State of New Hampshire v. Ernest Jones

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A couple minutes before. Um, hello. Um, Donna Brown. I represent Ernest Jones. Um, I'm from Wildly Star and Peters, and I also at Council Table is attorney Michael Eaton, who is an associate who started this year wildly Star and Peters, and by coincidence also when he was a student at the ACL U, wrote the brief. That is the amicus brief in this case. Before I get to the issue of race, which is obviously dealt with in both of the briefs, um, it is our position that a reasonable person, regardless of the color of their skin, would not have felt free to leave the encounter that, um, Mr. Jones, uh, encountered on, uh, 2017 Precisely. When do you contend that Mr. Jones was seized? I, we believe that when the two officers come to the side of the both sides of the, of the vehicle that is in a private driveway, and, you know, these cases turn on all sorts of things, and I've read them all in the last couple of days. One police officer, two police officers, um, blue lights shining backwards, blue lights shining forward. And, uh, so the two, the two police officer thing is big, right? But we have case law that says that a normal conversation between a police officer and a citizen doesn't constitute a seizure. Correct. And but what, what we're saying is that there basically, to use the term, I don't know from the old westerns, they're surrounded, uh, that these two officers are on both sides of the car. Uh, there's no way, way that, you know, this is very different. And, and I, I think the Amicus does a really good job of talking about the difference between being in a car when you're encountering the police and being on a street. You know, this all starts back with Menden Hall, with the airport. We were all, you know, somebody comes up to us in airport and says, Hey, I see your id. We're all like, that's normal. No problem. We wouldn't think we're seized. But when we get in a car, it, it's just different. Uh, and especially in this scenario, um, because you're in a car in a private driveway, you have no reason to know why the police are arriving. I know a lot of the, the state relies on Steve's and licks, which in both of those cases, I would argue is these are cars where a per someone's either maybe disabled or they're, they're pulled over to the side of the road for some reason. And I think a reasonable person would think, the police are here to help me, you know, I'm on the side of the road, whatever, and they're here to help me. You wouldn't feel as, uh, restrained or a show of authority that's not here. What is here is in a parked driveway, two people have no reason to know why the police are showing up. But it, it, it looks very much like a, a stop. Right. The lights aren't on. The lights are not on. Exactly. And the police off, and it's not even any evidence that the, the, the vehicle of the police vehicle was I visible, but it's the two uniformed officers, um, both sides of the car, uh, that, um, that make this a seizure. And from my, did they tap on the windows? There's no evidence that that happened. And I don't think it was, it was in April. Um, I think that this was a situation where, um, and, and what's also difficult is the, the state only called one of the police officers, right? So that, that, that doesn't fill in the facts, but it is, it is undisputed that they did ask for identification. Um, what's important also too, and I think it's important, is why they were there. Um, you know, it's, it's not like, uh, one of the cases the state relies on is Brown, where there's a robbery and there's three police officers showing up to investigate a robbery. This is suspicious vehicle. That's all the officer has. And, uh, officers have, and then they show up and immediately, and then, and the officer, uh, officer, uh, Mitchell admits this immediately, any suspicions of criminal activity are dispelled. The, the woman who says, I, I live right there. And, and, and he admits that at the hearing that his suspicions are dispelled, then they continue to detain these people and, and detain them and asking for, uh, a license, uh, or an I identification. So, So did Mr. Jones provide Officer Beacon with his license? You know, it's, it, it, that didn't come up at the transcript. I went back and looked, if you look in the appendix, the state's motion does say that he, Mr. Jones provided a non driver's id. It is very specific information, which I think is a reasonable, uh, inference from that is the, that they got that from the police Reports. Is there any evidence as to whether it was returned to him during this interaction? Uh, there is not any evidence one way or the other. So If somebody provides a license or identification to a police officer, would a reasonable person believe that he or she's free to go? I think under all the facts of this case, and that's why I think I may segue into the, the, the racial issue, because I think that to the extent if, if this court feels it doesn't, um, then I think race is one more factor. Uh, and, and I was getting at that before when I talked about Mendenhall, where we start these lines of cases in an airport where everyone would assume that, you know, if if someone comes up and says, can I see your identification at airport? That's fine. Then all these cases start like, well, okay would be on the side of a street and the, and the police ask for id. And then if you broken down on the side of the road, is it okay? Again, police are coming to help you with that situation. And I, I think there's an argument that, that that whole, it's always okay to ask for Id has been taken too far. Uh, and especially look at some of, you know, the, the current climate that sometimes can smell a lot, like, you know, show me your papers. And I think that it's especially problematic in the car because then it really mimics a stop. 'cause that's what we're all used to. If we're driving down 93 and the police officer puts his blue lights on, uh, we know what to do. We pull over. We are going to be there for as long as the police officer wants us to be there. If it's five minutes, if it's an hour and a half, that's how long we're gonna be there. We have no choice. We can't say, Hey, I'm busy. I'm gonna be late for court. We can't do any of that. We, we are there. And when you have a stop like this, it feels the same way, especially when there's two officers, um, and they, you know, they're uniform, they're both sides of the car, and it feels just like that. Gimme your license and registration. I'm gonna go run a check. You sit here while I do this for how long? Because I understand that this took 20 minutes. Is that right? That the language in the transcript is the officer said no less than 20 minutes. So do you wanna be precise about that? So I would say that's a fair, um, assessment that it was about 20 minutes. So it's not short. It wasn't, And how should that affect our thinking? Obviously, the longer it is, the more, it's more of, it's at a de a detention. And I think that when then you add onto that, um, like, you know, it's, it's easy to say a reasonable person would be free to leave because, you know, we have this case law that says, you know, we can ask for identification, or you can ask a person what's going on. But how would that have played out in this case? What would've happened if Mr. Jones just said, just put it in reverse, hit the gas, and he's got, he Would've been arrested, I'm sure. Absolutely. He absolutely would've been arrested. And hopefully he wouldn't have hurt anybody, um, in the process, because that would be anyone. It's no matter the color of their skin. You've got two people on the side of your car and you're gonna put your car in reverse. Um, and you've got, you know, things that protrude, like rear view, uh, mirrors or or side mirrors, they would hit the officers. But short of leaving, couldn't he have just said, no, I declined to give you my id. And that's, that's the ultimate question here of what that would violate A statute wouldn't, he's required Exactly 2 65, 4 that, and again, this goes back to this mimics a stop, even though we don't have the blue lights, we've got everything else. And it's just like any of us. If, if, you know, if we are stopped on 93 and the officer says, um, you know, Right. But he wasn't stopped here. So does it really come within the statute? Well, But I, I, I, I agree with that, but I think with the stat, it's not that the statute's controlling, I think the statute informs what reasonable people would think. And that, and that's why I wanted to just briefly address the preservation issue, because I don't think this is a preservation issue because I have argued the statute is relevant because this, you know, we all guide ourselves in terms of what, how we conduct ourselves as to the law. And I think a reasonable person would think that, Hey, I learned this in, you know, driver's ed, you know, you, you gotta give 'em your license and registration. Most of us have it ready before they even get to the window. So, you know, I think that is very, very important. But again, going back to how is he gonna get outta there? So, um, if I, he would've violated a law if he said, no, I don't want to give that to you. And again, this would be a totally different scenario if he's walking down the sidewalk on Allison Street and not in a car on Allison Street, because then I think maybe most people would feel more free to say, why are you asking me for an identification? I'm on the sidewalk. But people don't think that when they're in their car, they think that's just part of what police do when they approach a car, is they wanna see if this person has a license. So I, I think that we have preserved this issue. I think 2 65 4 is relevant to how people conduct themselves. Um, there a couple of other things they wanna do is how race kind of tips the scale on that. Um, and I think a big issue here, and I, and I get this from the state's point of view, is workability. And I think the court obviously will, you know, struggle with this and have conversations with, you know, you want to give guidance to the police. And I, I, I, two basic points to that is that I think it is workable. And I I analogize the whole, like, how are police gonna know, you know, to take these things into consideration. And, you know, it's analogous to the situation in a sexual harassment case where someone says, oh, well, she just sat there quietly and didn't say anything. How was I, I also know she didn't like my dirty jokes. Um, we, we wouldn't say that, that there, there's, there's, as, as a culture, we are educated to learn about what other people think and be sensitive to other people's experiences, and especially police officers. Um, there was no evidence of this, but you'd be surprised that there's not training or there should be training on this. Can't we consider race under the totality of the circumstances test that we already have? Yes. Not only can this court, but this court should, and we argue must because otherwise, um, then that would create an inequality of that. It was the quote I put in my brief that to treat, um, uh, unequal things as equal is a form of inequality and how, and the perception of police contact contact in the United States is not equal. And that is, uh, shown. Do we consider it in the context of the United States or in the context of New Hampshire or New England or the Northeast, or Really good point. And the state tried to make that point in their brief, that, well, maybe in Chicago or, or I think the Oregon case, the Portland, Oregon case was a big one because there had been shootings there. And my argument is that considering race would be any place that has the internet, cell phones, and cable television, because anyone who lives in any of those places, which would be Concord, New Hampshire, where this happened, um, would know about the issues regarding contact between the police and persons of color. But is there any, any real reason to think that if he were Caucasian, the police would've changed their behavior in any way? Well, well, what we're saying is that they, in terms of how the police should have acted, it should have been more of, okay, we got this call, a suspicious vehicle, we get here and nothing, you know, this woman lives here, so they should have said sorry to bother you. I mentioned the Memphis case where that's exactly what happened with the police. Sure. And, and the thing that should have changed that if they still felt some need to ask for identification, the way to handle it if they had accounted for race, would be to say, sorry to bother you people. It doesn't appear there's anything criminal going on here. Do you mind giving us your id? You don't have to. You are free to go. You are free to go in the house, free to leave. We'll step away from the car. But I think if the police, but, but the error that the court made and the police made is assuming the passivity meant as scent, um, and that the court aired in that, because the, that's why not considering race, both the police officer. And, um, the, the judge basically made a false assumption, assumption that, well, he's just sitting there, he's being polite, he's handing over the id. He must feel free to leave. And everything that's cited in our brief and in the amicus brief shows that that is a false assumption. And to go back to, to, to judge, um, Huntsman's, uh, um, question. This is not a thing in Portland, Oregon or Chicago or some other part of the country. We cite many instances of, um, media, New Hampshire Public Radio, other places where persons of color in New Hampshire say, we have the same experience here. New Hampshire's not different. What, what's the importance of the supplemental authority that you recently filed with us? Her case, uh, judge McCafferty's Case? Yes. And that when you combine it with height, which this court has decided, um, are two cases, which are just contrary to what the lower court judge found, which was that we, the judge foun, we can't and shouldn't consider race. That was Judge McNamara's decision. And both he and Hernandez, which is the federal court cases, saying they did consider it. And, and the federal judge, um, considered it a couple of times in that, um, the, the, in terms of whether someone was nervous in terms of their interaction with the police, and the judge found that being informed about how persons of color might be more concerned about police or may maybe more afraid or intimidated by the police, that would give a plausible explanation for the person being Nervous. I, I did read Hernandez, but, um, I can't recall that it say that race must be taken into account, or race Can be taken into account. It did not just, the judge did take it into consideration. Um, and I would say that it, it should be because the, I mean, the standard says all the circumstances. I mean, the, the, the test is that when conducting this inquiry, the court is mindful of all the circumstances. That's a circumstance. Uh, so When you have us remand for consideration of that specific circumstance, Um, of this, uh, I don't know that the, a remand would really develop the record any more than it would. But I, I think that's an option to the court, uh, to, you know, to send it back and have another hearing to develop that more. Um, and, you know, maybe the officer says, oh, I did, you know, I did consider it or whatever. But, um, I, I, I think that, um, the record before us shows that it wasn't considered, and the judge, it's the judge's order. He did not consider it. I mean, you could send it back to the judge and say, Hey, consider this. Maybe there might be a different decision in that case, no time is up. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Garland. Thank you, your Honor. I can say good afternoon, police court, sir. Uh, my name's Sam Garland. I'm here on behalf of the state in this case. Um, so this court's seizure jurisprudence is well developed. Um, it is, is well established. Um, and this court has said repeatedly as justice, uh, Donovan was getting to, um, I think in one of his questions that not all, uh, interactions, not all encounters between law enforcement and members of the community constitute seizures. This court has said that, um, contrary to what Amicus and, and, um, Mr. Jones counsel have argued, um, both in the context of interactions with pedestrians and in the context of interactions with people who are in vehicles that are stopped, um, that's established in this court's case law. And so the mere fact that he was in a motor vehicle, uh, does not establish that this was a seizure. Um, this court has re uh, reiterated that the, uh, that a seizure only occurs, excuse me, uh, went under a totality of the circumstances. And we do agree with that. Um, a reasonable person, individual in the individual's position no longer believe that he or she is free to leave. And the state carries the burden here proving that the, that the seizure was proper and legal and justified. Yes, your Honor. All right. And so I, I find it sort of interesting that the officer that actually had conversation with the defendant in this case wasn't present, didn't testify at the suppression hearing. Is that right? Yes, your Honor. So How did the state go about proving what was told to the defendant and when the defendant provided his license to the officer, when it was returned to the officer, what that officer said to the defendant, and how did the trial court make any findings regarding that without that kind of evidence? Um, based on officer, uh, Mitchell's testimony, he was the one who spoke with the passenger, your Honor. Um, officer Mitchell was able to testify, um, that he was able to generally observe it. He did say he didn't hear the specifics of the conversation, um, but he did, uh, make clear that, um, that he was able to observe the conversation, that the conversation was laid back and relaxed, that there was no yelling, no blue lights, excuse me, and no, no demands or anything like that. I mean, based on his proximity to the driver's side of the vehicle, what, What's the state of the record about the license?

I shared Justice Donovan's concern about that. Um, so the, the record, um, as Attorney Brown indicated, I think doesn't, uh, the tri transcript at least doesn't indicate whether there was even a request for a license or whether it was a request for a verbal identification. Um, there, there isn't any indication in the record that, that anyone went back to a cruiser, um, to, to run this through dispatch, in fact, attorney, or excuse me, officer Mitchell testified that, um, he heard through the radio, um, there's nothing in there to suggest that anyone left, um, decided the vehicle. Um, and, and I believe the duration of time that was there was, was less than 20 minutes, I think was how, uh, that was established in, in transcript as Well. So, but his identification was provided to the police officer in some way because you ran his name and you got, you got back the information that you got back. Yes, sir. Yep. So we don't, we don't, the record doesn't provide us with whether or not that information was conveyed by giving the police officer a document or just telling the officer what his name was. Um, I believe in, uh, the appendix, there's an indication it was a non-driver id, but that's not in the, in the transcript from the suppression hearing. No. And we don't know whether it was ever or when it was returned, Is that right? Right, your Honor, and I think, excuse Me, or if it was returned, Um, or I, I guess we don't know if it was returned, but I think, um, what, what, what both of you're getting at your honors is this idea that, that something about taking an identification could, uh, turn this into a seizure. Um, this court's case law is clear, even in the context. And, and Steve said this, that requesting identification in and of itself is not enough. Um, and in addition to that, this court has said, um, and this is, I believe on page 21 of our brief, but I have it in my notes as Well. So the difference being if he was on a public way pulled over by a police officer asked for his license, now that's a seizure. That, That's fundamentally different. That's an investigation. But 'cause we're on a private driveway, is the car running? Do we know, Um, that I don't, I don't, bel I'd have to double check. I'm not gonna, I can't Do that. But because the car's on a private driveway, it's a different, it's a different type of interaction. I I don't know that it's different necessarily because it's on a private driveway, your Honor, I think the fact that the car was not stopped by the officers is, is the distinction. And I think Steve's reveals that. I mean, that was obviously on a public way, um, in that court case appeared to be presented to the trial court as this was a traffic stop. Um, and this court said, no, we first have to figure out whether there was a seizure. This was a, this was a car, a police cruiser that came up and parked behind on the side of Route 28. Um, looks like it, you know, a traffic stop. But this court said it wasn't, this court did its normal seizure analysis with respect to the motorcycle there, um, and said it, and it wasn't, and took into consideration the totality of the circumstances. So, So if Mr. Jones had decided not to engage in any conversation with officer, be roll up his window and pull away, was he free to go? Or what do he have been Arrested? I think under this case's, uh, I think under this court's jurisprudence, he was free to go. As this court has, has, has framed that and considered the totality of the circumstances. And I think that's evident in Steve's oath, but What a reasonable person in his position feel that he was free to go. What I think you're getting at your Honor is, um, in, in several of the articles in the academic works that, um, opposing the opposing side has cited here and in certainly in some judicial opinions and in concurring and dissenting opinions, at least, I've been Taking grief about that motorcycle stop ever since I wrote it. I wish I had known that before I came. But, uh, but there, there is some criticism of the reasonable person standard, um, based on the fact that maybe it's based on a fiction, right? That, that people who are, uh, interacting with police officers very rarely do actually feel free to leave. Um, I, I'm not aware of any court that has adopted that, as, you know, as a revised version of the reasonable person standard. Um, and it becomes pretty quickly unworkable. Um, particularly if, um, there's testimony in the record here at the, uh, that Officer Mitchell said they, they asked for identification as a matter of course. And, and the reason that they do that is so that they can, uh, check to see who they're speaking with and so that they can document it. And there are plenty of administrative reasons. So Is it irrelevant to us if the li if the license or the ID was never given back? Um, I don't Are you free To, are you, do you feel as free to go if you haven't gotten your ID back? So this court, your Honor, hasn't addressed that. I I think it probably would be relevant to the inquiry. It's a circumstance that, And we don't know that here. You don't And the burdens on the state, Right? But, but in terms of, um, I think the totality of the circumstances that are pre, um, present, this court has never said, um, X amount of time not giving it back with an X amount of time or anything along that is, is the red line where a seizure has occurred, right? This court considers the totality and the evidence that is in the record suggests that this didn't last particularly long. I mean, I know it's been framed as a, as a long interaction, but less than 20 minutes, um, that this is asked for is in a matter of course, um, that through dispatch, they were able to hear, um, of the arrest warrant, um, within that timeframe. Uh, I, But the officer's suspicion was dispelled relatively quickly. Is that, is that fair and accurate to say? I think that's an accurate characterization, yes. All right. But, but your honor, um, the counsel, uh, before the trial court did not rely on reasonable suspicion. They never ar argued that this was, um, there was reasonable suspicion for a stop. The argument was always that there was no seizure in the first place. Um, and even if reasonable suspicion were dispelled, um, I guess that changes the analysis of how this was framed, right? This has been framed as an initial seizure that would change it to inappropriately prolonging, which kind of falls more in lines with the height decision. Um, and, and that's a different standard than what's been presented here. And it's one that I don't think I've thought entirely through. But, but I would say that the, the, in the ability to have a kind of an ongoing interaction, there's no requirement that, you know, I, I believe a police officer could talk to a person under this court's jurisprudence and under federal jurisprudence in that of other states for a very long time, as long as that interaction in and of itself didn't have some of these other indicia of a seizure. Um, and, and those don't exist here. And I would just like to emphasize that point. Um, the, the addition that this court is recognized, and of course it's not an exhaustive list, but threatening presence of several officers. Um, this case, there were two, there was nothing to indicate that they were acting threatening. And this court said in other contexts that three officers, um, was not enough in and of itself, um, display of a weapon by an officer. Officer Mitchell testified that no weapons were drawn during this interaction, um, some physical touching of, of the person by an officer. There's no evidence of that in, in this record. Um, the use of language or rat tone indicating that compliance with an officer's request might be compelled. Um, again, officer Mitchell testified that, um, the conversation was very laid back and relaxed, um, that there were no demands or anything like that. So these other things that this court has recognized can, if present in a current, in a particular, um, circumstance, give rise to a seizure, they don't exist in this record. Well, I mean the mr the occupants of the car were told by the officer that they were investigating a suspicious vehicle. Is that Right? Uh, we, we know that with respect to the passenger, yes. Right. And were there any other vehicles in the area that were being investigated? Uh, I don't, I'm not aware. Uh, I don't believe so. Based on the Record. So this is the only vehicle that is in the area. Isn't it fair to assume that the occupants are going to believe that they're not free to leave until the officers have completed their investigation? Uh, under, your honor, this, this court's precedent and the precedent of other jurisdictions, I don't think that in and of itself is the trigger. I I I, I didn't find it's one factor, isn't it? It is a factor the court can consider, certainly, but, but again, that, that would be one indicia and, you know, granting that that is, um, that it cuts that direction. And, and I think that the other things that this court has consistently recognized are the sorts of things that would be a show, show of authority, um, just simply don't exist here. Well, We don't know. We don't know what, we don't know what the officer said to, to Mr. Jones. So how do we know that We have Officer Mitchell's characterization? Um, I guess the thing that, that thing that we don't have is what specifically was said, but we do know that there was no yelling, that there were no demands. Again, there were no blue lights, there were no, um, no spotlight or take down lights or things along those lines. So, but if the Officer, officer Beacon had said to Mr. Jones, you sit tight, I'm gonna just check your id, that'd be an indication that he was seized at that point, right? I think it would be a factor that, that a court would consider. And so, uh, I would point to some of the cases, because this court hasn't, um, spoken specifically to it. Um, this court did say that being in the presence of a person in to do a warrant check, and that was in McInnis, um, in and of itself is not a seizure. This court indicated in the Dowd decision. Um, it agreed with, let me just pull up the actual quote for that. 'cause I think that is important that I get it correct. Excuse me. Um, agreed with the trial court's conclusion that the defendant was not seized until after the officer reviewed his non-driver identification. And we've cited a number of cases, one from Utah, one from, um, the state of Washington, where a defendant was not seized when the officer stood, stood near him while performing a warrant check. Um, which IMO took a minute that gave back the identification before continuing or question, which IMO took a minute in that case? It was a minute, yes, but we don't know. I, and again, I, I appreciate what you're saying, justice Donovan, I'm not trying to, I need to push that entirely aside, but based on the evidence that we do have here, um, there is nothing that is, that is sticking out to say that, you know, these indicia that this court has consistently recognized, um, are present, given The, that we have a totality of the circumstances test, how could it not be error for the trial court to say I can't take race into account? Um, your Honor, I, I have two responses to that. The first one directly to your question is, um, I believe that the statement in the trial court's, uh, decision that it would be error to consider it is essentially dicta. And the prior statement, he said he wasn't required to consider it. And, and I think that is the actual correct, uh, you know, correct position he took, I don't think there was anything that, um, that saying that it would've been error is anything that, that bound that it wasn't based, that wasn't the sole basis for the trial court's decision. Um, and, and I would add to that and relatedly that, um, that we don't believe that, that the, uh, that under the totality of these circumstances, the trial court was required to consider race, um, in the cases, and there's, I characterized it in the brief as a split of authority. I I would probably rephrase that to a divergence of authority because you have some cases on one side that say race is a factor, is not a factor, um, that's relevant in an objective seizure inquiry. You have a developing side of this issue that says basically what you just said, um, justice Bassett, which is under a totality of the circumstances, race can be considered as part of the objective component. But none of those courts have said, um, race is a deciding factor. In fact, many of them have said it's not. Um, men, none of those courts have said that, uh, race is, um, something that every court has to consider when courts have considered race or have suggested that race is, uh, something that a court can consider. They've done so in the context of the specific community as Justice Hans Marconi was getting at, or at least asked about with, um, with Attorney Brown, um, or the specific circumstances in that case. And I think that's consistent with this court's precedent. This court has looked at the specific totality of the circumstances presented, uh, in a case by case basis with Respect, not just to race, but also disability or, or age or those other factors. Yes, your Honor. Um, but, but, but to the best of my knowledge, it, at least in the race context, and I believe in the other, um, cases as well, uh, it's tethered to some particular circumstance before, uh, the court in that particular case. And so if you look at, um, That makes it Relevant, that makes it relevant. Exactly. Um, here we do not dispute of course, that that Mr. Jones is African American, but there's nothing else beyond kind of general conversation, um, general characterizations of, of race relations with law enforcement community, um, that would make it relevant in this case. And, and, uh, attorney Brown has not cited, as far as I know, any case that where in the seizure analysis at very least, um, that kind of general, um, climate has been enough. And in fact, in the cases where courts have considered it, they've always tethered it to the Portland community or they've tethered it to a high crime rate area where race relations were specifically, um, Well, well, if the trial court didn't think it could take it into account, then it would be understandable for the council not to have developed that issue about why it might be relevant. I, I, forgive me if I, it seemed like I was disparaging that, that at all. I'm certainly not, it's not the, I would simply say, your Honor, that that our position as we've laid out in the brief is it's not a categorical requirement that it has to, if it is relevant at all. And that's not an issue that we think this court needs to reach. But if, um, if it is relevant at all, it has to be tethered to the specific facts. Um, but I think that you can affirm the trial court's decision, um, by assuming that, that it's relevant, um, within the totality of the circumstances. Because again, um, while the find the facts that the trial court developed are things that, that you have to pay some deference to the legal determination's ultimately de novo. So if you're going to weigh those totality of the circumstances, I think you can still say all of the factors, uh, on one side or many of the factors or most of the factors indicate that this wasn't a seizure race, would not tip the scales. And, and that's something I think this court can do in this position, um, just by simply assuming that, assuming it's irrelevant, again, the fact that he's African American, not disputed, and we certainly don't dispute that. And there's nothing else that would tether it to these specific facts. This case, it's not without irony that state versus ball was the driving while Black case. You probably are much too young to know that I am, your Honor, I, I'm familiar with the, uh, with the, I know you are the case, but I Un without expression, Right? I not, nothing, I shouldn't step in anything by, by responding specifically to that. It's a good idea. Alright. Um, unless there are any more questions, I'll end on that note. Thank You. Thank you. Okay. Submit it. Court stands adjourned.