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2012-394, Steve Trefethen & a. v. Town of Derry

STEVE TREFETHEN & a.

moved for rehearing, which the ZBA denied on January 6, 2011.

No. 2012-394 Rockingham

permitting the property to be used as a day care facility. The petitioners timely

___________________________

THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

the ZBA granted a special exception to the lessee of abutting property relevant facts. The petitioners own property in Derry. On November 18, 2010, The trial court’s order and the appellate record support the following

matter jurisdiction. See RSA 677:4 (Supp. 2012). We reverse and remand.

order of the Superior Court (Wageling, J.) dismissing their appeal from a ruling

page is: http://www.courts.state.nh.us/supreme. a.m. on the morning of their release. The direct address of the court's home reporter@courts.state.nh.us. Opinions are available on the Internet by 9:00

of the Town of Derry Zoning Board of Adjustment (ZBA) for lack of subject

BASSETT, J.

The petitioners, Steve and Laura Trefethen, appeal an

Guimond Sabean on the brief), for the Town of Derry. Boutin & Altieri, P.L.L.C., of Londonderry (Edmund J. Boutin and Lynne

Steve and Laura Trefethen, self-represented parties, by brief. to press. Errors may be reported by E-mail at the following address:

Opinion Issued: April 12, 2013 Submitted: February 7, 2013

TOWN OF DERRY

v.

editorial errors in order that corrections may be made before the opinion goes Hampshire, One Charles Doe Drive, Concord, New Hampshire 03301, of any Readers are requested to notify the Reporter, Supreme Court of New

well as formal revision before publication in the New Hampshire Reports. NOTICE: This opinion is subject to motions for rehearing under Rule 22 as question of law, which we review de novo. See Radziewicz, 159 N.H. at 316. In

The interpretation and application of RSA 677:4 and RSA 21:35, II is a

Saturday, February 5. We agree. February 7, since the thirty-day filing deadline under RSA 677:4 fell on contend that RSA 21:35, II allowed them to file their appeal on Monday,

superior court. See Radziewicz, 159 N.H. at 316-17; cf. Dermody v. Town of with the thirty-day filing deadline to vest subject matter jurisdiction in the

2 was timely filed, and the trial court erred in dismissing their action. They

or repugnant to the context of the same statute.” (Emphasis added.) RSA

In construing RSA 677:4, we have held that a petitioning party must comply chapter 21 shall apply to the “construction of all statutes . . . unless such next business day.” RSA 21:1 (2012) states that the rules set forth in RSA holiday, the document or fee shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by the The court relied upon Radziewicz v. Town of Hudson, 159 N.H. 313 (2009), in

On appeal, the petitioners argue that their appeal to the superior court

followed. construction would be inconsistent with the manifest intent of the legislature

after the date upon which the board voted to deny the motion for rehearing.”

or paying fees and the specified date falls on a Saturday, Sunday, or legal RSA 21:35, II provides: “If a statute specifies a date for filing documents appeal was not timely because it was filed thirty-two days after the ZBA’s vote.

language that the legislature did not see fit to include. Id. jurisdiction over a planning board appeal). thirty-day deadline in order to vest superior court with subject matter meaning to the words used. Id. We interpret legislative intent from the statute Gilford, 137 N.H. 294, 296 (1993) (RSA 677:15 requires petitioner to adhere to

intent as expressed in the words of a statute considered as a whole. Id. When petitioners’ appeal. A motion to reconsider was denied, and this appeal

legislative body may apply, by petition, to the superior court within 30 days order or decision of the zoning board of adjustment or any decision of the local RSA 677:4 provides, in pertinent part: “Any person aggrieved by any deny the motion for rehearing. The court concluded that the petitioners’ appeal no later than Saturday, February 5, thirty days after the ZBA voted to as written and will not consider what the legislature might have said or add matter jurisdiction, ruling that RSA 677:4 required the petitioners to file their

examining the language of a statute, we ascribe the plain and ordinary

matters of statutory interpretation, we are the final arbiters of the legislature’s under RSA 677:4, and, therefore, it did not have jurisdiction over the

court. The superior court dismissed the petitioners’ appeal for lack of subject On Monday, February 7, the petitioners filed an appeal in the superior

ruling that RSA 21:35, II (2012) did not extend the time for filing an appeal Sutton v. Town of Gilford, 160 N.H. 43, 54 (2010) (“When a statute’s language

statute’s language is plain and unambiguous, we decline the Town’s invitation. with the state and paying any corresponding fees.” However, because the clear that the statute was intended to apply only to “filing corporate documents not exist in the first instance.” Id. at 317 (quotation, brackets, and ellipses

establish jurisdiction under RSA 677:4. Id. at 316-17. We stated that

3

chapter 677. Bosonetto, however, is inapposite. Bosonetto addressed the 21:35, II because the statute is ambiguous, and the legislative history makes it court’s procedural rules could not be used to “establish jurisdiction that did The Town argues that we should consider the legislative history of RSA

RSA 21:35, II, the deadline was extended until Monday, February 7.

the deadline falls on a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday, could not be used to

effect at the time of the petitioners’ filing deadline.” Id. Here, we are again

two days after the ZBA voted to deny a rehearing. Radziewicz, 159 N.H. at 315. timeliness of a motion for rehearing filed with the ZBA pursuant to RSA 677:2

where there has not been compliance with filing requirements under RSA Richmond, 163 N.H. 736 (2012), subject matter jurisdiction may not attach distinguished from the superior court’s own procedural rules” and that the Finally, the Town argues that pursuant to Bosonetto v. Town of

obtains, and we hold that the appeal was timely filed. thirty-day deadline fell on Saturday, February 5. Therefore, by operation of statute in effect in February 2011 was RSA 21:35, II; thus, a different result Superior Court Rule 12(l), which extends a deadline to the next business day if bound by the statute in effect at the time of the petitioners’ filing deadline. The

observed that “in deciding the case before us, we are bound by the statute in by the legislature but had not yet gone into effect. Id. at 318. We further effect. In that case, the petitioners filed an appeal to the superior court thirty- omitted). In Radziewicz, we noted that RSA 21:35, II had been recently enacted

the jurisdictional window has closed.” However, Radziewicz is distinguishable

“statutory time requirements relative to the vesting of jurisdiction must be

legal holiday, the deadline is extended to the next business day. Here, the if the thirty-day filing deadline set forth in RSA 677:4 falls on a weekend or superior court’s dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, we held that context of RSA 677:4. Accordingly, under the plain language of RSA 21:35, II, As in this case, the thirty-day deadline fell on a weekend. Id. In upholding the

because, at the time that it was decided, RSA 21:35, II had not yet gone into

language of RSA 677:4 does not allow for a ZBA appeal after 30 days, because result, arguing that Radziewicz “stands for the . . . proposition that the clear The Town also asserts that our decision in Radziewicz compels a different

is plain and unambiguous, we need not examine its legislative history.”).

it from the operation of RSA 21:35, II. Nor is RSA 21:35, II repugnant to the 677: 4 does not contain language manifesting the legislature’s intent to exclude 4

Reversed and remanded. meeting minutes. regarding the timeliness of the ZBA’s issuance of the notice of decision and the superior court, we need not address the petitioners’ remaining arguments

Because we hold that the petitioners’ appeal was timely filed in the

DALIANIS, C.J., and HICKS, CONBOY and LYNN, JJ., concurred. (2008). Bosonetto, 163 N.H. at 7 41. Not only did the deadline in that case fall

statutory thirty-day period ended. Id. at 7 41-42. was when the statutory thirty-day period began to run, rather than when the on a weekday, rather than a Saturday, as in this case, but the dispositive issue

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