2005-389, CITY OF ROCHESTER v. JAMES CORPENING & a.

The petitioner, City of Rochester (city), appeals an order of

the brief and orally), for respondent George Blaisdell. Backus, Meyer, Solomon & Branch, LLP, of Manchester (B.J. Branch on

for respondent James Corpening. Hanlon & Zubkus, of Rochester (Mark D. Hanlon on the brief and orally),

and Dianna J. Parker on the brief, and Mr. Wensley orally), for the petitioner. Wensley, Jones & Azarian, P.L.L.C., of Rochester (Danford J. Wensley Errors may be reported by E-mail at the following address:

page is: http://www.courts.state.nh.us/supreme. v.

errors in order that corrections may be made before the opinion goes to press. No. 2005-389 Hampshire, One Noble Drive, Concord, New Hampshire 03301, of any editorial Strafford Readers are requested to notify the Reporter, Supreme Court of New ___________________________

THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

a.m. on the morning of their release. The direct address of the court's home reporter@courts.state.nh.us. Opinions are available on the Internet by 9:00

well as formal revision before publication in the New Hampshire Reports. NOTICE: This opinion is subject to motions for rehearing under Rule 22 as bring the properties into conformity with the terms of its order. p. 2 the imposition of fines would make it financially difficult for the respondents to

city’s request to impose civil penalties pursuant to RSA 676:17, reasoning that

unregistered vehicles that may be on the property.” The trial court denied the removing the backhoe, the blue pickup truck, and “all but one of the other respondents to “bring the property into conformance with these regulations” by

and the blue pickup truck were no longer intended for use and ordered the

vehicles on the property, the trial court found that both the backhoe tractor the properties.” After noting that there were at least two unregistered motor boat, a camping trailer, a blue truck, a backhoe, and a white car are located on

neighborhood.

city ordinances and RSA 236:114. Specifically, the trial court found that “[a]

unsightly, pose an obvious health and safety risk in a residential

other things, reverse its decision not to impose statutory civil penalties against The city moved for reconsideration, requesting that the trial court, among

an unlicensed motor vehicle junkyard in violation of section 42.14(E)(3) of the

flower and plant nurseries and greenhouses (surrounding the houses are deplorable and, in addition to being speaking volumes about the condition. Simply put, the grounds

Ordinances relative to the maintenance of motor vehicle junkyards (

Among other things, the trial court found that the respondents were operating 676:17.

section 42.14(c)(6) of the city’s General Ordinances relative to the operation of properties, any description falls short, with the pictures themselves While the court has endeavored to describe the condition of the

storage and removal of rubbish; (2) section 42.14(E)(3) of the city’s General order that summarized the condition of the properties as follows: In January 2005, after a two-day bench trial, the trial court issued an

city sought injunctive relief, civil penalties and attorney’s fees pursuant to RSA Rochester § 42.14(c)(6)). When the use of the properties did not change, the that Blaisdell is supposed to maintain both properties. General Ordinances of the City of Rochester. Blaisdell resides at 794 Portland Street and Corpening contends governing State licensing requirements for motor vehicle junkyards; and (4) Ordinances of the City of Rochester § 42.14(E)(3)); (3) RSA 236:114 (1993)

maintenance of clean, sanitary and safe premises and requires the proper 2000 International Property Maintenance Code, which mandates the condition of the properties was in violation of: (1) various provisions of the By letter dated June 5, 2003, the city notified the respondents that the

owns two adjoining properties located at 788 and 794 Portland Street in The record supports the following facts. Respondent James Corpening motor vehicle junkyard regulations.”

p. 3 register the offending vehicles to bring his property into compliance with the

civil penalties has been RSA 676:17, I, and not the penalty provisions in the

highways.” Thus, the trial court found that Blaisdell “can either remove or

on the properties. junkyard violations by registering the unregistered vehicles that were located (2) ruling that Blaisdell could remedy the State and local motor vehicle

order accordingly. trial court level and on appeal, the basis of the city’s claim for the imposition of As a preliminary matter, we note that throughout the litigation at the

vehicles which are not intended for or in condition for legal use on the public vehicle junkyard, the property must contain two or more unregistered motor ordinances. See Harrington v. Town of Warner, 152 N.H. 74, 79 (2005). applicable State statute, the trial court also ruled, “To be deemed a motor traditional rules of statutory construction generally govern our review of of the overall statutory scheme and not in isolation. Id. Moreover, the Int’l Speedway, 151 N.H. 409, 419 (2004). We interpret statutes in the context ascribe the plain and ordinary meanings to the words used. statutory civil penalties it contends are mandatory under RSA 676:17, I(b); and Carignan v. N.H. considered as a whole. Id. We first examine the language of the statute and motor vehicle junkyard would be cured. He requested the court to modify its final arbiter of legislative intent as expressed in the words of the statute novo. Foote v. Manchester Sch. Dist., 152 N.H. 599, 601 (2005). We are the N.H. 779, 781 (2001). We review the trial court’s statutory interpretation de evidence and are not erroneous as a matter of law. Franklin v. Callum, 146 time to bring the properties into compliance with the trial court’s order. We defer to the trial court’s findings of fact if they are supported by the

penalties under RSA 676:17. After reviewing both the city ordinance and

On appeal, the city asserts the trial court erred by: (1) failing to impose

registering all motor vehicles on the property, any violations regarding the

but suspend their imposition for sixty days, thereby giving the respondents alternative, the city asked the trial court to impose the statutory civil penalties, respondents’ violations of various city ordinances and State statutes. In the The trial court ruled that it had properly declined to impose civil

In his motion to reconsider, Blaisdell argued, in pertinent part, that by

penalties were mandatory given the trial court’s rulings regarding the the respondents. The city asserted that, pursuant to RSA 676:17, I, the p. 4 4

selection clause).

must impose some penalty. of the statutory penalty on a case-by-case basis, it argues that the trial court concedes that the trial court has discretionary authority to tailor the imposition phrase “be subject to,” which affects the overall meaning of the clause.

mandatory enforcement.”

thereof.” receives written notice from the municipality of a particular statutory provision is determined primarily from the language (interpreting “shall be determined by” in the context of a contractual forum Strafford Technology v. Camcar Div. of Textron, 1 p. 4 47 N.H. 174, 176 (2001) “shall be subject to” in the context of a contractual forum selection clause); Dancart Corp. v. St. Albans Rubber Co., 124 N.H. 598, 602 (1984) (interpreting

local administrator or land use board acting Town of Nottingham v. Harvey, 120 N.H. 889, 895

makes enforcement of a statute permissive and that the word ‘shall’ requires omitted). The general rule of statutory construction is that “the word ‘may’

Appeal of Rowan, 1 p. 4 42 N.H. 67, 71 (1997) (quotation and citation

RSA 676:17, I(b) (emphasis added). The city contends that the use of the word condition of a permit or decision issued by, any

part: (b) Shall be subject to a civil penalty not to

. . . .

either in its brief or at oral argument. Therefore, we decline to address them. provisions in the trial court and did not develop its argument regarding them

The version of RSA 676:17, I, relevant to this case provided in pertinent

See Franklin v. Town of Newport, 151 N.H. 508, 509 (200 p. 4 4).

p. 4 40.12 of the city’s general ordinances in its brief, it did not rely upon these city’s general ordinances. Although the city references sections 42.25(b) and p. 5 236:114. city’s ordinance controls.

between the two. RSA chapter 236, entitled, “Highway Regulation, Protection

statutory penalty was mandatory. therefore, would still be an unlicensed motor vehicle junkyard under RSA under both the State statute and the city’s ordinance, and the property, requirement that the offending vehicles be unregistered, he argues that the still not be intended for, or in condition for, legal use on the public highways

which are 5

I(c)(1) and section 42.6(a)(32) of the city ordinance and the relationship

circumstances). Accordingly, we reject the city’s argument that imposition of a

junkyard. While he acknowledges that RSA 236:112, I(c)(1) contains no Specifically, the city argues that even if the vehicles were registered, they would

ordinance requires that there be two or more vehicles stored on the property

Our determination rests upon an interpretation of both RSA 236:112,

after considering the defendants’ financial condition and the totality of the

use on public highways” before the property constitutes a motor vehicle 42.6(a)(32) of the city ordinance and RSA 236:112, I(c)(1) (Supp. 2005). both unregistered and “no longer intended or in condition for legal

the statutory definition of motor vehicle junkyard. He contends that the city’s ordinance defining motor vehicle junkyards controls because it conflicts with Blaisdell counters that pursuant to RSA 236:124 (1993), the city’s

to RSA 676:17, I(b) based upon a lower rate than that requested by the town

should it choose to impose one. The city asserts that the trial court erred in its interpretation of section

jurisdiction in the English Courts. 131, 134-35 (2001) (affirming trial court’s imposition of civil penalties pursuant

determine whether or not to impose a penalty and the amount of the penalty such penalties. Thus, RSA 676:17, I(b) grants the trial court the authority to penalties set forth in RSA 676:17, I(b) rather than the obligation to impose subject to” as granting the trial court the authority to impose the statutory Similarly, in the context of the instant case, we interpret the clause “shall be subject to” as modifying the “mandatory character” of the word “shall.” Id. jurisdiction in the English Courts. Id. Thus, we interpreted the phrase “be clause “shall be subject to” was a grant of authority conferring non-exclusive

case, we declined to interpret this provision as a mandate of exclusive of the English Courts.” Dancart, 124 N.H. at p. 6 600 (emphasis added). In that selection clause that stated: “[The contract] shall be subject to the jurisdiction corporation and an English corporation disputed the meaning of a forum In Dancart, the parties to a contract action between a New Hampshire 6

established within the proper exercise of police power granted to

statute prohibits or vice versa”). highways . . . .

RSA 23 p. 6 6:112, I(c)(1) and section 42.6(a)(32).

ordinances for the control of junk yards now or hereafter

exists when a municipal ordinance or regulation permits that which a State Town of Bethlehem intended or in condition for legal use on the public to their original purpose . . . ., 150 N.H. p. 6 606, 611 (2004) (explaining that “[a] conflict

unregistered motor vehicles which are no longer See N. Country Envtl. Servs. v.

State statute. We, therefore, conclude that there is an actual conflict between which has stored or deposited two (2) or more vehicle junkyard because it contains an extra requirement not present in the effectively makes it more difficult for a property to be classified as a motor intended for legal use on the public highways. Id. Thus, section 42. p. 6 6(a)(32) as, in pertinent part: both unregistered and no longer as a motor vehicle junkyard under the city ordinance, the property must General Ordinances of the City of Rochester § 42.6(a)(32). In order to qualify this subdivision, RSA 236:112 defines a “junk yard” as including, in pertinent

whether in connection with another business or not,

Any business and any place of storage or deposit, quantity equal in bulk to 2 or more motor vehicles:

However, the applicable city ordinance defines a motor vehicle junkyard

RSA 23 p. 6 6:112, I(c)(1). a certificate of approval for the location of the junkyard. For the purposes of maintaining a junkyard to obtain a license to operate a junkyard business and Supp. 2005). RSA 236:114 requires a person who is operating, establishing or

where the following are stored or deposited in a

Motor vehicle junk yards, meaning any place . . .

“Motor Vehicle Recycling Yards and Junk Yards.” RSA 23 p. 6 6:111-:129 (1993 & and Control Regulations,” contains many subdivisions, one of which is entitled, binding upon all municipalities, it could have specifically so stated. p. 7 legislature had intended RSA 236:111-:129 to provide minimum standards

reasons, I respectfully dissent. the event that a municipality had not legislated in that area. For these

authorized municipalities to enforce less protective ordinances. If the

definition of motor vehicle junkyard in RSA 236:112 to be merely a gap-filler in

serving the purposes set forth in RSA 236:111, the legislature has specifically Moreover, even assuming that the city ordinance is a less effective method of violations. on the properties, which supports the underlying purpose of RSA chapter 236.

as used in RSA 676:17, I(b). Nor do I believe that the legislature intended its

dissented.

part, Blaisdell’s motion to reconsider its remedy for the motor vehicle junkyard Blaisdell would no longer be operating an unlicensed motor vehicle junkyard the city’s request for civil penalties pursuant to RSA 676:17 and granted, in

analysis is the proper approach to examining the phrase “shall be subject to” BRODERICK, C.J., dissenting: I do not believe that a plain meaning

DALIANIS, DUGGAN and HICKS, JJ., concurred; BRODERICK, C.J.,

law to preempt local ordinances and comprehensively regulate this particular language of RSA 236:124 indicates that there was no legislative intent for State in RSA 236:111. By complying with section 42.6(a)(32) of the city’s ordinance, Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not err when it denied

485-C:20 (2001).

local ordinances. Thus, the city’s ordinance, section 42.6(a)(32), controls over 236:124 provides that State statutes in this particular field are intended to aid

dealing with “Motor Vehicle Recycling Yards and Junk Yards.” The plain defeat the purpose of Chapter 236 of the State legislative scheme,” as set forth Blaisdell to escape the City violation merely by registering the vehicles would We are also not persuaded by the city’s assertion that “allowing Mr.

(explaining preemption doctrine). To the contrary, the express language of RSA See JTR Colebrook v. Town of Colebrook, 149 N.H. 767, 770 (2003)

236:124 applies to all statutes contained in the subdivision of RSA chapter 236 (Emphasis added.) Despite the city’s contrary assertion, we conclude that RSA

ordinances shall control when in conflict with this subdivision. municipalities, but rather is in aid thereof. Specific local p. 8 A:11. The statute parallels the constitutional provision that established these

that may be drawn from them.” jurisdiction, subject to appeal, of [certain] crimes and offenses . . . .” RSA 502-

the conclusion that this phrase shall rest exclusively in the English courts. because the language does not expressly provide that jurisdiction

not have the plain and ordinary meaning the majority would ascribe to it. language of the contract considered in the light of those exhibits and inferences statute. The statute states, “Each district court . . . shall have original phrase “subject to” did not change the mandatory nature of “shall” in that (1976), we interpreted RSA 502-A:11 and concluded that inclusion of the Indeed, in State v. Dickson, 116 N.H. 175, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 803

nature of “shall” to a discretionary grant of authority.

not be examined under a plain meaning analysis. Accordingly, I cannot join Given the ambiguous nature of this phrase, “shall be subject to” should reference to the plain meaning of the language of the clause,

simply to demonstrate my opinion that the phrase “shall be subject to” does record to determine whether the trial court’s ruling was “supported by the merely authorized, not obligated, to issue a fine “not to exceed $100.” I write Id. at 601-02 (citations omitted and emphasis added). We then examined the whether the majority correctly reaches the conclusion that the trial court was which we have referred in our statement of the facts. English courts.” his understanding of it by reference to the extrinsic evidence to stated that the contract at issue “shall be subject to the jurisdiction of the the trial judge found the language ambiguous, and supplemented

We assume that the trial court did not reach its conclusion by

In examining this ruling we stated:

therefore dismissed the plaintiff’s action from the superior court. Id. proper analysis by which to examine this phrase, I express no opinion as to that the phrase granted exclusive jurisdiction to the English courts, and

Dancart, 124 N.H. at 601. The trial court had determined

uphold the trial court’s interpretation of a forum selection clause. The clause Corp. v. St. Albans Rubber Co., 124 N.H. 598 (1984). There, we were asked to A plain meaning analysis is not supported by our holding in Dancart

of the word “shall” in RSA 676:17, I(b). As I do not believe that this is the phrase “be subject to” modifies what would generally be the mandatory nature I would not apply a plain meaning analysis to determine whether the

p. 9 for any single violation shall not exceed $500.

the conviction date; provided, however, that the total fines imposed

district court without a jury and if found guilty is given the system . . . by which a person charged with a misdemeanor is tried in the meaning analysis. Rather, the superior court for a jury trial. We stated, “Defendant attacks our two-tier term “shall” by itself. Indeed, in neither case did we purport to apply a plain “shall be subject to” should always be read to be mandatory, equivalent to the unambiguous. Thus, I believe that it is necessary to consider the legislative

not look beyond it to determine legislative intent.

more than $100 for each day that such violation continues after Any violation of this title may be made punishable by a fine of not

When first enacted in 1983, this section contained only one paragraph:

the legislature had given the defendant the ability to appeal his conviction to

superior court. I do not suggest that these cases support a conclusion that “shall be subject to” neither has a plain and ordinary meaning, nor is clear and

stated that, when the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, we do Int’l Speedway, 151 N.H. 409, 419 (2004). However, we have additionally ascribe the plain and ordinary meanings to the words used. Carignan v. N.H. As the majority notes, we first examine the language of a statute and

“shall be subject to” does not have the plain meaning the majority suggests.

him to first defend a bench trial in the district court. Through RSA 502-A:11,

not change an individual’s ability to appeal, as of right, from the district to the As Dickson and Handfield make clear, the presence of “subject to” does

N.H. at 629 (emphasis added). the superior court with a trial de novo by jury unless waived.” district courts shall be tried there, subject to appeal and trial de novo.” Handfield, 115

the state prison.” N.H. CONST. pt. II, art. 77. Although the “subject to” jury, all criminal causes wherein the punishment is less than imprisonment in

claimed that his Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial was violated by forcing 628 (1975), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 909 (1976). In Handfield, a defendant In reaching this conclusion, we relied on State v. Handfield, 115 N.H.

Dickson, 116 N.H. at 177.

statutory scheme is that cases within their jurisdiction which are begun in the

original jurisdiction to try and determine, subject to right of appeal and trial by courts. “And the general court are further empowered to give to police courts once they were in court. Any one having been a selectmen [ p. 10 in order to avoid confusion which had caused delays for the towns

enforcement mechanisms:

to enforce their codes. The bill clarifies certain penalty provisions

laws,”

Senator White indicated the legislature’s intent to strengthen a town’s

statutes. As the majority indicates, RSA 676:17 was again modified in 2004. This conclusion could also be supported by two other amendments to the

in this section and the need for more than a plain meaning analysis. acting under the authority of this title: long overdue and have not been useful to the municipalities trying discretionary. The legislative history of RSA 676:17 underscores the ambiguity decision issued by, any local administrator or land use board approved by, or any requirement or condition of a permit or id., it did not intend to make application of the fines merely infer that, where the legislature intended to “give[ ] some teeth to the current N.H.S. Jour. 59 (1988) (statement of Sen. White). It is not unreasonable to be mandatory and not discretionary. In discussing changes to the statutes, and “shall be guilty of,” indicated its intention that the imposition of a civil fine ordinances. know that you never really could enforce any of the zoning

As amended this bill gives some teeth to the current laws which is whichever is earlier. or any provision or specification of any application, plat, or plan

the statute to replace “may be made punishable by” with “shall be subject to” One could reasonably argue that the legislature, by expressly amending

Corpening and Blaisdell were found to be in violation of the 1988 version. Laws 1988, 19:6 (repealing and reenacting RSA 676:17, I) (emphases added).

written notice from the municipality that he is in violation, or any local ordinance, code, or regulation adopted under this title, conviction date or after the date on which the violator receives each day that such violation is found to continue after the (b) Shall be subject to a civil penalty not to exceed $100 for

guilty of a felony if any other person. (a) Shall be guilty of a misdemeanor if a natural person, or

I. Any person who violates any of the provisions of this title,

amended to read as follows: Laws 1983, 447:1 (emphasis added) (enacting RSA 676:17). In 1988, this was shall be subject to the control of the attorney general . . . .”).

legislative history supports. of any criminal law, but such officer or person, in the enforcement of such law,

Laws 1988, 19:6 making the application of the fines discretionary.

majority’s conclusion. be that there are other aspects of the legislative history that would support the legislature intended all, if any, of these statutes to be merely discretionary. has used this phrase nearly 200 times in the statutes. It is doubtful that the

and ordinary meaning, I need not decide the issue of which interpretation the However, because I disagree with the conclusion that the phrase has a plain any officer or person of any duty prescribed by law relative to the enforcement properly adopted local ordinance, code, or regulation.” (emphasis added)). different in each use — in Laws 1988, 19:1 allowing appeals as of right, and in of the phrase “be subject to” in the provision regarding fines. of any civil penalty, the imposition of which is authorized by statute or by a include, “The limitations on amounts of fines . . . shall not include the amount

plain and ordinary meaning the majority would ascribe to that phrase. It may For these reasons, I believe that “shall be subject to” does not have the unambiguous on its face. An electronic search indicates that the legislature

over such person.”); RSA 7: p. 11 11 (2003) (“Nothing herein contained shall relieve on the ground that the adjudicating court did not have personal jurisdiction modify “shall” twice in the same bill, but intended it to mean something penalties in the 1988 version to be treated as mandatory, despite the inclusion effected pursuant to the provisions of this compact shall be subject to attack argue that it is unlikely the legislature chose to use the phrase “subject to” to proceeding to which he had become a party by reason of service of process A:11-a). This jurisdictional statute remains unchanged today. One could See, e.g., RSA 5-A:1 (2003) (“No judgment obtained against any person in any

court shall have concurrent jurisdiction, of the district court to hear cases arising under RSA 676:17. “The district implications of declaring the phrase “shall be subject to” to be clear and Finally, I believe that the majority has perhaps overlooked the larger

suggests that the legislature may have intended both the criminal and civil

pursuant to the enabling statutes . . . .” Laws 1988, 19:1 (enacting RSA 502- guilty of a felony if any other person; of any violation of a local ordinance, code, or regulation properly adopted

in the same bill an addition to RSA chapter 502-A, expanding the jurisdiction Moreover, when the legislature amended RSA 676:17 in 1988, it included

payment of fines. RSA 676:17, I (Supp. 2005) (emphasis added). This further

that an individual both “shall be guilty of a misdemeanor if a natural person, or At that time, the legislature again redrafted paragraph I, explicitly requiring welfare of its citizens. p. 12 and proven importance to the economy of the state and the general recreation industry which is hereby declared to be of significant

specifically so stated.

invasion. In addition, such an environment is considered essential safeguarding of their material rights against unwarrantable added). importance to the health and safety of the inhabitants and the in conflict with the express purposes of this subdivision.” Id. (emphasis . . . is a useful and necessary business and ought to be encouraged when not It immediately followed this by recognizing “that the maintenance of junk yards provide minimum standards binding upon all municipalities, it could have

recognition only underscores the confusion created by that section. ordinances shall control when in conflict with this subdivision.” vehicles be unregistered. It is also true that RSA 236:124 states, “Specific local A clean, wholesome, attractive environment is declared to be of

subdivision of RSA chapter 236 dealing with motor vehicle junkyards: In RSA 236:111, the legislature expressly established its purpose for the analysis by stating, “If the legislature had intended RSA 236:111-:129 to reveals the legislature’s intent in enacting RSA 236:124. merely advisory, setting neither a floor nor a ceiling. The majority ends its statutory scheme and not in isolation. Carignan, 151 N.H. at 419. Doing so As the majority notes, we interpret statutes in the context of the overall

However, rather than ascribing a plain meaning to RSA 236:124, this RSA 236:112 established minimum guidelines for municipalities to follow. condition for legal use, while the ordinance additionally requires that the could have explicitly stated, as it did in RSA 485-C:20, that the definition in

236:124, meant that its definition of “junk yard” in RSA 236:112 was to be However, I do not believe that the legislature, in establishing RSA

236:112 requires only that the motor vehicles no longer be intended or in current version of RSA 236:112 and the ordinance — namely, that RSA intended. As the majority correctly points out, there is a conflict between the interpretation of these provisions that is more generous than the legislature Ordinances of the City of Rochester § 42.6(a)(32) (the ordinance) leads to an 2005), RSA 236:112 (Supp. 2005), RSA 236:124 (1993), and General The majority’s use of a plain meaning analysis of RSA 236:111 (Supp.

registration requirement. Senator Below explained this change:

widespread. preamble. This demand for something to control the junk yards is legislative history of these statutes. they can. The principle of the bill is set out pretty well in the RSA 236:124 ambiguous. As such, it would again be necessary to examine the the subdivision, the policy articulated in RSA 236:111 at the very least makes

passed House Bill 141. That bill amended RSA 236:112 to remove the These definitions remained identical until 2002 when the legislature

Ordinances of the City of Rochester § 42.6(a)(32). intended use and unregistered. Compare Laws 1965, 372:1, with General a motor vehicle junkyard, the cars must have been unsuitable for their State is embarking on a program to bring in as many tourists as the ordinance at issue here. Both required that, for a location to be defined as However, even assuming that this reading is not made clear by the language of This prior version of the statutes contained the exact same language as

A:1, titled “Purposes” and containing language found in RSA 236:111). what later became RSA 236:111. See Laws 1965, 372:1 (enacting RSA 267- N.H.S. Jour. p. 13 1300 (1965) (statement of Sen. Gove). The preamble described is

mean “when more restrictive than.”

The beauty of the areas has been diminished at a time when the have caused surrounding land values to decrease considerably. broadly as to completely frustrate the clear policy established by RSA 236:111. junking of automobiles that offends most people. These junk yards regulations in this area. A contrary reading allows towns to set standards so It isn’t so much the organized junk yard, but the indiscriminate filler, applicable only when towns and cities have not established their own Senator Gove stated: chapter 267-A, the precursor to RSA chapter 236. In discussing this bill, In 1965, the legislature passed House Bill 693, thereby enacting RSA

entire statutory scheme, is that the legislature intended “when in conflict” to See Carignan, 151 N.H. at 419.

create minimum guidelines — it did not intend this section to be merely a gap- Accordingly, I believe that the legislature intended that RSA 236:112

the clear and unambiguous meaning of RSA 236:124, as indicated by the important to the State’s economy and general welfare. As such, I believe that maintain the clean, wholesome, and attractive environment that is so intent that there be some minimal levels of junkyard regulation in order to Through RSA 236:111, the legislature clearly and expressly indicated its p. 14 14

enforce less protective ordinances.” declares, that “the legislature has specifically authorized municipalities to

leave it wide open by intending “where they conflict” to mean, as the majority registering for the proper permits to have a junkyard. reregister non-usable vehicles so they do not have the hassle of

the legislature expressly closed the loophole contained in RSA 236:112, only to motor vehicle salvage yards where individuals continue to

For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent.

with respect to motor vehicle junkyards. In my opinion, it does not follow that clear that the legislature intended RSA 236:112 to create minimum standards supply or the ground water. In particular, this bill focuses on respect to junkyards so that no harmful pollutants enter our water These statements, coupled with the policy defined by RSA 236:111, make Environmental Services control on environmental issues with N.H.S. Jour. 61 (2002) (statement of Sen. Below) (emphasis added).

junkyard. House Bill p. 14 141 closes that loophole. which is a loophole in the law to avoid being classified as being a current RSA, an individual may keep registering automobiles,

the past there’s been legislation passed giving the Department of House Bill p. 14 141 amends the RSA dealing with junkyard statutes. In