2009-312, I/M/O ADAM MUCHMORE AND AMY JAYCOX

contact with the child. The stipulation and order permitted either party to for the child and allowing the petitioner, Adam Muchmore, regular weekly the respondent “primary legal and physical parental rights and responsibilities”

born, both parents resided in Vermont; they now reside in New Hampshire. parents of a daughter, who was born in September 2006. When the child was

In June 2007, a Vermont court entered a stipulation and order granting

The record evidences the following facts. The parties are the unwed

We reverse. Lebanon Family Division (MacLeod, J.) modifying the parties’ parenting plan. DALIANIS, J. The respondent, Amy M. Jaycox, appeals an order of the

Girdwood on the brief and orally), for the respondent. Stebbins Bradley Harvey Miller & Brooks, P.A., of Hanover (Stephen P.

to press. Errors may be reported by E-mail at the following address: for the petitioner. Decato Law Office, of Lebanon (R. Peter Decato on the brief and orally),

page is: http://www.courts.state.nh.us/supreme. IN THE MATTER OF ADAM MUCHMORE AND AMY JAYCOX

No. 2009-312 editorial errors in order that corrections may be made before the opinion goes Lebanon Family Division Hampshire, One Charles Doe Drive, Concord, New Hampshire 03301, of any Readers are requested to notify the Reporter, Supreme Court of New ___________________________

a.m. on the morning of their release. The direct address of the court's home reporter@courts.state.nh.us. Opinions are available on the Internet by 9:00

well as formal revision before publication in the New Hampshire Reports. NOTICE: This opinion is subject to motions for rehearing under Rule 22 as for reconsideration, which was denied, and this appeal followed.

p. 2 in the child’s best interests was all that was required. The respondent moved

and that, pursuant to RSA 461-A:4 (Supp. 2008), proof that modification was modifying the parties’ parenting schedule would be p. 2 in the child’s best interests, of proof under RSA 461-A:11, I(b) or (c), it was sufficient to establish that

whole. 2

legislative intent.

legislature did not see fit to include. interpretation words used. ruling that while the petitioner’s evidence was insufficient to carry his burden

unsustainably exercised its discretion.

legislative intent as expressed in the words of the statute considered as a

Id. We interpret a statute in the context of the overall

governs. unambiguous, then we need not look beyond it for further indication of

will not consider what the legislature might have said or add language that the engage in statutory interpretation. We review a trial court’s statutory Id. We interpret legislative intent from the statute as written and language of the statute, we ascribe the plain and ordinary meaning to the 461-A:11. Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied the motion, Matter of LaRue & Bedard, 156 N.H. 378, 380 (2007). When examining the parenting rights and responsibilities unless it clearly appears that the court begin our analysis by looking to the language of the statute itself. In the In the Matter of Carr & Edmunds, 156 N.H. 498, 503-04 (2007). We

In matters of statutory interpretation, we are the final arbiters of the

interests, law issue in this case because the parties agree that New Hampshire law

de novo. Id. We note, at the outset, that there is no choice of

N.H. 707, 711 (2007). Resolving the issues in this appeal requires that we order in New Hampshire, ground that the petitioner had failed to meet his burden of proof under RSA See In the Matter of Choy & Choy, 154

We will not overturn a trial court’s modification of an order regarding parental rights and responsibilities was not working,

responsibilities for the child and modification would be in the child’s best

petitioned the Lebanon Family Division to register the Vermont stipulation and The respondent objected and moved to dismiss the petition on the

I(c); and (3) because of the respondent’s conduct, the original allocation of that the child’s present environment was harmful to her, see RSA 461-A:11,

see RSA 461-A:11, I(b); (2) there was clear and convincing evidence

intentionally, and without justification” interfered with his parental modification was warranted because: (1) the respondent had “repeatedly, 458-A:14 (2004); RSA 461-A:11 (Supp. 2008). The petitioner contended that

In July 2008, when the child was not quite two years old, the petitioner

of three and four. petition to modify the parenting schedule when the child was between the ages whether he met his burden of proof under RSA 461-A:11, I(d), the parties agree

rights and responsibilities” once a parent has proved that any one of four

proof under RSA 461-A:11, I(b) or (c). Although the trial court did not address

order outweighs the harm to the child from changing her environment, parties.” RSA 461-A:4, I, :6 (Supp. 2008).

best interests, the original allocation is not working, and modifying the order is in the child’s court may issue an order modifying a permanent order concerning parenting responsibility for the child,” either one parent asserts or the court finds that Here, the trial court found that the petitioner did not meet his burden of

environment is detrimental to the child and the advantage of modifying the interests of the child as provided under RSA 461-A:6 and the safety of the drafting a modified parenting plan, the court must consider “only the best responsibilities would be in the child’s best interests, may the court then modify the existing plan. See RSA 461-A:11. When Only after a parent has proved that one of these circumstances exists

see RSA 461-A:11, I(d).

seek modification of an existing parenting plan. RSA 461-A:11 provides: “The 461-A:11, I(c); or (4) the parents “have substantially equal periods of residential

and to modify an existing plan. ( p. 3 3) the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the child’s present

the other parent’s residential responsibilities and modifying the parents’ 461-A:11, I(a); (2) one parent has repeatedly and intentionally interfered with

RSA 461-A:11 governs the circumstances under which a parent may

however, as to when a parent may seek to modify an existing parenting plan.

pertains both to proceedings to establish a parenting plan in the first instance parenting plan to the court for inclusion in its decree. This requirement Pursuant to its plain meaning, RSA 461-A:4, I, requires parents to submit a

plan under this section, the court may develop it. the court’s decree. If the parents are unable to develop a parenting develop and file with the court a parenting plan to be included in providing for parenting time with a child, . . . the parents shall In any proceeding to establish or modify a judgment

RSA 461-A:4, I, provides, in pertinent part:

omitted). statutory scheme.” Fichtner v. Pittsley, 146 N.H. 512, 514 (2001) (quotation enacting them and in light of the policy sought to be advanced by the entire N.H. at 504. “Our goal is to apply statutes in light of the legislature’s intent in statutory scheme and not in isolation. In the Matter of Carr & Edmunds, 156 an invasion of a policy area better decided by the legislature.” child” within the meaning of RSA chapter 461-A. RSA 461-A:4, I. p. 4 applied, “under our constitutional supervisory authority would in our view be

meets this definition and was a “judgment providing for parenting time with a had under the circumstances of this case, and, if so, the burden of proof to be

parent’s rights and responsibilities.” The Vermont stipulation and decree choose to do so. For us to determine on review whether modification may be (Supp. 2008) defines a “[p]arenting plan” as a “written plan describing each do. features commonly seen in a New Hampshire parenting plan.” RSA 461-A:1, V

is not up to the court to solve it or to speculate as to how the legislature might assertion requires that we add language to RSA 461-A:11, I, which we cannot not interfering and where the child’s current environment is not detrimental, it parenting plan” because it “was not comprehensive and didn’t include all of the reassessing the best interests of a child in circumstances where the parents are

modify an existing plan under any other circumstances. The petitioner’s but creating a new one. The Vermont order, he contends, “did not constitute a of those circumstances. RSA 461-A:11, I, does not grant the court discretion to therein exists. While this problem may regrettably prevent a trial court from because the trial court was not, in fact, modifying an existing parenting plan, 461-A:11, I, allows a trial court to modify an existing parenting plan under any

existing parenting plan when, as in this case, none of the circumstances listed The petitioner argues that RSA 461-A:11 does not apply to this case prove that one of the four circumstances listed in RSA 461-A:11, I, exists. RSA Ingerson, 130 N.H. 112, 117 (1987). the statute as it sees fit. State v.

parenting plan found in RSA 461-A:4, I. this assertion, he relies upon the reference to a proceeding to modify a

RSA 461-A:11, I, simply does not allow a party to seek modification of an construction. RSA 461-A:11, II requires the party seeking modification to

Of course, if the legislature disagrees with our construction, it is free to amend circumstances other than those listed in RSA 461-A:11, it could have said so. intended to permit the trial court to modify a parenting plan under See In the Matter of LaRue & Bedard, 156 N.H. at 380. Had the legislature

seek modification when doing so is in the child’s best interests. To support

The plain language of RSA 461-A:11, I, does not support this

plan to the court). in “any proceeding to establish or modify” a parenting plan to submit such a

none of the circumstances set forth in RSA 461-A:11, I, apply, a parent may proof that doing so was in the child’s best interests. He surmises that when nonetheless, to a modification of the existing parenting plan based only upon circumstances set forth in RSA 461-A:11, I, exists, he was entitled, that he failed to do so. The petitioner contends that even though none of the p. 5 5

responsibilities.” has been replaced in RSA chapter 461-A with the phrase “parental rights and

stepparents and grandparents. RSA chapter 461 to refer to privileges granted to non-parents, such as rights and responsibilities, are anachronisms. The word “visitation” is used in

grandparents when doing so is in child’s best interests). The word “custody” BRODERICK, C.J., and DUGGAN, HICKS and CONBOY, JJ., concurred.

make clear that the terms “visitation” and “custody,” referring to parental listed in RSA 461-A:11. erred by modifying the parties’ decree absent proof of one of the circumstances For all of the above reasons, therefore, we conclude that the trial court

See RSA 461-A:20.

court to grant “reasonable visitation privileges” to stepparents and this state.” RSA 4 p. 5 58-A:15, I; See RSA 461-A:6, V (Supp. 2008) (allowing

support these contentions. Moreover, several provisions in RSA chapter 461-A governed by RSA 461-A:4. The plain language of both provisions fails to merely sought a change to “visitation,” and such changes, he asserts, are The petitioner also argues that RSA 461-A:11 does not apply because he

provided in RSA chapter 461-A). “custody” means “the allocation of parental rights and responsibilities” as

and shall be enforced in like manner as a custody decree rendered by a court of of-state custody decree that has been filed in this state “has the same effect and enforce” the Vermont decree, RSA 4 p. 5 58-A:13; it could not ignore it. An out- RSA ch. 458-A (2004 & Supp. 2008), the trial court was required to “recognize Moreover, pursuant to the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, see