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State of New Hampshire v. Charles Paul
June 16, 2023 - Brief
Case records
Open case pageDocket: 2022-0106
| Date | Record Text | Type | Party | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| November 14, 2023 | State of New Hampshire v. Charles Paul | Opinion | Supreme Court | Pre-Reporter |
| September 14, 2023 | State of New Hampshire v. Charles Paul | Oral argument text | State of New Hampshire; Charles Paul | |
| September 14, 2023 | Sept 14 2023 | Supreme Court oral argument calendar | - | |
| June 16, 2023 | State of New Hampshire v. Charles Paul Current page | Brief | Charles Paul | |
| May 30, 2023 | State of New Hampshire v. Charles A. Paul | Brief | State of New Hampshire | |
| March 13, 2023 | Hampshire v. Charles Paul | Brief | ||
| December 31, 2022 | 2022 Fourth Quarterly Status Report | Supreme Court case status list | - | |
| September 30, 2022 | 2022 Third Quarterly Status Report | Supreme Court case status list | - |
THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
SUPREME COURT
No. 2022-0106
State of New Hampshire
v.
Charles Paul
Appeal Pursuant to Rule 7 from Judgment
of the Rockingham County Superior Court
REPLY BRIEF FOR THE DEFENDANT
Thomas Barnard
Deputy Chief Appellate Defender
Appellate Defender Program
10 Ferry Street, Suite 202
Concord, NH 03301
NH Bar # 16414
603-224-1236
(15 minutes oral argument)
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
Table of Authorities
3
Argument I. THE COURT ERRED BY GRANTING THE STATE’S MOTION IN LIMINE TO ADMIT EVIDENCE OF PAUL’S PRIOR CONVICTIONS UNDER NEW HAMPSHIRE RULE OF EVIDENCE 609.................................... Conclusion
9
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page
Cases In the Matter of Geraghty, 169 N.H. 404 (2016)
8
Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750 (1946)
8
Mallard v. Warden, ___ N.H. ___ (Jan. 4, 2023)
7
State v. Bean, 153 N.H. 380 (2006)
8
State v. Boudreau, ___ N.H. ___ (June 7, 2023)
7
State v. Cavanaugh, 174 N.H. 1 (2020)
5
State v. Hayward, 166 N.H. 575 (2014)
5
State v. Hickey, 129 N.H. 53 (1986)
5
State v. Jette, 174 N.H. 669 (2021)
5
State v. Thorp, 86 N.H. 501 (1934)
8
Court Rule New Hampshire Rule of Evidence 609
4, 5, 6
I. THE COURT ERRED BY GRANTING THE STATE’S
MOTION IN LIMINE TO ADMIT EVIDENCE OF PAUL’S
PRIOR CONVICTIONS UNDER NEW HAMPSHIRE RULE
OF EVIDENCE 609.
In his opening brief, Paul argues that the court erred by
admitting his prior convictions on the ground that their
“probative value... outweigh[ed their] prejudicial effect, ” the
more relaxed of two balancing tests set forth in
New Hampshire Rule of Evidence 609. DB* 19–29;
N.H. R. Ev. 609(a)(1)(B). Paul argues that, because the
convictions were more than ten years old, the court instead
should have applied the more demanding balancing test,
under which it would have asked whether the convictions’
“probative value, supported by specific facts and
circumstances, substantially outweigh[ed] [their] prejudicial
effect.” DB 19–29; N.H. R. Ev. 609(b)(1) (emphasis added).
The State argues that the convictions were not more
than ten years old and, thus, that the court applied the
correct balancing test. SB 27–32. But it also argues that,
even if the convictions were more than ten years old and
thus, that the court applied the wrong balancing test, “this
Court should find that the [] court reached the correct
result... for the wrong reason.” SB 32. It argues that, even
under the more demanding balancing test, the probative
value of Paul’s prior convictions substantially outweighed
their prejudicial effect. SB 33–34.
If an alternative ground for affirmance would have been
discretionary, this Court will affirm on that ground “only if
there is only one way the trial court could have ruled as a
matter of law.” State v. Cavanaugh, 174 N.H. 1 (2020)
(quoting State v. Hayward, 166 N.H. 575, 583 (2014)). Had
the court here addressed whether the probative value of
Paul’s prior convictions substantially outweighed their
prejudicial effect, its ruling on that question would have been
discretionary. See State v. Jette, 174 N.H. 669, 673 (2021)
(reviewing trial court’s balancing of probative value and
prejudicial effect with deference); SB 26 (“To admit or exclude
evidence is within the discretion of the trial court”).
The State does not argue that the trial court would have
be
en compelled, as a matter of law, to find that the probative
value of Paul’s prior convictions substantially outweighed
their prejudicial effect. Nor could it. “The ten-year limitation
is the result of a considered judgment that the probative
value of evidence of convictions more than ten years old is, in
most cases, outweighed by its prejudicial effect.” State v.
Hickey, 129 N.H. 53, 57 (1986). “Under [Rule 609], ... it is
intended that convictions over 10 years old will be admitted
very rarely and only in exceptional circumstances.” Id.
(brackets omitted).
Nothing here would have required the court to conclude
that this was one of those rare cases that presented
exceptional circumstances. The State notes — correctly —
that “the jury’s judgment of [Paul’s] credibility was integral to
the case, ” and that “[Paul’s] credibility was a central issue in
the case.” SB 33. Based on this premise alone, however, it
asserts that the probative value of his convictions must have
“substantially outweighed any prejudicial effect.” SB 33.
Under Rule 609(b), the question would not have been
whether Paul’s credibility was central. Rather, the question
would have been whether his convictions, which were more
than ten years old, were highly probative of his credibility.
Those two questions are distinct. Evidence can be highly
probative of a tangential issue. Conversely, evidence can be
minimally probative of a central issue. Here, Paul’s credibility
was certainly central, but the State offers no reason to
conclude that his prior convictions were particularly probative
of his credibility.
If anything, the centrality of Paul’s credibility would
have weighed against any finding that the more demanding
balancing test was satisfied. Because Paul’s credibility was
central, the prejudicial effect of admitting the convictions was
substantial. See DB 29–31 (arguing that, because “Paul’s
credibility was crucial, ” admission of the convictions was
prejudicial).
The State also argues that, even if the court erred by
admitting Paul’s convictions, the error was harmless.
SB 34–37. After the State filed its brief, this Court clarified
that its harmless-error analysis involves a totality-of-the-
circumstances test in which “[n]o one factor is dispositive.”
State v. Boudreau, ___ N.H. ___ (June 7, 2023). The ultimate
question is whether “the State [has] prove[n] beyond a
reasonable doubt that the error did not affect the verdicts.”
Id. Here, it has not.
As the parties agree, Paul’s credibility was central.
SB 33. The erroneous admission of the old convictions
distorted the jury’s evaluation of his credibility. As Paul
explained in his opening brief, the State maximized the
prejudicial effect of the attempted-escape conviction, in
particular, by using it to show that Paul would do anything to
avoid going to prison. DB 29–30. This made it more likely
that the jury would not only reject self-defense, but also find
that Paul intended to kill A.Y. DB 30–31.
The State notes that it did not question Paul extensively
about his convictions and did not mention them in its closing
argument. SB 37. “[W]hen an elephant has passed through
the courtroom, ” however, “one does not need a forceful
reminder.” Mallard v. Warden, ___ N.H. ___ (Jan. 4, 2023).
The State argues that, even without Paul’s convictions,
the evidence of his guilt was overwhelming. SB 34–37. The
cases it cites, however, involved disputes about the relevance
and sufficiency of evidence. SB 35–36 (citing State v. Bean,
153 N.H. 380, 387 (2006) (addressing sufficiency of the
evidence); State v. Thorp, 86 N.H. 501, 507 (1934) (addressing
the relevance of the defendant’s statement); In the Matter of
Geraghty, 169 N.H. 404, 416 (2016) (addressing sufficiency of
the evidence)). It is one thing to say that a jury could have
found guilt. It is something else entirely to say, beyond a
reasonable doubt, that a jury would have found guilt. See
Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 765 (1946) (“The
inquiry cannot be merely whether there was enough to
support the result, apart from the phase affected by the
error.”).
The State asks this Court to find, based on a cold
record, that even if Paul’s convictions had been excluded, the
jury still would have found his “testimony... both unreliable
and incredible.” SB 37. This Court has no way of knowing
how a jury would have evaluated Paul’s credibility had the
court not erroneously admitted his convictions. It should
reject the State’s invitation.
CONCLUSION
WHEREFORE, Charles Paul respectfully requests that this Court reverse.
Undersigned counsel requests 15 minutes oral argument.
This brief complies with the applicable word limitation and contains 1, 088 words.
Respectfully submitted,
By /s/ Thomas Barnard
Thomas Barnard, #16414
Deputy Chief Appellate Defender
Appellate Defender Program
10 Ferry Street, Suite 202
Concord, NH 03301
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a copy of this brief is being timely provided to Audriana Mekula-Hanson, counsel for the State, through the electronic filing system’s electronic service.
/s/ Thomas Barnard
Thomas Barnard
DATED: June 16, 2023
Footnotes
-
*
Citations to the record are as follows: “DB” refers to Paul’s opening brief; “SB” refers to the State’s brief.