03301
603-224-5828 ♦ Fax 228-9511

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*non-lawyer member

Ventura, John advs. Attorney Discipline Office
#2024-010 and #2024-023

Order

On August 19, 2025, the Professional Conduct Committee (“PCC”) held oral argument in this case. Stephanie Hausman was recused. Both the Attorney Discipline Office and Respondent presented. Pending before the PCC were the following: (i) a jointly filed Stipulation dated March 26, 2025 (the “Stipulation”); (ii) an Assented-to Request for Protective Order relating to the Stipulation; and (iii) an Agreement to Pay Costs.

After deliberation following oral argument, the PCC voted to conditionally approve the Stipulation as follows: the PCC agreed that the baseline sanction in this case would normally be a disbarment pursuant to ABA Standard 4.41(b). Though the NH Supreme Court has not adopted the ABA Standards, it looks to them for guidance. *Conner’s Case*, 158 N.H. 299, 303 (2009). In this case, the PCC voted to make a downward departure from the baseline of disbarment to a one-year suspension, stayed with the conditions described in the Stipulation.

On September 16, 2025, the PCC voted to approve the Assented-to Protective Order relating to the Stipulation and the Agreement to Pay Costs.

October 2, 2025

/s/ Caroline K. Leonard
Caroline K. Leonard, Vice Chair

cc: Sara S. Greene, Disciplinary Counsel (by email)
John Ventura, Esq. (by email and U.S. Mail)

NEW HAMPSHIRE SUPREME COURT
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT COMMITTEE

Ventura, John advs. Attorney Discipline Office - #24-010
and
Ventura, John advs. Attorney Discipline Office - #24-023

**STIPULATION AS TO FACTS, VIOLATIONS,
AND SANCTION: ONE-YEAR SUSPENSION, STAYED**

Respondent John Ventura, Esq., and the Attorney Discipline Office (ADO) stipulate as follows:

A. Facts

1. Mr. Ventura is an attorney licensed to practice law in New Hampshire. Mr. Ventura was admitted to practice on November 19, 2015.
2. Mr. Ventura was also admitted to practice law in Massachusetts on June 17, 2015. He is currently on active status for the Massachusetts Bar.
3. At all times material to this proceeding, Mr. Ventura operated his law office as Ventura Law, LLC, 126 N. Main Street, Newton, NH.
4. Mr. Ventura does not have a previous disciplinary history.

Background

5. This matter arises from a referral filed by the Honorable David W. Ruoff and a complaint filed by Mark F. Sullivan, Esquire against John Ventura, Esquire involving his representation of Jason Mainz and Michele Mainz in an action for partition entitled *Joanne Pinette v. Jason Mainz and Michele Mainz*, Case No. 218-2022-CV-00800, pending in the Rockingham County Superior Court (the "Court").
6. Judge Ruoff is the Superior Court Justice who presided over the Action. Mr. Sullivan appeared on behalf of Mr. and Ms. Mainz after Mr. Ventura failed to file certain pleadings and appear for a hearing in the matter.
7. The Court ultimately entered judgment for the Plaintiff and against Mr. Ventura's

clients based on his failure to file the pleadings and appear at a scheduled hearing. The property subject to the partition has been sold, with the proceeds split equally between the three parties.

Underlying Action for Partition


8. On or about September 29, 2022, Joanne Pinette filed a Petition for Partition (the “Petition”) with the Court against the Mainzes. The subject of the Petition was real property located at 8 Bertha Lane in Raymond, New Hampshire (the “Property”) jointly owned by Ms. Pinette and Mr. and Ms. Mainz. Ms. Pinette is Michele Mainz’s mother.
9. In summary, there was a falling out between Ms. Pinette and her daughter, and Ms. Pinette sought to sell the Property so that she could use the sale proceeds to obtain new housing, as well as collect a debt that her daughter, Ms. Mainz, purportedly owed to her in the amount of approximately \$65,000. At the time that she filed the Petition, Ms. Pinette resided with her ex-husband in Florida, while Mr. and Ms. Mainz resided in the Property.
10. On November 16, 2022, Mr. Ventura filed an Appearance in the Action on behalf of Mr. and Ms. Mainz, and on November 21, 2022, Mr. Ventura filed an Answer to the Petition. The Mainzes paid Mr. Ventura a \$2,500 retainer for handling the Petition.

Mr. Ventura’s Professional Background

11. Mr. Ventura has served as a town or police prosecutor since 2014, handling mostly misdemeanors, probable cause hearings, and violation level offenses. At the time of his Appearance in the Action, Mr. Ventura was working part-time as a town prosecutor for various seacoast communities, including Seabrook, North Hampton, Hampton Falls, and South Hampton. In this capacity, Mr. Ventura does not use e-filing. He had the support of two legal assistants for his work for Seabrook.
12. Also during the pertinent time frame, Mr. Ventura was the full time Chief of Police for Brentwood, New Hampshire, a position from which he resigned in November 2024.

13. Throughout 2023, Mr. Ventura was extremely busy in these two positions, and found himself spread thin. In addition, Mr. Ventura rarely represents private clients, but agreed to assist the Mainzes based on a personal request from a friend. He admits in hindsight that civil matters such as an action for partition were outside of his expertise.

14.



Default Judgment in Partition Action

15. Mr. Ventura's Appearance in the matter noted the following email:

john@jventuralaw.com (this email is not the email Mr. Ventura maintains as town prosecutor). Cindy Bodendorf, Esq. represented the plaintiff in the Action.

16. Pursuant to New Hampshire Superior Court Rule 22 (Automatic Disclosures),¹ the

¹ NH Superior Court Rule 22 states, in relevant part:

(a) Materials that Must Be Disclosed. Except as may be otherwise ordered by the court for good cause shown, a party must without awaiting a discovery request, provide to the other parties:

(1) the name and, if known, the address and telephone number of each individual likely to have discoverable information that the disclosing party may use to support his or her claims or defenses, unless the use would be solely for impeachment, and, unless such information is contained in a document provided pursuant to Rule 22 (a)(2), a summary of the information believed by the disclosing party to be possessed by each such person;

(2) a copy of all documents, electronically stored information, and tangible things that the disclosing party has in his or her possession, custody or control and may use to support his or her claims or defenses, unless the use would be solely for impeachment;

(3) a computation of each category of damages claimed by the disclosing party together with all documents or other evidentiary materials on which each computation is based, including materials bearing on the nature and extent of injuries suffered; and

(4) for inspection and copying, any insurance agreement or policy under which an insurance business may be liable to satisfy all or part of a possible judgment in the action or to indemnify or reimburse for payments made to satisfy the judgment.

plaintiff in a civil suit pending in the Superior Court must disclose certain information to the defendant within 30 days of the Defendant filing an answer to a complaint. The Defendant must, in turn, disclose certain information within 60 days of the Defendant filing an answer.

17. Ms. Bodendorf emailed Mr. Ventura her automatic disclosures on January 23, 2023. Mr. Ventura did not submit any Automatic Disclosures to Ms. Bodendorf. They did speak briefly by phone in March of 2023, but in the ensuing months, Ms. Bodendorf attempted to reach Mr. Ventura by email and several phone calls. He did not respond in a timely or sufficient manner to those efforts, which involved Ms. Bodendorf inquiring about possible settlement, the automatic disclosures she lacked, and eventually her intent to file a motion to compel.
18. On July 12, 2023, Ms. Bodendorf filed a motion to compel Rule 22 disclosures. Mr. Ventura would testify that he did not, at that time, see a number of emails from the NH Court Filing System notifying him that any motion to compel was filed or that there any hearings were scheduled in the Action.
19. That notwithstanding, he acknowledges that he should have calendared all Rule 22 deadlines, and affirmatively tracked the case progress, including responding to opposing counsel or initiating contact to ensure he was complying with deadlines. He further admits that he responded to Ms. Bodendorf sporadically and she was using the correct email in her attempts to reach him from January 2023 on.
20. On July 17, 2023, the Court granted the Motion to Compel. Mr. Ventura did not respond.
21. On August 8, 2023, Ms. Bodendorf filed a Motion for Default Judgment against the Defendants. Mr. Ventura did not respond.
22. On September 27, 2023, the Court held a contempt hearing which neither Mr. Ventura nor his clients attended. The Court entered Default Judgment against the Defendants on November 1, 2023.
23. Mr. Ventura received a phone call from the Mainzes around mid-November indicating that they had just been evicted from their home by the Sheriff's

Department. Mr. Ventura would testify that the notice from the Court regarding the default judgment went to his email account's "junk" folder.


24. Mr. Ventura takes full responsibility for missing this email, and admits that he should have checked the "junk" folder earlier or contacted the Court, particularly when he had not seen any notices for three months. In addition, he accepts responsibility for failing to respond to opposing counsel's inquiries in the January to September 2023 time period. He attributes these failures in large part to his worsening neurological symptoms, and attendant concentration problems, as well as his worsening mental health.
25. After learning of the eviction, Mr. Ventura communicated with his clients and Ms. Bodendorf to resolve the dispute and reach an agreement to allow his clients to enter the Property to recover their personal property. These efforts proved to be unsuccessful.
26. Mr. Ventura filed a Motion to Vacate and Immediate Injunction from Removal of Property dated January 11, 2024. After a hearing in April 2024, the Court denied the motions to vacate the judgment against the Defendants.²
27. The Court concluded that the Defendants' recourse for Mr. Ventura's conduct was to file a malpractice lawsuit against Mr. Ventura, rather than the Court vacating the judgment against the Defendants. Mr. Ventura has malpractice insurance and has notified his insurance carrier of the potential malpractice action. The Mainzes were ordered to pay \$24,649 in attorneys' fees to Ms. Bodendorf.
28. Mark Sullivan, Esquire, filed an appearance on behalf of Mr. and Ms. Mainz as successor counsel. Mr. Ventura contacted Mr. Sullivan, as well as the attorney the

² Interestingly, the materials submitted to the ADO demonstrate that on May 29, 2024, the Plaintiff filed a Motion to Attach against the Defendants. Upon receipt of the Motion to Attach, Mr. Ventura contacted Mr. Sullivan, who informed Mr. Ventura that Mr. Sullivan did not receive the Motion to Attach. Mr. Ventura stated that, "[h]ad I not contacted him, another motion and potential hearing would have been missed." The foregoing was evidenced by Mr. Sullivan in a pleading entitled Defendant's Surreply to the Objection to the Motion to Attach. In the pleading, Mr. Sullivan confirmed that he did not receive a copy of the Motion to Attach through the Court's filing service and that Mr. Ventura was the one who informed him of the filing.


Mainzes consulted regarding a malpractice claim, and has informed these attorneys that Mr. Ventura wishes to refund the Mainzes \$2,500 retainer.

Mr. Ventura's Physical and Mental Health; LAP Voluntary Monitoring Agreement


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
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
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32.



33.



34.

35. Ms. O'Neill will submit a written quarterly report to the ADO confirming Mr. Ventura's compliance with the LAP requirements.

B. Disciplinary Rules Violated

36. The parties agree that Mr. Ventura's conduct in this case involves violations of the New Hampshire Rules of Professional Conduct, as follows:

Rule 1.1: Competence

37. The facts set forth at ¶¶ 1-35 above are incorporated by reference.

38. Rule 1.1 states as follows:

- (a) A lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client.
- (b) Legal competence requires at a minimum:
 - (1) specific knowledge about the fields of law in which the lawyer practices;
 - (2) performance of the techniques of practice with skill;
 - (3) identification of areas beyond the lawyer's competence and bringing those areas to the client's attention;
 - (4) proper preparation; and
 - (5) attention to details and schedules necessary to assure that the matter undertaken is completed with no avoidable harm to the client's interest.
- (c) In the performance of client service, a lawyer shall at a minimum:
 - (1) gather sufficient facts regarding the client's problem from the client, and from other relevant sources;
 - (2) formulate the material issues raised, determine applicable law and identify alternative legal responses;
 - (3) develop a strategy, in consultation with the client, for solving the legal problems of the client; and
 - (4) undertake actions on the client's behalf in a timely and effective manner including, where appropriate, associating with another lawyer who possesses the skill and knowledge required to assure competent representation.

39. Mr. Ventura violated Rule 1.1 when he failed to provide competent representation to the Mainzes as set forth herein, including failing to provide automatic disclosures, track the case's deadlines appropriately, respond timely to opposing counsel, and respond timely to pleadings filed in the matter.

Rule 1.3: Diligence

40. The facts set forth at ¶¶ 1-35 above are incorporated by reference.

41. Rule 1.3 states as follows:

A lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client.

42. Mr. Ventura violated Rule 1.3 when he failed to provide diligent representation to the Mainzes as set forth herein, including failing to provide automatic disclosures, track the case's deadlines appropriately, respond timely to opposing counsel, and respond timely to pleadings filed in the matter.

Rule 1.4: Communication

43. The facts set forth at ¶¶ 1-35 above are incorporated by reference.

44. Rule 1.4 states as follows:

(a) A lawyer shall:

- (1) promptly inform the client of any decision or circumstance with respect to which the client's informed consent is required by these Rules;
- (2) reasonably consult with the client about the means by which the client's objectives are to be accomplished;
- (3) keep the client reasonably informed about the status of the matter.
- (4) promptly comply with reasonable requests for information; and
- (5) consult with the client about any relevant limitation on the lawyer's conduct when the lawyer knows that the client expects assistance not permitted by the Rules of Professional Conduct or other law.

(b) A lawyer shall explain the legal and practical aspects of a matter and alternative courses of action to the extent that such explanation is reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation.

45. Mr. Ventura violated Rule 1.4 by failing to keep his clients informed of the status of their matter and failing to respond to multiple requests from opposing counsel regarding overdue disclosures and responsive pleadings.

Rule 8.4(a): General Rule

46. Having found the foregoing violations, there is clear and convincing evidence that Mr. Ventura's conduct, as described herein, violated N.H. R. Prof. Conduct 8.4(a).

C. Recommended Sanction

47. The Attorney Discipline Office and Mr. Ventura jointly agree that a one-year suspension, stayed for one year, is the appropriate sanction in this matter. This sanction would serve the purposes of attorney discipline.
48. Both case law and the American Bar Association's *Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions* (2005) ("*Standards*") support this sanction.
49. The purpose of the Court's disciplinary power is "protecting the public, maintaining public confidence in the bar, preserving the integrity of the legal profession, and preventing similar conduct in the future." *Conner's Case*, 158 N.H. 299, 303 (2009). "The sanction...must take into account the severity of the misconduct." *Coffey's Case*, 152 N.H. 503, 513 (2005).
50. Although the Court has not adopted the *Standards*, it looks to them for guidance. *Conner's Case*, 158 N.H. at 303. The *Standards* set forth a four part analysis for courts to consider in imposing sanctions: "(a) the duty violated; (b) the lawyer's mental state; (c) the potential or actual injury caused by the lawyer's misconduct; and (d) the existence of aggravating or mitigating factors." *Id.* (quoting *Douglas' Case*, 156 N.H. 613, 621 (2007)); *Standards* § 3.0.
51. The first three parts of the analysis create the framework for characterizing the misconduct and determining a baseline sanction. *See Conner's Case*, 158 N.H. at 303 (stating that "[i]n applying these factors, the first step is to categorize the respondent's misconduct and identify the appropriate sanction"). Once the baseline sanction is determined, the Court then looks to the fourth and final part of the analysis: the existence of any aggravating or mitigating factors, and whether they affect the baseline sanction. *See id.* (stating that "[a]fter determining the sanction, [the Court] consider[s] the effect of any aggravating or mitigating factors on the ultimate sanction").

52. Under the first prong of the analysis, Mr. Ventura violated duties owed to his clients.
53. With respect to Mr. Ventura's mental state under the second prong of the sanction analysis, the parties agree that Mr. Ventura's mental state was knowing.
54. The *Standards*, as well as New Hampshire's Rules of Professional Conduct, differentiate between a knowing state of mind and an intentional state of mind. Rule 1.0(f) of the N.H.R. Prof. Conduct defines "knowingly" as "denot[ing] actual knowledge of the fact[s] in question. A person's knowledge may be inferred from circumstances." The *Standards* define "knowledge" as a "conscious awareness of the nature or attendant circumstances of the conduct but without the conscious objective or purpose to accomplish a particular result." *Standards*, Sec. III ("Definitions"). See also *In Re Wyatt's Case*, 159 N.H. 285, 307, 982 A.2d 396, 413 (2009) (discussing "knowing" misconduct and stating "[w]hat is relevant . . . is the volitional nature of the respondent's acts, and not the external pressures that could potentially have hindered his judgment.").
55. An intentional state of mind is the most culpable state of mind, defined in the *Standards* as acting with "a conscious objective or purpose to accomplish a particular result."
56. Here, Mr. Ventura acted knowingly, because he had a conscious awareness of attendant circumstances, such as the fact that he had not submitted automatic disclosures, nor responded in a timely and effective fashion to inquiries from opposing counsel. He did not, however, act intentionally nor engage in self-dealing or dishonest conduct.
57. The third prong of the sanction analysis requires an assessment of the actual or potential injury caused by Mr. Ventura's misconduct.
58. Mr. Ventura's conduct significantly injured his clients. His clients lost their ability to litigate their claim in court, were evicted from the home in which they had been residing, and they paid over \$24,000 in legal fees to the opposing party.
59. The parties agree that the baseline sanction in this matter is a suspension, as set

forth in detail below.

60. Mr. Ventura's 1.1, 1.3 and 1.4 rule violations implicate Section 4.4 of the *Standards*. That Section provides:

Absent aggravating or mitigating circumstances, upon application of the factors set out in Standard 3.0, the following sanctions are generally appropriate in cases involving a failure to act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client:

4.41 Disbarment is generally appropriate when:

- (a) a lawyer abandons the practice and causes serious or potentially serious injury to a client; or
- (b) a lawyer knowingly fails to perform services for a client and causes serious or potentially serious injury to a client; or
- (c) a lawyer engages in a pattern of neglect with respect to client matters and causes serious or potentially serious injury to a client.

4.42 **Suspension is generally appropriate when:**

- (a) a lawyer knowingly fails to perform services for a client and causes injury or potential injury to a client, or**
- (b) a lawyer engages in a pattern of neglect and causes injury or potential injury to a client.

4.43 Reprimand is generally appropriate when a lawyer is negligent and does not act with reasonable diligence in representing a client, and causes injury or potential injury to a client.

4.44 Admonition³ is generally appropriate when a lawyer is negligent and does not act with reasonable diligence in representing a client, and causes little or no actual or potential injury to a client.


(emphasis added).

61. Mr. Ventura's conduct in this matter, when considered under *Standard 4.42*, would call for a baseline sanction of suspension.
62. The baseline sanction must be considered in light of any aggravating and mitigating factors. *E.g., Conner's Case*, 158 N.H. at 303.

³ The term "admonition," as used in the *ABA Standards*, is analogous to a reprimand in New Hampshire. The term "reprimand," as used in the *ABA Standards*, is analogous to a public censure in New Hampshire.

63. The only aggravator in this case is Mr. Ventura’s substantial experience in the practice of law. *See Standards* § 9.22.
64. Mitigating factors include the absence of a disciplinary history, absence of a dishonest or selfish motive, significant personal and emotional problems, full and free disclosure to the ADO and cooperative attitude towards proceedings, and remorse. *See Standards* § 9.32.

65.



66. Should Mr. Ventura violate any conditions of the stay, a one-year suspension would be imposed. To practice law again, Mr. Ventura would be required to seek reinstatement pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 37(14)(b). That process contemplates a hearing at which the burden rests with Mr. Ventura to demonstrate he is fit to practice, after passing and MPRE and completing other requirements.
67. The parties agree that given the baseline sanction, and consideration of aggravating and mitigating circumstances, a one-year suspension stayed for one year serves the purposes of discipline and is an appropriate sanction in this case.
68. This sanction is proportional to discipline imposed in other cases involving breaches of Rules of diligence and communication (as opposed to dishonest conduct) in which mental and/or physical conditions contributed to the misconduct. *See, e.g., Trunzo, Thomas H., Jr. advs. ADO, #2023-002* (stayed suspension), *Kunz, Carol L. advs. ADO, #2022-003* (stayed suspension).

**D. Conditions of Imposed Discipline and Procedures
For Alleged Violation of Conditions**

69. Mr. Ventura agrees to comply with the following conditions for one year, which

shall begin on the date the Professional Conduct Committee (PCC) accepts this Stipulation:

- a. Respondent shall comply with the voluntary monitoring agreement he signed with the NHLAP program, attached hereto as Exhibit A.
 - b. LAP shall supply Disciplinary Counsel with quarterly reports, with the first report to be provided to Disciplinary Counsel within 60 days of the date that the PCC accepts the Stipulation, and subsequent reports thereafter at quarterly intervals/deadlines thereafter as set forth by the ADO. The reports shall set forth Mr. Ventura's compliance with the Monitoring Agreement. The quarterly reports shall be submitted directly to Disciplinary Counsel by Ms. O'Neill.
 - c. Respondent shall pay the expenses incurred by the PCC in connection with this investigation and prosecution, and if unable to pay in lump sum, shall agree to some form of payment plan with the PCC within 60 days of receiving an invoice from the PCC.
 - d. Respondent will engage in no professional misconduct during the one year period.
70. If it is alleged that Mr. Ventura violated any of the conditions enumerated at Paragraphs 69(a),(c) above, the following shall apply:
- a. Upon motion by Disciplinary Counsel, the PCC may determine whether any of the conditions enumerated at Paragraph 69(a),(c) have been violated. If it determines that a condition has been violated, the Committee shall lift the stay and impose 69(a),(c). If the Committee determines that no condition of this Stipulation has been violated, the Stipulation shall continue in force and effect pursuant to its terms.
 - b. Respondent may request that the PCC remand the matter to the Hearings Committee so that a Hearing Panel may be appointed to decide the sole issue of whether a condition under Paragraphs 69(a),(c) of this Stipulation has been violated. During such hearing, it shall be the burden of

Disciplinary Counsel to demonstrate by a preponderance of evidence that a condition listed in Paragraphs 69(a),(c) has been violated.

- c. If a Hearing Panel determines that a condition has been violated, the Panel shall lift the stay and impose a one year suspension. If the Hearing Panel determines that no condition of the Stipulation has been violated, the Stipulation shall continue in force and effect pursuant to its terms. The PCC shall review the decision of the Hearing Panel.

- 71. If a new grievance or referral is filed against Mr. Ventura during the one-year period of the stay, thus implicating the condition at Paragraph 69(d), the following shall apply:
 - a. So long as a grievance or referral is filed within the one-year period of the stay (“the subsequent proceeding”), and the alleged misconduct occurred, at least in part, during the one-year period, the stay can be lifted and the one year suspension imposed at such time as there is a finding of misconduct in the subsequent proceeding, even if such finding occurs beyond the one-year period of the stay.
 - b. Pending the final resolution of the subsequent proceeding, the matter underlying this Stipulation shall not be closed.
 - c. If the conditions of Paragraphs 69(a) – (c) have been met, Mr. Ventura will not have to continue to comply with those provisions while the subsequent proceeding is pending.
 - d. The Respondent shall bear all costs associated with compliance and enforcement of the terms and conditions of this Stipulation.
 - e. Nothing herein shall be construed to limit prosecution of any new grievance or referral involving conduct of Respondent occurring during the one year period of stay.
 - f. If a grievance or referral is filed within the one-year period of the stay, Mr. Ventura shall provide written notice to Disciplinary Counsel within thirty (30)

days of receipt of notice of the grievance or referral, *time being of the essence*, along with supporting information or documentation.

E. Costs


72. Subject to the New Hampshire PCC's approval of Mr. Ventura's Stipulation, Mr. Ventura agrees to pay the costs incurred by the ADO in the investigation and enforcement of this disciplinary matter. *See* Supreme Court Rule 37(19). His agreement to pay the costs incurred by the ADO is the subject of a separate agreement signed by Mr. Ventura.

F. Effect of Stipulation

73. Mr. Ventura understands that this Stipulation represents a recommended disposition, and that the PCC may accept, reject, or conditionally accept the Stipulation pursuant to Rule 37A(III)(aa)(1).
74. Mr. Ventura acknowledges that the admissions of misconduct and the proposed disposition contained in this Stipulation are freely, knowingly, and voluntarily submitted; that he is not entering this Stipulation as a result of any threats, coercion, or duress, or of any promises or inducements not set forth in the Stipulation.
75. Mr. Ventura understands that he has a right to obtain counsel regarding this Stipulation and, that he is fully aware of the consequences of the Stipulation.
76. Mr. Ventura knowingly and intelligently waives his right to a hearing.


Respectfully submitted,

Dated: 3/25/2025 2025



John Ventura, Esquire
Respondent

Dated: 3/26 2025



Sara S. Greene, Esquire
Disciplinary Counsel