2025 N.H. 50, State v. Cormiea

evaluation of the defendant pursuant to RSA 135:17, I(a) (2021) (amended comply with a mandatory and jurisdictional deadline to complete a competency State argues that the court erroneously concluded that the parties failed to dismissing criminal charges against the defendant, Dennis R. Cormiea. T he [¶1] The State appeals an order of the Superior Court (MacLeod, J.)

and orally, for the defendant. Matthew McNicoll, assistant appellate defender, of Concord, on the brief

on the brief, and Anthony J. Gal d ieri orally), for the State. general (Anthony J. Galdieri and Audriana Mekula, assistant attorney general, John M. Formella, attorney general, and Anthony J. Galdieri, solicitor

Citation: State v. Cormiea, 2025 N.H. 50 Case No. 2024 - 0496 Grafton

page is: https://www.courts.nh.gov/our - courts/supreme - court a.m. on the morning of their release. The direct address of the court’s home reporter@courts.state.nh.us. Opinions are available on the Internet by 9:00 to press. Errors may be reported by email at the following address: editorial errors in order that corrections may be made before the opinion goes Hampshire, One Charles Doe Drive, Concor d, New Hampshire 03301, of any Readers are requested to notify the Reporter, Supreme Court of New well as formal revision before publication in the New Hampshire Reports. NOTICE: This opinion is subject to motions for rehearing under Rule p. 2 22 as 2

trial court to dismiss the case. We agree. deadline and any court - ordered extension s do es not create an obligation for the mandatory deadline, the State argues that the failure to meet the statutory discretion to extend the deadline. Further, b ecause the statute does not set a deadline to complete a competency evaluation because it grants the trial court [¶5] T he State argues that RSA 135:1 7, I(a) does not set a mandatory

II. Analysis

followed. case. The State unsuccessfully moved for reconsideration. This appeal not completed by the statutory deadline, the court was required to dismiss the evaluation. The court concluded that, because the competency evaluation was request from each party for an extension of time to complete a competency 135:17, I (a) are mandator y, and that the s tatute permit ted it to grant only one defendant. The court ruled that the statutory timeframes set forth in RSA request for an extension of time and dismissed the charges against the for the competency evaluation passed, the court denied the State’s second briefing and argument on the issue, during which time the extended deadline after it became clear that the OFE would not meet the extended deadline. After [¶4] The State subsequently filed a second motion to extend the deadline

and denied the State’s request to appoint an alternative evaluator. the evaluation. The court extended the deadline by an additional ninety days alternatively, for the appointment of a different qualified evaluator to conduct [¶3] T hereafter, t he State moved to extend the deadline by six months or,

days af ter the date they a re ordered unless either party requests an extension). evaluations for non - incarcerated individuals must be conducted within ninety prescribed by statute. See RSA 135:17, I(a) (providing that competency not complete the defendant’s evaluation within the ninety - day period evaluation. Shortly thereafter, the OFE informed the trial court that it could court appointed the Office of the Forensic Examiner (OFE) to conduct the competency evaluation pursuant to RSA 135:17 ( p. 2 2021) (amended 2024). The 135:17, I(a). The trial court granted the defendant’s motion and ordered a competent to stand trial and moved for a competency evaluation. See RSA action. The defendant’s counsel raised a concern that the defendant was not on c riminal charges. He was released on bail during the pendency of the [¶2] The record reflects the following facts. The defendant was indicted

I. Background

a mandatory deadline, we reverse and remand. p. 2 2024). Because we agree with the State that RSA 1 p. 3 35:17, I(a) does not provide 3

required to dismiss the case. This conclusion was error. not permitted to grant additional extensions to the State and that it was extension. Id. (emphasis added). Accordingly, the court concluded that it was extension of this period” as permitting the court to grant the State only one evaluation, and construed the phrase “unless either party requests an the statute as setting a mandatory deadline to complete the competency extension. After the State requested a second extension, the court interpreted requested an extension of this deadline, and the court ordered a ninety - day unless either party requests an extension of this period.” Id. The State be completed within “90 days after the date of the order for such examination, facility. The statute therefore provided that the competency evaluation “shall” pursuant to RSA 1 p. 3 35:17. The defendant was not being held at a correctional [¶9] In th is case, the trial court ordered a pre - trial competency evaluation

extension of this period. order for such examination, unless either party requests an county correctional facility, otherwise 90 days after the date of the completed within 45 days in the case of a person being held at a case may require . . . . Such pre - t rial examination shall be qualified psychiatrist or psychologist as the circumstances of the psychologist on the staff of any public institution or by a private pre - trial examination of such person by a qualified psychiatrist or the competency or sanity of the person, may make such order for a said court is notified by either party that there is a question as to circuit or superior court before which he or she is to be tried, if . . . When a person is charged or indicted for any offense, . . . the

its order provide d in relevant part: [¶8] The version of RSA 1 p. 3 35:17, I(a) in effect when the trial court issued

construe them in harmony with the overall statutory scheme. Id. However, we do not construe statutes in isolation; instead, we attempt to also construe all parts of a statute together to effectuate its overall purpose. Id. have said or add language that the legislature did not see fit to include. Id. We a statute whenever possible and will not consider what the legislature might according to its plain and ordinary meaning. Id. We give effect to every word of the language of the statute itself, and, if possible, construe that language Hill Orchard s, LLC, 177 N.H. 55, 57 (2024), 2024 N.H. 58, ¶6. We first look to We review the trial court’s statutory interpretation de novo. Adams v. Moose [¶7] This question requires that we engage in statutory interpretation.

must first determine whether the statute sets a mandatory deadline. See id. Appraiser Bd., 16 p. 3 3 N.H. 3 p. 4 4, 42 & n.2 (2011). Thus, a s a threshold matter, we court is obligated to dismiss the case before it. See Ruel v. N.H. Real Estate [¶6] If a mandatory and jurisdictional time limit is not met, then t he trial 4

further protections to defendants by creating an ongoing obligation for the trial [¶1 p. 4 4] In addition, RSA 135:17, I(d) (2021) (amended 2024) provide s

the right to request that the trial court appoint an alternative evaluator. RSA 135:17, I(a) are not met, then RSA 135:17, I(c) provides defendant s with See RSA 135:17, I(c) (Supp. 202 p. 4 4). Accordingly, if the deadlines prescribed by incarcerated defendants if their evaluation is not performed within ninety days. statute after the trial court issued its order to provide the same right to non by a qualified psychiatrist or psychologist.” T he legislature amended the court ’ s order, “the court shall, upon request of the person, order an evaluation pre - trial examination has not been performed within forty - five days of the (amended 2024) provide s that, i n cases where the person is incarcerated and a defendant s when th ose deadlines are not met. RSA 135:17, I(c) (2021) obtained with in the s tatute’s default timeframe s, and it provides a remed y to (2020). RSA 135:17 contemplates that an examination cannot always be the legislature or repugnant to the context of the same statute.” RSA 21:1 [¶13] This construction i s not inconsistent with “the manifest intent of

RSA 21:3. alone, does not limit either party to a single request. RSA 135:17, I(a); see also language granting either party the ability to request “an extension,” standing and be applied to several persons or things.” Accordingly, the statute’s specifically provides that “[w]ords importing the singular number may extend permits only one extension of time per party. However, RSA 21:3 (2020) phrase “an extension” impor ts the number one into the statute and thereby [¶12] As to its plain meaning, the defendant essentially argues that the

statutory scheme. contrary to the plain meaning of the statute and in conflict with the overall only one extension. Id. (emphasis added). The defendant’s argument is that th e statute permits the court to grant “an extension” of the deadline, as in either party requests an extension of this period.” Id. The defendant argues [¶11] Therefore, our analysis turns to the meaning of the phrase “unless

the otherwise mandatory command. Id. the phrase “unless either party requests an extensi on of this period” modifies extension of this period.” RSA 13 p. 5 5:17, I(a) (emphas e s added). The addition of date of the order for such examination, unless either party requests an “Such pre - trial examination shall be completed within. . . 90 days after the the trial court the authority” to act). The statute provides in relevant part: can render mandatory language, such as the word “shall,” to instead “grant[] Corpening, 153 N.H. 571, 57 p. 4 4 - 75 (2006) (explaining that modifying phrases “shall” is modified to change its mandatory character. Cf. City of Rochester v. correctly argues, while “shall” generally denotes a mandatory command, here signifies that the statutory deadline is mandatory. However, as the State [¶10] The defendant asserts that the use of the word “shall” in the statute 5

DONOVAN, COUNTWAY, and GOULD, JJ., concurred.

other arguments wh en h olding on one issue wa s dispositive). See Antosz v. Allain, 163 N.H. 298, 302 (2012) (declining to address parties’ issue is dispositive, we need not address the parties’ remaining arguments. and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Because this not met. See Ruel, 163 N.H. at 42. We therefore reverse the trial court’s order dismiss the charges against the defendant because the extended deadline was matter of law, to deny the State’s second request for an extension of time or to of time. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court was not required, as a does not prohibit the trial court from granting a party more than one extension [¶1 p. 5 5] In sum, RSA 135:17, I(a) does not set a mandatory deadline, and

thereafter.” RSA 13 p. 5 5:17, I(d) (Supp. 2024). days, the court shall schedule a status conference, and every 30 days “is not incarcerated, and the evaluation has not been completed within 90 subparagraph I (c), subparagraph I(d) was amended to provide, i f the defendant incarcerated and his or her evaluation has not been completed. Similar ly to court to review a defendant’s bail conditions on a monthly basis if he or she is