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Taylor Community v. City of Laconia et al.

December 17, 2024 - Brief

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Docket: 2024-0393

Date Record Text Type Party PDF
August 27, 2025 Taylor Community v. City of Laconia Opinion Supreme Court Pre-Reporter
May 20, 2025 Taylor Community v. City of Laconia et al. Oral argument text Taylor Community; the defendants
May 20, 2025 May 20 2025 Supreme Court oral argument calendar - PDF
January 21, 2025 Taylor Community v. City of Laconia, Et Al. Brief City of Laconia, Et Al. PDF
December 31, 2024 2024 Fourth Quarterly Status Report Supreme Court case status list - PDF
December 17, 2024 Taylor Community v. City of Laconia, New Hampshire and City of Laconia Mayor and Current page Brief PDF
November 4, 2024 Taylor Community v. City of Laconia, Et Al. Brief City of Laconia; Taylor Community PDF
September 30, 2024 2024 Third Quarterly Status Report Supreme Court case status list - PDF
STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
SUPREME COURT
No. 2024-0393
TAYLOR COMMUNITY
V.
CITY OF LACONIA, NEW HAMPSHIRE AND CITY OF LACONIA MAYOR AND
CITY COUNCIL
INTERVENORS MATTHEW LAHEY AND NANCY ETTELSON’S
MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN OPPOSITION TO
TAYLOR COMMUNITY’S APPEAL
Matthew J. Lahey, pro se, #1415
48 Cottonwood Avenue
Laconia, NH 03246
603-524-4494
matt(@laheylawnh.com
Stephan T. Nix (NH Bar #12923)
25 Country Club Road, Suite 502
Gilford, NH 03249
603-524-4963
snix@metrocast.net
STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
SUPREME COURT
No. 2024-0393
TAYLOR COMMUNITY
V.
CITY OF LACONIA, NEW HAMPSHIRE AND CITY OF LACONIA MAYOR AND
CITY COUNCIL
INTERVENORS MATTHEW LAHEY AND NANCY ETTELSON’S
MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN OPPOSITION TO
TAYLOR COMMUNITY’S APPEAL
I. Statement of the Case
Taylor Community (“Taylor”) appeals a decision of the Belknap County Superior
Court (Attori, J.) granting Intervenor Matthew Lahey’s (“Lahey”) motion for summary
judgment. (Orders, Taylor Brief Addendum at 52 and 59).! The court ruled that there
was “occasion to layout” the existing paved Cul-de-sac at the end of Cottonwood Avenue
in Laconia as a public highway pursuant to RSA 231:8. Layout is one method that a
municipality can use to create a public highway and accept responsibility for its
maintenance and repair. RSA 229:1.
The Laconia City Council previously approved Intervenors Nancy Ettelson
(“Ettelson”), Lahey, et al.’s (“Intervenors”) petition to layout the Cul-de-sac as a Class V
highway. (Intervenors’ Appx. Ex. L-1, 2 at 2-5).? Taylor appealed that decision to the
superior court for a de novo review.
' Order 3/2/2024
Order 6/10/2024 on Taylor’s Motion for Reconsideration
Citations to “Order(s)” is according to page numbering in the Addendum to Taylor’s brief.
The Cul-de-sac abuts a portion of Taylor’s property. Taylor objected to the layout
because it wanted to develop the cul-de-sac for its own purposes.
The foundation of the court’s layout decision was that Taylor dedicated the Cul-
de-sac to public use in 1987 when it submitted the two-lot subdivision plan to the
Laconia Planning Board that included the Cul-de-sac; the plan was approved; and the lots
were sold as described on the plan. The court found that Taylor dedicated the Cul-de-sac
to public use as a matter of law. (Order at 55-57), RSA 231:51, Harrington v. City of
Manchester, 76 N.H. 347, 82 A. 716 (1912).
Having found that the Cul-de-sac was dedicated to public use, the court applied
the Crowley ? two-prong [ayout test. As to the first prong; “balance[ing] the public
interest in the layout against the rights of the affected landowner, ” Id., the court ruled:
The Court finds that the most efficient way to engage in the first step of
the occasion analysis is to decide Taylor’s rights as the affected
landowner before determining the public need. As explained below, the
Court finds that: (1) Taylor dedicated the cul-de-sac to the City, (2) said
dedication is still effective, and (3) as a result of the dedication, Taylor
has no rights in the cul-de-sac against which the public need can be
balanced. Therefore, the City’s decision to lay out the cul-de-sac was
justified.
Order at 56 (underline added).
The court concluded,
The ultimate issue before the Court is whether an occasion exists to
lay out the cul-de-sac and whether “the rights of the affected
landowner outweigh the public interest.” Crowley, 162 N.H. at 773.
As Taylor no longer has an interest in the cul-de sac, the Court finds
that Taylor has no rights that can be affected. Assuming without
deciding that the public’s interest in the cul-de-sac is scant, even a
scant public interest justifies an occasion to lay out the cul-de-sac
when compared to the absence of Taylor’s interest in same. The
Court therefore AFFIRMS the City’s decision to lay out the cul de-
sac.
Order at 58.
> Crowley v. Town of Loudon, 162 N.H. 768 (2011).
The court found that because of the dedication, it did not need to engage in an analysis of
the eight Crowley public interest factors. (Order at 55-56, 58). 4
In response to Taylors’s motion for reconsideration, the court clarified two points.
The first was Taylor’s title interest to the underlying fee. The court stated, “[T]he trial
court was referring not to the underlying fee (which Plaintiff retains), but to Plaintiff's
right to use the dedicated property for its own purposes (which it does not).” (Order at
59). The fee title interest still did not require analysis of the eight Crowley factors as
Taylor retains its fee title interest irrespective of the layout.
As to the second prong, the public interest versus the burden on the city, the court
acknowledged that it had not engaged in an “explicit balancing.” The reason was that
Taylor did not originally contest that the public interest outweighed any burden to the
city. Taylor addressed it for the first time in its motion for reconsideration. (Order at 59,
“The second prong of that analysis was not briefed by the plaintiff in its motion papers.”).
Nevertheless, the court stated that it had “no difficulty agreeing with the intervenor that
any burden on the City is negligible in comparison with the public interest.” (Order at
59). The court noted that the city council had found that the cost to maintain the Cul-de-
sac was “minimal.” (Order at 59, Intervenors’ Appx. Ex. L-2 at 5).
As to the specifics of the public interest, the court stated,
Further, the City’s interest in the cul-de-sac is clear in that it affords the
most safe and efficient traffic route for City vehicles providing
emergency and other public services to the approximately 30 residents
on Cottonwood Avenue. See id. On balance, the City’s interest in
having an effective route for providing services outweighs the burden
on the City of maintaining a road it had already been maintaining for the
past three decades. The Court therefore concludes that the public
interest in the cul-de-sac outweighs the public burden and that an
occasion exists for laying out the cul-de-sac. Crowley, 162 N.H. at 773—
75.
Order at 59.
The court ruled that Taylor’s laches claim was without merit where Taylor had
never petitioned the City Council to release the dedication pursuant to RSA 231:52.
(Order at 59).
The court found that there was occasion to layout the Cul-de-sac as a public
highway. (Order at 58).
The court also affirmed the city council’s vote that Taylor was not entitled to any
compensation. (Order at 58). The council had found that as a result of Taylor’s dedication
of the Cul-de-sac to public use, Taylor did not lose any additional rights due to the layout.
(Intervenor’s Appx. Ex. L-2 at 5). The court noted that “Once a dedication is effective,
the municipality to which the land was dedicated gains the land “for public purposes
without cost, ”” citing Hersh v. Plonski, 156 N.H. 511, 515 (2007). Taylor has not raised
the issue of compensation in its brief here.
The court’s occasion to layout ruling made the Cul-de-sac a public highway,
meaning the City is officially responsible for its maintenance and repair. The fact that the
City is responsible for maintenance and repair does not impair Taylor’s title rights to the
underlying fee.
Taylor appeals the trial court’s rulings.
II. Summary of the Intervenors’ Argument
The sum total of the court’s two orders may be summarized as follows:
1. Taylor dedicated the Cul-de-sac to public use in 1987. Taylor thereby
voluntarily relinquished its right to develop the property for its own purposes.
The granting of the layout has no impact on this already lost right.
2. As an abutter, Taylor retains title to a portion of the underlying fee. The
granting of the layout does not impact this title interest.
3. No rights currently possessed by Taylor are impacted by the layout.
4. Even though Taylor has no rights affected by the layout, there is a significant
public interest in the Cul-de-sac to support both Crowley prongs. The cost of
the layout to the city is minimal. (Pages 4-5 above).
5. Taylor is not entitled to compensation for the layout since the property was
already dedicated to public use and Taylor has not lost anything.
6. Only the governing body, the city council, can release the dedication (RSA
231:52). Taylor has never requested the council to do so. The court found no
merit in Taylor’s laches defense for this reason.
Taylor does not challenge the court’s ruling that it dedicated the Cul-de-sac to
public use in 1987.
Taylor has not identified any right that it claims was lost through the layout other
than to develop property for its own purposes
Taylor does not recognize the standalone significance of dedication. Dedication
commits the property to “public servitude” and deprives the owner of the underlying fee
the right to develop the property for his own purposes. The dedication of a highway to
public use is not dependent upon the municipality’s acceptance of the responsibility for
its maintenance and repair. RSA 231:51, 52, Harrington, infra.
The net effect of the granting of the layout was to have the city formally accept
responsibility for its maintenance and repair.
The court orders reflect “some evidence” to support the finding of occasion for the
layout. Town of Hinsdale v. Town of Chesterfield, 153 N.H. 70, 74 (2005).
Ill. Background
Taylor is a retirement community in the City of Laconia. Intervenors Ettelson and
Lahey own residential properties on Cottonwood Avenue and live there. The Taylor
campus abuts various portions of Cottonwood, including the Ettelson and Lahey
properties, as well as the subject Cul-de-sac that is gated off from the campus.
(Intervenors Ettelson’s lot abuts the Cul-de-sac. (Intervenors’ Appx. Ex. L-3 at 6-7, Tax
Map and Aerial Photograph of Cottonwood and Walker, Appx. Ex. L-12 at 15,
Photograph of the Cul-de-sac). Cottonwood on its north end is a dead-end with the Cul-
de-sac. Cottonwood on its south end is connected to Walker Street, which in turn
intersects with Union Avenue, a main thoroughfare in Laconia. Cottonwood and Walker
are fully developed residential neighborhoods with a total of 30 houses. (Intervenors’
Appx. Ex. L-3 at 6-7, L-12 at 15). Cottonwood and Walker had been for decades an
accepted public highway in Laconia. The Cul-de-sac came later in 1987 as part of a
Taylor subdivision plan that it submitted to the Laconia Planning Board. The plan
depicted two building lots around a 70’ diameter Cul-de-sac. (Order at 53, Intervenors’
Appx. Ex. L-6 at 8). The plan was approved, and Taylor built the Cul-de-sac to City
standards in 1987 as required by the approval. The two lots around the Cul-de-sac as
described by the plan were conveyed to third parties. (Intervenors’ Appx. Ex. L-8 at 11-
14}. Taylor is also an abutter to the Cul-de-sac and retains fee title to the underlying fee.
The Cul-de-sac has been used extensively by the public since 1987. (Intervenors’ Appx.
Ex. L-7 at 9-10, Affidavit of Matthew Lahey).
The city plowed, maintained and repaired the Cul-de-sac from 1987 until 2021,
but had not formally accepted that responsibility by city council vote. (Order at 59 “...a
road [the city] had already been maintaining for the past three decades). (Intervenors’
Appx. Ex. 7 at 9, 4 5).
In 2019, after 32 years of public use and City plowing, maintenance and repair,
Taylor sought to take back the Cul-de-sac for its own development purposes. Litigation
between Taylor, the city and the neighborhood, represented by the Intervenors, followed.*
In January 2022, Ettelson, Lahey and others filed with the Laconia City Council
an RSA 231:8 Petition to Layout A Highway, namely the Cul-de-sac at the end of
Cottonwood Avenue. (Intervenors’ Appx. Ex. L-1 at 2-3). Ettelson and Lahey argued that
the Cul-de-sac was dedicated to public use by the 1987 subdivision process; that the city

had plowed, maintained and repaired the Cul-de-sac since 1987; and that all that remained was for the City Council to vote to layout the Cul-de-sac as a public highway.

The Council granted the Petition after a public hearing, finding that occasion for layout exists. The Council specified its reasons in the minutes of the hearing. The Council also found that no compensation was due Taylor because the Cul-de-sac was dedicated to public use since 1987. The Council reasoned that Taylor suffered no loss because the dedication prevented Taylor from making private use of the Cul-de sac. (Intervenors’ Appx. Ex. L-2 at 4-5).

Taylor’s RSA 231:34 de novo appeal to the superior court followed. V.S.H. Realty, Inc. v. City of Manchester, 123 N.H. 505, 507-508, 464 A.2d 111-1113 (1983)

In the Superior Court, Lahey moved for summary judgment and Taylor cross

motioned. The court heard oral arguments and then issued its written orders.

IV. Argument Standard of Review on Appeal

A Superior Court’s finding of occasion to layout a public highway will not be disturbed on appeal if there is “some evidence” to support the finding. Town of Hinsdale v. Town of Chesterfield, 153 N.H. 70, 74 (2005) (“We have previously determined that

‘the superior court's conclusion that occasion exists for the layout of roads must be supported by some evidence, and we will not disturb its determination in the absence of gross mistake or fraud.’ Rodgers Dev., Co., 147 N.H. at 60, 781 A.2d 1029. Accordingly, we conclude that "some evidence" is the appropriate standard by which to review the trial

court's de nove determination.

It is important to note four points at the outset that render much of Taylor’s long factual recitations and arguments in its brief irrelevant.

First, Taylor’s appeal to the superior court is de novo. So, any alleged errors Taylor argues that the City Council made in its layout hearings are irrelevant to the de

novo appeal.

Second, Taylor does not challenge in its notice of appeal or brief the trial court’s finding that the subdivision process in 1987 dedicated the Cul-de-sac to public use. This means that all the trial court’s findings on the issue of dedication, factual and legal, stand. Therefore, Taylor’s discussion about whether the 1987 planning board approval, conditioning the PUD development on roads remaining “private”, also applied to the separate approval of the two lot subdivision and Cul-de-sac is irrelevant. (Taylor Brief at 12-13) The extensive discussion of the street analysis done by public works director Anderson, all the spreadsheets he prepared, and what Anderson believed was meant by “private” is irrelevant. (Taylor Brief at 13-15). (Mr. Anderson does correctly state that an “accepted” street is one where the governing body has committed to expend public funds for its maintenance and repairs. (Taylor Appx. at 49, Exhibit 1 deposition pp. 61 and 64).

Third, Taylor is not challenging the court’s finding that it is not entitled to compensation.

Fourth, Taylor has not identified in its brief any rights that are in play other than ownership of the Cul-de-sac and Taylor’s right to use it for its own development purposes. The court, the city and the intervenors all agree that as an abutter, Taylor retains a title interest to a portion of the underlying Cul-de-sac fee. Harrington at 348 (abutting property owners retain “the fee in the soil to the center of the street..., ” subject to the public’s right of passage).

Taylor’s alleged right to use the Cul-de-sac for its own development purposes is

the only remaining claim.

Occasion to layout a highway

Layout is one of the ways that the governing body of a municipality can create a public highway. RSA 229:1. Ifa new road is to be created, a “taking” from the owner of the subject property is often involved. The municipality must apply the full two-prong

Crowley test to determine if the taking is justified. Crowley v. Town of Loudon, 162 N.H. 768, 35 A.3d 597 (2011). The municipality must first balance the public interest in the layout against the rights of the affected landowner. See Nashua v. Gaukstern, 117 N.H. 30 (1977), (where the layout of a public highway is an eminent domain proceeding). The court applies the eight Crowley public interest factors. Id. at 773-774. If the rights of the affected landowner outweigh the public interest, there is no occasion for laying out the road and taking of the rights in the land. If, on the other hand, the public interest justifies taking the land without the landowner's consent, then the court must engage in a

second step, which is to balance the public interest in the layout against the burden imposed upon the town. If the balancing required by the second step favors the public

interest, occasion for the layout exists. Id. at 773-776.

The municipality’s task is made easier when, as here, the property under consideration has already been dedicated to public use. There is no taking involved as the owner has already voluntarily relinquished its rights to use the property for its own purposes in favor of public use. The layout procedure may be used to layout a Class V highway over a dedicated street that has not been formally accepted. “A laying out or locating and defining the limits of a road in the manner prescribed by statute is a proper method of creating a public highway. (citations omitted). This laying out is not limited to the creation of a new road but inciudes also the making into public highways private roads already in existence. (citation omitted).” Locke Development Corp. v. Town of Barnstead, 115 N.H. 642, 643 (1975). See also Alfano, Roads Revisited, 46 NHBJ 56, 59 (Fall 2005).

Dedication of the Cul-de-sac to Public Use

Even though Taylor has not appealed the trial court’s finding that the Cul-de-sac was dedicated, Intervenors will address it briefly given its importance to the case. The dedication is easily proven as found by the trial court. (Order at 56-57). In 1987, Taylor

submitted a subdivision plan to the Laconia Planning Board. The plan depicted the Cul- de-sac with two lots around it. (Order at 53, Intervenors’ Appx. Ex. L-6 at 8). The plan was approved by the Planning Board. Taylor conveyed the lots to third parties pursuant to the plan. (Intervenors’ Appx. 11-14, Ex. L-8 Deeds to Third Parties Per 1987 Subdivision Plan). These are the elements of dedication to public use. RSA 231:51, Harrington v. Manchester, supra (“In addition to conveying these private rights in the proposed streets,

the company by thus platting and selling the lots manifested an unequivocal intention to dedicate the streets to public use; and they are therefore to be regarded as dedicated to such use.”). Id. at 348. Taylor admits these elements in response to Lahey’s Statement of Material Facts 1- 7. (Intervenors’ Appx. at-17, Taylor Answers to Lahey Statement of Material Facts).

An owner who dedicates property to public use is not entitled to compensation.

Hersh at p. 3 above. Taylor is not claiming any compensation

Taylor’s Acceptance Argument

Taylor does not recognize the standalone significance of dedication. Taylor believes that unless the City “accepted” the Cul-de-sac as a public highway for purposes of maintenance responsibility, Taylor retains rights to use the property for its own purposes. This misperception was noted by the Supreme Court in the controlling case Harrington at 349, wherein it stated,

Whether an acceptance of the dedicated streets is necessary to perfect the gift and vest the right of passage in the public is a matter upon which different conclusions have been reached, due, no doubt, to a failure to distinguish between what is necessary to vest the right of passage in the public and what is necessary to constitute an acceptance, such as will render the city or municipality responsible for the construction and maintenance of the streets.

Id.

The Court went on to hold, citing the New Jersey Supreme Court with approval, But an acceptance by the public authorities, or public user, is not essential to conclude the owner from his power of retraction, when his

intention to abandon his property and dedicate it to public uses is once unequivocally manifested.

Id. 349.

That dedication survives independent of acceptance is confirmed by its statutory framework. RSA 231:51 describes the elements that create dedication, independent of acceptance. RSA 231:52 then requires, independent of acceptance, municipality action to release the dedication.

The dedication prevents Taylor from making any use of the Cul-de-sac other than as a member of the public. Only the Laconia City Council can release the dedication pursuant to RSA 231:52. (Order at 59).

The trial court reviewed the case de novo and applied the Crowley two-prong test. The trial court found that Taylor dedicated the Cul-de-sac to public use in 1987 as part of a subdivision plan, approval and sale of lots. (Order) While Taylor retains title to a portion of the underlying fee as an abutter, by dedicating the property it already gave up its right to use the property for its own purposes. (Order at 59).

In applying the first prong of the Crowley layout test, the balancing of the public interest in the layout against the rights of the affected landowner the trial court found that the dedication to public use effectively rendered the first prong moot. The trial court found no need to engage in an analysis of the eight Crowley factors (Id. 773-774) to determine the public interest since Taylor retained no rights that were affected by the layout to balance against. (Order at 58). The court’s position was the same when it clarified that Taylor had a title interest in the underlying Cul-de-sac fee. Taylor retains its fee title interest irrespective of the layout. (Order at 59).

As to the second prong, the court found that the public interest easily outweighed any burden to the city.

The court concluded that Taylor’s remedy was to petition the City Council pursuant to RSA 231:52 to release the dedication, which it had never done. The court

dismissed Taylor’s /aches claim for that reason. (Order at 59).

V. Conclusion Taylor dedicated the Cul-de-sac to the City in 1987 and thereby waived its rights to damages. The dedication was never released by the City. The layout procedure may be used to layout a public road over an existing private road. The City Council found that the evidence supported an occasion to layout the Cul-de-sac and did so. Under its de novo review, the trial court found that there was evidence to support an occasion to layout the Cul-de-sac and upheld the layout. Taylor retains the fee title to the Cul-de-sac, subject to the rights of the public to use the Cul-de-sac for highway purposes.

VI. Relief Requested

Intervenors respectfully request the Court to affirm the trial court’s finding of occasion for layout of the Cul-de-sac, and rule that the Taylor Community has suffered

no loss and is not entitled to any compensation.

Date: 12/17/2024 Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Matthew J. Lahey, pro se
48 Cottonwood A venue
Laconia, NH 03246
603-524-4494
matt@laheviawnh.com
/s/ Stephan T. Nix (NH Bar #12923)
25 Country Club Road, Suite 502
Gilford, NH 03249
603-524-4963
snixia'metrocast.net

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on this date this document was filed through the ECF system and will be sent electronically to all registered participants as identified on the Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF).

/s/ Matthew J. Lahey, Pro se

Footnotes

  1. *

    Citations to Intervenor Lahey exhibits are proceeded by “L”. These are exhibits that were attached to Lahey’s Memorandum of Law or his Statement of Material facts that were admitted by Taylor.

  2. *

    In Crowley v. Town of Loudon, the New Hampshire Supreme Court outlined a non-exclusive list of what the City Council may consider, among other factors, when assessing the “public interest”: (1) Integration within an existing road system; (2) ease of existing traffic flow; (3) improvement to convenience of travel; (4) facilitation of transportation for school children; (5) improved accessibility to business district and employment centers; (6) improved accessibility for fire, emergency and police services; (7) whether it would benefit a significant portion or just a small fraction of the town tax base or year-round residents; and (8) anticipated frequency of road use. Id. at 773-774.

  3. *

    Taylor’s reference to the Site Plan appeal regarding the court’s finding that where Taylor may make “modifications to the cul-de-sac, so long as Ettelson retains the ability to access and use the private way” is related to Ettelson’s private easement rights claim, which are not relevant to this appeal. (Taylor Brief at 17).