2018-0404, In re J.W.

birth mother were terminated in 2017. awarded primary residential responsibility of J.W. The parental rights of J.W.’s married. J.W. has lived with them since approx imately 2011, when M.F. was 2008. They live together and s hare two biological children but have never born in 2007. M.F. has been in a relationship with C.N. since approximately The relevant facts follow. M.F. is the biological father of J.W., who was

170 - B:4, II and III. We affirm. court erred because they are eligible to jointly adopt J.W. pursuant to RSA (governing who may adopt). On appeal, the petitioners argue that the trial authorize such an adoption and dismissed the petition. See RSA 170 - B:4 J.W. The Circuit Court (Moran, J.) ruled that RSA 170 - B:4 (2014) does not cohabitating adults who jointly petitioned to adopt M.F.’s minor biological son, HANTZ MARCONI, J. The petitioners, M.F. and C.N., are unmarried,

assistant attorney general, on the memorandum of law), as amicus curiae. Gordon J. MacDonald, attorney general (Laura E. B. Lombardi, senior

for the petitioners. Law Offices of Kelly E. Dowd, PLLC, of Keene (Kelly E. Dowd on the brief),

No. 2018 - 0404 8th Circuit Court - Keene Family Division

address of the court’s home page is: http://www.courts.state.nh.us/supreme. available on the Internet by 9:00 a.m. on the morning of their release. The direct by e - mail at the following address: reporter@courts.state.nh. us. Opinions are corrections may be made before the opinion goes to press. Errors may be reported Doe Drive, Concor d, New Hampshire 03301, of any editorial errors in order that requested to notify the Reporter, Supreme Court of New Hampshire, One Charles formal revision before publication in the New Hampshire Reports. Readers are NOTICE: This opinion is subject to motions for rehearing under Rule p. 2 22 as well as 2

assents to the adoption; (a) The petitioner’s spouse is a parent of the adoptee and

any one of the following circumstances apply: petitioner, if the adoptee is not the petitioner’s spouse; and if IV. A married person without that person’s spouse joining as a

III. The unmarried parent of the adoptee.

II. An unmarried adult.

I. Husband and wife together.

Any of the following adults may adopt:

see RSA 170 - B:4. T he statute provides: categories of individuals who are el igible to adopt. Jason C., 1 p. 2 29 N.H. at 764; We turn first to the language of the relevant statute. RSA 170 - B:4 lists

Carrier, 165 N.H. at 7 p. 2 21. might have said or add language that the legislature did not see fit to include. intent from the statute as written and wil l not consider what the legislature v. Town of Seabrook, 148 N.H. 519, 525 - 26 (2002). We interpret legislative did not enact superfluous or redundant words, Winnacunnet Co op. Sc h. Dist. School Dist., 143 N.H. 331, 339 (1999), and we presume that the legislature every word of a statute whenever possible, Marco tte v. Timberlane/Hampstead Doggett v. Town of North Hampton, 138 N.H. 744, 74 5 (1994). We give effect to words of the statute because they are the touchstone of the legislature’s intent. as a whole. In re Baby Girl P., 147 N.H. 772, 775 (2002). We focus on the the intent of the legislature as expressed in the words of the statute considered 721 (2013). In matters of statutory interpretation, we are the final arbiter of question of law, which we review de novo. Petition of Carrier, 165 N.H. 719, (1990); In re Sky D., 138 N.H. 543, 545 (1994). Statutory interpretation is a enacted by the legislature. In re Estate of McQuesten, 133 N.H. 420, 422 therefore, our review of the law is limited to interpreting the applic able statutes Adoption was unknown to the common law and is wholly statutory;

reconsideration. This appeal followed. dismissed the petition and denied the petitioners’ subsequent motion for not authorized under RSA 170 - B:4, II (19 77)). Consequently, th e court 765 (holding that a joint adoption application from two unmarried adults was our decision in In re Jason C., 1 p. 2 29 N.H. 762 (1987). See Jason C., 129 N.H. at unmarried adult,” RSA 170 - B:4, II. The trial court disagreed, relying in part on unmarried parent of the ado ptee,” RSA 170 - B:4, III, and C.N. is “[a]n that the ir joint petition is authorized under RSA 170 - B:4 because M.F. is “[t]he M.F. and C.N. the reafter filed a joint petition to adopt J.W. They argued p. 3 3

chapter 170 - B was repealed and reenacted in 2004. Laws 2004, 255:1. The language of paragraph III was changed to “[t]he unmarried parent of the adoptee” when RSA 1

unmarried adults to adopt jointly under paragraph II. Jason C., 129 N.H. at “[a] n unmarried adult,” the legislature did not intend to authorize two statute. Id.; see RSA 170 - B:4, IV. We concluded that, in using the language narrowly limited circumstances” that are listed in the last paragraph of the “[m]arried applicants must apply j ointly with their spouses, . . . except under (emphasis added). The other paragraphs of the statute ma ke clear that mother of the individual to be adopted.’ RSA 170 - B:4, III [(1977)].” Id. 1 an ‘unmarried adult,’ RSA 170 - B:4, II [(1977)]; and the ‘unmarried father or “include two classes of individuals described as unmarried and applying alone: th e statute. Jason C., 129 N.H. at 764. We observed that these categories “we look[ed] carefully at the categories of eligible petitioners to adopt” listed in In Jason C., which required us to interpret paragraph II of RSA 170 - B:4,

legislature amends a statute after we have construed it). 171 N.H. 524, 529 (2018) (describing presumptions we apply when the 170 - B:4. See Jason C., 129 N.H. at 76 p. 3 3 - 65; cf. Anderson v. Estate of Wood, our decision in Jason C. is instructive in construing the current version of RSA 343:3; Laws 1996, 46:2; Laws 1999, 18:2, 76:1; Laws 2004, 255:1. Therefore, overall structure has remained the same. See Laws 1973, 266:1; Laws 1987, the language of paragraph III has not materially changed, an d the statute’s several times since 1973, the language of paragraphs I and II has not changed, N.H.B.J. 199, 199 - 201 (1977). Although RSA 170 - B:4 has been amended A. DeGrandpre, The New Hampshire Adoption Statute: An Overview, 18 N.H. 216, 221 (1984); James J. Bianco, Jr., Michael R. C hamberlain & Charles Commission on Laws Affecting Children. See In re Adoption of Baby C., 125 Laws 1973, 266:1, as part of legislation proposed by the Governor’s RSA chapter 170 - B, including RSA 170 - B:4, was first enac ted in 1973, see A brief overview of the statute gives context to our determinations below.

unrelated, unmarried adult. See RSA 170 - B:4, II, III. a doption of a minor child by an unmarried parent of the child and an J.W. is premised on their argument that the statute authorizes the joint RSA 170 - B:4. The petitioners’ contention that they are eligible to jointly adopt

adoptee is over the age of 18. (d) The petitioner’s spouse assents to the adoption and the

unreasonable withholding of asse nt; or absence, unavailability, or circumstances constituting an is excused by the court by reason of prolonged unexplained (c) The failure of the petitioner’s spouse to join in the petition

(b) The petitioner and hi s or her spouse are legally separated; p. 4 4

In the Matter of Ball & Ball, 168 N.H. 133, 137 (2015) (stating that we rely child.” Unif. Adoption Act § 3 cmt. (amended 1971), 9 Part IA U.L.A. 1 p. 4 44; se e the UAA “permits any unmarried father or mother to adopt his [or her] own IA U.L.A. 143. The official comment to section 3 states, in relevant part, that RSA 170 - B:4, III (1977), with Unif. Adoption Act § 3(3) (amended 1971), 9 Part paragraph III was identical to the language of section 3(3) of the UAA. Compare 170 - B). When RSA 170 - B:4 was first enacted in 1973, the language of underlying document” in drafting the 1973 legislation that created RSA chapter Governor’s Commission on Laws Affecting Children used the UAA “as its basic (1999); Bianco, Chamberlain & DeGrandpre, supra at 201 (stating that the origina tes. See Unif. Adoption Act § 3 (amended 1971), 9 Part IA U.L.A. 143 Uniform Adoption Act (UAA), from which the language of RSA 170 - B:4 We find further support for this conclusion in the 1971 version of the

pursue the adoption as a sole petitioner. See id.; RSA 170 - B: p. 4 4, III. that the legislature intended to allow the unmarried parent of the adoptee to both Jason C. and the plain language of paragraph III support the conclusion at 764. Although that case did not involve the application of RSA 170 - B:4, III, seeking to adopt under paragraph III as “applying alone.” Jason C., 129 N.H. adoptee.” (emphasis added)). Thus, in Jason C., we described an individual phrased in the singular. See RSA 170 - B:4, III (“T he unmarried parent of the We first note that p arag raph III of the statute, like paragraph II, is

joint adoption by the unmarried parent and another individual. We disagree. and t hus the legislature’s intent in including paragraph III was to facilitate a would ha ve no reason to seek adoption of his or her child as a sole petitioner, adoption.” In other words, the petitioners assume that an unmarried parent possession of full parental rights, would have no need or reason to pursue “would amount to mere surplusage, as an unmarried parent of the child, in They reason that paragraph III must be so construed because, otherwise, it child to adopt the child jointly with another individual.” (Emphasis added.) asserting that this paragraph i s “intended to permit the unmarried parent of a pursuant to paragraphs II and III. The petitioners focus on paragraph III, adopt pursuant to paragraph II, whereas they are seeking to jointly adopt part, that Jason C. addressed only whether two unmarried adults could jointly The petitioners contend that Jason C. is distinguishable. They argue, in

(emphasis added)). legislature or repugnant to the context of the same statute,’ RSA 21:1 (2012).” ‘ unless such construction would be inconsistent with the manifest intent of the may extend and be applie d to several persons or things,’ RSA 21:3 (2012), provided that in construing all statutes, ‘[w]ords importing the singular number Dir., N.H. Retirement Sys., 166 N.H. 7 p. 5 52, 75 p. 4 4 (2014) (“[T]he legislature has appli cation from two unmarried adults.” Id. at 765; cf. Anderson v. Executive preclude s our reading RSA 170 - B:4, II so as to authorize a joint adoption 7 63 - 64 (quotation omitted). W e held that “[r]espect for such [legislative] intent 5

1973, 266:1. 1977, 20 p. 5 5:1, and thus was not in effect when RSA chapter 170 - B was enacted in 1973, see Laws (emphasis omitted) (quoting RSA 460:29, I). RSA 460:29 was not enacted until 1977, see Laws wedlock’” to “bring[ ] a legitimation petition in [superior] court.” Robin C., 532 F. Supp. at 679 Robin C. discussed RSA 460:29 (2018), which permits a “‘putative father of any child born out of 2

....” RSA 170 - B:20, I (1977) (current version, as amended by Laws 2004, obligations as if [the child] had b een born in wedlock to the adopting parent “entitled to the same rights and privileges and subject to the same duties and could legitimate his or her child born out of wedlock, making that child thus provided a nother mechanism through which a n unmarried natural parent F. Supp. at 679 (discussing methods). T he provisions of RSA chapter 170 - B 2 legitimated under New Hampshire law prior to 1973. See, e.g., Robin C., p. 5 532 (amended 1983). T here were few methods by which a child could be kindred, not from the father (or his kindred).” Id.; see RSA 561:4 (1974) whose p arents die d intestate could “only inherit from the mother and her 532 F. Supp. 677, 679 (D.N.H. 1982). For example, a child born out of wedlock from a “legitimate” child in certain respects. See, e.g., Robin C. v. Schweiker, enacted, New Hampshire law treated a child born out of wedlock differently Chamberlain & DeGrandpre, supra at 207. When RSA chapter 170 - B was first “formalize [his or her] relationship with the child through adoption.” Bianco, R SA 170 - B:4, III enables an unmarried parent of a child born out of wedlock t o considered in the historical context within which it was originally enacted. his or her own child. One reason becomes apparent when the statute is question why an unmarried parent would have any “need or reason” to adopt In arguing for a different interpretation of RSA 170 - B:4, t he petitioners

“any individual under the age of 18”). individual who is not a minor”); RSA 170 - B:2, XI (2014) (defining “[m] inor” as that only “adults” may adopt); RSA 170 - B:2, I (2014) (defining “[a] dult” as “an years of age or older to adopt his or her own child. See RSA 170 - B:4 (providing language of RSA 170 - B:4, III to allow an unmarried parent who is eighteen M.K.C., 28 p. 5 5 S.W.3d 605, 6 06 (Ark. 2 008). We similarly construe the plain (Ark. 2008), and an unmarried mother to adopt her own child, In re Adoption of unmarried father to adopt his own child,” King v. Ochoa, 285 S.W.3d 602, 604 Arkansas, 53 Ark. L. Rev. 1, 2 n.3 (2000), as “clearly allow[ing] for an through July 1, 2019); H. Keith Morrison & Patricia A. Sievers, Adoption Law in which is modeled after the UAA, see Ark. Code Ann. § 9 - 9 - 204 (West, Westlaw In addition, Arkansas has construed the language of its own provision,

Ct. Ch. Di v. 1990). 14 p. 5 5 (Md. 1985); Adoption of Adult by G.V.C., 581 A.2d 123, 125 (N.J. Super. In re J.H., 313 A.2d 874, 875 n.3 (D.C. 1974); Bridges v. Nicely, 497 A.2d 142, expressly permits an unmarried parent to adopt his or her own child. See, e.g., courts from other jurisdictions have recognized that section 3 of the UAA upon the official comments to a uniform act in interpreting that act). Likewise, p. 6 6

470 (2015) (noting that “[w]e confine our analysis to the questions rai sed on appeal”). premised upon the joint nature of their petition. See Deere & Co. v. State of N.H., 1 p. 6 68 N.H. 460, becaus e that is what they ask us to do. Indeed, their statutory construction arguments are fact that they brought the adoption petition jointly, we treat the petitioners as joint petitioners While the dissent seems to fault us, as well as the petitioners themselves, for focusing upon the 3

they have a “stable household.” They point out that Jason C. involved a concern about “stability” expressed in that case is not present here because The petitioners also attempt to distinguish Jason C. by arguing that the

in that statute as a whole). a manner that wou ld be inconsistent with the legislature’s intent as expressed Ins. Co., 170 N.H. p. 6 660, 668 (2018) (declining to construe statut ory provision in household for the child.” Jason C., 129 N.H. at 764; see Langevin v. Travco legislature has determined “will probably provide a unified and stable legi slature’s intent to confine adoption to categories of individuals whom the the petitioners’ construction of RSA 170 - B:4 is inconsistent with the relationship, such as whether they must cohabitate, s ee RSA 170 - B:4. Thus, statute does not impose any re quirements regarding the nature of that the relationship between the two petitioners, because t he plain language of the with “[t]he unmarried parent of the adoptee,” RSA 170 - B:4, II, III, regardless of construction, ho wever, any “unmarried adult” would be eligible to jointly adopt child.” Jason C., 129 N.H. at 764. If we agreed with the petitioners’ applicants who will probably provide a unified and stable household for the of RSA 170 - B:4, that “it was the legislature’s intent to confine adoption to adoptive “home” in the singular). We concluded, based on the plain language omitted); see, e.g., RSA 170 - B:18 (Supp. 2018) (repeatedly referring to the the adopted child will have one home.” Jason C., 129 N.H. at 765 (quotation did not intend. As we observed in Jas on C., RSA chapter 170 - B “assumes that construction of RSA 170 - B:4 would lead to results that the legislature clearly jointly adopt the minor child of the unmarried parent. Indeed, the petitioners’ intended to allow an unmarried parent and an unmarried, unrelated adult to Additionally, the petitioners have not persuaded us that the legislature

pursue adoption” of his or her own child as a sole petitioner. 3 assumption that an unmarried parent “would have no need or reason to jointly with another individual, as this argument is premised on the that this paragraph must be intended to permit an unmarried parent to adopt pursuant to RSA 170 - B:4, III. Accordingly, we reject the petitioners’ argument one reason why an unmarri ed parent might seek to adopt his or her child Therefore, we observe that legitimation of a child born out of wedlock is

father adopts in order to legitimize [their] child”). the natural mother’s parental rights and responsibilities when the “natural 105 p. 6 6 - 5 p. 7 7 (1982) (holding that RSA 170 - B:20 (1977) did not require severance of 255:1, codified at RSA 170 - B:25, I (2014)); see In re Jessica W., 122 N.H. 1052, 7

petitioners do not assert that C.N. qualifies as J.W.’s “parent” or “stepparent” unmarried parent of that child and an unmarried, unrelated adult. The RSA 1 p. 7 70 - B:4 does not authorize the joint adoption of a minor child by the note the scope of our decision in this case. We hold that, as currently written, their view, could arise from our construction of RSA 170 - B:4, II and III. We Finally, t he petitioners raise concerns about the implications that, in

49 p. 7 7 (2018). scheme. See Appea l of New England Police Benevolent Ass’n, 171 N.H. 490, eligibility to adopt should be expanded, it is free to amend the statutory of the courts.” T.K.J., 931 P.2d at 496. Thus, if the legislature determines that soc ial mores of the public at large is the role of the democratic process and not legislative decision [to limit adoption] is or is not in keeping with the changing Newmarket, 1 50 N.H. 804, 810 (2004). Rather, the question of “whether this desirability of the legislature’s choice. See Blackthorne Group v. Pines of to the custodial parent”). It is not our role to inquire in to the wisdom or divested of their parental rights and duties or (2) the adopting party is married limiting adoptions to situations in which: (1) the parents are completely interests of children and the interests of familial stability would be promoted by (holding that the legislature “may reasonably have determined that the best 724 A.2d at 1060; Adoption of T.K.J., 931 P.2d 488, 496 (Colo. App. 1996) household for the child” to be adopted. Jason C., 129 N.H. at 764; see Baby Z., individuals that it believes are most likely to “provide a unified and stable constitutional limitations — to limit eligibility to adopt to those categories of taken on many different forms, it is the legislature’s prerogative — subject to the legislature”). Therefore, although we recognize that the modern family has 168 N.H. 52, 57 (2015) (noting that “matters of public policy are reserved for 1035, 1060 (Conn. 1999) (emphasis omitted); see Dolbeare v. City of Laconia, the legislature, not the judiciary, to make.” In re Adoption of Baby Z., 724 A.2d “[P]olicy determinations as to what [eligibility] limitations apply are for

categories of individuals, see RSA 1 p. 7 70 - B:4. child” to be a dopted, id., and it has chosen to confine adoption to those of petitioners “will probably provide a unified and stable household for the Instead, the New Hampshire L egislature has determined that certain categories underlying the petition to adopt indicate the existence of a stable household. to determine eligibility to adopt by assessing whether the specific facts interpreting. See id. at 764. That statute, RSA 170 - B:4, does not allow a court discerning legislative intent from the plain language of the statute we were Our observations in Jason C., however, were made in the context of

dissent would similarly “limit In re J ason C. to its facts.” M.F.’s son, who has been a member of their joint household since 2011. The and C.N. live together, share two biological children, and are seeking to adopt couple before the marriage ended, see Jason C., 129 N.H. at p. 7 763, whereas M.F. divorced couple seeking to jointly adopt the foster child who lived with the p. 8 8

Guardianship of Madelyn B., 166 N.H. 453, 455 (2014); see RSA 457:1 - a (201 p. 8 8). Same - sex marriage became legal in New Hampshire in 2010. Laws 2009, 59:1,:10; In re 4

allow an adoption arrangement that the legislature did not authorize. beyond liberal construction and effectively rewrites the statutory scheme to provision). In our view, the dissent’s reading of RS A chapter 170 - B goes bound by the statutory requirements for adoption” despite liberal construction 67 p. 8 8, 687 (Wis. 1994) (Geske, J., concurring) (noting that the court is “still June 7, 2019) (slip op. at 8); see also In Interest of Angel Lace M., 516 N.W.2d 931 P.2d at 492; accord Appeal of Town of Lincoln, 172 N.H. ___, ___ (decided “[L]iberal construction does not permit a court to rewrite the statute.” T.K.J., Benefit Tru st v. N.H. Ins. Guaranty Assoc., 154 N.H. 618, 623 (2006). statutory language reasonably allows. N.H. Motor Transport Assoc. Employee liberally construe a statute, however, extends only to the degree that the Smith v. Consul General Of Spain, 110 N.H. 62, 64 (1969). A court’s power to 171 N.H. at 102 (quotation omitted); accord Jessica W., 12 2 N.H. at 1057; be considered liberally, with a view to effectuating the statutory policies.” Y.L., “the position of more enlightened courts ... [is] that adoption statutes are to Both the dissent and t he State emphasize our previous observation that

as amicus curiae. turn to some of the points raised by our dissenting colleagues and by the State wa rrant further discussion, see Vogel v. Vogel, 137 N.H. 321, 322 (1993), we While we conclude that the petitioners’ remaining arguments do not

petitioners are not eligible to jointly adopt J.W. (citing RSA 170 - B:25, II)). Because they are not married, however, the intact automaticall y” if the petitioner was married to the adoptee’s birth mother the legal relationship between the adoptee and her birth mother “would remain B:25, II (2014); see also In re Y.L., 171 N.H. p. 9 99, 100 - 01 (201 p. 8 8) (explaining that as a stepparent if she and M.F. married. See RSA 170 - B:4, IV(a); RSA 170 - M.F. and C.N., and there is no dispute that C.N. would be eligible to adopt J. W. 373 - 74, 398, 405, 413 (2012). We note that marriage is legally available to eds., Legal Recognition of Same - Sex Relationships, 13 Geo. J. Gender & L. 365, 628 A.2d 1271, 1272, 1276 (Vt. 1993); Mark Kleinma n & Katelyn D. Wicks, Tammy, 619 N.E.2d 315, 316, 318, 321 (Mass. 1993); Adoption of B.L.V.B., 804 N.E.2d 1253, 1254, 1256 - 57, 1260 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004); Adoption of K.M., 653 N.E.2d 888, 890, 898 - 99 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995); In re Adoption of K.S.P., the jurisdiction did not recognize same - sex marriage. See, e.g., Petition of 4 child, without severing the biological parent’s parental rights, at a time when to permit the same - sex partner of the child’s biological parent to adopt the court considered whether to construe the jurisdiction’s adoption statutes so as in many of the out - of - state cases relied upon by the petitioners, in which the for purposes of RSA chapter 170 - B. Nor are we presented with the issue raised 9

general rule that adoption severs the adoptee’s legal relationship with both N.H. at 45. The legislature has thus created a “stepparent exception” to the the adoption, see RSA 170 - B:25, II; Jessica W., 122 N.H. at 1056; Preston, 133 because that parent’s legal relationship with the child will remain intact after RSA 170 - B:4, IV(a), but need not execute a surrender of parental rights the parent married to the adopting stepparent must assent to the adoption, see In cases where a stepparent seeks to adopt the child of his or her spouse,

VI. adoptee have already been terminated by court order. See RSA 170 - B:7, II, V, B:7 (2014); for example, a person whose parental rights to the proposed however, from persons who fall within one of the categories listed in RSA 170 statutory requirements. See RSA 170 - B: p. 9 9, :10 (2014). Consent is not required, the form of a surrender of parent al rights executed in accordance with the stepparent adoption, the consent of the persons listed in RSA 170 - B:5, I, takes father. Baby Girl P., 147 N.H. at 775; RSA 170 - B:5, I. Except in cases of from the birth mother, the legal father, and, in certain circumstances, the birth Generally speaking, consent to a proposed adoption must be obtained

with that child. S ee RSA 170 - B: 11, I (2014); RSA 170 - B: 25 (2014). child is, in effect, consent ing to the termination of his or her legal relationship created by the legislature, a parent who consents to the adoption of his or her Mercieri, 133 N.H. 36, 45 (1 p. 9 990). Therefore, subject to certain exceptions parents, together with their extende d families, are substituted out,” Preston v. N.H. at 1055, the adoptee “receives two new parents, and both of the natural 102 N.H. 481, 483 (1960). In “the usual case of adoption,” Jessica W., 122 the natural parents. See RSA 170 - B:5 (2014); see also Durivage v. Vincent, One of the statutory requirements for adoption concer ns the consent of

requirements of an applicable statute are not met, no adoption is possible.”). of Huitzil, 504 N.E.2d 1173, 1175 (Ohio Ct. App. 1 p. 9 985) (per curiam) (“[I]f the necessary [statutory requirements] wi ll preclude the adoption.”); In re Adoption N.W.2d 374, 378 (Neb. 2002) (per curiam) (“The absence of any one of the requirements, the effort to adopt must fail”); In re Adoption of Luke, 640 at 491 (noting that “if a proposed adoption fails to confo rm to statutory B:19, VI (2014); Baby Girl P., 147 N.H. at 775; see also, e.g., T.K.J., 931 P.2d adopt unless the statutory requirements for adoption are met. See RSA 170 agree with the State, however, that t he circuit court cannot grant a petition to the interests of both natural and adoptive parents” (quotation omitted)). We best interests of children while at the same time protecting as far as possible the policies underlying adoption statutes in general “include promoting the the purposes of RSA chapter 170 - B); Jessi ca W., 122 N.H. at p. 10 1057 (stating that policy objectives of the statutory scheme. See RSA 170 - B:1 (2014) (identifying court determines that the proposed adoption would be consistent with the court can dis pense with statutory requirements for adoption as long as the For example, t he dissent essentially takes the position that the circuit 10

(explaining that the court must determine whether the proposed adoption merits of the adoption petition. See Angel Lace M., 516 N.W.2d at 681 When the statutory requirements are not met, the court does not reach the statutory requir ements for adoption are not met. See RSA 170 - B:19, IV, VI. not surrendered his parental rights to J.W. (and does not intend to), the RSA 170 - B:5, I; RSA 170 - B:16, III (2014); RSA 170 - B:1 9, IV. Because M.F. has M.F.’s minor child unless M.F. surrenders his parental rights to the child. See statutory scheme, C.N. — an unmarried, unrelated adult — cannot adopt W e conclude that, b ecause neither exception applies, u nder the current

C., 129 N.H. at 765. discussed. Respect for legislative intent precludes us from doing so. See Jason the legislature’s choice to limit adoptions in the manner we have already contrast, a pplying the stepparent exception in this case would effectively revise order to effectuate the intent of the legislature” (emphasis omitted)). By A.2d at p. 10 1061 (explaining that “the statute a t issue is construed liberally in to co ver this situation effectuate s the legislature’s intent. See Baby Z., 724 DeGrandpre, supra at 207. Thus, liberally construing the stepparent exception children through the adoption process. See Bianco, Chamberlain & above, the legislature intended to allow unmarried parents to legitimate their legitimate their child. Jessica W., 122 N.H. at 1055 - 57. As we have explained parental rights where the unmarried natural father adopted in order to the stepparent excepti on to permit the birth mother of the child to retain her case is factually distingui shable from Jessica W., where we liberally construed purposes of RSA chapter 170 - B. Furthermore, as the State acknowledges, this nor do the petitioners even argue that C.N. qualifies as J.W.’s “stepparent” for exceptio n applies here. As noted above, C.N. is not married to J.W.’s parent, extent the dissent relies upon the stepparent exception, we disagree that this relationship with both natural parents. See RSA 170 - B:25, II, III. To the exceptions to the general rule that adoption severs the adoptee’s legal The State correctly notes that the legislature has only created two

involving the proposed adoption of a minor. Y.L., which involved an adult adoption, is similar to the issue in this case III, IV (2014). Thus, we disagree with the dissent that the question posed in treatin g adult adoptions differently, see, e.g., RSA 170 - B:7, IV; RSA 170 - B:19, minor,” id. at p. 10 101, and the statutory scheme reflects those distinctions by adoption of an adult, however, must be distinguished from the adoption of a relationship with her birth mother. See Y. L., 171 N.H. at 100 - 02. “The could be adopted by an unmarried adult male without severing her legal 170 - B:25, III. In Y.L., we held that, pursuant to this exception, an adult female The legislat ure created a second exception to this general rule in RSA

McQuesten, 133 N.H. at 422 - 23. natural parents. See RSA 170 - B:25, II; Jessica W., 122 N.H. at p. 10 1056; p. 11 11

spouse); Laws 2006, 200: 6, : 10, : p. 11 11 (amending RSA 170 - B:11 and RSA 170 married petitioner to adopt another adult with the consent of the petitioner’ s shortcomings. See, e.g., Laws 1999, 76:1 (amend ing RSA 170 - B:4 to allow a reexamine the adoption statutes on a number of occasions to address asserted N.H. 386, 393 (2012). We note that the legislature has been willing to adoption. Baby Z., 724 A.2d at 1060; see In re Guardianship of Eaton, 163 [petition],” this cannot transcend the limits the legislature has placed on factual record that may warrant sympathetic consideration of their adoption legislature’s intent). Therefore, although the petitioners “have presented a 129 N.H. at 764 - 65 (construing adoption statute in accordance with the construing the relevant adoption statutes consistent with this intent); Jason C., statutes. See Y.L., 171 N.H. at 101 - 02 (examining the legislature’s intent and matters of statutory interpretation, includin g the interpretation of adoption We reiterat e that legislative intent is the touchstone of our inquiry in

misplaced. applies here; t herefore, the dissent’s reliance on RSA 170 - B:19, IV is 170 - B:25; Y.L., 171 N. H. at 100 - 02. As we have explained, neither exception legal relationship between the adoptee and his or her birth parents. See RSA Subject to the two exceptions described above, the adoption decree severs the not change the legal effect of the adoption decree under RSA 170 - B:25. See RSA 170 - B:19, IV, VI. Notably, the court’s excusal of the surrender does adoption; it merely means that the adoption petition can be heard by the court. surrender does not mean that the parent’s rights are unaffected by the J.W.’s legal relationship to M.F. The court’s excusal of a parent’s required we disagree that RSA 170 - B:19, IV allow s C.N. to adopt J.W. without affecting adversary process and increases the possibility that we will err.”). Nonetheless, dissenting) (“Deciding issues that have not been briefed undermines our 91 (2007); see also Hodges v. Johnson, 170 N.H. 470, 490 (2017) (Bassett, J., raised nor briefed. See LaChance v. U.S. Smokeless Tobacco Co., 156 N.H. 88, We are generally reluctant to address issues that the parties have neither

parents except in limited circumstances that are not present here. which severs the legal relationship between t he adoptee and his or her birth as allowing the court, in its discretion, to “excuse” the effect of RSA 170 - B:25, adoptee” (emphasis added)). In effect, the dissent construes RSA 170 - B:19, IV been obtained or excused and that the adoption is in the best interest of the a minor child if it determine s, inter alia, “that the required surrenders have best interest.” See RSA 170 - B:19, IV (stating court may grant petition to adopt the surrender of M.F.’s parental rights because doing so w ould be in J.W.’s circuit court with “discretion to authorize C.N.’s adoption of J.W. and excuse achieved in this case because it reads RSA 170 - B:19, IV as providing the The dissent posits that the proposed adoption arrangement can be

interest inquiry). s atisfies the statutory requirements for adoption before it reaches the best p. 12 12

finalized. So I brought a joint petition with [M.F. and C.N.], who [M.F.] would have to terminate his parental rights for that to get If I brought a petition solely in [C.N.’s] name, it would seem that

petition was brought jointly so as to allow M.F. to retain his parental rights: At the hearing on their motion, the petitioners’ attorney explained the

par ent of the adoptee” to adopt. RSA 170 - B:4, III (2014). purported to do so pursuant to RSA 170 - B:4, III, which allows “[t]he unmarried which allows “[a]n unmarried adult” to adopt. RSA 170 - B:4, II (2014). M.F. parental rights” with respect to J.W. C.N. petitioned under RSA 170 - B:4, II, petition was jointly filed, even though M.F. has, in his attor ney’s words, “full In 2018, the petitioners jointly filed a petition to adopt J.W. Their

C.N. since approximately 2011. biological mother were terminated in 2017. J.W. has resided with M.F. and certificate. See RSA 170 - B:2, X(a) (2014). The parental ri ghts of J.W.’s addition, M.F. is J.W.’s legal father, having been named on J.W.’s birth for the purposes of adoption law as an individual “under the age of 18”). In was born in December 2007. Se e RSA 170 - B:2, XI (2014) (defining a “minor” approximately 2008. M.F. is also the biological father of J.W., a minor, who biological parents of two children. M.F. and C.N. have been together since The petitioners are unmarried, domestic partners and, together, are the

best interests.” adoption arrangement and the trial court finds that the adoption is in J.W.’s parental rights over J.W., so long as both [M.F.] and C.N. consent to the her domestic partner, petitioner M.F., “without requiring [M.F.] to surrender his of the adoption statute” allows petitioner C.N. to adopt J.W., the minor son of we respectfully dissent. Like the State, we believe “that a liberal construction adoption statutes to allow the contemplated adoption in this case to take place, HICKS and BASSETT, JJ., dissenting. Because we would interpret our

dissented. LYNN, C. J., and DONOVAN, J., concurred; HICKS and BASSETT, JJ.,

legislature deems t hem to be meritorious. policy concerns raised by the petitioners and relied on by the dissent if the concurring). We are confident that the legislature will carefully conside r the wisdom of statutory changes.” Angel Lace M., 516 N.W.2d at 687 (Geske, J., listening to their constituents, reviewing our current laws, and debating t he continue[d] to work to advance the interests and protection of our children by the final decree of adoption is issued). In other words, “our legislators [have] B:25 to address inheritance rights in a situation where the adoptee dies before p. 13 13

at most, two legal parents at any given time, it is straightforward that [J.W.] B:25, I (2014). “And, finally, because the statute contemplates a child having, as if [he] had been born to [her].” In re Y.L., 171 N.H. at 100; see RSA 170 the same rights and privileges and subject to the same duties and obligations ad option is approved, [J.W.] will be considered the child of [C.N.], entitled to state’s adoption statute.” Id.; see RSA 170 - B:4, II. “Basic, also, is that if the As an unmarried adult, C.N., “is plainly eligible to adopt under our

colleagues, we believe that she may. parental statu s of J.W.’s father, M.F. Contrary to the trial court and our unmarried woman, may adopt J.W., a minor, without altering the legal three desired. Id. In the instant matter, we are asked whether, C.N., an the legal parental status of the adult female’s birth mother, a result that all the petitioner, an unmarried man, could adopt an adult female without altering In re Y.L., we were asked whether, under New Hampshire’s adoption statute, similar to that posed in In re Y.L. See In re Y.L., 171 N.H. 99, 100 (2018). In Like the State, we believe that this case requires us to answer a question

remain intact. brought jointly in an attempt to ensure that M.F.’s parental rights over J.W. petition by C.N. alone. As the petitioners’ attorney explained, the petition was rights over him. Thus, we believe that the petition, properly viewed, is a filed jointly, M.F. cannot “adopt” J.W. because he already has full, parental Manchester, 151 N.H. 30, 43 (2004). Although the petition in this case was appr oach to the technical requirements of pleadings. Porter v. City of New Hampshire is a notice pleading jurisdiction and, as such, we take a liberal C.N. brought the adoption petition jointly. We believe that focus is mistaken. The petitioners and our colleagues focus upon the fact that M.F. and

possible under the curren t statutory scheme. C.N. would adopt J.W., and M.F. would retain his parental rights — was not effect, the trial court ruled that the outcome that the petitioners sought — that adu lt when a biological parent is not surrendering his parental rights.” In chapter 170 - B “does not authorize an adoption application from an unmarried Ultimately, the trial court dismissed the petition on the ground that RSA

then we can do that. [C.N.’s] name and we can waive the termination of [M.F.’s] rights, my clients about that. If the Court says we coul d bring it in Court says they need to be married, I will have a conversation with So I’m trying to get clarification from the Court. . . . [I]f the

. . . .

this point and have two children in common. are not married but have been in a family unit for ov er a decade at p. 14 14

adoption need not surrender his or her par ental rights before an adoption is conclude that a birth parent married to an adopting spouse in a stepparent Reading RSA 170 - B:5, I, :7, and :25 together, as we must, requires us to a statute in a wa y that would render it a virtual nullity.” (quotation omitted)). Wolfgram v. N.H. Dep’t of Safety, 169 N.H. 32, 36 (2016) (“We will not construe possible, every word of a statute should be given effect.” (quotation omitted)); presumed to waste words or enact redundant provisions and whenever See Garand v. Town of Exeter, 159 N.H. 136, p. 14 141 (2009) (“The legislat ure is not to retain parental rights in a stepparent adoption, would be rendered a nullity. Were it to apply, then RSA 170 - B:25, II, which permits the birth parent spouse individuals from the requirement to execute a surren der of parental rights). pursuant to RSA 170 - B:7”), :7 (2014) (exempting certain categories of from whom a surrender of parental rights must be obtained “[u]nless excused adoption. See RSA 170 - B:5, I (2014) (enumerating categories of individuals at 101, that requirement cannot be interpreted as applying to a stepparent surrendered or terminated before an adoption is finalized,” In re Y.L., 171 N.H. parental rights of a minor’s birth parent or parents to have been either change the analysis. Although the adoption statute generally “requ ires the We agree with the State that the fact that J.W. is a minor does not

M.F. RSA 170 - B:1, I (20 p. 14 14). separation” from the only parent who currently has parental rights over him, state policy of protecting an adoptive child, here, J.W., from “unnecessary Allowing M.F. to retain his parental rights when C.N. adopts J.W. furthers the N.H. 62, 64 (1969) (quotation omitted); see In re Y.L., 171 N.H. at 102. statutory policies” that underlie them. Smith v. Consul General Of Spain, 110 adoption statutes are to be construed liberally, with a view to effectuating the view, “it is preferable to take the position of more enlightened courts, that adopt as an unmarr ied woman and M.F. to retain his parental rights. In our Y.L., 171 N.H. at 101. We believe that our adoption statutes allow C.N. to when, as in this case, the adopting parent (here, C.N.) is unmarried. See In re explicitly tell us whether the relationship between J.W. and M.F. may survive Here, similar to the situation in In re Y.L., the statutory scheme does n ot

is the parent of the adoptee and assents to the adoption). person to petition to adopt without joining his or her spouse when the spouse 170 - B:25, II (20 p. 14 14); see also RS A 170 - B:4, IV(a) (2014) (allowing a married to the stepparent) “shall in no way be altered by reason of the adoption.” RSA stepparent, the child’s relationship to the child’s birth parent (who is married that case, C.N. would be J.W.’s stepmother, and when a child is adopted by a That relationship would remain intact were C.N. and M.F. married. See id. In maintain his legal relationship with M.F. after being adopted by C.N. See id. Not as clear under our adoption statute, though, is whether J.W. may

adopted by [C.N.].” In re Y.L., 171 N.H. at 100. may not maintain [his] legal relationship with both of [his] birth parents if p. 15 15

court ruled that allowing the petition was inconsistent with the statute’s visitation issues to be addressed if the joint adoption petition were allowed, the In re Jason C. maintained separate households, requiring custody and perhaps child.” In re Jason C., 129 N.H. at 764. Because the two, unmarried adults in applicants who will probably provide a unified and stabl e household for the The court ruled that “it was the legislature’s intent to confine adoption to the singular number may extend and be applied to several persons or things”). ellipsis omitted); see RSA 21:3 (Sup p. 2018) (providing that “[w]ords importing when consistent with the intent of the chapter.” Id. (quotations, brackets, and another stated that singular terms in the adoption statute included “the plural petition. See id. at 763. One provision allowed “an unmarried adult” to adopt; 763 - 64. On its face, the statutory language would have allowed the joint households could jointly petition to adopt a child. In re Jason C., 129 N.H. at Jason C., the issue was whether two, unmarried adults who lived in separate decision in In re Jason C., 129 N.H. 762 (1987), would preclude it. In In re is truly a “joint” petition, even if it were, we disagree with the majority that our Although we do not believe that, properly viewed, the petition in this case

child’s hal f - siblings. to be adopted by his father’s long - term, domestic partner, the mother of the have to be deprived of his relationship with his biological, legal father in order natural father through the adoption process,” id., so too should a child not be deprived of its relationship with its mother in order to be legiti mized by its mother.” Id. at 1056 (quotation omitted). Just as a “child should not have to father were the stepfather of the adoptive child by marriage to the natural permitting the natural father to adopt in the sam e manner as if the petitioning reasoning of another court that a child’s “best interests are served by mother. In re Jessica W., 122 N.H. at 1056 - 57. The court agreed with the be legitimated by his natural father without losing his relationship with his is now RSA 170 - B:25, II had to be interpreted liberally so as to allow a child to Jessica W., 122 N.H. 1052 (1982). In that case, the court concluded that what As the State aptly observes, our conclusion is further supported by In re

J.W.’s best interest. excuse the surrender of M.F.’s parental rights because doing so would be in view, the court has the discretion to authorize C.N.’s adoption of J.W. and excused and that the adoption is in the best interest of the adoptee.” In our the court “determines that the required surrenders have been obtained or 170 - B:19, IV (2014) allows the court to authorize the adoption of a minor when surrender in the instant case, even though C.N. is not J.W.’s stepparent. RSA Nor should the statutory scheme be i nterpreted to require such a

absurd or unjust result.”). parts of a statute together to effectuate its general purpose and avoid an finalized. See Petition of Carrier, p. 16 165 N.H. 719, 721 (2013) (“We construe all 16

majority opinion. For all of the abov e reasons, therefore, we respectfully dissent from the

C., 129 N.H. at 765. who will provide a unified and stable household for the child. See In re Jason consistent with the legislature’s purpose of confining adoption to applicants include the plural. See RSA 21:3. And, allowing such an adoption would be The general rules of statutory construction provide that the singular may statute specifically allows unmarried adults to adopt. See RSA 170 - B:4, II. because their adoption of J.W. would further that legislative intent. The J.W.’s parent, and they sought to jointly adopt, we believe that they cou ld do so id. at 764. Under our reading of In re Jason C., if neither C.N. nor M.F. were intent that applicants provide a unified and stable household for the child. See from jointly adopting a child only when to do so would co ntravene legislative we would interpret In re Jason C. narrowly to preclude two, unmarried adults C. is no longer true, we would limit In re Jason C. to its facts. In other words, Given that an important rationale underlying the holding of In re Jason

chapter 458,” that rationale no longer applies. In re Jason C., 129 N.H. at 765. independently of the superior court’s domestic relations jurisdiction under RSA in which custody disputes would be likely to arise, or indeed could arise, say that the legislature did not intend “to authorize adoption in circumstances while it may well be that when In re Jason C. was decided, we could properly and repealing RSA 458:17, among other provisions in RSA chapter 458). Thus, RSA 461 - A:3, II (2018); see Laws 2005, 273:1, :20 (enacting RSA chapter 461 - A parental rights and responsibilities when “unwed parents are living apart.” and RSA 461 - A:3 now provides that the court has jurisdiction to decide Since In re Jason C. was decide d, however, RSA 458:17 was repealed

custody orders in divorce and annulment cases.” Id. at 765. a case and that “RSA 458:17 . . . simply empowers the superior court to make that RSA chapter 170 - B made no provision for custody determinations in such court would lack jurisdiction to decide custody issues. Id. The court observed applicants could not be allowed to adopt jointly because, if they could, the trial longer true. The court in In re Jason C. reasoned that two unmarried language is dicta and, more importantly, is bas ed upon a rationale that is no unmarried adults could not jointly adopt under any circumstances, that Although the court in In re Jason C. used language implying that two,

Id. at 764 - 65. purpose, and declined to interpr et the statute as authorizing the joint petition.