Daniel Richard v. Speaker of The House of Representatives et al.

NOTICE: This speech-to-text record was generated from automated speech recognition, is likely to contain errors or inaccuracies, and should be verified against the recording provided by the Supreme Court at https://www.courts.nh.gov/our-courts/supreme-court/oral-argument/live-stream/2022.

representatives et al. Thank you, Mr. Richard. Good morning. If it appears the Honorable Court. My name is Daniel Richard. I'd like to preserve two minutes for rebuttal of the defense's arguments. This is a first impression case on the right of Redress agreements by Remon. I respectfully submit the following three points. First, the Bill of Rights, part one, articles 30, 31 and 32 are still some of the laws of the land. These are private rights of the people and not the rights of the state. Second, conflicting arguments by the defense. Third, the trial court and the defense arguments in this case are repugnant and contrary to the precedent of this court bur versus speaker in 2020. First, someone here is not telling the truth either the legislature's own legal scholar attorney Chuck Douglas, a former member of this court, was telling the truth in two 2015 when he wrote a redress analysis for the legislature, or the defense is telling the truth when they say that I have no rights to be heard or considered by the legislature anymore. Both cannot be true. It's an undisputed fact that for 34 years the General Court did act as a tribunal for public matters and private disputes under Part one, articles 30 and 31 and 32. And from the time of the adaptation of the Constitution in 1784 until Merrill versus Sherburne in 1818, Merrill versus Sherburn clarified the separation of powers in Article one, excuse me, part one, article 37, but it did not repeal articles 30, 31 and 32. It did, however, stop the common practice for litigants and civil causes to petition legislature for new trials or stays, appeals or reversals of decisions of the courts until the practice was ruled unconstitutional. The Merrill Court reaffirmed legislature's jurisdiction to hold tribunals to decide matters of public concern. The trial court and the defense did cite Part one, articles 30, 31 and 32 of the Bill of Rights outta context. And they did ignore this plain meaning it's historical usage and custom, which are preserved in the House and Senate journals and in the state archives. This is an error of law. The primary tactic for the defense relies on trying to convince you that Part One, article 31 does not say what it says. Article 31 states very clearly, oh, the legislature shall assemble for redress of public grievances and for making such laws as the common good may require. This is important. Article one part one, article 31 is one sentence. It has two parts, beginning with the legislature's First duty to assemble redress a grievance. This is a right that this is really important. This right is distinct separate from the legislature's duties detailed in part two, the form of government. Part one, article 31 and Article 32 emanate from the Bill of Rights and not from part two, the form of government. The second part of the sentence in Article 31 is mandatory also for making such laws as the public good may require this led, excuse me, this compels the legislature to establish all laws and rules necessary to perform all their constitutional duties detailed by the first clause in the sentence. This is a private right of the people, not the right of the state. Therefore, an obligation upon the legislature to assemble when called upon by the people for correcting, strengthening, and confirming the laws. This must be complied with the powers delegated to the legislature to enact laws and to judge for the benefit and welfare of the state are distinct and separate from the Bill of Rights, which they cannot touch. Item two, conflicting arguments by the defense. Which of these is True? Can I just ask? Yes, ma'am. On your first argument, is it influenced at all by the historical, uh, function of the general court when it sat as a court? It did, your Honor. From the very beginning or from prior to the adaptation of the Constitution into the early constitutional period, the process was in regular practice, Merrill versus Sherburne changed all that. It only from the perspective that it clarified private matters submitted to the courts would be heard by the courts and not re-litigating by the legislature, which was what they were doing. Conflicting arguments by the defense on July 23rd at Attorney Ancy stated that I was told in the speaker's office, there was no process under house rules by which the House of Representatives to consider the Remon and to the extent that I wished the house to consider the subject matter of the rem monstra, the only proper avenue was through, excuse me, through legislation, what a convenient answer. My constitutional rights have now been subject to the convenience and the discretion of the legislature's procedural rulemaking power. On March 13th, attorney Ancy changed his story when he submitted as his evidence the following summary of law and Exhibit F on behalf of Speaker Shirtliff in the legislative ethics committee, attorney Ancy quote, this is a confession. The scope of these rights and the mechanism by which they are implemented by the legislature has evolved over time in New Hampshire petitions for redress and rem mons while once common in the early part of the state's history fell out of favor. What does fell out of favor? When did the Constitution fall out of favor? Falling out of favor is not a constitutional amendment. Attorney Douglas's redress analysis did not say these rights simply fell out of favor as claimed by attorney ancy. But rather, the redress analysis stated the all important point on page three

and the constitutional articles of course still remain, which is true today. Now comes Attorney Lehman on page six of the transcript of the Superior court hearing. Judge Kissinger asked Attorney Lehman quote, let me ask you about one thing you said. What's the process from your perspective by which the legislature complies with this obligations under Article three two with regards to a Remonstrance? And he repeats the question, how does the legislature meet its obligations under the Constitution? Attorney Lehman replied, by not retaliating against somebody who files a remonstrance, let that sink in. That's the government's response. If attorney Lehman's statement is to be believed, a constitutional right has been reduced to a lack of retaliation. What's even more insulting is the fact that the trial court believed him. The fact of the matter is they did retaliate by suppressing my right of freedom of speech to deliberate and debate before either of the House

or the Senate under Part one, article 30, 31 and 32. Mr. Richard, could you, uh, clarify? You said that you took issue with the trial court's ruling in regard to Bert and Hughes. Yes. But the court trial court found that under those cases that the, the issue was justiciable. So what are you taking issue with? Well, the, the, uh, judge Kissinger also said that this case was just ticketable in his opinion. Yes. And so he did review it, but unfortunately he ignored the precedent of this court and the usage in custom 'cause there is no case law on this. The closest we get is Merrill versus Sherburne, in your opinion, in 2020 in the Bird case on similar but not quite the same point. And you, you've referenced several times, attorney Douglas's, uh, piece on this issue, but that's not binding on either this court or the House or the Senate. Absolutely. Absolutely. And the reason I cite that is for two reasons. One, it was their evidence. They submitted this evidence because they believed it to be true. When Attorney Ancy presented this evidence to the ethics committee, he submitted it and then tried to convince them that my rights simply fell out of favor. And so I've a problem with that.

Judge Kissinger acknowledges these obligations to the legislature twice within his line of questioning of Attorney Lehman. What's very concerning is Judge Kissinger would accept such a ridiculous answer from Attorney Lehman as a response to his question, what good are my rights? What good is the Constitution if it's true? Item three, the precedent of this court, judge Kissinger and Attorney Ancy were both personally involved in her versus speaker as the trial judge and the attorney of record for the House. Therefore, they have full knowledge of the opinion of this court in that case as if a losing argument, excuse me, losing on this bogus argument the first time wasn't enough. They've now resurrected it a second time in this case. Such a legal argument was rejected for the same reason by this court, which subsequently reversed and remanded this flawed reasoning in versus speaker no part of government making fringe on the Bill of Rights. Attorney Ancy cited in his brief to continue on this point about me, excuse me, about your opinion. Attorney Ancy cited in his brief on page 12 that the trial, the trial court found that I have no right to be heard or considered by the legislature in light of the legislature's authority to make its own rules or procedure under Part two articles 22 and 36. They believe this allows the legislature or the defendants the discretion decide whether or not Part one articles 30 31 and 32 apply. This is an error of law attorney Lehman States on page three of his brief, that somehow he believes in the same losing argument when he states quote that the newly added provisions granting express authority to the Senate and the House to settle their own rules or procedure reflected a break from the past practice. It's not true. There's no such, there's no such amendment. Article 22, part two, articles 22 and 36 still say the same thing today. Here's the rub. This is a substantive rights issue, not a procedural issue. As the opposing counsel will tell you, there's no newly added provisions or constitutional articles granting any expressed authority to the Senate or the House to exercise such discretion as to decide whether they will follow the Constitution, nor does the defense cite any such authority. And even if they did make such a rule, it'd be ruled unconstitutional as they cannot amend the Constitution by a legislative act. Finally, speaker Packard and President Morris, as the elected leaders of the General Court did retaliate the defendants make, and excuse me, the defendants made intentional choices as they're the only elected officers of the legislature with the authority to cause the legislative body to assemble for public redress a grievance. This is why the petition for WR Manus lies upon them as the, as these decisions were made by these two individuals and not by the General Court. Thank you. Do you have any questions?

Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Richard. Mr. Ancy, I understand you have, uh, reserved eight minutes and that, uh, Mr.

Lehman has seven. Is that accurate? Yes, it is, your Honor. Thank you. Uh, thank you, your Honor. Um, may it please the court, James Ancy on behalf of the Speaker of the House of Representatives. Um, in the interest of time, I'll be willing to take the court's question at any time. Um, part one, article 32 of the New Hampshire Constitution means exactly what it says. Um, the people have a right to request of the legislature. I think that's the important word. Um, in this case, I think that, I know that is what Judge Kissinger found, um, in dismissing this case, that there is a substantive right in part one, article 32, and it is the right to request. There is no legislatively prescribed procedure in the Constitution, um, for petitions redress or Man Davis. Wouldn't a fair reading be that the legislative body is required to do something? Well, none of the cases that have decided, certainly there's no New Hampshire precedent on this case. Um, but all of the federal cases and the state cases, which have looked at this issue, have not come to that conclusion. In fact, they have said that the nature of the right is a right to petition to request that there is no right to be heard. There is no right to, for a person who presents a petition to be heard, uh, or for the legislative body to act on a petition. So beyond that, it's ephemeral, It's really within, Sorry, If, if there's no requirement that the Legislative Body Act, is there a requirement that at least it be informed of the contents of the petition? I don't think that's, I don't think any of the cases have even gone that far. Um, however, in this particular case, the legislature has been informed, um, the receipt of the Remon was published in the house calendar. It was made available to the body on I believe, three separate occasions. Um, so to the extent that this court, um, believes that the right requires the legislature at least to receive it and be made aware of it, um, the legislature has complied with that. And you're not taking issue with this court ruling and the Burt case, are you? No. Um, and in fact, I I don't think there's anything, um, inconsistent with this court's holding in Burt, um, with, uh, with how the trial court decided this case. In fact, they, they followed Burt in, in, as you noted, uh, justice that, uh, this case was just disible. Um, and therefore, I I don't see any inconsistency In justice. The ability was the issue in Burt Correct, Your Honor. And, and Judge Kissinger followed it, Correct? Correct. Right before Part one, article 32 is part one Article 31. Yes. Which says, the legislature shall assemble for the redress of public grievances. So doesn't that inform Justice Hick's question as to what happens next with the grievance? It certainly opens the question, but I don't think it provides an answer. It, it's unlike other legislative, legislatively prescribed, uh, procedures in the Constitution, uh, for example, veto overrides or presentment of bills. Um, there's, it's not specified. And so therefore, I think it, um, devolves on the legislature's own rulemaking authority in part two articles 22 and 37 to determine whether there is going to be a process that may have been a process at some point. Um, there isn't now, um, that's incumbent on the legislature to determine the process for handling, uh, petitions, whether it is simply a matter of receiving them and being made aware, or if the legislature chooses to take some further process as suggested to the plaintiffs in this case. So the leg legislature could ignore the second half. The legislature shall assemble for making such laws as a public good may require they could just not do that. Well, I don't think that there's anything in the Constitution that requires the leg, the legislature assembles to make laws, but I don't think they're required to pass laws. I don't think there's any constitutional requirement that the legislature needs to meet to pass laws. Um, we certainly do. And there are rules in the House and the Senate for that purpose. Well, there's Also gap in the three branches of government. If the legislature did a gap, you don't want us to fill? No, but I, I guess my point is that it, it provides sort of the, the framework for the duties of the legislature. It doesn't, the, the, the Constitution doesn't spell out then what the legislature needs to do to effectuate that. And I think in terms of making laws or receiving petitions for redress or grievance, that is incumbent on the legislature to flesh out through its rules, through its internal processes, how it's going to meet Constitution requirement, how it's going to redress the grievances. Correct. Okay. Correct. But you would agree that the, there is a constitutional limitation at some point on the powers of the House or the Senate and their rulemaking, And I think that was the issue, president bur, um, correct. And, um, certainly this court, um, is the, the final arbiter of the Constitution. Uh, and there are sort of limits to co to legislative rulemaking. Um, however, I don't, again, I don't think there's anything inconsistent with this matter. Um, in, in the bur case, I think, uh, the legislature could adopt rules, um, to, um, to deal with re redress of grievances ands. Um, but I don't think it's required to, and I don't think anything in Burt, And certainly this court doesn't get involved with the rules that the legislature, um, prescribes for its own procedures. Correct. And I think only to, I think this court gets involved when there is a constitutionally prescribed procedure such as V two overrides presentment by Bism. Certainly those are procedures where the, where the, the, the legislature couldn't effectuate a rule that would be contrary to the Constitution. Of course, the argument here is that the practice is contrary to the Constitution. So, but ultimately we have to interpret Article 32 and decide whether it's contrary to the Constitution. Correct. And that, that's why I think the, again, there, there's no, it is a matter of first impression for this court, but I think the Supreme Court, US Supreme Court jurisprudence on this is very clear. And I think the other cases, the other state, uh, court cases that were cited, I think were also instructive because they essentially, they are all in agreement that, uh, numerous constitutions, uh, provide for this. Right. But they don't prescribe a procedure. And therefore Are there textual differences between the constitutional provisions and other states and the constitutional provision here that we should take into account in deciding how those cases are, the reasoning of those cases ought to apply here. I would say there's obviously differences in the provisions. I'd say probably most pertinent is the case cited, uh, Gentry, uh, the Tennessee case, the very recent case. And, uh, my recollection is their provision in the Constitution is very similar to New Hampshire's. And that's why they came to the result that, you know, so we are impressing upon this court that, you know, certainly the, the, the Tennessee Constitution provided a right, uh, to, uh, petition for redress and rem mons. However, it didn't require any procedure. And I think the similarity there really should inform this court, um, um, to, to come out the same way. And there's, there's nothing in New Hampshire history pre constitutional history that would inform our decision either in favor or against adopting the Tennessee approach. I think certainly history can be somewhat tricky because, um, there's a whole wealth of history. I think this was cited in the, um, the we of the people case, the DC circuit case, which sort of looked at the scholarship on both sides under the First Amendment and came to sort of this mixed conclusion that, you know, there's certainly some history in favor of saying there is a right to Remonstrate and to have some sort of direct participation in government. And there's a equally amount of equal amount of, of scholarship that says no, it's sort of limited. Um, and what the court came to the conclusion was, even in light of this history, really our precedent finds us that, that, uh, the right is limited to sort of request to present. It doesn't require any procedure beyond that. Um, so certainly I think this court can be informed by history, but I don't think he's bound by it. Um, and I think my co-counsel probably can address a little bit more of the history 'cause he, he addressed more of that in, in, in the brief.

But I, I guess that's, thank you. Thank you, your Honor. Thank you very much, Mr. Stan. Mr. Lehman? Thank you, your Honor. Richard Lehman, uh, layman made your list for Senate president Chuck Morris. First thing I want to say is starting out as contrary to what Mr. Richards said in his argument, uh, Senator Morse wasn't the Senate president at the time. This whole controversy started. That was a prior administration, prior chief of staff, prior legal counsel to, so to the extent that he's saying Senator Morse had anything to do with the underlying facts, that's simply incorrect. Um, the Senate president responded to this as the head of the institution, not as the person personally involved. Secondly, I'd just like to say to the extent that the general claim has to do with the openness or responsiveness of New Hampshire legislature, generally, there is none more open or responsive in this country than the New Hampshire legislature. We have, we are the biggest state legislature in the country, serving 1.3 million people. All 400 state reps serve an average of 300, 3,344 people each. Any state rep that's not responsive to the concerns, uh, or complaints of their constituents is not gonna be state rep, uh, for long. We also would You, would you though I, there's no, I don't think there's any serious disagreement with everything you said thus far, but would you focus upon, uh, part one, article 32, and tell me whether Mr. Richards is right, is that if we adopt the state's view, it does, the language is meaningless. The language isn't meaningless. As I spelled out in my brief, it, uh, the language of Article 32 has three specific provisions. Um, and if you think of them, uh, temporarily, they make sense as the way people communicate with their elected representatives. People have a right to assemble and consult together upon the common good. That is the right to assemble. Where citizens get together and talk about what they think the law should be or what the public good requires, then they have the right to give instructions, who their representatives, they communicate with their representatives individually, um, or as a group. And, um, finally, and, And I know we're going slowly here, but you don't mean just to their individual representatives, you mean to all 400 or 424 representatives. They can communicate with whoever they want to communicate with. And certainly since the time of the adoption of the, of the Constitution, it's become far easier for them to communicate with all of them. And it's very common, I assure you, for, uh, similar or identical emails to be received by 424 elected representatives and Senators State House. Um, so it's very simple matter for them to, uh, reach out and let their elected officials know what's on their mind. And finally, they have the way to request by petitioner, or that the legislature take action. The verb request does not include any response. They can request all they want. And as Mr. Richards said, I believe that the, that provision prohibits retaliation, just like the First Amendment prohibits retaliation. It doesn't say it, sure, but it's been adopted by every court. Now, I would point out the difference between articles 31 and 32, um, Mr. Richards, uh, brief is interesting to the extent that it certainly, uh, explains a lot of history about England, colonial America. And the specific process involved in petitions in Mon is that at one point in his brief, and I don't think it's, uh, exactly what either the Massachusetts, uh, uh, Massachusetts constitution say, but he claims that the citizens have a right to assemble with their legislative representatives. And I submit that's not the law. Um, they don't have a right to go into the State House to make their pitch to a joint assembly of the House and the Senate together. Um, they do have a right to, uh, petition and, um, to petition and resate. Mr. Richards spends a great deal of time, and it is interesting reading and some of the attachments to his pleadings. Law review articles and historical documents are interesting in what that practice meant in 17th century England in Colonial America. And that's all well and good. But the tactic he adopts in trying to convince you that the legislature today is required to use the same procedures that were in place at the time as if they're locked in amber. It's really the same kind of argument that, uh, gun control advocates adopt when they say things like the Second Amendment protects your right to have a musket, or the technology that existed at the time and the Constitution even read in its original intent, doesn't lock all the surrounding procedures or all the very specific incidents of living in the late 18th century in Amber and require us to stick with them today. It guards the principles. So you're not, but you're not contesting the relevance of the understanding of the people of New Hampshire in 1784 when the Constitution was adopted. The understanding of what is, I guess would be the Question of, of this provision? No, I think, and what the practice was at that time. Uh, the practice at the time was to request that there be a petition or a ance, and that the hope would be that it would be heard in the legislature. There's nothing that I've seen in anything that Mr. Richards has submitted that says the legislative body felt itself required to reach every single piece of correspondence that received, did You find any case where that did happen? Well, he submitted the single instance from 1786 about, uh, a petition that was adopted, but petitions are adopted to this day. It's not the same formal process. Legislators receive communications from their constituents and they turn 'em into legislation. Furthermore, everybody has the right to come testify on any bill they want. So if the subject matters of what Mr. Richards is complaining about, in this case, there was an election law bill and, um, a, a second matter. He's entitled to come and testify on those matters and be heard by at least a committee of the legislature, not a joint assembly of the entire body. But Basically it boils down to you are saying that citizens can't sort of put in their own legislation, they've gotta go through a representative. Correct. Correct. Being able to testify seems very different to me than submitting a petition of reon. I I would submit a higher order of privilege than, than doing that. He's, he's allowed to go look them face to face and talk about what he wants to talk about. And at that time, and this happens all the time, people can propose amendments to, to bills that are pending before the legislature. If they choose, they can ask their representative to submit legislation. And that happens all the time. In this case, the meeting in the speaker's office that attorney Ian was talking about occurred with either one or two. I don't remember exactly how many legislators with Mr. Richards, either of them could have put in a, a bill on his request if they wanted to. I do avoid That was not, I'm sorry. You go. I was gonna say, and if no legislature is willing to do it, then what? Well, if no legislator's willing to do it, he's, he's free to communicate however he wants, which is apparently what he did today. But there's no required response. The Constitution doesn't obligate the legislature to respond in a particular way to individual citizens. I would Think it would be more important to focus upon whether the legislature does nothing. What can the court do about it, what we do? Well, I think that the, uh, the, the commitment of, uh, the right to adopt its own rules of procedures to the legislature seriously hampers the court's ability to intervene. And the, the pre predicate question to that is whether there is a right to obtain a certain response. If the constitution, if you were the Constitution requires a specific response from the legislature, then that constitutional rule, which is really not expressed in the Constitution, but he is asking you to imply it would trump or constrain the legislature's ability to adopt its own rules. The corollary question is, does mandamus or quote, warrant o lie to redress any of that? I, I believe not for all the reasons set forth in the speaker's, in the speaker's brief. If I can have just a few seconds. You may, you may. Article 32, We'll allow the same intelligence to Mr. Richard. Please go ahead. Ahead. Uh, article 31, which, uh, you asked a question about says, legislature shall assemble for the address of public grievances. Article 32 says that the people have the right to request of legislative body by way of petition or rem mons. Those are different words, and there are different words chosen advisedly. All your precedents say the words are chosen for a mean. Um, the idea of petition and rem mons, the public grievances means something different than the petition and remon that Mr. Richards is talking about. And I would submit that public grievance is a description of a legislator's, uh, purview of what they hear from their constituents, what they think public good requires, and not an obligation for them to hear cases, which is essentially what he's asking for. Thank you, Mr. Richard. You have two minutes, but I'm gonna allow you some indulgence. Please go ahead. Thank You. Um, the first thing I want to address is avoiding Article 31 is very, very clear shall right, the legislature shall address or shall assemble for redress of public grievances. And clearly up until 1818, this was a regular practice. The practice remained in the statutes until 1925. So we know that the, uh, the, the analysis, the analysis isn't a legally binding instrument, but there's no case law in this case. The defense states in their pleadings that there's no relevant case law here, right to right to Remon. They are correct. I couldn't cite any state case law. And so that's why my brief was more of a historical, uh, brief based on, on previous usage and custom, I can only rely on the Constitution. The House and Senate Journals is preserved by the historical records in the state archives and the usage of customs recorded therein verified by the legislature's own legal scholar, contrary to the defense statements, otherwise, exhibit F the redress analysis confirms the House and Senate journals which detail the fact that for more than 200 years and more than 18,000 petitions were submitted. And, and by the way, the big difference here between Petition and Remon rem Mons is the application to the legislature to repeal a law, not to make a law. They want to exclude the people from their house, from the State House over the issue of only making law that what they're advocating is the only solution they want to offer. We the people is the ability to make law as a solution, a legislative process. And to your point, uh, judge that what good is the text if there's no application of it? Right? What good is my rights if they've just summarily been removed? Now I'll grant the practice hasn't happened in a long time. The archives show that there are 51 re mons, and the last one applied was in 1825. That's a long time. And Mr. Ancy, in some respects, is correct. The practice didn't fall out of favor. I would say that the problem really is apathy and ignorance of the law. That's what's happened to our society in many, many ways. So we don't have an educated citizenry electing smart legislators. And this is a problem, and this is how I believe the process fell out of favor. Your, your red light is on, but you may proceed for another minute or so, Um, to the federal issue and the cases they wanna cite. There's no federally protected right to Remonstrance in the First Amendment, the US Constitution, to redress state public grievances. So all citation, every case they cite is predicated on someone invoking the First Amendment. The first amendment right to petition doesn't grant any of the same rights granted by the state, nor is there any usage in customer case law. And so I believe that the state, the defense has misapplied and all their, all the cases that they cite here are all based on federal First Amendment cases that failed, including The other cases. Well, they also cite the, the, uh, Tennessee case that was decided in 20 20 20. And I believe Mr. Ancy is correct. The language there, the operative language was functionally identical, if not identical to the language here. Why is that case wrongly decided? Well, first of all, yeah, the language. Uh, great question, judge, uh, language in the, in that case, in the Gentry case, yes, the state constitution of Tennessee is not like New Hampshire. Our constitution and the provisions in it are much stronger. We have articles 30 and 31 10, the Tennessee does not have. And Mr. Gentry in error cited the First Amendment right to read as the first amendment right to petition. And so that's why I would argue that that case doesn't apply, because he's seeking a remedy under the First Amendment. And finally, the opinion of this court, I think, really summarizes this case. You, this is the opinion that you gave in court, the legislature, because of the, the rulemaking issue, the legislature may not even in the exercise of its absolute internal rulemaking authority, violate constitutional limitations. Indeed, no branch of state government can lawfully perform an act which violates the constitution. Therefore, any legislative act violating the constitution or infringing on its provisions must be void because the legislature, when it steps beyond its pounds, acts without authority. And that's exactly what they did here. They want us to not have access to this process. And I'll, I'll close with this. Write a revolution in the Bill of Rights. Our state is unique in that feature. It has one key caveat write of redress, right? When all effective means of redress are no longer effectual, the people have a right to throw off their government and start a new one. And that's where we're at now because this is the last stop. And so that's why those rights were so, why is the redress process so important? Because all of our rights emanate from that very process. When you stop that process, you kill the the Republican form of government. Thank you. Thank You very much. Case submitted. Court is adur. For the record, the chief justice is disqualified.