William C. Sheridan (2006)

incurred in the investigation and prosecution of these matters. William C. Sheridan shall reimburse the Professional Conduct Committee for all expenses

00-N-099 (LD 2001-007), to run concurrently. period of six months, retroactive to December 20,2002, the effective date of his suspension in The Committee hereby orders William C. Sheridan suspended from the practice of law for a

Charges. the following Rules of Professional Conduct: S.5(a), and 8.4(a), as charged in the Notice of proposed by the parties, which contains the Respondent's admission to the facts and violation of The Committee voted to approve the Stipulation and issue an Order of Sanction, in the form

Process, pursuant to Sup. Ct. Rule 37 A (III). The Committee voted to grant disciplinary counsel's Motion to Waive the Hearings Committee

was recused and Gretchen Rule Hamel was absent. Daley; Thomas C. Connair; David Cole; Eleanor Wm. Dahar, and David Page. Alan Cronheim Reporter; Benette Pizzimenti, Vice Chair; Stephen B. Stepanek; James R. Martin; Gerald A. matters. Members present included: Margaret H. Nelson, Chair; Toni Gray, Vice Chair and On February 21,2006, the Professional Conduct Committee considered the above-captioned

Order on Motion to Permit Waiver of Hearings Committee Process

Sheridan, William C. advs. Professional Conduct Committee # 02-073

Sheridan, William C. advs. Professional Conduct Committee # 02-070

Landya B. McCafferty, Disciplinary Counsel William C. Sheridan Distribution:

March p. 3 10, 2006 1

from the Professional Conduct Committee in this matter.

parties to waive the process before the Hearings Committee and seek a ruling

respectfully requests that the Professional Conduct Committee permit all

NOW COMES Landya B. McCafferty, Disciplinary Counsel, and

states:"As good cause appears and as justice may require, the

Committee in the"Preface" to N.H. Sup. Ct. R. 37A(III). That Rule

parties can seek a waiver of the process before the Hearings

6. Disciplinary Counsel finds support for the proposition that the

request this waiver.

Professional Conduct Committee. All parties are in agreement to

and seeking a more expeditious result directly from the

possibility of waiving the hearing before the Hearings Committee

5. Disciplinary Counsel has discussed with Mr. Sheridan the

appropriate sanction.

suspension (with retroactive credit for"time-served") was the

contained in the Notice of Charges and agreed that a six-motion

4. In that"Stipulation," Mr. Sheridan conceded all allegations

"Stipulation" is attached as Exhibit 5.)

"Stipulation" dated January 7 and 11, p. 4 2006. (A copy of the

3. Disciplinary Counsel and Mr. Sheridan have executed a

hereto as Exhibit 3 and 4).

Charges in these matters. (A copy of each Answer is· attached

p. 4 2. On December 1, 2005, Mr. Sheridan filed Answers to the Notices of

attached hereto as Exhibit 1 and p. 4 2.)

Charges in these matters. (A copy of each Notice of Charges is

1. On October 7, p. 4 2005, Disciplinary Counsel issued Notices of

In support, Disciplinary Counsel states as follows: p. 5 3

(C) Grant such other relief as is fair and in the public interest.

(B) Issue a Ruling on the basis of the"Stipulation"; and

Process";

(A) Grant this"Motion To Permit Waiver Of Hearings Committee

Honorable Committee:

WHEREFORE, Disciplinary Counsel respectfully requests that this

waive oral argument before the Committee.

9. In the event the Committee grants this request, all parties agree to

more expeditious result while preserving scarce judicial resources.

8. All parties agree that this request is made in an effort to seek a

pleadings.

Committee process and seek the Committee's ruling on the

there is"good cause" to permit the parties to waive the Hearings

Counsel have entered into a stipulation on both facts and sanction,

7. Where, as is the case here, the Respondent and Disciplinary

rule under this section."

professional conduct committee may waive the application of any p. 6 4

Massachusetts 01810, by regular m' ostage prepai . day of January 2006, to William C. Sherid Street, Andover, To Permit Waiver Of Hearings Committee Process" is being sent on this 13 th Supreme Court Attorney Discipline Office, certify that a copy aforesaid"Motion I, Landya B. McCafferty, Disciplinary Counsel of the New Hampshire

Dated: January 13, 2006 By:~~;z=~+-- ____ _

(attached as Exhibit 2).

fulfilled your CLE requirements. See Order dated May 24, 2002

suspension when the MCLE Board informed the Court that you had

24,2002 (attached as Exhibit p. 7 1). On May 24,2002, the Court lifted that

Continuing Legal Education- ("CLE") requirements. See Order: dated April

suspended you from the practice of law for failure to comply with

2. By Order dated April 24, 2002, the New Hampshire Supreme Court

well as the disciplinary rules alleged to have been violated.

Charges sets forth both the allegations of misconduct against you, as

Court Rule 37 A(III)(b)(2). In accordance with that Rule, this Notice of

p. 7 1. This Notice of Charges is issued pursuant to New Hampshire Supreme

under a suspension order.

see Exhibit 3, you engaged in the unauthorized praCtice of law while

including therein the"Certificate of Service" which you signed on both,

8. By assisting Mr. Hikel in drafting and serving the two pleadings, and

Rule 5.5/a): Unauthorized Practice of Law

of Professional Conduct S.S(a) and S.4(a).

7. Your conduct in this case raises questions under New Hampshire Rules

6. You signed each"Certificate of Service" as ''William C. Sheridan, Esq."

NH 03105-03 p. 8 26 this 17 day of May, 2002. th Middleton, 900 Elm Street, PO Box 326, Manchester, Richmond, Jr., at McLane, Graf, Raulerson & it in hand to defendant's counsel Stewart S. within Hikel's Mfidavit on the defendant by delivering I WilliamC. Sheridan, hereby certify that I served the

5. Both pleadings contain the following"Certificate of Service";

herein by reference.

these two pleadings are attached hereto as Exhibit 3 and incorporated

pending before the Hillsborough County Superior Court-North. Copies of

opposing counsel two pleadings dated May 17, p. 8 2003, in a case then-

4. Specifically, you assisted Mr. John Hike1 in drafting and serving on

suspension, you engaged in the practice of law.

p. 9 3. Between April p. 8 24 through May 24, 2002, while you were under 3

period for you to flle an answer. See Sup. Ct. R. p. 9 37 A(III)(b)(4).

receiving an answer from you, or upon the expiration of the p. 9 3~-day

Hearings Committee appoint a hearing panel in this matter either upon

14. It is the duty of Disciplinary Counsel to request that the chair of the

Ct. R. p. 9 37 A(III)(b)(3)(A).

this Notice of Charges"shall be deemed to be admitted." See Sup.

1 p. 9 3. In the event you fail to file an answer, the allegations set forth in

all affirmative defenses. See Sup. Ct. R. p. 9 37A(III)(b)(3)(B).

specifically to each allegation of this Notice of Charges, and must assert

p. 9 37A(III) (b)(3) (A). Your answer must be in writing, must respond

days of the date of your receipt of this Notice of Charges. See Sup. Ct. R.

12. You are advised that you must answer this Notice of Charges within p. 9 30

R. Prof. Conduct 8A(a).

convincing evidence, this would necessarily constitute a violation of N.H.

11. In the event that anyone of the above allegations is proven by clear and

would constitute a violation of N.H. R. Prof. Conduct 5.5(a).

10. If proven by clear and convincing evidence, your conduct in this regard

suspension, you were prohibited from practicing law.

p. 9 311. See also Tocci's Case, 140 N.H. 68, 70 (1995).. As you were under

9. New Hampshire law prohibits the unauthorized practice of law. See RSA p. 10 4

R. 37 A(III)(b)(6)(A).

days of the appointment of a hearing panel in this matter. See Sup. Ct.

"good cause," such pre-hearing conference must be requested within 30

Rule, which provides for a pre-hearing conference. In the absence of·

which governs discovery in this matter, as well as subsection (6) of that

17. Your attention is also directed to Supreme Court Rule 37 A(III)(b)(5),

See Sup. Ct. R.37(20)(b)(2).

product, internal memoranda, and deliberations) of both, shall be public.

Conduct Committee, as well as the written decisions (other than work

Charges that take place before the Hearings Committee and Professional

is now a public file. Further, the proceedings related to this Notice of

work product and internal memoranda of the Attorney Discipline Office)

16. This Notice of Charges and the file of Disciplinary Counsel (other than

37A(III)(b)(2).

and to testify and present evidence on your own behalf. See Sup. Ct. R.

1 p. 11 5. You are advised that you have the right to be represented by counsel, 5

receipt requested and a copy by regular mail pos aid. Hampshire 030 p. 11 53 by certified mail #70023150000153856860, return William C. Sheridan, 50 Nashua Road, Suite 102, Londonderry, New aforesaid Notice of Charges is being !lent on this 7th day of October 2005, to Supreme Court Attorney Discipline Office, certify that the original of the I, Landya B. McCafferty, Disciplinary Counsel of the New Hampshire

Brock, C.J., and Nadeau, Dalianis, and Duggan,JJ., concurred.

Hampshire.

William C. Sheridan is hereby suspended from the practice of law in New

brought himself into compliance with Supreme Court Rule 53.7(A) (3).

William C. Sheridan has neither responded to the show cause order, nor

requirements and to pay the fee of $425 in late and delinquency fees.'

failing to file his ceJi:iii.cate of compliance with the minimunl legal education

why he should riot be suspended from the practice of law in New Hampshire for .

On March 15, 2002, this court ordered William C. Sheridan to show cause

. court on April 24, 2002, issued the following order: In Case No. ADM"2002-oo42. In the Matter ofWjIlj:im C Sheridan. the

vElebora..'h A. Bills, Supreme Court ~a O'Neill, NH Bar Vtee Jones, MCLE Board jWilliam C. Sheridan, Esquire

Distribution:

DATE: May 24, 2002

ATTEST: \...._-' Brock, C.J., and Nadeau, Dalianis and Duggan, JJ., concurred.

motion to reinstate Attorney Sheridan is hereby granted. that he has paid the delinquency fees at issue: Accordingly, the MCLE board's legal education requirements for the reporting year ending June 30,2001, axid court that Attorney Sheridan is now in compliance with the minimum continuing Attorney Sheridan's reinstatement In its motion, the MCLE board informed the New Hampshire Minimum Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) Board, moved for $425 in late a..'1d delinquency fees. See Ru1e 53.7(A) (3). On May 13, 2002, the . compliance with the minimum legal education requirements and'to pay the fee of the practice of law in New Hampshire for failing to file his certificate of' On April 24, 2002, the court suspended William C. Sheridap, Esq. from

No. ADM-2002-0042, In the Matter ofWiIljam C. Sheridan

"]:ID'fAE~f'

May,20Q2,. ~ (/ tPdA~ was true and correct to the best of his knowledge and beliefbefore me this 17th day of Then personally appeared the above named John Hike! and swore that the within

Hillsborough, SS State CifNew Hampshire 5/17/02

t~ld the new tenants that it would get the telephone n~ber for them.

auto repair portion of the business because they do not havJthat phone nuinber .. Draper

number brings. the customers to the garage, and that the new tenants have not opened the

repair portion of the business without the phone number 623-9267 because that phone

2. John told Hike! to wit, that the new tenants do not want to open the auto

1. Hike! has spoken with the new tenants at 20 Boynton Street Mobil, John.

I, John Hike! state the following under oath:

HrEKL'S AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO RECONSIDER

HILLSBOROUGH NORTH, ss SUPERIOR COURT

Manchester, Nfl 03105-0326 this 17ft> day of May, 2002. Richmond, Jf., at McLane, Gra±; Raulerson & Middleton, 900 Elm Street, PO Box 326, Affidavit on the defendant by delivering it in hand to defendant's counsel Stewart S. I William C Sheridan, hereby certifY that I served the within HikeI's

.~ p. 16 .cOC!!!C£/\ 11 004

. .. 013 /11.#7.. an ownership interest in the phone number 623-9267. It is und:~:~at Boynton Street

4. Draper has failed to establish any facts or legal theory to show that it has.

~~ that number. ~ .~ ~ owner of the telephone number 603-623-9267 or is the owner of the goodwill attached to

3. The merits underlying Draper's case was that Draper Energy Inc is the

requesting party must demonstrate that it has a high likelihood of success on the merits.

2. More than that, in order to sustain a request for injunctive relief the

Draper to obtain this Court's sympathy.

never filed a bankruptcy. This was just one inore falses self-serving statement made by

to this Cout!o Draper told the Court Moore had filed a banlauptcy. By contrast, Moore

i. This Court's Order was in reliance upon afalse statement made by Draper

Draper Enerw, Inc.jor the following reasons:

of clarification in which it ordered Plaintiff'to transfer the telephone number 623-9267 to

NOW COMES, John Hikel, pro se, and moves this Court to reconsider it's order

told the John, the new tenant, that it would get the telephone number faT him.

auto repair portion of the b1,lsiness because he do not have that phone number .. Draper

phone number brings the customers to the garage, and that the John has not opened the

the auto repair portion of the business without the phone number 6 p. 17 23-9267 because that

, 9. John told Hikel to wit, thafthe John, the new tenant, does not want to open

8, Hikel has spoken with the n'ew tenants at p. 17 20 Boynton Street Mobil, John.'

never filed bankruptcy and Draper never operated the auto repair business.

Court. As noted above, in contrast to Draper's sworn tO,statements to this Court, Moore

telephone number and shows that the Draper again made a misrepresentation to this

7. Atta~hed is an Affidavit ofGruy Moore which documents the title to the

the lease back into their name. There is no difference here.

payments on the lease, does not give them the right to require the third party to transfer

transfers the lease to a third party. Clearly, the fact that the original oWner made some

obligations. tater, the original owner pays a few ofthe lease payments. The assignee then

assignee. The assignee exercises ownership, pays for the lease and takes on all

two. One transfers the lease and all of the obligations associated to the lease to an

6. Is this not analogous to a lease interest? One has a leased car for it year or

5. What facts or legal theory gives Draper an ownership right?

the legal obligations attached thereto was transferred to Hikel in MaJ:ch of p. 17 2002.

with the number and the yellow page advertising since 1999. That right of ownership and

Mobil LLC has been the owner of the number and has been legally responsible associated p. 18 3

defendant's motion for preliminary equitable relief

. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays that this Comi; reconsider its order arid deny

goodwill ofthe old auto repair business.

tenants wanted to build their own customer base and that the phone was not tied to the

10. Thi~ is in contrast to Draper's representations to the Court that the new

( p. 19 1

(attached as Exhibit 2).

fulfilled your CLE requirements. See Order dated May 24,2002

suspension when the MCLE Board informed the Court that you had

24, 2002 (attached as Exhibit p. 19 1). On May 24, 2002, the Court lifted that

Continuing Legal Education ("CLE") requirements. See Order dated April

suspended you from the practice of law for failure to comply with

2. By Order dated April 24, 2002, the New Hampshire Supreme Court

well as the disciplinary rules alleged to have been violated.

Charges sets forth both the allegations of misconduct against you, as .

Court Rule 37A(III)(b)(2). In accordance with that Rule, this Notice of

p. 19 1. This Notice of Charges is issued pursuant to New Hampshire Supreme

Reconsideration on the following in the above within Motion to Supplement Motion for I William C. Sheridan hereby certify that I served the

6. Your affidavit con~ained the following"Certificate of Service":

Supplement." (A copy of this Affidavit is attached hereto as Exhibit 4.)

The Court Her Request That She Be Granted Additional Time To

Motion As Requested Yesterday And That She Has Asked Me To Relay To

Reaction That Made It Impossible For Her To Submit Her Supplemental

Morning Paula Martin Amirault Has Experienced A Severe Allergic

Which He Seeks To Relay To The Court As An Individual The Fact This

behalf in the same case entitled,"Mfidavit Of William C. Sheridan In

5. Thereafter on May 14, p. 20 2002, you filed an affidavit on Ms. Amirault's

attachments are attached hereto as Exhibit 3.)

.lind Preserved For Further Review." (A copy. of this pleading and its

Rule 7(1), Especially As To Federal Questions Expressly Raised Below

[sic] Order Denying Defendant's Notice Of Appeal Under Supreme Court

p. 20 2002, and was entitled"Defendant's Motion For Reconsideration Of It's

the pleading delivered to the Court. The pleading was filed on May 9,

courier bring the pleading to Ms. Amirault for signing, and then you had

Martin. You prepared a pleading for Ms. Amirault's signature, had a

Hampshire Supreme Court, case no. p. 20 2002-133, Alain Valles v. Paula

4. Specifically, you assisted Paula Amirault in her appeal before the New

suspension, you engaged in the practice of law.

p. 21 3. Between April p. 20 24 through May 24, 2002, while you were under 3

p. 21 37A(III)(b)(3)(A). Your answer must be in writing, must respond

days of the date of your receipt of this Notice of Charges. See Sup. Ct. R.

.12. You are advised that you must answer this Notice of Charges within p. 21 30

R. Prof. Conduct 8A(a).

convincing evidence, this would necessarily constitute a violation of N.H.

11. In the event that anyone of the above allegations is proven by clear and

. would constitute a violation of N.H. R. Prof. Conduct 5.5(a).

10. If proven by clear and convincing evidence, your conduct in this regard

suspension, you were prohibited from practicing law.

p. 21 311. See also Tocci's Case, 140 N.H. 68, 70 (1995). As you were under

9. New Hampshire law prohibits the unauthorized practice of law. See RSA

practice of law while under a suspension order.

referenced above, see Exhibits p. 21 3 and 4, you engaged in the unauthorized

8. By assisting Ms. Amirault in drafting and filing the two pleadings

Rule 5.5(a): Unauthorized Practice of Law

of Professional Conduct S.S(a) and 8.4(a).

7. Your conduct in this case raises questions under New Hampshire Rules

You signed the"Certificate of Service" as"William C. Sheridan."

mailing it as follows: ... referenced matter this 1 p. 21 3 day of May, 2002 by th

.. p. 22 4

"good cause," such pre-hearing conference must be requested within 30

Rule, which provides for a pre-hearing conference. In the absence of

which governs discovery in this matter, as well as subsection (6) of that_

17. Your attention is also directed to Supreme Court Rule 37 A(III)(b)(5),

See Sup. Ct. R. 37(20)(b)(2).

product, internal memoranda, and deliberations) of both, shall be public.

Conduct Committee, as well as the written decisions (other than work

Charges that take place before the Hearings Committee and Professional

is now a public file. Further, the proceedings related to this Notice of

work product and internal memoranda of the Attorney Discipline Office)

16. This Notice of Charges and the file of Disciplinary Counsel (other than

37 A(IU)(b)(2).

and to testify and present evidence on your own behalf. See Sup. ct. R.

15.· You are advised that you have the right to be represented by counsel,

period for you to file an answer. See Sup. Ct. R. 37 A(III)(b)( p. 22 4).

receiving an answer from you, or upon the expiration of the 3D-day

Hearings Committee appoint a hearing panel in this matter either upon

1 p. 22 4. It is the duty of Disciplinary Counsel to request that the chair of the

Ct. R. 37 A(III)(b)(3)(A).

this Notice of Charges"shall be deemed to be admitted." See Sup.

13. In the event you fail to file an answer, the allegations set forth in

all affirmative defenses. See Sup. Ct. R. 37A(III)(b)(3)(B).

specifically to each allegation of this Notice of Charges, and must assert p. 23 5

requested and a copy by regular mail pos ge prepaid. Hampshire 030 p. 23 53 by certified mail #7002 31 856877, return receipt William C. Sheridan, 50 Nashua Road, Suite 102, Londonderry, New aforesaid Notice of Charges is being sent on this 7th day of October 2005, to Supreme Court Attorney Discipline Office, certify that the original of the I, Landya B. McCafferty, Disciplinary Counsel of the New Hampshire

Date: October 7,200 p. 23 5

R. 37A(III)(b)(6)(A).

days of the appointment of a hearing panel in this matter. See Sup. Ct.

·. p. 24 Eileen Fox. Clerk ~~

Brock, C.J., and Nadeau, Dalianis, and Duggan,JJ., concurred.

Hampshire.

William C. Sheridan is hereby suspenci.ed from the practice of law in New

brought himself into compliance with Supreme Court Rille 53.7(A) (3).

William C. Sheridan has neither responded to the show cause order, nor

requirements and to pay the fee of $425 in late and delinquency fees.'

failing to file his ceJ:t:i:fi.cate of compliance \vith the minimum. legal education

why he should not be suspended from the practice of law in New Hampshire for .

On March 15,2002, this court ordered William C. Sheridan to show cause

. court on April 24, 2002, ~ued the following order: In Case No. ADM-2002-0042. In the Matter nfWiJljam C Sheridan, the

File ~eborah A.. Bills, Supreme Court V1Umq. O'Neill, NH Bar Viee Jones, MCLE Board jWilIiam C. Sheridan, Esquire

Distribution:

DATE: May 24, 2002

A'ITEST: o Brock, C.J., and Nadeau, Dalianis and Duggan, JJ., concurred.

motion to reinstate Attorney Sheridan is hereby granted. that he has paid the delinquency fees at issue.. Accordingly, the MCLE board's legal' education requirements for the reporting year ending June 30, 2001, and court that Attorney Sheridan is now in compliance with the minimum continuing Attorney Sheririan's reinstatement. In its motion, the MCLE board informed the New Hampshire MinimUItl Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) Board, moved for '$425 in late and delinquency fees. See Rule 53.7(A) (3). On May 13, 2002, the compliance with the minimum legal education requirements and' to pay the fee of the practice of law in New Hampshire for failing to fIle his certificate of . On April 24, 2002, the court suspended William C. Sheridap.,Esq. from

No. ADM-20Q2-0042, In the Matter ofWUliam C. Sheridan

" EXHIBIT p. 26 . DOh

3 p. 26 . Her first federal claim was cle<'!f1y framed thr~ughout the case, to wit,

2002, raising several federal qu~stions as the basis for her aPpeal,

2 p. 26 . On March 1, 2002 Amjratilt filed her Notice of Appeal, amended March 4,

previously comply with the rtiles and her failure to negotiate in good faith with PlaiIi p. 26 .tiff..

granted) the Nashua District Court entered a defatilt judgment against her and issued an

present with counsel and ready to proceed on the merits after all continuances had been

immediately before the properly schedUled hearing on the merits (at which dilfendant was'

1 p. 26 . ThiS is an appeal ofa decision of the Nashua District <;::ourt in which, .

"--' p. 26 .. raised below and preserved for further review, for the following reasons:

Supreme' Court RuIe 7(1), dated April 29, 2002, especially as to the federal questions

Honorable Court to reconsider its order'in which it deqIined to accept her appeal under

NOW CO} p. 26 .1ES, PauIa Martin Amirault, pro se, and hereby moves that this ,. . .

: p. 26 .-- -. -.-~--- p. 27 ( 007

incorporated herem by reference. -- Appellant's Motion to Strike Plaintiffs Motion to Dismiss Appeal, which was rued in this case, and is ~. For a statemeut of the additional false statements made by Plaintiff Di. this case, see also I~ is now imdisputed that Amirault never paid rent to Plaintiff and thst she lived there"rent free." 2 all of her nionthly c;hi1d support p. 27 (less $300.00) fur rent. sUPport in !lie amonnt of $4,200.00 per inonth. It is incredible that defendant could ever have agreed to pay undisputed that the defendant is a multiply handicapped disabled mother who iuiS a fixed income of child later statements in the record (where he acknowledges that defundant resides there"relit free"). It is also 3)llOt;lIlt of $3,900.00 monthly. (Appendix at page 12). This statement in direct contradictiol). with plaintiffs 1Jtepl;liiltiff ciaimed under oath in its Affidavit of Ownership that the defendant paid rent Di. the

raised in Amirault's Notice of Appeal.3 Exhibits attached.

that the eviction proceedings be summarily dismissed. See Question XI

and Motion to Dismiss), fed~rallaw required that collection "cease," and

dispute within 30 days of their being made p. 27 (by her Stateme)Ji of Defenses

due and unpaid.2 S\ilce Amirault had placed these false statements in

falsely Stated in the Landlord Tenant Writ that $27,000.00 of rent was now

Ownership that Amirault has"paid" $3,900.00 monthly· rent.' He also

among other things, he falsely stated, under oath, in his Affidavit of

proceeding, Plaintiff violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act when,

income exceeds $600,000.00) was finalized. In commencing this eviction

ill the property tent free until her rancorous divorce with her husband p. 27 (his

property's FMV) in exchange for Plaintiff s promise that Amirault remain

the purchase price equaling just the existing mortgage payoff and not the

over $200,000.00 of equity in it, in lieu of direct mortgage financirig p. 27 (with

reverse mortgage, in which Plaintiff took title to Amirault's home with

Plaintiff refinanced Amirault's existing ll?-ortgage through a, so-called

Teun. 1994)(bleeding disorder, such as def~ndant's, causing unpredictable' enunciated in Thomas VEl. Davidson Academy, 846 F. SUpp. 611 (jvf.D, '. The standard is de novo.because this is a question.oflaw

Question V

AI!lended Notice of Appeal, Amirault said

6, The federal basis of this claim was aiso clearly asserted. Thus, in it's

Amirault See Question V raised in Amirault's Notice of Appeal.

emergency basis due, in part, due to conpem of"intracranial hemorrhage."

"disability" under the ADA), was in the hospital for well over 1210MS on an

with regular attendance due to unforeseen emergency medical treatment found a

611 (M:.D. Tenn. 1 994)(similar unpredictable bleeding disorder that interfered

cbronic life threatening bleeding disorder, cf. Thomas v. Davidson. 846 F. Supp.

emergency basis. because Amirault, who has multiple disabilities, including a

. the fact that Amirault's counsel requested a continuance of a prior hearing on an

S; Amirault's next federal claim, was also framed below, to wit

debt" lSU.S,C. § l692g(b). (See Appendix at pages Wand 12). 1 692f(1 ). In such instances, .the plaintiff must"cease collection of the when it has"no present right to do'so" in violation of 15 U.S.C. Section 1 692e(2)(A) and because the plaintiff seeks to repossess and collect a debt debt" in violation of the Fair Debt CoIIe<;tion Act, 15 uS.n § "misrepresentations as to the existence, charader and legal status of the that a creditor may not repossess property when there are The standard of review is de novo because i~ is a question oflaw

OuestionXI

. Amended Notice of Appeal, Amirault said

4 .. The federal basis of this claim was also clearly asserted .. Thus, in it's

., , incorporated herein by reference.. p. 29 Objection to Motion for Summary Affirniimce :filed in this case and the Exhibit attached thereto which are 5 For a more complete emniciation of Amirault's federal due process claim see Defendant's l:\erein by rerere~ce. Motion fot SUIll1llaIY Affirmance:filed in thiS case and the Exhibit attached thereto, which are incorporated .. For a more complete en1Illciation of Amirault's federal ADA claim see Derendant's Objection to

law governed by the principals of due process and adequate notice as' The standard of review is de novo because these ate questions of

Question VII (sic) and X

Amended Notice of Appeal, Amirault said

8. The federal basis of this claim was also clearly asserted. Thus, in it's

. Appeal. 5

negotiations. See Questions VIII and X rinsed in Amirault's Notice of

the Rules' and failed to exhibit good faith to Plaiotiff in pretrial

that a default judgment entered because Amirault failed to compiy with

without prior notice, issued an order on completely diJferent grounds, i.e.

2001, and after the hearing ended, and after the CoUrt left the Courtroom, ,

appear at the original hearing on the merits scheduled for December 5,

default judgment should enter on the grounds that Amirault had failed to

7. Amirault's next federal claim was also framed below, to wit

individuals)(Appendix at pages 71 thru 74 and pages 170 thru·173). 4 etc, to make reasonable ~cco=odations to disabled F.3d 29 (1st Cjr 2000)(entities governed by the ADA must alter their rules, made) and Ward vs. Massachusetts Health Research Institute, Inc., 209 stateprograril unless there is no reasonable acco=odation that can be mdividual with a protected disability cannot be denied the benefits of a YorkBr of Law Examiners, 813 F. Supp. 217 (W.D.N.Y 1993)(an. attendance is a disability protected under the ADA): D'Amico v. New

M?§sachusetts. '-... e~ergency hospital care, and Amirault is now a patient of the Dana Farber Cancer Center in Boston, " 6 Given the emergency medical condition arising out of the disability that rerjuired over 12 hours of

cited by the Court was just a"pretext," for knowing or unconscious prejudice against that .

reasbn for the Court's fiiililre to apply this criteria equally to all evidences that the reason

. Cotirt)'supports a valId inference (that must be addressed by the appellate court) that the

the nondisabled Plaintiff; unsworn to statements of it's counsel may be relied upon by the

when the party is in the hospital), against the nondisabled Plaintiff (i.e. by contra~ fot

dishlJiiity, 6 (i.e the disabled person must have sworn to affidavit to;equest a continuance

Defendant, a disabled person; such as Amirault, especially on matters that arise out of her

nondlsabled is critical here. The failure to apply the criteria used by the Court against the

10. This failure to apply,the same criteria to b9th the disabled and the

Amirault's Notice of Appeal

not apply to Plaintiff; a nondisabled person.'See Question vm raised.in

criteria to Amirault, a disabled person,.in denying her right to a hearing that it did

hlS Motion for Default Judgment In doing so, the Nashua Diatrict Court applied a·

Court, over Amirault's objections, relied on Plaintiff's unsworn to statements in

under Diatrict Court Rule 1,2, LS-A and 1,8-B.By contrast, the Nashua District

Amirault, in part, for her failure to file an affidavit with her Motion to Continue

9. Amirault's next federal claim was also framed below, to wit

and Appendix at page i65 tbm 168). of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections"); notice reasonably calculated to apprise interested parties of the pendency Village, Inc. 118 N.H 282, 385 A.2d 851 (1978) ("the State must provide 506,494 A2d 270 (1985) ; and Town of Nottingham v. Cedar Waters. M.D. (New Hampshire Board of Registration in Medicine), 126 N.H. 500, p. 31 01t

judiciaty. New Orleans Public Service v. City of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350 (1989). As

.. dtizenrY and for this reason is given deference at the first inst~ce by the federal

n is' the duty of the New Hampshire Supreme Court to enforce federal claims of it's

manner as that each mllY be Ii check on the other-" where the constant aim is to divide and arrange the several offices in: such a see, it particularly displayed in all the subordinate distributions of power, thIough the whole s-ystem of human affairs, private as well'as public. We by opposite and rival interests, the defect of better motives, might be'trace!l mankind the necessi1y of auxiliary precautions., This policy of supplying, doubt, the primary control of the government; but experience has taught next place oblige it to control itself. A dependence on. the people is, no You must first enable the government to control the governed; and in the

heart of our constitutional system. As Madison states in Federalist Paper LI

C>()urt to insure that federal claims are addressed. Checks imd ba:Iances goes to the very

vitiates completely any check' and balance placed upon the New Hampshire Supreme.

Supreme Court Rule 7(1) violates due process under the Federal Constitution because it

13. First, Amirault submits that declination of an appeal on tbe basis of

Supreme Court Rule 25.

In doing ~o, the Court expressly declined to sunnnaruy affirm the decision below under'

RuIe 7(1) without providing any basis, directly or by reference, by the Court's decision.

12. On April 29, 2002, this Court declined to accept Amirault's appeal under

exercise of this Court obligation to enforce federal law ..

11.' This issue is squarely before this Court and should be addressed as· an

Douglas v Gree11,411 US 729,802-805 (1973).

disabled person. Garcia v. US, Docket No. 00-09223 (200 Cir. 9126/01); and McDonnell

·, ((. p. 32 012

reqjrl:rements. At this point he has complied and is awaiting the lifting of the suspension. the practice of law before the New:t1ampsbire Bar because he failed to timely comply with his CLE 7 Amfrault did receive the aide of William C Sheridim who has been temporarily suspended from

accept the appeal, but rather to accept th\'l appeal.

WHEREFORE, Defendant prays that this Court reconsider it's refusal to ,. 12. . Third, this appeal shouId be accepted.

federal courts, and to exercise discretion when discretion is mandated.

obligation to enforce federal law, to provide art inadequate record for appeal to the

acceptance of her appeal was improper because it completely avoided ¢is Court

11. Second, Amirault submits that this Court's decision to declihe the

. discretion and denial of substantive due process under federal law.

provide some basis for it's decision. The failure to exercise discretion is itself an abuse of

denied AmirauIt due. process. It cannot .shy away from this duty. It must, at a minimum

bas avoided the only check left against it, i. e. informed federal review. By doing so, it has

apply any standard for the basis of refusal to accept the appeal under RuIe 7(1) this Court

ability of the federal judiciary to review it's decisions on appeal. However, by refusing to

legislative control, the only check that exists as to this Court on federal issues is the

the highest COlJIi: in New Hampshire; unelected for lifetime tenure, independent from

Chelmsford, MA 01824 Suite 103 1 Olde North Road Gallant & Ervin John Gallant, Esq.

2002 by mailing it as follows: Reconsideration on the following in the above referenced matter this 9th day of May, ( I'paula Amirault hereby certifY that I served the within Monon for .

-~-------~ p. 34 (l1d

200 l od~trVtood, rlac.!), Sio 101 • nu~!"nll!l

coftrlllt"'IO/f I @lJIl lfYo(;il' li'IIfI~W\lj1l'f ilil l~t· r/'Il.m pH U-f!S 5:H r (n.:,81 tJ1Ii~J'2!! 1.:1: PH tl Ht I o.a.rft t I 561tl

may held by you as tenants of my client at 36 Berkeley Sti-eet; Nashua, New Hatn~shire. next ~onth 0 f your'tenancy beginning after this notice, the premises or any portion thereof wpich You are hereby notified to quit and deliver up on or before AugustJ 1,2001, the end onhe

baSis for this Notice." The ab~ve IS not meani td be, and should not be considered as, ~ all-inclusive list of the:

4. failure to pay amounts for use and occupancy,oftlle premises. prcll!ises; ,.. 3. Failure to reach an agreement for the renewal or lise and occupancy oflhe 2. Failure to vacate the premises afler s'ale; 1. Failure to qu:it arid surrender up U)e premises; ; tenilination: J Mr: Valles herby terminates your tenancy. The following is amon'g the reasons for said'

Nashua, New Hampshire. as their tenant at \vill, namely the properly commonly known and numbered as 36 Berkeley Street, that Mr. Valles hereby termimites your tenancy or rights to possession of the premises held by you This firm represen\S'.Allaill Valles as the owner of 36 Berkeley Street: Please be ad~ed

Dear Pauia M;utin:

Re: 36 Berkeley Street, Nashua, New Hampshire , , Nashua; NH 03063 36 Berkeley Street Paula Martin' .

" " , ,(, \.," ", .. , , ' p. 36 ..... :" 1, ,', J"if " "

" ..: ~:' p. 36 ....: .

...-.~-

the ,Iloctloo. li j9'aulllud\1~rne:nt WI! . 'QI.InU r OHIl::l.;tJon rti:liy"bt tnuw • appearMO:9" .:ti.m for s:.. tlfn9 lOrth wy ao:::n ct21 . untilrcli:lm.. fllli to Iili tn: JIPPf-.r«nc' bfm , It Wi' be. ultlnud lhA.lYOtJ do (let *!.h Itl ~.tI tho·I.sOdlord ~U'ch claim or ccurit.rd2Iit'l n'\US( bQ /Had. tilt! flETURN DAY Jllrrot1J1ln thLt ~d'OH' ll\d-n:n~nt \\frlt. Specs!., prevkf~d or'!: N wi~ btl *' rc:.11"1"0 on.lhlt d')t If,. tA(ldf¢(d ~ltil11' t.mp~'d ~I,;nd It 1ft" ~nt fl~5 Q; elidm or oounteftil!l:lm whfctl ortsetJ or r.dUe..u: tn. ~e',I!\J Owtd 1) • dal. for" t."In~ w,1I b ... I by.n. Courr and')"u rim b4 ~'Uft6d by m"II, You do nol hive 10 pi'y!lcaJtr epp'" In tourl!X1lho,RETtJAN DAY!lnce IMrs Ih5 ~Ie spt.:lhd cn lnl; wpi nttX1. tQ IflO-WOrd;: ~AeJlJRH CAY", (lhe," formulrt ttlf[tbtf Ililha Cruk's Of1fce.) Qo:::I; Y'C!u f\a;~ ~ J1WUpp e tmnct-! _".. t~>-ol:·~e~',) ~t. 1'4"!rCf ¢n rnq';'.tit(l 'lInd In I~~n .P,P~fS, you ~m not,fy, t:'lQ eputl.bv rlU(t1l !U1 appnrlnc. rormwhlt ~h' C~rk 01 CourtOF1 orbtfare

Detenda"I(~1 hava conUnued and slill aie In poss!!. ,Ion ~I' g~i~ prQmltU'WithOUI righi, deliver up po.sesslon 01 the same on Ihe:i st' dey 01 Al , 2001,' yet ~ald _--=3",1.=;<:;;:~ d~y 01, July' . '. 200: ~. VlQ", duly no.llnod in wrlUnl1 ~ tha said Plalnilffts)!o qull and with 1M !,;'p,Urlennf1C'9!, nnw occupied by the Delend!,,1 • rl lhillliii. sald [)jj , nl(e) on the . ~.. . .jJr,9,rn/s"HltiJliladM. " 3~}'l<;t'~ley sf:n~t, NII:"!1UR, Nfl. ~'..•., ...", _,_' , p. 37 .' _ .. III ~ plU Villa/ern the Plalntlff(t) eornp.laro,!iiy'\·Q!1 tI,'; iia'la ,,'-II1(s Writ lhsy's'r. enlllllOd to possession of on or bebr~ 1i1~ RETURN DAY'~', t{1oiir; Iq~ri;,;~i.'Rie.!ntllr(~J.,. oourl al Mashua , " fn Bald C9UntY 01',!t!::l.t,",'l,","",~:::ro:;:.",tl9h:.:;l'!!!-' _-----------~'-­ 1/ found In your preolnct, In file an appSfiranc~ fqrm at Ihe',,N:::Ii1l~hua~~O=_i~!ltr!::'o.;1~c:.::t:...' ____________ _ of -1§J.gkeley s.t:teet,. Naahua fn Ihe county of _ ... II ... il"'l.!J=lmo~~u"'gliliL- ____ ' .... :: ___ =r;..: ",' __ WE COMMAND YOU TO SUMMQN: __ --"P""aul"""il'-"Mar""',l::I.='''''n'--________ ~_.,__-'-_+--.:.., __ -, -.t.. ~ Tha Sher,t! 0.1 any County or to hi. DeputY or to. anv Law Enlorcornellt Olnen: ,-"is

p. 38 Total: $ __ ~ ___ _ ~Jth8r Travel: FEeS; ,ServIce; $ _______ _ . . . ': . ~,

art at!..~s!ed copy of thlg Weft. (>~r ________________________________ ~~--- ( ) E.boj:le service of __ :..-____________ --'---'---------~ . ( ) in hand serv(ce by I s..Jmmol)sd the within named ______ --'-____ :-________ _

i'\f:TUi'tN OF SERVICE (FOR OFFICIAl. USE ONLY) dacfs(Dn and !he final dIsposition of.the appeal, (tl) Pay elf rent. a!I it comBS du.., between the dshl of!ns nQtlca of !ohm! to appeal il1e dl9trlcl.court's declslcn i and .. (2} Notice of appeal 111 ths supreme pourt must bel med within 30 days of the noUc" of the court'! district CQUft'S decisIon; and . (I) NoUc1i of Inlent 19 eppeal must be mad wltf\th& district court withIn 7 days o/Ih" nolict! of the . . clurG! rflu"t be (ollowed: - . If be tenant wishes to appeal tha dIstrict CQU/j'9 cleclsion to fhe suprema courl,tha following prom!. ... recording 01 tha av£atlon hearing by checking th~ appropriate box on tll& eppaaranca form. Al Ihe !1me the tenant filss im I:Ippearanca, !!\ reqt.lest msy be made that tha courl make a !!Otmd the t8n~i1t does nol /IIa an appearance.. The tenant s'hal1 not be ",vlclaci unles5 lhe courlso tltder~; l1owsvar, suoh an orci~r may be granted if courl no lalar ihan the RETURN DAY \lppearfng on this !ANDLOR£) AND TENANT WRn: 1.',118 tenMI wishes (0 confes}lha ",violion, an Ilppearnncl1 must be mad by the tanant In 1119 dfatrlct

... ( ......... -~..,,,,.. ~..,.., ...."". r....... -... . ( p. 39 .'. . ~ 019 , - -. IRl.I am the attorney for the owner of the real estate in question.

- -. • '1' Dram an employee of a corporation that is the actual owner of the real estate in question.

CHECK aNE BOX BELOW, ( , .;g., OOr. m'~..

Oat Own-er/Employe

DlSM 5S D BY HIE C.oURT. ~ ~ I UNDERSTAND THAT IF THIS CERTIFfCAT s INt;:OH,RECT, THI,~S";C=,, MAY BE S~MARitY

$ ____ WEEKLY 3,900.00MONTHL Y , :::: ;j ...... -;(1) C. PLEASE PRQVIDE RENTAL AMO()N.D $9 0):- C pther residential puip~ses_ QCJ , " -t::t: en o A single-family house acquired -!1aai1ink~s~oOir"ollhi"""'O'J artgage"s througn forecltlsu® ~ ~ purposes...... , = . .,. ' o A rental u"it In a vacation or' recreational building, not rented for vacatIon or iocr.atlona! ,' o A rental unit in an'owner-occupied buildin!!. cpntaln1rtQ a total of four dwelttnQ unit" ar f"wer. family nouses at any t!l1e ti;"'e.', q! A singl. family house",herll the owner of such Iloust:',doe'~ not own more than !hr •• sIngle , l [8l i1{esidentiaf pu~poses and consists of one of the f9110wing kinds of real estate:

o ~ on-residential'purposes,

. . . .' (Check one box below) (Seg RSA 54Q:1-9), , '"" '.-.--; .;:. B_ THE REAL ESTATE WHICH IS THE SUBJEcT OF nils EVICTIONfS RENTED F..OR: ."

City/State/Zip

ACT£ON IS: A_ I HEREBY CERTIFY THAT THE OWNER Of' THE PROPERTY fN THE ABOVE ENTITLED'

~~_y~~~s~, __________ ~_V. __ ~ ____ ~~ ______________ ___ Paula' Marlin '- - ,. AFFIDAVIT OF OWNERSHIP/TENANCY

Hampshire Superior'COll~t to hear jury trials in Nnvt!lllber Hilt! December.

') -.,.' ~\ •. ~ The I,-andlord is barred by esloppcl nnd lhnid fi'ol1l pntslIing Ihi~ maHer:-

theComrnollwealtl! -Of Massacllllsells and 10 IRS WX t:iaiJns .. going buck 12 years.

The contract will be (he subjectofa breach of COil fmc I claim iii Sqi'crillr Court lor

The Notice (0 Quit fails 10 lefer to propel" stnllltory authority.

No art1(!avit of daniages was altac{Jed 10 Ihe Writ as r~qllired hy law. ( . .' Iikewi se concerns issues that are lllJ(sidc. of the jurisdi<;titln of this court. . ,".. '. ! . . .. ." ' , Deremlanl' claims that thie cas,; is ill' vinlnlion of the.filir credit I:cp\lrtirig nct amI,

. 10 lrial on Ihe merits; . ,.

;lIld served on defendani.

Tile Landlord T~llal1lllotiCe'[0 quit ;rnd dcmlln'd lilf renl were implOpetiy ,[raned

pr'emises is pnrl ofn·complex business nrrangelll~n[ b<!lwcc~lthc partics. invtlll'ing issues

Defendanf"is nol a tenanl in Ihe pro·per;I)'. fia[h!!r, dt!fendm1l's occopancY of the in

-... --.---..._._----_.... . p. 41 '" 021

Chclmsfonl,II.';\, c One North"I~on" Galluul & En',in, LtC rec6hLTriliil Gallnnl ': .-' ,". ',',.,';", ' ' ' . , Ihe plainti{(liy mniling it poslnge prepaid fin! 'class llluilllrlrlrcsscl! III his eiHl!lscI of I, \VilJiam C Sheridan, linch}' eel'Hry ilwl I SCI'Ycli Ihe within Ohjcclinll 1>1)

~ 10m OCT I q P 3: 2 I \ .' SIIEHIHf\.N,I'A

•• , • f' .. ..... , I ,+ p. 42 022

1'lal11pshire Superior Court (0 "hear jury lrilils ill" November untl December.

This case hns beeli brO\lgftt. by the landlord because o-fthe refusul of the New "," The Landlwd is barred by estoppel and n"aud n"0111 pursuing this mailer.

The con{mcl \viH be the sUh.it:CI (1/" a bre(u:h of contract clllitfl in Superior Ct;lurt for , The"Notice to Quit h'1ifs 10 rder to proper statutory authority. " " "; No ulTtJavi! of oanmges i,vtlS atlncheu,to the Writ as required by law.

.". Odem!uII( clrlitlis thai this ca~J is in violation oftlle lair credii reporting het and I

to tria; 011 the merits:'Iff U

Delel,dtlllt requires disCOYCI:Y thmugh depositions and document production prior.~ "~\«,J; The Landlord Tenant Writ \\(\s im(JrtJperly served on the defenuant #'{ilt _(If r-," am! served on defend;inL ~~V" ~~t) \l

The l",~'",d T e,,,'" ""' ke ,,, "";,.,~ J""",,d ro, ,,", ~";",p;o",,;,""n,d.r:i) i f":J: .

of title to the properly. Defendun! is not in breach oflhat agreement." flIX

premises is part of tl c\>l11pleX busin~ss;Irrungemen! betweeii the parties. involving issues

Defendant is not tl teilllnl in lh~ pr{i"perty. [tather, detel1dant'~ occupancyoftlle

! ...'

. ' .::<~l·;.:.:·.::: ~'.,:....; ,': dlfficuli tcit heA~ ~}~~tb.: A-~diti~illlI1Y: she i~' b6~er~d mth- hi~es alid her.e};~ ate

having, a seriQus jiot"entiaIJy life threatening allergic. rea.cuQn in. which, among .

B. As aresillt of this exposur<il, she lItlinediately had; and IS stili, , ..-.~ ~>~~! -.' -' •• violently allergic. The exposure was directly on her face and in her mouth.

Paula Martin Amirault, received an accidental exposu're to latex, to which she is

A While receiving treatment at her doctor's office early this morning,

- . }:30 PM today and told me the following:

1. Paula Martin Amirault, who is acting pro se herein, telephoned me around

worse... ' . sf?I1~(i, treatment at a IlDspit;!l, Where latex is p'revalant il!. !lle air, is likely to make tl)e allergiC reaction Amirault indicated that she could not go to the hOspital because once the latex allergic reaction

May, 2002, before me" ~~.... t1)~within was tme and COrrect to the best of-his

e;rtens'lon. ' " simpl~a:s a fact witness to relay to this Court, fier situation, and her request for an

For this reason, and this reason alone, I am using this format, not as her courisel, but

Howev~t,,it soon became obviC?us that travel by her to Concord, NH was not possible.

her atto~ti; at this time and fhat she' should get lip to Coqcord and file the request herself,

additio.lmlw~y to supi}jement'hef.Moti6n·t",Ree"i1sidet"Ji,told.her. tQ~H;c{}llld not-act a$"+",, ,,'

3. She asked nie to relay to the Court her request that this Court grant her an

having repeated sprees of deep asthr)la like coughing,

placing into simply breathing: I could also hear.l:i.er wheezIng while breathing, as well as

2. During Amirault's phone call t~ me, I could hear how much effort she was

strict medical protocoL

attempting to control the allergic reaction with doctor prescribed medications and

she, pursuant to her doC.to(s instmction, went straight home l, where she is

C. She remained' at the'doCtor's offic~' for the next two hours and then

c'

" .;i I

G<!ilant & Ervin Jolin Gallant, Esq. '

thjs 13th day of May, 2002 by maji1i'ig it as follows;.", 4 Supplement Motion for Reconsideration on the following,in the above referenced matter' I William C. Sheridan hereby certifY that I servea the witlrin Motion to

~ ! '. , .' , , others in Court and"commonly" holding himself out to the public and the Court as one

p. 46 expressly limited to a situation, not present here, where Tocci was"filing" pleadings for

RSA 311: 7. Tocci's Case, 140 N.H. 68, 70 (1995) speaks for itself and its holding is

Exhibit A for a discussion oO-Jew Hampshire law on t..his point. See also, RSA 311:1; and

Sheridan admits that New Hampshire law prohibits the unauthorized practice oflaw. See

3. Sheridan denies paragraph 3, 7, 8, 9,10, and 11, and further states that

attached hereto as Exhibit A and incorporated herein by reference.

that the Supreme Court Orders speak for themselves. See Sheridan's Declaration which

2 Sheridan denies the allegations contained in paragraph 2 and further states

Court Rille 37A(III)(b)(2) and the NOC speak for themselves.

allegations contained in paragraph I of the NOC, and therefore denies the same. Supreme

I. William C Sheridan is without information to either admit or deny the

Charges of the Professional Conduct Committee, as follows:

NOW COMES, William C Sheridan, pro se, and hereby answers the Notice of

sanctions would be a denial of due process under the NH and US constitutions. Next, this

law to notifY Sheridan whether his conduct was indeed prohibited and as such to impose

reinstatement. Sheridan also states that there was inadequate notice in New Hampshire

Conduct Committee rendered its decision in p. 47 2001-007 concerning Sheridan's

unduly prejudiced by the delay. It was commenced one day after the Professional

be dismissed insofar it has remained dormant for 3 years during which Sheridan has been

6. Sheridan further states that due to laches and estoppel this matter should

themselves.

paragraphs 1 p. 47 2 thru 17 and therefore denies the same. The Rules and documents peak for

5. Sheridan is without sufficient information to either admit or deny

by this clerical mistake. See Exhibit A.

aware that Sheridan was suspended and could not represent him and was not influenced·

noticed that the title"Esq." was next to his name. Hikel has testified that he was very

John, mailed the document for John, and left. Likewise, neither Sheridan nor John

door to visit with his 86 year old mother out of state and spent a very short time with

counsel in hand. Rather, Sheridan mailed the pleading. Sheridan was on his way out the

on Sheridan's word processor and is inaccurate. Sheridan did not serve defendant's

themselves, but further states that this language was accidentally carried over by default

4 Sheridan admits paragraphs 5 and 6 as the documents speak for

, . Hampshire Supreme Court Order, nor engaging in the unlawful practice oflaw.

conduct here, though he would never repeat it, he was neither violating the New

who could act as a lawyer on the behalf of third parties. Sheridan submits that, by his p. 48 3

(60 p. 48 3)2289511 Concord, NH 03301 Suite 304 4 Park Street Disciplinary Counsel New Hampshire Supreme Court Landya B. McCafferty

it this 1 day of December, 2005 to 51 I, William C Sheridan, hereby certify that I served the within Answer by mailing

Conduct, and such other relief as is right and just.

Notice of Charges and find no violation of ethical conduct or the Rules of Professional

WHEREFORE, Sheridan prays that the Hearings Panel dismiss the Committee's

this conduct again if faced with the same situation

presently suspended from the practice oflaw and has learned his lesson not to engage in

matter is mute and discipline would serve no additional purpose insofar as Sheridan is p. 49 I presumed that I retained all of the rights as a citizen that I had prior to my admission to the bar. any citizen of good character within the state. order does. I submit that the April, 2002 administrative order left me with all of the rights and privileges of language prohibiting me from refraining from eugaging in"any legal matter," as my present suspension merely an administrative order deleting me from the privileges of membership in the bar, and contained no Remember the Apri12002 administrative suspension was not for cause under RSA p. 48 311 :8, but was shut my office down and stopped practicing law. reconsideration, did it remain interlocutory or subject to this day to retraction). Nonetheless, I immediately this day. (Query: did the suspension order go in effect on Apri124, 2002 or, given my motion for that order reconsidered due to the fire in my home. My motion for reconsideration remains outstanding to respond to the order to show cause, a suspension order was sunnnarily issued. I innnediately moved to have 7,2002. I did not return to practice until about April 22, 2002. On Apri124, 2002, due to my failure to In March 2002 an order to show cause was issued. Thereafter my home had a serious fire on April 2 qualifications to act as a citizen under RSA 311: I. finding of a defect in my moral character and thus, unlike other suspension orders, did not affect my was not carried out under RSA 311 :8. Second, the administrative snspension was not premised upon any What is critical here are two facts. First, unlike most suspensions, this administrative suspension

said must be ms ideas etc. agreed to so long as he was aware that I could not represent hlm and the bulk of what was three documents. John was a close friend of mine (he remains my friend to tills day} and I to the short time frame involved, and asked if I could help type and edit ms dictation on Hikel later informed me that he had been unable to obtain alternative counsel, due mm, which he understood. Hikel filed a pro se appearance. suspension, withdrew from the case, and told Hikel that I could not act as an attorney for As to John Hikel's case specifically, I notified the court and Hikel of my a right to engage in.3 court was issued prombiting me from engaging in any act that I, as a normal citizen, had Hampshire, and the consequences necessary flowing therefrom, no further order of the Other than notice that I had been suspended from the practice of law in New was ever made on my motion to reconsider. 2 Committee respond to it if they desired. I was reinstated on May 24, 2002. No decision expressly accepted my motion for reconsideration and formally requested that the CLE CLE requirements and moved for reinstatement. The New Hampsmre Supreme Court in New Hampshire.! I immediately and timely filed a motion to reconsider, completed my with my CLE requirements timely, I was summarily suspended from the practice of law why I should not be suspended from the practice oflaw insofar as I had failed to comply In March of 2002, due to my failure to timely respond to an order to show cause

District of New Hampshire, Docket No. 0 p. 50 2-227-M, (Order dated June 14, 2002). never represent parties before it in any capacity. Hohnes, et al v. L vnn, United States District for the 5 This is fundamentally different from federal court and other states, where non-lawyers can with the unauthorized practice oflaw. Ct R 33(2), even though the following year the State of New Hampshire successfully charged Kamasinski to represent the Petitioner before the New Hampshire Supreme Court in every facet of the appeal under S. 2001)(in which· a non-lawyer, Theodore Kamasinski, was allowed by the New Hampshire Supreme Court Finally, see, Thayer v. Thayer, New Hampshire Supreme Court, NO 99-805 (decided April 25, Court on appeal. the non profit organization, although this ruling was later reversed by the NH Supreme. organization in all facets of a court proceedings so long as that non lawyer was a member or shareholder of Justice of the Superior Court, incorrectly granted a non-lawyer the power to represent a non-profit New Hampshire in 1967. See also, State v. Settles, 129 NH 171 (1987) in which Justice DeClerico, when a paucity ofIaw on the matter, and given the repeal of the statutory definition of unlawful practice oflaw in Hampshire bar in good fuith also misconstrued the definition of the unauthorized practice ofIaw, given the See, Bilodeau v. Antal, 123 N.H. 39, 41 (1983) in which a very distinguished member of the New practice oflaw in New Hampshire. been confused by the uncertain state oflaw in New Hampshire concerning the definition of the unlawful unauthorized practice ofIaw. There are several instances where courts or distinguished counsel have also 4 These statutes have created much confusion in New Hampshire as to what constitutes the

RSA 3311:6 provides that,

citizen shall be presumed to be of good character unless demonstrated otherwise. represented by any citizen of good character. For the purposes of this section, a plead, prosecute or defend in his or her proper person, that is, pro se, or may be 311:1 Right to Appear, etc. - A party in any cause or proceeding may appear,

RSA p. 51 311: 1 provides that, unless he has been admitted by the court and taken the oath as prescribed in RSA 31 I:6." courts5• However no person shall be permitted to commonly to practice as an attorney Under these statutes a citizen of good character may represent another before the oflaw, were p. 50 2 loosely worded interconnected statutes. RSA 31 I: 1; and RSA 311 :7. Practice afLaw Statute (June 2002). 4 In place of the repealed definition of the practice Bar Journal, Impersonating a Lawyer, History of New Hampshire's Unauthorized constitutes the practice oflaw was repealed in New Hampshire in 1967. New Hampshire layperson in New Hampshire. This is especially the case since the defInition of what There is a paucity of law on what constitutes the unauthorized practice of law by a practice of law in New Hampshire. My Conduct did not violate a rule of law nor did it constitute the unauthorized unauthorized practice of law? The first issue is did my conduct violate a rule of law or constitute the boilerplate paragraph to a Motion to reconsider, and affidavit and one idea. I typed as he dictated; I made stylistic changes to his language and added one 3

7. To this day I do not know ifhe had signed or filed the Affidavit of Gary Moore. associated with my membership in the bar. It did not add any other limitations'. legal matter for another, as my present suspension order did. Rather, it merely took away all of the rights in any 6 Again, my suspension was not for cause and the order did not prohibit me from engaging

court.? pleadings. Except for this matter, I had no idea if, when or what Mr. Hikel filed with the filed the pleading himself. In fact, I had no control if or when he was to fIle the add one boilerplate paragraph and one general idea. Mr. Hikel remained pro se and anywhere near that far. All I did was type Mr. Hikel's dictation, make stylistic edits and a right to do as a citizen under RSA p. 51 311: 1, regardless of my suspension,6 but I did not go was not acting commonly. Not only did I not appear for Mr. Hike!, which I arguably had These statutes, along with Judge Lynn's interpretation, are right on point. Here, I North Superior Court Docket No. 00-M-815, October 15,2001 at Pg 21 legal system." Holmes vs. Holmes, Judge Lynn decision, Hillsborough County attorney, who turns to a trusted friend. or colleague for help in negotiating the example, of a person involved in litigation and unable to afford the cost of an

"the statute was designed primarily to cover the situation, for

under the statute. Judge Lynn said, Judge Lynn went on to define when a layperson could represent another lawfully October 15, 2001 at pg 19-20. decision, Hillsborough County North Superior Court Docket No. 00-M-8I5, appear in an individual case." (Emphasis added). Holmes vs. Holmes, Judge Lynn 171, 180 (1987)(RSA p. 51 311:1 merely provides an opportunity for lay counsel to representation by non-lawyers. 123 NH at 44. See also State v. Settle, 129 NH similar to RSA 311: 1 were intended to allow"only isolated instances of legal court cited approvingly cases from other jurisdictions, which had held that statutes is completely consistent with the Supreme Court's analysis in Bilodeau. There the not as an isolated or unusual happening. This construction ofthe term commonly something occurs with a degree of regularity, in the ordinary course of events, and "The key concept behind the term"commonly" is the notion that this context. Judge Lynn said, OO-M-8I5, Judge Lynn had the occasion to discuss what this term"commonly" meant in In Holmes v. Holmes, Hillsborough County North Superior Court, Docket No. capacity of their attorney so long as he does not do so"commonly." not otherwise authorized to practice law, may still represent another in court in the As such under New Hampshire law a layperson, of good moral character, who is

prescribed in RSA p. 51 311 :6. attorney in court unless he has been admitted by the court and taken the oath 311:7 Prohibition. - No person shall be pennitted commonly to practice as an p. 52 4

instance? Is it thus not also ttue that I also retained the right under RSA 3 I 1: 1 to represent a friend in an isolated matter before any court witbin the State of New Hampsbire regardless afmy suspension under RSA 311: I. in any s For example, it is without questiou that, as a citizeu, I could still represeut myseJfpro se

Hampshire, et al, Merrimack Superior Court, Docket No. 2001-E-0386 (decided January lawyer layperson, that is Hohnes v. Hohnes, supra. and Kamisinski v. State of New There are also 2 Superior Court cases that describe what is prohibited for a non­ constitutes the unlawful practice oflaw). negotiations for clients, filing appearances and other pleadings for clients in court, etc (199 p. 53 5)(suspended lawyer holding himself out to the public as an attorney, engaging in the future constitutes the unlawful practice oflaw); (3) Tocci's Case, 1 p. 52 40 NH 68 pleadings and conducting depositions with the intent of doing so in several other cases in expert appearing as counsel in medical malpractice case for compensation, filing practice oflaw); (2) Bilodeau v. Antal, 123 N.H. 39,41 (1983)(nonlawyermedical throughout New Hampshire for compensation as his livelihood constitutes the unlawful 171 (1987)(non lawyer preparing and filing pleadings for clients in several cases character is prohibited from doing in New Hampshire, that is (1) State v. Settle, 129 NH. There are only three cases which state what a non-lawyer citizen of good the rights of a non-lawyer citizen of good character.s doing anything that a non-lawyer layperson is prohibited from doing. I still retained all of I submit that the New Hampshire Supreme Court's order prohibited me from affidavits that I was violating the Supreme Court's order. Next, I did not believe nor do I believe now that by typing HikeI's Motion and despite the loss of quite a bit of potential income. law, and was for all practical purposes out of business during the term of suspension, pending matters in need of inunediate attention that I was suspended from the practice of suspension order. Rather, I shut my office down, informed those clients who had First and foremost, I did not intend to circumvent or violate the Supreme Court Court's suspension order and the Supreme Court's power to regulate the bar. I submit t.ltat by my conduct I was not attempting to circumvent the Supreme Supreme Court's suspension order and the Supreme Court's power to regulate its bar. The next issue is whether my conduct violated or attempted to circumvent the for a close friend for free. dictation of another, edited it for style and added on boilerplate paragraph and one idea Superior Court Docket No. 00-M-815, October 15, 2001 at Pg 21 Rather, I simply typed for his services." Holmes vs. Hohnes, Judge Lynn decision, Hillsborough County North appears in court with some regularity representing different clients, and where he charges person [held] himself out as being available to provide legal representation, where he instance of representation, involving just typing dictation, and certainly was not"where a reoccurring, at the request of a trusted friend. Indeed, it was argnably less than one file, plead or appear before the court, and (2) my conduct was only isolated, and non­ statutes or rules of law concerning the unauthorized practice of law because (1) I did not Applying this precedent to the facts at bar, my conduct did not violate these 5

help a friend during my administrative suspension arguments here that I could act in an isolated instance for another under RSA 311: 1 to Other New Hampshire Superior Court Judges have implicitly accepted my competing issues properly. time trying to comply with the court order. I believe that I did balance these two help those in need within the parameters that I thought was allowed, while at the same instance, that was not possible because the order was issued summarily. I tried my best to clients, closed my doors and never did anything else for clients. However, in this their clients found alternative counsel. In that instance, I wound down my business with 3D-day period within which one is allowed to wind down their practice and insure that suspended attorney. When one is suspended for cause an order is issued that allows for a In conclusion, I am not arguing for an expansion of what is allowed for a follow the same course if placed in the same situation in the future I am not arguing for an expansion of present law, nor am I arguing that I would it was an isolated instance of helping a friend in nced for free. here, I did not file any pleading, had no control over the filing of pleadings. Also here court for clients as a matter of course that constitutes the practice of law. By contrast p. 54 68 (199 p. 53 5). In that case, the Court made it clear that it was Tocci filing pleadings in This analysis is not contradicted by the court's rulings in Tocci's Case, 140 NH for all other work and helped here only to help a friend in need9). (5) I acted under an isolated unusual circumstance (I had shut my office down (4) I did not charge for the services; and and indeed, one was not filed; (3) I did not fIle the pleadings with the court; had no control over the fIling (2) I had a personal friendship with Hikel that continues until this day; suspended, (1) I did not hold myself out as an attorney and Mr. Hikel knew that I was None of these cases are even remotely similar to the facts here. Rather, here services; and (4) did so as a matter of course and not as an isolated and unusual instance. (2) filed pleadings with the court on behalf of the client; (3) charged clients for his client with which he had only a professional relationship; and not a personal friendship; In all of these cases the individual charged with unlawful practice oflaw (1) had a Lisa Amy Holmes, Gary and Kim Scott, George LaBrie, arid Cecilia de La Rossa). Hay, Rebecca Carroll, JoAnn Quinn Foster, Walter H Foster III, Judith O'Brien Thayer, unlawful practice oflaw in New Hampshire with the following active cases: Andrew M discovery for clients,"as a matter of course," throughout New Hampshire constitutes the 30, 2002)(nonlawyer:filing of appearances and pleadings, conducts depositions and 6

stepped in to help my wife and I when we had the fire within our home in April of2002. dinner with my wife and her daughter and I put the ornaments on our Christmas tree that year. Also, she thne she was a very good personal friend of the family. For instance, she and her daughter had Christmas John Hikel, this friend, Paula Amirault and I, are no longer friends. However, during this 10 Unlike

and penalty of perjury. Conduct Committee v. William C. Sheridan as if fully set forth therein signed under pains 2005 and is intended to be and shall be a part of his Answer to #02-070 Professional This Declaration was signed by William C Sheridan this 151 day of December,

good faith, believe that I could help Hikel as I did. arbitration hearing alone and not for any other hearing or matter), I could likewise, in 311: 1 for another friend in an isolated instance (the appearance was expressly for the I submit that if Judge Hampsey believed, in good faith, that I could act under RSA personally and asked if everything was going well. Hampsey, who I believe knows me by sight, came into the arbitration room, as I sat there, room and said that the Court had approved my appearance. During the arbitration, Judge proceed without the Court's blessing. After a while, the clerk came into the arbitration and opposing counsel, who were aware of my administrative suspension, did not want to reviewed and accepted by the Court before we could go forward. Likewise, the arbitrator appearance. The Clerk told my client and I that this appearance would have to be of the Hillsborough South Superior Court. My friend likewise filed her pro se arbitration hearing for another friend at the timeIO and for that hearing only with the Clerk On May 24, 2002, I filed an appearance, individually, under RSA 311: 1 for an extent of filing an appearance individually for a single court event. during my administrative suspension I could act for another under RSA 311: 1 even to the In a companion case, Judge Hampsey implicitly agreed with this analysis that others in Court and"commonly'~ holding himself out to the public and the Court as one

p. 55 expressly limited to a situation, not present here, where Tocci was"filing" pleadings for

and RSA 311: 7. Tocci's Case, 140 N.H. 68, 70 (1995) speaks for itself and its holding is

See Exhibit A for a discussion of New Hampshire law on this point. See also, RSA 311:1;

that Sheridan admits that New Hampshire law prohibits the unauthorized practice of law.

3. Sheridan denies paragraph 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 9,10, and 11, and further states

attached hereto as Exhibit A and incorporated herein by reference.

that the Supreme Court Orders speak for themselves. See Sheridan's Declaration which

2 Sheridan denies the allegations contained in paragraph 2 and further states

Court Rule 37 A(III)(b )(2) and the NOe speak for themselves.

allegations contained in paragraph 1 of the NOC, and therefore denies the same. Supreme

1. William C Sheridan is without information to either admit or deny the

Charges of the Professional Conduct Committee, as follows:

NOW COMES, William C Sheridan, pro se, and hereby answers the Notice of

law to notify Sheridan whether his conduct was indeed prohibited and as such to impose

reinstatement. Sheridan also states that there was inadequate notice in New Hampshire

Conduct Committee rendered its decision in p. 56 2001-007 concerning Sheridan's

undilly prejudiced by the delay. It was commenced one day after the Professional

be dismissed insofar it has remained dormant for 3 years during which Sheridan has been

6. Sheridan further states that due to laches and estoppel this matter shoilld

themselves.

paragraphs 1 p. 56 2 thm 17 and therefore denies the same. The Rilles and documents peak for

5. Sheridan is without sufficient information to either admit or deny

4 Sheridan admits paragraph 6 as the documents speak for themselves

filed. All of this was fully disclosed to the Court in the pleadings.

signature, is accurate, was prepared by me, and was delivered to Ms Amirault after it was

control of its filing with the Court. Exhibit 4 speaks for itself and it contains my

with her sitting right next to me, she signed the document in front of me and she was in

time restraints, I did help her draft a pleading (but she remained in control of its content)

had been suspended and that I could not act as her attorney. At her request, and given the

to Court. Rather, Ms. Amirault, who is extremely smart and sophisticated, was told that I

bring the pleading to Ms Amirault for signing, nor that I then had the pleading delivered

specifically denies that he"prepared" a pleading for Amirault's signature had a courier

Hampshire Supreme Court Order, nor engaging in the unlawful practice of law. Sheridan

conduct here, though he would never repeat it, he was neither violating the New

who could act as a lawyer on the behalf of third parties. Sheridan submits that, by his p. 57 3

(60 p. 57 3) 228 9511 Concord, NH 03301 Suite 304 4 Park Street Disciplinary Counsel New Hampshire Supreme Court Landya B. McCafferty

it this 1 st day of December, 2005 to I, William C Sheridan, hereby certify that I served the within Answer by mailing

Conduct, and such other relief as is right and just.

Notice of Charges and find no violation of ethical conduct or the Rules of Professional

WHEREFORE, Sheridan prays that the Hearings Panel dismiss the Committee's

this conduct again iff aced with the same situation

presently suspended from the practice of law and has learned his lesson not to engage in

matter is mute and discipline would serve no additional purpose insofar as Sheridan is

sanctions would be a denial of due process under the NH and US constitutions. Next, this p. 58 I presumed that I retained all of the rights as a citizen that I bad prior to my admission to the bar. any citizeu of good character within the state. order does. I submit that the April, 2002 administrative order left me with all of the rights and privileges of language prohibiting me from refrainiog from eugaging in"any legal matter," as my present suspension merely an administrative order deleting me from the privileges of membership in the bar, and contained no p. 57 3 Remember the April 2002 administrative suspension was not for cause under RSA 311 :8, but was shut my office down and stopped practicing law. reconsideration, did it remain interlocutory or subject to this day to retraction). Nonetheless, I immediately this day. (Query: did the suspension order go in effect on April 24, 2002 or, given my motion for that order reconsidered due to the fire in my home. My motion for recousideration remains outstanding to respond to the order to show cause, a suspension order was sununarily issued. I inunediately moved to have 7,2002. I did not return to practice until about April 22, 2002. On April 24, 2002, due to my failure to 2 In March 2002 an order to show cause was issued. Thereafter my home had a serious fire on April qualifications to act as a citizen under RSA 311 : 1. . finding of a defect in my moral character and thus, unlike other suspension orders, did not affect my was not carried out under RSA 311: 8. Second, the administrative suspension was not premised upon any What is critical here are two facts. First, unlike most suspeusions, this administrative suspension

with the law. She told me what she wanted said, but I did frame how it was presented. me work on my case which involved many issues similar to hers and was very familiar could not represent her and the bulk of what was said must be hers etc. She had helped of mine (she is no longer a friend of mine) and I agreed to so long as she was aware that I due to the short time frame involved, and asked if I could help her She was a close friend Paula later informed me that she had been unable to obtain alternative counsel, her, which she understood. Paula filed a pro se appearance. suspension, withdrew from the case, and told Paula that I could not act as an attorney for As to Paula Amirault's case specifically, I notified the court and Paula of my a right to engage in.3 court was issued prohibiting me from engaging in any act that I, as a normal citizen, had Hampshire, and the consequences necessary flowing therefrom, no further order of the Other than notice that I had been suspended from the practice of law in New was ever made on my motion to reconsider. 2 . Committee respond to it if they desired. I was reinstated on May 24,2002. No decision expressly accepted my motion for reconsideration and formally requested that the CLE CLE requirements and moved for reinstatement. The New Hampshire Supreme Court in New Hampshire.1 I immediately and timely filed a motion to reconsider, completed my with my CLE requirements timely, I was summarily suspended from the practice oflaw why I should not be suspended from the practice oflaw insofar as I had failed to corriply In March of 2002, due to my failme to timely respond to an order to show cause

DECLARATION OF WILLIAM C. SHERIDAN IN RESPONSETO THE p. 59 A party in any cause or proceeding may appear,

District of New Hampshire, Docket No. 02·227·M, (Order dated June 14,2002). never represent parties before it in any capacity. Hohne,. et al v. Lvnn, United States District for the non·lawyers can 5 This is fundamentally different from federal court and other states, where with the unauthorized practice oflaw. Ct R. 33(2), even though the following year the State of New Hampshire successfully charged Kamasinski to represent the Petitioner before the New Hampshire Supreme Court in every facet of the appeal under S. 200l)(in which a non·lawyer, Theodore Kamasiuski, was allowed by the New Hampshire Supreme Court Finally, see, Thayer v. Thayer, New Hampshire Supreme Court, NO 99·805 (decided April 25, Court on appeal. the non profit organization, although this ruling was later reversed by the NH Supreme organization in all facets of a court proceedings so long as that non lawyer was a member or shareholder of Justice of the Superior Court, incorrectly granted a non·lawyer the power to represent a non·profit New Hampshire in 1967. See also, State v. Settles, 129 NH 17l (1987) in which Justice DeClerico, when a paucity oflaw on the matter, and given the repeal of the statutory definition of unlawful practice oflaw in Hampshire bar in good faith also misconstrued the definition of the unauthorized practice oflaw, given the See, Bilodeau v. Antal, 123 N.H. 39, 41 (1983) in which a very distinguished member of the New practice oflaw in New Hampshire. been confused by the uncertain state oflaw in New Hampshire concerning the definition of the unlawful unauthorized practice oflaw. There are several instaoces where courts or distinguished counsel have also 4 These statutes have created much confusion in New Hampshire as to what constitutes the

RSA 3311:6 provides that,

citizen shall be presumed to be of good character unless demonstrated otherwise. represented by any citizen of good character. For the purposes of this section, a plead, prosecute or defend in his or her proper person, that is, pro se, or may be 311:1 Right to Appear, etc; -

RSA p. 60 311: 1 provides that, unless he has been admitted by the court and taken the oath as prescribed in RSA 3 I 1:6." courts5. However no person shall be permitted to commonly to practice as an attorney Under these statutes a citizen of good character may represent another before the of law, were 2 loosely worded intercounected statutes. RSA 31 I : I; and RSA 31 I :7. Practice of Law Statute (June 2002), 4 In place of the repealed defInition of the practice Bar Journal, Impersonating a Lawyer, History of New Hampshire's Unauthorized constitutes the practice oflaw was repealed in New Hampshire in 1967. New Hampshire layperson in New Hampshire. This is especially the case since the definition of what There is a paucity of law on what constitutes the unauthorized practice of law by a practice of law in New Hampshire. My Conduct did not violate a rule oflaw nor did it constitute the unauthorized unauthorized practice of law? The fIrst issue is did my conduct violate a rule oflaw or constitute the Papers which was my idea. She was aware of virtually all of the cases cited, except my citation of the Federalist 3

associated with my membership in the bar. It did not add any oilier limitations, legal matter for another, as my preseut suspension order did. Rather, it merely took away all ofthe rights 6 Again, my suspension was not for cause and the order did not prohibit me from engaging in any

statutes or ruIes of law concerning the unauthorized practice of law because (1) I did not Applying this precedent to the facts at bar, my conduct did not violate these the pleadings. filed the pleading himself. In fact, I had no control if or when she was to file some of add one boilerplate paragraph and one general idea. Mr. Paula remained pro se and anywhere near that far. All I did was type Mr. PauIa's dictation, make stylistic edits and a right to do as a citizen under RSA p. 60 311: 1, regardless of my suspension,6 but I did not go was not acting commonly. Not only did I not appear for Mr. Paula, which I arguably had These statutes, along with Judge Lynn's interpretation, are right on point. Here, I North Superior Court Docket No. 00-M-815, October 15,2001 at Pg 21 legal system." Holmes vs. Hohues, Judge Lynn decision, Hillsborough County attorney, who turns to a trusted friend or colleague for help in negotiating the example, of a person involved in litigation and unable to afford the cost of an

"the statute was designed primarily to cover the situation, for

under the statute. Judge Lynn said, Judge Lyun went on to define when a layperson conld represent another lawfully October 15, 2001 at pg 19-20. decision, Hillsborough County North Superior Court Docket No. OO-M -815, appear in an individual case.': (Emphasis added). Holmes vs. Holmes, Judge Lyun 171, 180 (1987)(RSA p. 60 311: 1 merely provides an opportunity for lay counsel to representation by non-lawyers. 123 NH at 44. See also State v. Settle, 129 NH similar to RSA 311 : 1 were intended to allow"only isolated instances of legal court cited approvingly cases from other jurisdictions, which had held that statutes p is completely consistent yvith the Supreme Court's analysis in Bilodeau. There the not as an isolated or unusual happening. This construction of the term commonly something occurs with a degree of regularity, in the ordinary course of events, and "The key concept behind the term"commonly" is the notion that this context. Judge Lyun said, 00-M-815, Judge Lynn had the occasion to discuss what this term"commonly" meant in In Hohues v. Hohues, Hillsborough County North Superior Court, Docket No. capacity of their attorney so long as he does not do so"commonly." not otherwise authorized to practice law, may still represent another in court in the As such under New Hampshire law a layperson, of good moral character, who is

prescribed in RSA p. 60 311 :6. attorney in court unless he has been admitted by the court and taken the oath 311:7 Prohibition.~ No person shall be permitted commonly to practice as an p. 61 4

instance? Is it thus not also true that I also retained the right under RSA 311: 1 to represent a friend in an isolated matter before any court within the State of New Hampshire regardless of my suspension under RSA 311: 1. 7 For example, it is without question that, as a citizeu, I could still represent myself pro se in any

discovery for clients,"as a matter of course," throughout New Hampshire constitutes the 30, 2002)(non lawyer filing of appearances and pleadings, conducts depositions and Hampshire, et ai, Merrimack Superior Court, Docket No. 200 I-E-03 86 (decided January lawyer layperson, that is Hohnes v. Holmes, supra. and Kamisinski v. State of New There are also 2 Superior Court cases that describe what is prohibited for a non­ constitutes the unlawful practice oflaw). negotiations for clients, filing appearances and other pleadings for clients in court, etc (I 99 p. 62 5)(suspended lawyer holding himself out to the public as an attorney, engaging in the future constitutes the unlawful practice oflaw); (3) Tocci's Case, 1 p. 61 40 NH 68 pleadings and conducting depositions with the intent of doing so in several other cases in expert appearing as counsel in medical malpractice case for compensation, filing practice oflaw); (2) Bilodeau v. Antal, 123 N.H. 39, 41 (1983)(non lawyer medical throughout New Hampshire for compensation as his livelihood constitutes the unlawful 171 (1987)(non lawyer preparing and filing pleadings for clients in several cases character is prohibited from doing in New Hampshire, that is (I) State v. Settle, 129 NH There are only three cases which state what a non-lawyer citizen of good the rights of a non-lawyer citizen of good character. 7 doing anything that a non-lawyer layperson is prohibited from doing. I still retained all of I submit that the New Hampshire Supreme Court's order prohibited me from was violating the Supreme Court's order. Next, I did not believe nor do I believe now that by typing Paula's Motion that I despite the loss of quite a bit of potential income. law, and was for all practical purposes out of business during the term of suspension, pending matters in need of immediate attention that I was suspended from the practice of suspension order. Rather, I shut my office down, informed those clients who had First and foremost, I did not intend to circumvent or violate the Supreme Court Court's suspension order and the Supreme Court's power to regulate the bar. I submit that by my conduct I was not attempting to circumvent the Supreme Supreme Court's suspension order and the Supreme Court's power to regulate its bar. The next issue is whether my conduct violated or attempted to circumvent the for a close friend for free. dictation of another, edited it for style and added on boilerplate paragraph and one idea Superior Court Docket No. 00-M-815, October IS, 2001 at Pg 21 Rather, I simply typed for his services." Holmes vs. Hohnes, Judge Lynn decision, Hillsborough County North appears in court with some regularity representing different clients, and where he charges person [held] himself out as being available to provide legal representation, where he instance of representation, involving just typing dictation, and certainly was not"where a reoccurring, at the request of a trusted friend. Indeed, it was arguably less than one file, plead or appear before the court, and (2) my conduct was only isolated, and non­ 5

But see, companion Professional Conduct Complaint involving Paula Amirault

arbitration hearing for Paula at the time9 and for that hearing only with the Clerk of the On May 24, 2002, I filed an appearance, individually, under RSA 311: 1 for an appearance individually for a single court event. suspension I could act for Paula under RSA 311: 1 even to the extent of filing an Judge Hatnpsey implicitly agreed with this analysis t.1J.at during my administrative help a friend during my administrative suspension arguments here that I could act in an isolated instance for another under RSA 311: 1 to Other New Hampshire Superior Court Judges have implicitly accepted my allowed, while at the same time trying to comply with the court order. summarily. r tried my best to help those in need within the parameters that r thought was clients. However, in this instance, that was not possible because the order was issued wound down my business with clients, closed my doors and never did anything else for their practice and insure t/lat their clients found alternative counsel. In that instance, I order is issued that allows for a 3~-day period within which one is allowed to wind down suspended attorney. r would never do this again. When one is suspended for cause an In conclusion, I am not arguing for an expansion of what is allowed for a follow the same course if placed in the same situation in the future r am not arguing for an expansion of present law, nor am r arguing that r would in need for free. here, I did not file any pleading. Also here it was an irolated instance of helping a friend court for clients as a matter of course that constitutes the practice of law. By contrast p. 63 68 (199 p. 62 5). In that case, the Court made it clear that it was Tocci filing pleadings in This analysis is not contradicted by the court's rulings in Tocci's Case, 140 NH for all other work and helped here only to help a friend in need8). (5) I acted under an isolated unusual circumstance (I had shut my office down (4) I did not charge for the services; and (3) Paula filed the pleadings with the court; (2) I had a personal friendship with Paula; suspended, (1) I did not hold myself out as an attorney and Mr. Paula knew that I was None of these cases are even remotely similar to the facts here. Rather, here services; and (4) did so as a matter of course and not as an isolated and unusual instance. (2) filed pleadings with the court on behalf of the client; (3) charged clients for his client with which he had only a professional relationship; and not a personal friendship; In all of these cases the individual charged with unlawful practice of law (1) had a Lisa Amy Holmes, Gary and Kim Scott, George LaBrie, and Cecilia de La Rossa). Hay, Rebecca Carroll, JoAnn Quinn Foster, Walter H Foster III, Judith O'Brien Thayer, unlawful practice oflaw in New Hampshire with the following active cases: Andrew M 6

stepped in to help my wife and I when we had the fire within our home in April of2002. dinner with my wife and her daughter and I put the ornaments on our Christmas tree that year. Also, she time she was a very good personaI friend of the family. For instance, she and her daughter had Christmas this friend, Paula Anrirault and I, are no longer friends. However, during this 9 Unlike John Paula,

and penalty of perjury. Conduct Committee v. William C. Sheridan as iffully set forth therein signed under pains 2005 and is intended to be and shall be a part of his Answer to #02-073 Professional This Declaration was signed by William C Sheridan this 1st day of December,

believe that I could help Paula as I did. hearing alone and not for any other hearing or matter), I could likewise, in good faith, 3 p. 64 11: 1 for Paula in an isolated instance (the appearance was expressly for the arbitration I submit that if Judge Hampsey believed, in good faith, that I could act under RSA everything was going well. knows me by sight, came into the arbitration room, as I sat there, personally and asked if had approved my appearance. During the arbitration, Judge Hampsey, who I believe blessing. After a while, the clerk came into the arbitration room and said that the Court were aware of my administrative suspension, did not want to proceed without the Court's Court before we could go forward. Likewise, the arbitrator and opposing counsel, who told my client and I that this appearance would have to be reviewed and accepted by the Hillsborough South Superior Court. Paula likewise filed her pro se appearance. The Clerk 1

with Continuing Legal Education ("CLE") requirements. On May 24,

suspended Mr. Sheridan from the practice of law for failure to comply

p. 64 1. By Order dated April 24, 2002, the New Hampshire Supreme Court

I. Stipulation of Facts

Sheridan, hereby submit this Stipulation in the above-referenced cases.

Disciplinary Counsel, Landya B. McCafferty, and Respondent, William C.

suspension, he continued to represent Ms. Amirault.

7. Between April p. 65 24 through May 24,2002, while Mr. Sheridan was under

the Court that Mr. Sheridan had fulfilled his CLE requirements.

p. 65 2002, the Court lifted that suspension when the MCLE Board informed

with Continuing Legal Education ("CLE") requirements. On May p. 65 24,

suspended Mr. Sheridan from the practice of law for failure to comply

6. By Order dated April p. 65 24, 2002, the New Hampshire Supreme Court

Esq." Mr. Hikel filed the pleadings on a pro se basis.

5. Mr. Sheridan signed each"Certificate of Service" as"William C. Sheridan,

NH 03105-03 p. 65 26 this 17th day of May, 2002. Middleton, 900 Elm Street, PO Box 326, Manchester, Richmond, Jr., at McLane, Graf, Raulerson & it in hand to defendant's counsel Stewart S. within Hikel's Affidavit on the defendant by delivering I William C. Sheridan, hereby certifY that I served the

4. Both pleadings contain the following"Certificate of Service":

pending before the Hillsborough County Superior Court-North.

opposing counsel two pleadings dated May 17, p. 65 2003, in a case then-

3. Specifically, Mr. Sheridan assisted John Hikel in drafting and serving on

representation to two clients.

suspension, Mr. Sheridan nonetheless continued to provide legal

p. 65 2. Between April 24 through May 24,2002, while Mr. Sheridan was under

the Court that Mr. Sheridan had fulfilled his CLE requirements.

p. 65 2002, the Court lifted that suspension when the MCLE Board informed p. 66 3

Mr. Sheridan signed the"Certificate of Service" as"William C. Sheridan."

mailing it as follows: ... referenced matter this 1 p. 66 3 day of May, 2002 by th Reconsideration on the following in the above within Motion to Supplement Motion for I William C. Sheridan hereby certify that I served the

11. Mr. Sheridan's affidavit contained the following"Certificate of Service":

Granted Additional Time To Supplement."

She Has Asked Me To Relay To The Court Her Request That She Be

To Submit Her Supplemental Motion As Requested Yesterday And That

Experienced A Severe Allergic Reaction That Made It Impossible For Her

Individual The Fact This Morning Paula Martin Amirault Has

William C. Sheridan In Which He Seeks To Relay To The Court As An

affidavit on Ms. Amirault's behalf in the same case entitled,"Affidavit Of

10. Thereafter, on May 14, 2002, Mr. Sheridan filed the second pleading, an

Preserved For Further Review."

Especially As To Federal Questions Expressly Raised Below And

Denying Defendant's Notice Of Appeal Under Supreme Court Rule 7(1),

entitled"Defendant's Motion For Reconsideration Of It's [sic] Order

9. The first pleading was filed on a pro se basis on May 9,2002, and was

Martin.

Hampshire Supreme Court, case no. 2002-1 p. 66 33, Alain Valles v. Paula

Amirault in drafting another pleading in her appeal before the New

8. Specifically, Mr. Sheridan drafted one pleading and assisted Paula p. 67 4

of a violation of N.H. R. Prof. Conduct 8A(a).

violated the above rule, there is necessarily clear and convincing evidence

17. Because there exists clear and convincing evidence that Mr. Sheridan

evidence of a violation of N.H. R. Prof. Conduct 1.16(a)(I).

16. Mr. Sheridan's conduct in this regard constitutes clear and convincing

Sheridan violated RSA 311:10.

15. By continuing to represent Mr. Hikel while under suspension, Mr.

311. See also Tocci's Case, 1 p. 67 40 N.H. 68, 70 (1995).

from providing any further legal representation to Mr. Hikel. See RSA

1 p. 67 4. As Mr. Sheridan was under suspension at this time, he was prohibited

"Certificate of Service" which Mr. Sheridan signed on both.

serving the two pleadings discussed above, and including therein the

legal representation to Mr. Hike1 by assisting Mr. Hikel in drafting and

13. While under suspension, however, Mr. Sheridan continued to provide

and halted any further work as Mr. Hikel's attorney.

Sheridan should have withdrawn from the representation of Mr. Hikel,

12. Upon his April 2 p. 67 4, 2002, suspension from the practice of law, Mr.

Rule 1.16(a)(1): Terminating Representation

II. Stipulation as to Rules Violated p. 68 5

suspension (with retroactive credit for"time-served") as the appropriate

24. Disciplinary Counsel and Mr. Sheridan jointly recommend a six-month

III. Stipulation as to Sanction

of a violation of N.H. R. Prof. Conduct 8.4(a).

violated the above rule, there is necessarily clear and convincing evidence

23. Because there exists clear and convincing evidence that Mr. Sheridan

evidence of a violation of N.H. R. Prof. Conduct 1. 16(a)(1).

22. Mr. Sheridan's conduct in this regard constitutes clear and convincing

Sheridan violated RSA 311:10.

21. By continuing to represent Ms. Amirault while under suspension, Mr.

311. See also Tocci's Case, 140 N.H. 68, 70 (199 p. 68 5).

from providing any further legal representation to Ms. Amirault. See RSA

20. As Mr. Sheridan was under suspension at this time, he was prohibited

motion for reconsideration.

Mr. Sheridan drafted an affidavit and assisted Ms. Amirault in drafting a

legal representation to Ms. Amirault. As discussed in more detail above,

19. While under suspension, however, Mr. Sheridan continued to provide

and halted any further work as Ms. Amirault's attorney.

Sheridan should have withdrawn from the representation of Ms. Amirault

18. Upon his April 24, 2002, suspension from the practice of law, Mr.

Rule l.I6(a)(II: Terminating Representation

to the professional misconduct and to any aggravating or mitigating

sanctions, consideration must necessarily be given to the facts pertaining

involves unique facts and circumstances. In striving for fair disciplinary

Sanctions § 9.1 (1992) (hereinafter"Standards") ("Each disciplinarj case

Center for Professional Responsibility. Standards for Imposing Lawver

2005) (citing Flint's Case, 133 N.H. p. 69 685,689 (1990)). See also ABA

Wolterbeek's Case, No. LD-2005-002, slip op. at 2 (N.H., October 31,

27. Every case is to be judged"on its own facts and circumstances." See

(199 p. 69 6) (internal quotations and citations omitted).

circumstances disclosed by the record." Basbanes' Case, 141 N.H. 1, p. 69 6

take into account both the severity of the misconduct and the mitigating

2 p. 69 6."The sanction ... must be sufficient to satisfy those goals. . .. It must

conduct in the future." Id. at 412-13 (internal quotation marks omitted).

the bar, preserve the integrity of the legal profession, and prevent similar

disciplinary power"is to protect the public, maintain public confidence in

880 A.2d 403,412 (N.H. 2005). Rather, the purpose of the Court's

25. Lawyer discipline is not intended to be punishment. See Coffey's Case,

purposes of attorney discipline.

(LD-2001-007). A six month retroactive suspension would serve the

concurrently with Mr. Sheridan's suspension in #00-N-099

suspension with an effective date of December 12, 2002, to run

Sheridan recommend that the Committee impose a six month

sanction in this matter. Specifically, Disciplinary Counsel and Mr. p. 70 7

mitigating factors are present here. Mr. Sheridan's underlying

where the conduct caused no harm to the clients. See id. Both of these

appropriate where the underlying suspension was administrative and

31. In Tocci's Case, however, the Court recognized that a lesser sanction was

Standards § 8.1 comment at 4 p. 70 7 (1991)).

suspended is disbarment." Tocci's Case, 140 N.H. 68, p. 70 71 (1995) (citing

suspension."The presumptive sanction for practicing law while

to be imposed when a lawyer continues to represent clients while under

30. Section 8.1 of the Standards generally addresses appropriate sanctions

LD-2005-002, slip op. at 2.

factors on the ultimate sanction." See Wolterbeek's Case, No.

sanction, [the Court] considers the effect of any aggravating or mitigating

misconduct and identify the appropriate sanction. After determining the

29."In applying these factors, the first step is to categorize the respondent's

LD-2005-002, slip op. at 2 (quoting Standards § 3.0).

existence of aggravating or mitigating factors.''' Wolterbeek's Case, No.

potential or actual injury caused by the lawyer's misconduct; and (d) the

sanctions: '(a) the duty violated; (b) the lawyer's mental state; (c) the

28. The Standards"list the following facts for consideration in imposing

LD-2005-002, slip op. at 2.

Court looks to the Standards"for guidance." Wolterbeek's Case, No.

factors .... "). In imposing sanctions in attorney discipline matters, the p. 71 8

Dated: January LL 2006

Conduct Committee in the investigation and prosecution of this matter.

36. Mr. Sheridan agrees to pay the expenses incurred by the Professional

IV. Stipulation as to Costs

serve the goals of attorney discipline.

(LD-2001-007), and to run concurrently with that suspension, would

December 20, 2002, the effective date of his suspension in #00-N-099

aggravating and mitigating factors, a six month suspension retroactive to

35. In light of the facts of these two particular cases as well as the

34. Indeed, Mr. Sheridan is currently under suspension for misconduct in

record is attached hereto as Exhibit A.

record. See Standards § 9.22(a). A complete copy of Mr. Sheridan's

33. The aggravating factor in this case is Mr. Sheridan's lengthy disciplinary

sought nor received compensation from either Mr. Hikel orMs. Amirault.

instances, while misguided, was well-intentioned. Mr. Sheridan neither

32. Perhaps most importantly, however, Mr. Sheridan's motive in both

caused no harm to his clients.

suspension was administrative and of short duration, and his conduct p. 72 © 2005 ThomsoniWest. No Claira to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.,

The Supreme Court retains the ulthnate authority to 45k57 Most Cited Gases clients or reinedy his mistake. [2J Attorney and Client <8=57 situation and made no attempt to innnediately notify been rejecfed, he failed to appreciate urgency of 1.3(a), 1.4(.), !.l6(d), 8.4(a). finally discovered incorporation documents had Prof.Conduct, Rules 1.1 (a), 1.l(b)(5), 1.1 (c)(4), understand its significance, and once attorney had prior disciplinary record. Rules of check was returned to him, or if he did, he failed to problems were not factor in mitigation, and attorney attorney never noticed that uncashed., .. filing fee suspension, where attorney's apparent mental health filed any documents with the Secretary of State, sums received for legal services, warranted one year had been incorporated one week before he had even return funds held in escrow, and failing to return violations; attorney told clients that their business file as requested by clients, failing to promptly account for mnch of misconduct underlying ethical incorporate client's business, failing to provide case lenient sanction, where mental disorder did not Attorney's conduct in failing to promptly explanation for his ethical lapses, did not justify 45k58 Most Cited Cases probilble biological basis, while offering some [1 J AttorJl.~y and Client <8=58 Evidence that attorney had a mental disorder with a 45k58 Most Cited Cases West Headnotes [6J Attorney and Client <8=58 Ordered accordingly. indicator that his effort to incorporate failed. fee check and that should have been an obvious ADA. proceeding, where attorney received uncashed filing attorney's mental disorder was disability under considered in mitigation in attorney discipline (4) evidence was insufficient to establish that attorney their rejected status was not factor to be mental disorder did not justify lenient sanction; and incorporation' lacked clarity in communicating to mitigating factor; (3)" evidence that attorney had a Question of whether or not returned articles of whether incorporation had been rejected was not 45k58 Most Cited Cases . suspension; (2) ambiguity in fonns regarding'[5J Attorney and Client <8=58 had been properly incorporated warranted one year business, and misrepresenting to client that business future. conduct in failing to promptly incorporate client's legal profession, and prevent similar conduct in the recommendation, and held that: (1) attorney's confidence in the bar, pieserve the integrity of the Broderick, J., adopted committee's Court seeks to protect the public, maintain public suspended for one year. The Supreme Court, punisinnent on the offending attorney; rather, the referee, Drum, 1, recommended that attorney be ulthnate aim in fashioning a sanction is not to inflict one year from practice. After hearing, judicial In attorney discipline actions, the Supreme Court's against attorney requesting that he be suspended for. 45k5'8 Most Cited Cases Committee on Professional Conduct filed petition [4J Attorney and Client <8=58

Opinion Issued Dec. 6, 2002. judges each case on its own facts and circumstances. Argued Sept. 19,2002. In attorney discipline matters, the' Supreme Court 45k58 Most Cited Cases No. LD-2001c007. [3J Attorney and Client <8=58 SHERIDAN'S CASE. Supreme Court of New Hampshire. the rules governing attorney conduct. c detennine the appropriate sanction for a violation of

(Cite as: 148 N.H. 595, 813 A.2d 449) 148 N.H. 595, 813 A.2d 449,25 NDLR P 12 813 A.2d449 Page 1

the respondent $1,300.00 for legal services and respondent has not returned any of the sums 1999, the incOIporators signed the Articles and paid returning the $200.00 filing fee,. however, the 'Incorporation from his computer, and on May 6, properly incorporate. their. busineSs. Beyond The respondent generated Articles of damages caused by the respondent's failure to agreed to incorporate the business in Massachusetts. incorporators identified· approximately $5,000 in practice law ill New Hampshire and Massachusetts, files or bank records with him. At the hearing, the business. The respondent, who was admitted to May 2001, but the respondent failed to bring any respondent's legal services to incorporate their clients. The Committee conducted a hearing in spring of 1999, two individuals sought the' Massachusetts, which he returned to his former [I] The admitted facts are as follows. In the . representing the original filing fee rejected by discovered $200.00 in his escrow account year. We adopt the referee's recommendation. after the complaint was filed, the respondent from the practice of law in New Hainpshire for one clients or -their new counsel. Further, sometime recommended that the respondent be suspended but still failed to provide the file to his former Rules). After a hearing on sanctions, the referee respondent supplied the case file to the Committee Hampshire Ru1es of Professional Conduct (the Committee. More than eight months later, the 1.3(a), 1.4(a), 1.16(d) and 8A(a) of the New conduct complaint against the respondent with the violations of Rules 1.1 (a), 1.1 (b)(5), 1.1(c)(4), In Ju1y 2000, the incorporators filed a professional approved. In sum, the admitted facts constituted the requests admitted, which we subsequently to do so because he could not find it. the referee issued, upon motion, an order declaring to provide their case file to new counsel. He failed upon the respondent. When he failed to respond, incorporation process and requested the respondent served a request for numerous factual admissions retained another lawyer to complete the and recommendation. Thereafter, the Committee documents. In the meantime, the incorporators petiticm to a JUdicial Referee (Dunn, I) for hearing days to prepare new incorporation ** 451 year from the practice of law. We referred the their problem, and it took him approximately ten Sheridan, requesting that he be suspended for one In May 2000, they confronted the respondent with with this court against the respondent, William C. refused to accept their 1999 corporate tax return. Professional Conduct (Committee) filed a petition papers had been rej ected when Massachusetts In August 2001, the Supreme Court Committee on nearly a year before learning that their incorporation The incorporators operated their business for BRODERICK, J. formed. orally, pro se. notity them that the corporation was not properly William C. Sheridan, of Londonderry, by brief and later. He never contacted the incorporators to had not been successful until ten or eleven months the professional conduct committee. However, he did not realize that his second attempt Dover (Robert J. Gallo on the brief and orally), for to incorporate the business also met with rejection. **450 *596 McNeill, Taylor & Gallo, P.A., of to the respondent. The respondent's second attempt U.S.C.A. § 12102(2). returned the Articles as well as the filing fee check Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, § 2(2), 42 Massachusetts rejected the corporate filing, and under Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). was insufficient to establish existence of a disability Secretary of State until May 28. diagnosis of attorney's apparent mental disorder, the original signed Articles to the Massachusetts psychiatric treatment, but did not provide definitive business. The respondent, however, did not dellver probable biological basis that could benefit from incorporated. They then began to operate their attorney suffered from mental disorder with incorporators and told them that they were attorney discipline proceeding, which stated that corporate minute book and seal to the *597 Independent psychiatric evaluation submitted in minute book and seal. On May 20, he provided the 45k53(2) Most Cited Cases the Articles in Massachusetts and obtain a corporate [7] Attorney and Client £=53(2) filing fees. He informed them that he wou1d file (Cite as: 148 N.H. 595, 813 A.2d 449) 148 N.H. 595, 813 A.2d 449, 25 NDLR P 12 813 A.2d 449 Page 2

Case, 143 N.H. 475,476-77,727 A.2d 985 (1999). clients reasonably informed (Rule l.4(a». These the rules governing attorney conduct. It Morgan's and diligence (Rule 1.3 (a», or failed to keep his determine the appropriate sanction for a violation of. whether he failed to act with reasonable promptuess [2J[3J[4J"We retain the ultimate authority to before the incorporators confronted him relates to discovery of the defective incorporation shortly with attention to detail." attention to detail (Rule 1.1(b)(5». Likewise, his get secretarial help and prove iliat he [can J perform he is culpable in the first instance for failing to pay provide him"an opportunity to develop his practice, and laSt pages, bears more on the issue of whether limit the number of cases he handles in order to given the apparent discrepant notations on the first probation dnring which he wonld be required to initial misperception of the status of the Articles, most. appropriate sanction would be some form of of sanctions is questionable. The· respondent's U.S.C. §§ 12101 ef seq. (2000). He asserts that the The relevance of much of this evidence to the issue Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). See 42 entitles him to reasonable accorinnodation under the incorporation documents on the tenth day. disorder that serves as a mitigating factor and several occaSions, providing them with new referee, the respondent asserts that he has a mental within the next ten days, he spoke with iliem on psychiatric evalnation which he presented to the the defective incorporation, and, he contends, addition, based upon the results of an independent incorporators soon thereafter confronted him with facts in order to mitigate his misconduct. In the Articles had actnally been rejected. The evidence to supplement or explain the admitted because he had hired a secretary, he discovered that erroneously deprived. him of his right to offer He claims that in late April or early May 2000, nnduly harsh. He argues that the referee the first page and not the rejection on the last page. recommended sanction of a one-year suspension is have a secretary, he noticed only ilie acceptance on The respondent contends that the referee's him withont a cover page and, because he did uot the *599 respondent, the Articles were returned to Rules of Professional Conduct. remained noted on the first page." According to 8.4(a)--engaging in .. conduct in violation of the acceptance on the last page" but that "acceptance tennination of the representation; and acceptance of the Articles [byJ whit[ingJ out [theJ 1.l6( d)--failing to return the clients' file at the He contends that "[IJater, Massachusetts revoked its informed regarding the status of the matter; the first and last pages reflecting initial approval. 1.4(a)--failing to keep the clients reasonably returned to him by Massachnsetts bore notations on and diligence; Specifically, the respondent asserts that the Articles 1.3(a)--failing to act with reasonable promptness manner; the respondent mitigates his misconduct. to the incorporation in a timely. and effective· that none of the additional evidence described by 1.1 (c)( 4)--failing to undertake actions with regard properly preserved it for our review, we conclude the client's interest; deciding, that he had such a right and that he would be completed with no' avoidable harm to mitigating circumstances. Assuming, without so as to assure that the legal matters undertaken admitted facts in order to demonstrate relevant and details in incorporating the client's-business, present evidence supplementing and explaining the 1.)(b)(5)--failing to pay attention to schedules that the referee erroneously denied·him the right to competent manner; I5J We first address the respondent's contention *598 l.1(a)--failing to represent clients in a constitute violations of the following Rules: in the future." Jd (quotation omitted). referee's conclusion that ilie admitted facts legal **452 profession, and prevent similar conduct facts deemed admitted, nor does he challenge the confidence in the bar, preserve the integrity of the The respondent neither disputes the truth of the seek"to protect the public, maintain public punishment on the offending attorney; railier, we misconduct. ultimate aim in fashioning a sanction is not to inflict payments toward ilie damages caused by his circumstances. Jd at 477, 727 A.2d 985. Our received for legal services, nor has he made any We judge each case on its own facts and (Cite as: 148 N.H. 595, 813 A.2d 449) 148 N.H. 595, 813 A.2d 449, 25 NDLR P 12 813 A.2d449 Page 3

p. 75 © 2005 ThomsonfWest. No ClaOO to Orig. U.S. Gov!. Works.

caused by his conduct but that they have failed to"physical disorder." The doctor did not provide a incorporators and the corporation for damages alternating with periods of high energy and has always been willing to reOOburse the spells of fatigne and poor mental functioning excluding the $200.00 filing ree. He asserts that he He described the respondent as apparently suffering that he has made no payment to the incorporators, which [could] benefit from psychiatric treatment." The respondent also seeks to explain his admission mental disorder with a probable biological basis matter, and opined that the respondent had"a rectifY the situation." the evaluation pursuant to our order in another situation, but failed to take hnrnediate action to November 2001, Dr. Albert Drukteinis conducted respondent] became aware of the urgency of the disorder and explain its effect on his behavior. In that [the business] was not incorporated, [the establish the existence of his apparent mental incorporators in May of 2000 concerning the fact submitted an independent psychiatric evaluation to situation"; and (2)"When contacted by the During the sanctions hearing, the respondent **453 take *600 hnmediate action to rectifY the was not a corporation, [the respondent] did not a lenient sanction. return had been rejected because [their business] explanation for his ethical lapses, it does not justifY notified [the respondent] that their corporate tax while his apparent mental disorder may offer some two admissions of fact: (I)"After the incorporators and thus obtain'a secretary." We conclude that hnmediate steps to remedy his mistake contradicts clients, his primary area of practice], obtain income tending to demonstrate his attempt to take chilled his ability to advertise [for Bankroptcy their phone call to hOO in May 2000. Any evidence taking past action against him which"wrongfully incorporators during the ten-day period following blames his lack of a secretary on the Committee for sought to introduce regarding his contact with the claOOed to be taking the appropriate medication and We do not consider the evidence the respondent secretary would"ameliorate the problem." He basis" and that psychiatric medication and nse of a passing day. he has"a mental disorder with a probable biological continued exposure to personal liability with each [6] As a final mitigator, the respondent c1aOOs that delay was unacceptable given the incorporators' them or taking steps to remedy his mistake. The been made. the respondent would have waited before contacting one-half years later, no payment in any amount has effort, we have no way of knowing just how long some payment. To date, more than one and who frrst confronted hOO on his failed incorporation sufficiently precise for the respondent to have made incorporated." Indeed, since it was the incorporators corporation. The estimated $5,000 in damages was that [the corporation] had not been properly which otherwise would have been incurred by the the incorporators hnmediately upon his discovery c1aOOs that may be incurred by the incorporators that he"has no explanation fot his failure to notifY incorporation; and (2) any personal liability for of the failed incorporation, the respondent admitted for filing the 1999 corporate tax return before against hOO. Further, regarding his late discovery interest and penalties Massachusetts might assess after the incorporators filed an ethical complaint. presented at the May 2001 hearing were: (I) any only first discovered the $200 in his escrow account retmns filed for 1999. The only unknown damages' notice that the check had been retmned because he by new counsel and to the state and federal tax failed. The respondent, however, did not even expenses relating to incorporation services provided obvious indicator that his effort to incorporate attributed to additional accounting and legal the uncashed filing fee check should have been an incorporate their business. These damages were communicating their rejected status, his receipt of damages caused by the respondent's failure to returned incorporation documents lacked clarity in incorporators identified approxOOately $5,000 in respondent's misconduct. Whether or not the At a May 200 I hearing before the Committee, the In any event, none of the evidence mitigates the this claim. violated the Rules of Professional Conduct. out-of-pocket expenses. The admitted facts belie issues are probative of whether the respondent provide hOO with an itemized list of actual (Cite as: 148 N.H. 595,813 A.2d 449) 148 N.H. 595, 813 A.2d449, 25 NDLRP 12 813 A.2d 449 Page 4

mental disorder constitutes a disability under the clients of their lack of corporate status, further [7] The respondent also claims that his apparent patent neglect and lack of diligence in apprising his before he filed incorporation documents, **455 and support cannot ameliorate. misrepresentation of the status of the corporation professional judgment, which administrative obtain or prepare updated incorporation documents, thes~ actions demonstrate grave errors in his errors in professional judgment in his failure to the incorporators or remedy his mistake. All of suspension. His misconduct demonstrates grave situation and made no attempt to innnediately notifY convincing us to impose a sanction less harsh than secretary), he failed to appreciate the urgency of the The respondent identifies no viable mitigators been rejected, (through, he contends, the aid of a finally discovered the incorporation documents had an impairment is not enough). understand its significance. Moreover, once he substantial; mere evidence of medical diagnosis of check was returned to him, or if he did, he failed to impairment in tenns of claimant's own experience is State. He never noticed that the uncashed filing fee the extent of the limitation. caused by the had even filed any documents with the Secretary of L.Ed.2d 615 (2002) (claimant must establish that business had been incorporated a week before he Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 196-98, 122 S.Ct. 681, 151 incorporation. He told the incorporators that their impairment); Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. proper documents for the Massachusetts impairment; or being regarded as having such an The respondent failed to obtain or prepare the major life activities; a record of such an substantially limits one or more of an individual's ethical violations. defined as a physical or mental impairmeut that account for much of the misconduct underlying the ADA. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (disability time frame at issue,the mental disorder did not establish the existence of a disability under the respondent suffered a mental disorder during the conclude that Dr. Drukteinis' report is insufficient to Assuming, without deciding, however, that the respondent's treating physician. Accordingly, we income and forced him to discharge his secretary. prescription of appropriate medication to the in the past, which curtailed his primary source of he offered no definitive diagnosis and deferred the Committee engaged in wrongful action against him suffer from lIhypomania seen in Bipolar Disorder," provided .by a secretary. He contends that the priorities. While the doctor suggested that he may disorder through the . structure' and organization hyperfocusing on a project to the detriment of other lawyering deficiencies caused by his mental a tendency for distractibility, disorganization and The respondeut claims that he can overcome his alternating fatigued and high energy periods and has benefit from psychiatric treatment," incurs could be devastating." disorder with a probable biological basis which can that an attorney must **454 maintain, those deficits conclnded only that the respondent has a"mental subtle; but, with the high standard of performance of the respondent's apparent mental disorder. He project," and that his"mental state deficits are *602· Dr. Drukteinis made no definitive diagnosis him to miss deadlines as he is hyperfocusing on a distractibility and disorganization could easily lead the ADA. particular, the doctor stated that his "tendency for respondent suffered a"disability" recognized under obligations. With respect to the respondent in however, is inconclusive as to whether the pursuing certain objectives at the cost of other instance. The evidence presented to the referee, balance their activities appropriately, and intensely jurisdiction to adjudicate an ADA claim in the first distracted and disorganized, failing to prioritize or preserved in the record before us and that we have from Bipolar Disorder to include a tendency to be of argument, that his ADA claim is properly general characteristics of individuals who suffer with attention to detail." We assume, for the sake known as Manic Depressive TIiness)." He outlined obtain a secretary and"prove that he could perfonn hypomania seen in Bipolar Disorder (formerly' opportunity to financially restore his practice, respondent's ,"presentation is characteristic of lenient sanction of probation to give him an apparent mental disorder, but noted that the"reasonable accommodation. It He seeks a more definitive *601 diagnosis of the respondent's ADA, and thus reqnires us to provide him with (Cite as: 148 N.H. 595, 813 A.2d 449) 148 N.H. 595, 813 A.2d 449, 25 NDLR P 12 813 A.2d449 Page 5

DUGGAN, JJ., concurred. BROCK, C.l, and NADEAU, DALIANIS and So ordered. See Sup. Ct. R 37(16). in the investigation and prosecution of this matter. reimburse the Committee for all expenses incurred Hampshire for one year, and direct him to suspended from the practice of law in New future. Accordingly, we order the respondent legal profession, and prevent similar conduct in the confIdence in the bar, preserve the integrity of the is necessary to protect the public, maintain pnblic suspending the respondent's license to practice law the respondent's prior diSCipline, we conclude that After reviewing the admitted facts and considering A.2d 1017 (1993). (2002); Welt's Case, 136 N.H. 588, 593-94, 620 Farley's Case, 147 N.H. 476, 478, 794 A.2d 116 their professional obligations are compromised. See step aside from their legal representation before professional obligations to their clients, and should have on *603 their ability to sustain their must be sensitive to the impact external pressures suffering trying times in their personal lives .. They competent level of performance even while detail. Attorneys, however, mnst maintain a ability to remain focused, organized and attentive to his apparent mental condition and complicated his record. Certainly, these circumstances compounded over the past several years, as revealed in the suffered various misfortnnes in his personal life are sympathetic to the fact that the respondent has undertake this sanction lightly. Furthermore, we disciplinary measure for any attorney, and do not We are mindful that suspension is a severe Case, 146 N.H. 736,739,781 A.2d 7 (2001). the probate of a decedent's estate. See Sheridan's lack of diligence and competence in his handling of default. In 2001, he was publicly censured for his' accounts, and again for allowing a civil matter to admittedly commingling trust and operating In 1998, he was publicly censured twice, once for career, we have sanctioned him on three occasions. record. In the last four years of his fIfteen-year law In addition, the respondent has a prior disciplinary END OF DOCUMENT exposing them to p6tential liability. 148 N.H. 595, 813 A.2d 449,25 NDLR P 12 (Cite as: 148 N.H. 595, 813 A.2d 449) 148 N.H. 595, 813 A.2d449, 25 NDLR P 12 813 A.2d 449 Page 6

.. appear~ to be required in the immediate future in order to preserve Attorney Sheridan's sqspension, informing them of any action which b. notify the clients by certified mail, return receipt requested, of

the clients as well as the interest of Attorney Sheridan; take such actions as he deems necessary to protect the interests of a. review Attorney Sheridan's client files and trust accounts and

actions: accounts no later than December 20,2002, and shall take the following Belobrow shall take possession of Attorney Sheridan's client files and trust necessary to protect the interests of Attorney Sheridan's clients. Attorney an inveritory of such files and trust accounts, and to take such action as is possession of Attorney Sheridan's client files and trust accounts, to make 2. Attorney Corey Be1obrow of Devine & Nyquist is appointed to take

receipt of the order. and complete, on behalf of imy client, any matter that was pending prior to and the effective date. of the suspension, Attorney ~heridan may wind up receipt of this order. During the period between his receipt of this order lawyer for another in any new case or legal matter of any nature after 1. Attorney Sheridan shall not accept any new retainer or engage as

follows: . In accordance with Supreme Court Rule 37(14), the court orders as

reconsideration or rehearing. order of this court, shall not be stayed by the filing of a motion for The suspension shall take effect on December 20,2002, and, absent further Sheridan from the practice of law in New Hampshire for a period of one year. In an opinion dated December 6, 2002, the court suspended William C.

o~~. Sheridan, the coUrt on December 9, 2002, issued the following In Case No. LD-2001-007, In the Matter ofWilJiam C.

Gretchen Leah Witt, Esquire Richard Y. Uchida, Esquire Corey Belobrow, Esquire William C. Sheridan, Esquire Robert J. Gallo, Esquire Margaret H. Nelson, Chair v0ames L. DeHart, EsqUire Distribution:

concurred. Brock, C.J., and Broderick, Nadeau, Dalicinis, and Duggan, JJ.,

and certified mail, return receipt requested, restricted delivery; 4. A copy of this order shall be served on Attorney Sheridan by first class , Sheridan unless otherwise ordered by the court. Committee of Professional Conduct, to be reimbursed by Attorney 3. The fees of Attorney Belobrow shall be paid in the first instance by the

Sheridan;s clients. actions should be taken to protect the interests of Attorney taken under this order and a recommendation as to what further or before January 20, 2003, together with a report of his actions accounts and file a copy of the inventory with the supreme court on c. make an inventory of Attorney Sheridan's client files and trust

Page Two of Two

order:. Sheridan, the court on December 9,2002, issued the following In Case No. LD-2001-007, In the Matter of William C. p. 80 © 2005 ThomsonlWest. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 45k58 Most Cited Cases [4] Attorney and Client <:=58 William C. Sheridan, by brief and orally, pro se. legal profession. professional conduct committee. of the public and preservation of the integrity of the (Robert J. Gallo on the brief and orally), for the the rules of professional conduct for the protection **8 *736 McNeill, Taylor & Gallo, P.A., of Dover comport with the professional standards outlined in attorney's miscondnct. members of the bar whose conduct does not when determining appropriate sanction for detennine what sanctions, if any, to impose on Relevant mitigating factors should be considered The Supreme Court has the ultimate authority to 45k58 Most Cited Cases 45k58 Most CitedCases [8] Attorney and Client £=58 [3] Attorney and Client <:=58 imposed as punishment. and substitute them for the judgment of the referee. Discipline for an attorney's misconduct is not Supreme Cpurt's role to make independent findings 45k49 Most Cited Cases . in attorney discipline proceedings, it is not the [7] Attorney and Client £=49 When reviewing findings made by a judicial referee 45k57 Most Cited Cases misconduct in the future.. [2] Attorney and Client <:=57 assess what sanction is likely to prevent similar integrity of the legal profession; the Court must also presented. public confidence in the bar, and preserve the conclusion as the referee based upon the evidence case, is necessary to protect the public, maintain whether a reasonable person could reach the same sanction, under the facts and circumstances of the judicial referee in attorney discipline proceedings is the Supreme Court must consider whether such a The standard of review for findings made by a recommended sanction for attorney's misconduct, 45k57 Most Cited Cases In assessing the appropriateness of a referee's [1] Attorney and Client <:=57 45k58 Most Cited Cases [6] Attorney and Client <:=58 West Headnotes Rnles of Prof. Conduct, Rules 1.1, 1.3(a), 8.4(a). Public censure ordered. fashion, and attorney had prior disciplinary record. made and duties discharged in proper and timely duties as counsel for and commissioner of an estate. remained responsible to ensure that filings were period of time in failing to timely discharge his oversight of estate to an associate, where attorney negligence and lack of diligence over an extended suffered serious injuries, and though he delegated ceusure was appropriate sanction for attorney's commissioner of an estate, though attorney had Supreme Court, Broderick, J., held that public to timely discharge his duties as counsel for and Attorney disciplinary proceeding was initiated. The diligence over an extended period of time in failing attorney's professional negligence and lack of Rehearing Denied Oct. 12,2001. Public censure was appropriate sanction for Sept. 6,2001. 45k58 Most Cited Cases [5] Attorney and Client £=58 No. LD-99-004. SHERIDAN'S CASE. its own facts and circumstances. Supreme Court of New Hampshire. attorney's misconduct,-every case must be judged on H In detennining the appropriate discipline for an

(Cite as: 146 N.H. 736, 781 A.2d 7) 146 N.H. 736, 781 A.2d 7, 21 NDLRP 201 781 A.2d 7 Page 1

p. 81 © 2005 ThomsonlWest. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Gov!. Works.

1997, not having.oured the defaults, the respondent"It is not our role to [make independent findings neglected to meet those obligations. In February 559, 561, 619 A.2d 571 (1992) (quotation omitted). meet his obligations to the estate, he nonetheless the evidence presented ...." Whelan's Case, 136 N.H. respondent had secured an extension of time to reach the same conclusion as the referee based npon of time to satisfy his obligations. Although the proceedings is whether a reasonable person could subsequently sought and was granted an extension by a judicial referee in attorney discipline respondent of his numerous defaults, and he [1][2]"The standard of review for findings made In January 1996, the probate court notified the or by the statute of limitations. 1994. present complaint is barred by the doctrine oflaches Commissioner between June 30, 1993, and June 30, and totally underdeveloped *738 contention that the neglected to perform any of his duties as Finally, in his brief, the respondent makes a fleeting executrix, the first of which was due in 1993, and his disability, a new sanction would be duplicative. failed **9 to II1e any accounts on behalf of the for unrelated conduct occurring during the period of RSA 557:1 (1997). Thereafter, the respondent because he was previously sanctioned by this court Commissioner of the then insolvent estate, See censure would be inappropriate. He also asserts that County Probate Court appointed him to serve as Act (ADA), see 42 U.S.C. § 12131, a public the estate. On June 30, 1993, the Hillsborough protection under the Americans with Disabilities *737 was retained by the executrix as counsel for extension, which he believes offers him some appointed executrix of his estate. The respondent from serious injury during the period of the of the same year, his widow, Norma Levigne, was asserts, however, that because he was recovering In June 1992, Gene Levigne ill died, and in August previously would justify such a sanction. He The record reveals the following undisputed facts. coupled with his failure to file those accounts accounts after receiving' an extension of time months. We adopt the referee's recommendations. censure. He contends that only his failure to file complete the practical skills course within twelve insufficient misconduct, by itself, to warrant public expenses incurred by the Committee and requhed to timely filings in the probate court prior .to 1996 is respondent be publicly censured, assessed all The respondent argues that his failure to make had not expired He recommended that the 8.4(a), and that the applicable statnte of limitations executrix in August 1996. l.I(a), l.I(b)(I), l.I(b)(5), l.I(c)(4), 1.3(a) and part to the illness and subsequent death of the Hampshire Rules of Professional Conduct (Rules) of the estate, while admittedly deficient, was due in evidence that the respondent had violated New 1995. He further contends that his representation The referee found by clear and convmcmg debilitating injuries in August 1994 and in March his law partnership and after he sustained statnteoflimitations and laches. defaults until January 1996, after the dissolution of that the complaint against hinl was barred by the alleges that he was not informed of the various argued that a public censure was not justified and handling the representation of the estate. He violated various rul,es of professional conduct, but contends' that until June 1993 his associate was that his conduct in the handling of a probate estate allowed or disallowed. To explain his lapses, he memoranda of law. The respondent did not contest report detailing which claims he believed should be pleadings, an agreed statement of facts and creditors, receive claims from creditors, or file a matter was submitted to the referee on the Commissioner, post and send notices to the hearing and recommendation. By agreement, the the estate in his capacity as couitsel, and did not, as referred to a Judicial Referee (O'Neil, J.) for and June 30, 1994, he failed to file any accounts for respondent, William C. Sheridan. The petition was The respondent admits that between June 30, 1993, with this court seeking a public censure against the Professional Conduct (Committee) filed a petition with the Committee against the respondent. In August 1999, the Supreme Court Committee on subsequently filed a professional conduct complaint Commissioner was appointed. The probate judge BRODERICK, J. was removed as counsel to the estate and a new (Cite as: 146 N.H. 736, 781 A.2d 7) 146 N.H. 736, 781 A.2d 7,21 NDLR P 201 781 A.2d 7 Page 2

~uch a sanction, under the facts and circumstances censure on all the violations charged and further of *739 public censure, we must consider whether 701, 634 A.2d 1340. Accordingly, we order public the appropriateness of the referee's recommendation misconduct. **11 See Wood's Case, 137 N.H. at determination of the proper sanction. In assessing integrity of the legal profession, and deterring future [5][6][7][8] The remammg issue is the public confidence in the bar, preserving the stated purpose of protecting the public, maintaining some protection for his ethical lapses. We conclude that public censure will satisfy the respondent's argument that the ADA affords him disability. Accordingly, we heed not reach the sanctions. lack of diligence was, therefore, unrelated to any periods. Independent violations warrant discrete extension expired. His professional negligence and mark. Sanctions relate to conduct, not to time extension of the filing deadline after the original render any further sanction mmecessary misses the was exacerbated by his failure to seek further same general time frame as the case before us the respondent was injured in Augnst 1994 and it sanctions on unrelated matters occurring in the conduct occurred primarily and SUbstantially before professional responsibility. To suggest that prior as the primary source of his ethical violations. The obligations and evidences a significant breach of governed by the ADA." It is this conduct that serves extended period of time falls well below hls ethical [his. eye and hip] injuries and thus clearly not in his handling of the Levigne estate over an Augnst of 1992 and June of 1994 ... [was] prior to The respondent's lack of diligence and competence' to file the requisite probate documents between In his brief, the respondent admits that the"failure co-mingling trust and operating accounts. received a public censure for admittedly , 136 N.H. 588, 592,620 A.2d 1017 (1993). unrelated disciplinary action, also in 1998, he on its own facts and circumstances. See Welts' Case 1998 for allowing a civil case to default and in an determining discipline every case must be judged disciplinary record. He was publicly censured in and citation omitted). We are rnindful that in of the New Hampshire bar since 1987, has a prior N.H. 698, 701, 634 A.2d 1340 (1993) (quotation In addition, the respondent, who has been a member integrity of the legal profession." Wood's Case, 137 fashion. By his own admission, he failed to do so. the protection of the public and preservation of the made and duties discharged in a proper and timely professionaI" standards outlined in the Rules ... for and thus responsible;. to ensure that the fIlings were' ... bar whose conduct does not comport with the he remained counsel and Commissioner of record what sanctions, if any, to impose on members of the delegated the oversight of the estate to an associate; are mindful of our"ultimate authority to determine Further, . although the respondent may have not support a **10 public censure. In doing so, we Accordingly, they cannot afford him any protection. that his challenged conduct in 1993 and 1994 does unfortunate, were not the cause of his misconduct. [3][4] We first address the respondent's argument mitigators. His injuries, although serious. and In this case, the respondent identifies no viable facts and circumstances of this case. public censure was for conduct unrelated to the N.H. 685, 690, 582 A.2d 291 (1990). referee also concluded that the respondent's prior factors should be considered, Flint's Case, 133 1.I0(a) was applicable and had not expired. The 236 A.2d 488 (1967), and that relevant mitigating six-year statute of limitations codified in Rule punishment, Silverstein's Case, 108 N.H. 400, 401, without valid excuse or justification," and that the mindful that discipline is not imposed as Professional Conduct alleged by the Committee (1991). In calculating the proper remedy, we are respondent had "violated all the Rules of Astles' Case, 134 N.H. 602, 605, 594 A.2d 167 not applicable to the respondent's case, that the prevent similar misconduct in the future. See In this case, the referee found that the ADA was We must also assess what sanction is likely to Case, 130 N.H. 313, 315, 538 A.2d 1222 (1988). 626 A.2d 397 (1993) (quotatiou omitted). the integrity of the legal profession." Henderson's referee." Robertson's Case, 137 N.H. 113, 116, maintain public conndence in the bar, and preserve and] substitute [them] for the judgment of the of this case, is necessmy "to protect the public, (Cite as: 146 N.H. 736, 781 A.2d 7) 146 N.H. 736, 781 A.2d7,21 NDLRP201 781 A.2d 7 Page 3

END OF DOCUMENT 146 N.H. 736, 781 A.2d 7, 21 NDLR P 201 DUGGAN, JI., concurred. BROCK, C.J., and NADEAU, DALIANlS and So ordered. v. Vogel, 137 N.H. 321, 322, 627 A.2d 595 (1993). merit and warrant no further discussion. See Vogel *740 The respondent's remaining argmnents lack months. See Sup. Ct. R. 37(16); complete the practical skills course within twelve in investigating and prosecuting this matter, and for all of its expenses, including legal fees, incurred order that the respondent reimburse the Co=ittee (Cite as: 146 N.H. 736, 781 A.2d 7) 146 N.H. 736, 781 A.2d 7,21 NDLRP 201 781 A.2d 7 Page 4

'own property'clients or third persons in his possession separate from his 1. Rul'e 1.15 (a) (1) by failing to hold property of In docket number LD-97-0l0, the respondent violated:

Professional Conduct. 5. Rule 8.4(a) by violating provisions of the Rules of

client. reasonable promptness and diligence in representing said 4. Rule 1.3(a) in that he railed to act with

said client's behalf in a timely and effective manner. 3. Rule 1.1(c)(4) in that he failed to take actions on

interest. to details and schedules to avoid harm to said client's 2. Rule 1.1(b)(5) in that he failed to pay attention

incompetently. i. Rule l.l(a) in that he handled a client's case

In docket number LD-97-006, the respondent violated:

(Rules) . following violations of the Rules of. Professional conduct respondent, William C. Sheridan, has admitted to the is not necessary for the disposition of this appeal. The parties, the court concludes that a formal written opinion Having considered the briefs and oral arguments of the

argument is denied. Sheridan.to allow him to make factual responses'to his oral of William C. Sheridan is denied. Motion of William C. Motion to allow late filing of second appendix to brief

order: Sheridan, the court upon November 19, 1998, made the following In Case Nos. LD-97-006 & LD-97-01O, In the Matter of William C.

THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE p. 85 Clerk

File Union Leader Donna Nadeau, Supreme Court Aggie Pelletier, N.H. Bar Association Bar News Honorable William J. O'Neil Robert J. Gallo, Esquire William c. Sheridan, Esquire James L. DeHart, Esquire Jean K. Burling, Chair

Distribution:

Broderick, J., did not participate.

fh 37(16}. investigating and prosecuting these matters. See Sup. ct. committee on professional conduct for the costs of set forth above and order the respondent to reimburse the Accordingly,,ve order public censure on all the violations '-profession, and deterring future misconduct, §g§ id, at 593. confidence in the bar, preserving the integrity of the legal purposes of protecting the public, maintaining public review of the record that public censure will satisfy the Welts' Case, 136 N.H. 588, 592 (199:3), we conclude from our case must be judged on its own facts and, circumstances; §g§ and serious. II Mindful that in determining discipline every injuries described by the judicial referee as"disastroUf, run over by an automobile in March 1995, resulting in noted that the respondent was assaulted in August 1994 and appropriate clients' fUnds to his own use. We have further deceit'ful or dishonest, and that the respondent did not fact that the respondent's behavior was apparently not including the absence of a prior disciplinary record, the The judicial referee found mitigating circumstances,

ProIessional Conduct. ,3. Rule 8.4(a} by violating provisions of the Rules of

;...,<0 ,,', .,'" , , additional charges of misconduct are brought against you.. p. 86 whether to. impose discipline and the extent of disciplu;.e to be imposed, in the event that issued this warning may, together with the basis of this warning, be considered in determining relative to this marier.· Pursuant t.e provisions of Rule 37 A(1)ef) the·fact that YQu have been submit a written response to this letter and such response would be l11aintained with the file Pursuant to the provisions ofN ew Hampslllre Supreme Court Rule 37 A(II)(b )(1), you may . The waruing contained in this letter d~es not constitute dis~ipllne by t.llls Connnittee.

cburtbearing., . information:, and must especially let your-clients know if there has been a change ii:t as'cheduled ,the future, you milst be more attentive to returning your· clients' calls and to their' requests· for finding of no proIessionaJ misconduct on your part. How'!ver, the Committee wains you that in ' After discussion,: deliberation and diie ~onsideration, it has dismissed this matter with a

Dear Mr. Sheridan:

. Londonderry, New Hampshire 03053 Sillte 102 50 Nashua Rbacf . Mr. William.C. Sheri.dan

Richard J. Daschbach *" non att9ni~y-inember Jules J.BmYrnan*. Ronna F. Wise. . Stephen A. Bartlett*· (603}224 - 5828.Fax (603) 228'- 9511. DaVid M."Rothstein . Marthe·F. Dyn,er, Vice Chair* Concord; New Hampshire 03301 WilliamF. Lynch*. . Martha iT all Oot, Chair. . 4 Park Street; Suite 304 Michaei p, Hall . ..

. G:\DOCS\CompJaint Screening\Conclusions ~ 2004\~2.0~4ws.npmw.doc cc: Ken Pacunas

'MFDlksc Vice Chair

Bartlett, and Michael P. Hall,Esquire.' The following Coimnittee member were'absent: Martha Van Dot, Chair, Stephen A.

:N:6vemoer 9,2004 , 'Rei ,#02-024' , )4r. William C. Sheridan"-.; •.'. Page 2:,

against you. discipline to be imposed, iri the event that additional charges of misconduct are brought this warning, . be considered in determining whether to impose discipline aiJd the extent of 37A(1)(f), the fact that you have been issued this warning may; together with the basis of be maintained with the file relative to this matter. Pursuant to provisions.ofRule 37A(2)(b)(l), you may strbmit a written response to this letter and such response would Corrmiittee. Pursuant to the provisions of New Hampshire Supreme Court Rule The warning cont!iined in this letter does not constitute discipline by this . . hearings.. . from the court and be more attentive to your obligation, unless excused, to attend those warns you that in the future you should pay more attention to notices of hearings received with a fuiding of no professional misconduct on your pari;. However, the Committee After discussion, deliberation and due consideration it has dismissed this matter·

pursuantto New Hampshire Supreme Court Rule 37(17)(b)(J). . of the information it has received a~ to the above entitled matter, which is now public The Professional Conduc(CoIIUIiittee has recently made a thorough review of all'.

Dear Mr. Sheridan:.

Re: Sheridan, William C. advs. Professional Conduct Committee.- #00"N-147

Londonderry, New Hampshire 03053 50 Nashua Road, Suite 102 William c. Sheridan, Esquire

JKB/bg

brought against you. . extent of discipline to be imposed, in the event that additional charges of nusconduct are basis of this warning, be considered in detennining whether to impose discipline and the provisions of § 1.8 the fact that you have been issued this warning may, together with the such response would be mamtamed WIth the file relatIve to this matter. Pursuant to Professional Conduct Co~tt~e, you. may submit a ~tten r!?sponse·to this letter and Committee. Pursuant to the provisions of § 2.8 ofthe RuIes and Procedures of the. . The warning contained in this letter does not constitute discipline by this

hearings uDless you are excused by the Court from attending. . that when you have an appearance filed with a Court, you should attend scheduled and Susan KISIel although you had an actIve appearance ill that matter. You are warned Conunittee's. a.ttention was that you faiIeq to attend a heapng in the matter of In re: James Rules of Professional Couduct; part of the reason that this matter was brought to the WanIS you that although there.was no clear and convmcmg eVIdence of a VIolatIon of the with a finding of no professional misconduc.t on yom: p~. H,?wever, the C:;o~ttee After discussion, deliberation and due consideration it has dismissed this matter of the infonnation it has received as to the above entitled matter. The Professional Conduct Conunittee has recently made a thorough review of all .

Dear Mr. Sheridan:

Re: Sheridan, William C. advs. Professional Conduct Committee - #97-072

Londondeny, New Hampshire 03053 50 Nashua Road, Suite 102. WilliamC. Sheridan,· Esquire

The State rif New Hampshire Supreme Court and the consequences of a breach of the agreement.

p. 90 Sheridan's reinstatement upon successful completion of the monitoring period, provisions addressing the termination of the conditional nature of Attorney reports by Attorney Sheridan and the mentor. The:;tgreement includes assist the ADO in monitoring Attorney Sheridan, and for the filing of regular period of two years. The agreement provided for the appointment of a mentor to Sheridan agreed to monitoring by the Attorney Discipline Office (ADO) for a November 14, 2007, the parties filed a mentoring agreement in which Attorney Oral argument took place before the court on November 8, 2007. On

through disciplinary counsel, elected not to file a brief. brief, Attorney Sheridan agreed to the conditions proposed by the PCC. The PCC, opportunity to set forth their positions on the revised recommendation. In his issued, providing Attorney Sheridan and disciplinary counsel with the After the PCC filed its revised recommendation, a briefing order was

to private practice. enter into a mentoring agreement for a period of two years if he decided to return in private practice, the PCC recommended that Attorney Sheridan be required to reinstatement be granted conditionally. Noting that Attorney Sheridan was not the necessary steps to rehabilitate himself, and recommended that his motion for Sheridan's motion for reinstatement. It found that Attorney Sheridan had taken On May 4, 2007, the PCC filed a revised recommendation on Attorney

to the PCC for further proceedings. reviewing the parties' briefs and other pleadings, the court remanded the case the concerns identified by the PCC in its recommendation and brief. After filed briefs. Thereafter, Attorney Sheridan filed additional pleadings addressing denied. Both the PCC, through disciplinary counsel, and Attorney Sheridan report with the court recommending that the motion for reinstatement be Professional Conduct Committee (PCC). In December 2005, the PCC filed a reinstatement. In accordance with Rule 37(14), the motion was referred to the professional conduct. In July 2004, Attorney Sheridan filed a motion for from the practice of law for a one year period for violations of several rules of On December 6,2002, Attorney William C. Sheridan was suspended

following order: Sheridan's Case, the court on December 18,2007, issued the In Case No. LD-2001-0007, In the Matter of William C.

File Sherri Kluesener, Supreme Court NH Bar Association Craig A. Calaman, C.P.A. Daniel S. Coolidge, Esquire William C. Sheridan, Esquire Y" Landya B. McCafferty, Esquire James 1. DeHart, Esquire Distribution:

Broderick, C.J., and Dalianis, Duggan, Galway and Hicks, JJ., concurred.

the monitoring period and making his reinstatement unconditional. Attorney Sheridan may file an application with the court for an order terminating mentoring agreement, upon successful completion of the monitoring period, terms of the mentoring agreement. In accordance with the terms of the is reinstated to the practice of law conditioned upon his compliance with the The parties' mentoring agreement is hereby approved. Attorney Sheridan p. 92 File Margaret H. Nelson, Chair /Landya B. McCafferty, Disciplinary Counsel William C. Sheridan Distribution:

Broderick, C.J., and Dalianis, Duggan, Galway and Hicks, JJ., concurred.

reinstatement unconditional. with the court for an order terminating the monitoring period and making his completion of the monitoring period, Attorney Sheridan may file an application the December 18, 2007 order issued in LD-2001-007, upon successful agreement between himself and the Attorney Discipline Office. As provided in the condition that Attorney Sheridan comply with the terms of the men to ring termination of the six-month suspension imposed by the PCC, is granted on 2007 order, Attorney Sheridan's motion for reinstatement, which seeks himself and the Attorney Discipline Office. In light of the court's December 18, condition that he comply with the terms of a mentoring agreement between Sheridan's Case, reinstating Attorney Sheridan to the practice of law on the On December 18,2007, the court issued an order in LD-2001-007,

Sheridan's Case. from the practice of law as a result of the court's decision in LD-2001-007, Attorney Sheridan's motion for reinstatement because he remained suspended reinstatement. On June 28, 2007, the court issued an order deferring action on had expired and stating that he had complied with the other requirements for filed a motion for reinstatement, noting that the six-month suspension period on complaints in two separate matters. On June 20,2007, William C. Sheridan for a period of six months by the Professional Conduct Committee (PCC) based In March 2006, Attorney Sheridan was suspended from the practice of law

order: Sheridan, the court on January 16, 2008, issued the following In Case No. LD-2007-0007, In the Matter ofWilIiam C.