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State of New Hampshire

April 2, 2026 - Supreme Court motion

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Docket: 2026-0150

Date Record Text Type Party PDF
June 25, 2026 Steven Rand et al. v. State of New Hampshire Supreme Court order PDF
June 25, 2026 Steven Rand et al. v. State of New Hampshire Supreme Court order PDF
June 15, 2026 Steven Rand et al. v. State of New Hampshire Supreme Court order PDF
June 15, 2026 Steven Rand et al. v. State of New Hampshire Supreme Court order PDF
June 5, 2026 Steven Rand et al. v. State of New Hampshire Supreme Court order PDF
June 4, 2026 Steven Rand et al. v. State of New Hampshire Supreme Court order PDF
May 26, 2026 Steven Rand et al. v. State of New Hampshire Supreme Court briefing order PDF
May 26, 2026 Steven Rand et al. v. State of New Hampshire Supreme Court order PDF
May 26, 2026 Steven Rand et al. v. State of New Hampshire Supreme Court order PDF
May 18, 2026 Steven Rand et al. v. State of New Hampshire Supreme Court order PDF
May 15, 2026 Steven Rand et al. v. State of New Hampshire Supreme Court order PDF
May 6, 2026 Steven Rand et al. v. State of New Hampshire Supreme Court order PDF
April 28, 2026 Steven Rand et al. v. State of New Hampshire Supreme Court order PDF
April 10, 2026 Steven Rand et al. v. State of New Hampshire Supreme Court motion PDF
April 9, 2026 Steven Rand et al. v. State of New Hampshire Supreme Court motion PDF
April 9, 2026 Steven Rand et al. v. State of New Hampshire Supreme Court motion PDF
April 9, 2026 Steven Rand et al. v. State of New Hampshire Supreme Court motion PDF
April 9, 2026 Steven Rand et al. v. State of New Hampshire Supreme Court motion PDF
April 2, 2026 Steven Rand et al. v. State of New Hampshire Supreme Court order Supreme Court PDF
April 2, 2026 Steven Rand et al. v. State of New Hampshire Current page Supreme Court motion PDF
April 2, 2026 Steven Rand et al. v. State of New Hampshire Supreme Court motion PDF
April 2, 2026 Steven Rand et al. v. State of New Hampshire Supreme Court motion PDF
April 2, 2026 Steven Rand et al. v. State of New Hampshire Supreme Court motion PDF
April 2, 2026 Steven Rand et al. v. State of New Hampshire Supreme Court motion PDF
March 16, 2026 Steven Rand et al. v. State of New Hampshire Supreme Court motion PDF
March 16, 2026 Steven Rand et al. v. State of New Hampshire Supreme Court motion PDF
March 16, 2026 Steven Rand et al. v. State of New Hampshire Supreme Court motion PDF
March 16, 2026 Steven Rand et al. v. State of New Hampshire Supreme Court motion PDF
March 16, 2026 Steven Rand et al. v. State of New Hampshire Supreme Court motion PDF
February 24, 2026 Steven Rand et al. v. State of New Hampshire Supreme Court notice of appeal PDF
THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
SUPREME COURT

Docket No. 2026-0150 Steven Rand & a. v.

State of New Hampshire OBJECTION TO MOTION TO RECUSE CHIEF JUSTICE MACDONALD The Defendant, the State of New Hampshire, by and through its attorneys, the New Hampshire Department of Justice, hereby objects to the Plaintiffs' Motion to Recuse Chief Justice MacDonald. In support thereof, the State provides the following. 1. Plaintiffs move to recuse Chief Justice MacDonald pursuant to RSA 492: 1 and Code of Judicial Conduct ("CJC") Rule 2.11 (A), arguing that recusal is necessary because Chief Justice MacDonald served as New Hampshire's attorney general during the pendency of the Con Val litigation (Contoocook Valley Sch. Dist. v. State, 174 N.H. 154 (2021)1). 2. These are substantially the same arguments Plaintiffs made when this case was previously before this Court and they should be rejected 1 The Con Val litigation was appealed to this Court on two occasions. See Contoocook Valley Sch. Dist. v. State, 174 N.H. 154 (2021) (ConVal I); Contoocook Valley Sch. Dist. v. State, 2025 NH 29 (Con Val II). The State cites to Con Val I for purposes of establishing the relevant status and facts of the litigation as all Chief Justice MacDonald's involvement with the Con Val litigation proceeded this first appeal in 2021. -2- for substantively the same reasons, as well as those additional reasons set forth below. See Ex. A, Steven Rand, et al. v. State of New Hampshire, Case No. 2024-0138, Order denying recusal (May 31, 2024).

A. Plaintiffs have not complied with Rule 21A 3. Rule 21A provides that "[a] motion for recusal shall ... contain a verification by affidavit of any facts upon which the motion is grounded, unless the facts are apparent from the record or from the papers on file in the case, or are agreed to and stated in a writing signed by the parties or their attorneys[.]" 4. Plaintiffs have not filed an affidavit containing the facts upon which they ground their motion. Instead, they speculate that Chief Justice MacDonald cannot be impartial in this case. "[U]nsupported speculation regarding bias or partiality is insufficient to warrant judicial recusal." Talley v. Tyer, 648 F. Supp. 3d 276, 282 (D. Mass. 2023). Indeed, a judge owes "a duty not to recuse himself on unsupported speculation." Willner v.

Univ. of Kan., 848 F.2d 1023, 1027 (10th Cir. 1988) (emphasis in original).

For this reason alone, the motion should be denied.

B. Recusal is not dictated by the terms of RSA 492: 1. 5. RSA 492:1 provides in relevant part: "A justice shall not sit in any case in which he has been concerned as party or attorney[.]" 6. As Chief Justice MacDonald previously explained, recusal is clearly not appropriate under the plain language of RSA 492:1. See Ex. A, Order at 3. 7. Having been initiated well after Chief Justice MacDonald left employment at the Department of Justice, this case "is not a 'case' in -3- which" Chief Justice MacDonald had previously been "concerned as [an] attorney." Id. 8. Plaintiffs offer no argument to meaningfully counter this plain reading of the statute.2 C. "Matter in controversy," as the phrase is used in CJC Rule 2.ll(A)(S), is not as broad as Plaintiffs read it. 9. CJC Rule 2.1 l(A) provides: (A) A judge shall disqualify himself or herself in any proceeding in which the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned, including but not limited to the following circumstances: (5) The judge: (a) served as a lawyer in the matter in controversy, or was associated with a lawyer who participated substantially as a lawyer in the matter during such association; (b) served in governmental employment, and in such capacity participated personally and substantially as a lawyer or public official concerning the proceeding, or has publicly expressed in such capacity an opinion concerning the merits of the particular matter in controversy; or 2 On page 3 of their motion, Plaintiffs write: "Judges are specifically instructed to recuse themselves from cases if they acted as lawyers in substantially similar cases as the one before them. See RSA 492:1." The plain language of the statute contains no such specific instructions, nor would such a requirement be a fair inference therefrom. RSA 492: 1 precludes a judge from sitting on "any case" in which he or she served as an attorney or served as a lower court judge. It neither expressly nor implicitly directs judges to recuse themselves froin cases which present factual or legal questions substantially similar to cases in which they previously served as an attorney. -4- (c) was a material witness concerning the matter. 10. Plaintiffs argue these rules apply to mandate recusal of Chief Justice MacDonald because this case and the Con Val litigation should be considered the same "matter in controversy." Considering the merits of this claim requires an examination of the meaning of "matter in controversy." 11. Starting with the language of the rule, the term "matter in controversy" and "matter" appear to be used synonymously. For example, a judge is directed to recuse himself if he served as a lawyer in the "matter in controversy" or if a lawyer with whom he was associated participated substantially in the "matter" during that association. CJC Rule 2.11 (A)(5)(b ). 12. Multiple courts have considered this language and concluded that there is little or no difference between a "matter" /"matter in controversy" and a case/docket number. See Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Rhode Islandv. Delta Dental of Rhode Island, 248 F. Supp. 2d 39, 43-47 (D.R.I. 2003) ("This Court holds that the term 'matter in controversy' ... should be given a restrictive reading; that is, it should be read as applying only to the case that is before the Court as defined by the docket number attached to that case and the pleadings contained therein[.]"). See also United States v. Scherer, No. 2:19-CV-03634, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 158006, 2019 WL 5064686, at* 1 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 17, 2019) ("The term 'matter in controversy' refers 'to the actual case that is pending before the Court."' (quoting Clifton-Jere/: Jones v. Phi/a. Parking Auth., No. 11-4699, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 118851, 2011 WL 4901291, at *2 (E.D. Penn. Oct. -5- 14, 2011))); Pitrolo v. County of Buncombe, No. 06cv199, 2013 U.S. Dist.

LEXIS 19364, 2013 WL 588753, at *5 (W.D.N.C. Feb. 13, 2013). 13. This Court should similarly find "matter"/"matter in controversy" as used in CJC Rule 2.1 l(A)(5) to be synonymous with "case" as used in RSA 492: 1, which pertains to the disqualification of justices. 14. Under this plain meaning, recusal is not necessary because this matter and the Con Val matter are different cases, brought by different plaintiffs, advancing different legal theories, under different docket numbers.

D. Even under a broader definition of "matter in controversy," recusal is not appropriate here. 15. Even if this Court were to adopt a broader definition of "matter in controversy," Plaintiffs' motion to recuse should nevertheless be denied because, despite sharing some general legal and constitutional issues, the two cases are fundamentally different, with different plaintiffs bringing different claims, and presenting numerous different legal issues. 16. The Con Val Plaintiffs were predominantly a group of school districts, and they advanced a narrow legal claim that "the amount of per­ pupil base adequacy aid set forth in RSA 198:40-a, II(a) (Supp. 2020) to fund an adequate education [was] unconstitutional as applied to the plaintiff school districts[.]" 174 N.H. at 156. 17. Plaintiffs in this case are "individuals and entities owning real property in New Hampshire[.]" Rand v. State, 2025 NH 27. 18. Plaintiffs claimed below that, because the State is broadly failing to spend enough money on an adequate education-including on special education-municipalities are forced to impose local education -6- property taxes to make up the difference, thereby converting those local education property taxes into a State tax that violates Part II, Article 5 of the New Hampshire Constitution. (Ex. B., Pls.' First Amended Compl. at ,i,i 79-83.); see id. at 20, ,i 80 (specifying that plaintiffs are seeking a declaratory judgment that finds and declares that: "The State does not currently guarantee funding sufficient to cover the cost of an adequate education. As a result, New Hampshire must rely on local school taxes to bridge the gap. These local school taxes violate Part II, Article 5 of the New Hampshire Constitution because they are not uniform in rate."). 19. Undoubtedly, some legal issues overlap in these two cases.

But as discussed in more detail in section E below, it would be illogical and unworkable for the mere overlap of general legal issues to be sufficient to require recusal. The phrase "matter in controversy" simply "could not have been intended to encompass all cases involving the same substantive subject or legal issues that the judge litigated while in private practice." Kondaur Capital Corp. v. Matsuyoshi, 150 Haw. 1, 15 (2021). "If Judges could be disqualified because their background in the practice of law gave them knowledge of the legal issues which might be presented in cases coming before them, then only the least-informed and worst-prepared lawyers could be appointed to the bench." Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 802 F.2d 658, 659-60 (3d Cir. 1986). See also Laird v. Tatum, 409 U.S. 824, 835, (1972) ("Proof that a Justice's mind at the time he joined the Court was a complete tabula rasa in the area of constitutional adjudication would be evidence of lack of qualification, not lack of bias."). 20. Indeed, reading the phrase "matter in controversy" to encompass different cases brought by different plaintiffs that merely -7- present overlapping or even substantially similar legal or factual issues would likely paralyze this Court's ability to function and to provide timely, uniform application of justice to the litigants coming before it. 21. This Court is the only appellate court in New Hampshire. It has broad mandatory jurisdiction over both civil and criminal appeals. See Sup. Ct. R. 3 ( defining "mandatory appeal"). Criminal proceedings, in particular, frequently present issues of statutory and constitutional law that substantially overlap with prior cases. Yet four of the five Justices on this Court (including three Justices whom Plaintiffs have moved to recuse) have significant experience in criminal cases, as attorneys, judges, or both. 22. As Attorney General, Chief Justice MacDonald "act[ ed] as attorney for the state in all criminal and civil cases in the supreme court in which the state is interested" and "ha[ d] and exercise[ d] general supervision of the criminal cases pending before the supreme court and superior courts of the state[.]" RSA 7:6. As Solicitor General, Justice Will's duties included "[r]epresenting the state in all criminal appeals to the New Hampshire supreme court or federal court." RSA 21-M: 12-a. Justice Will also presided over and made rulings in criminal cases during his more than four years as a superior court judge. Justice Donovan served as a prosecutor at the New Hampshire Department of Justice and then spent 18 years in private practice, where he focused on, among other things, "criminal matters."3 And Justice Countway served as both a police prosecutor and 3 Senior Associate Justice Patrick E. Donovan, New Hampshire Judicial Branch, https://www.courts.nh.gov/our-courts/supreme-court/about/justices/senior-associate-justice­ patrick-e-don ovan. -8- three terms as Belknap County Attorney, before serving more than six years as Circuit Court Judge.4 23. Under Plaintiffs' conception of "matter in controversy," each of these justices would have to recuse from any criminal case that presented a legal issue that overlapped with an issue they litigated or supervised while in government service or private practice or presided over as a lower court judge. If, for example, a case presented a suppression issue or a confrontation issue that was the same or significantly overlapped with an issue presented in a case they litigated, supervised, or presided over, then this would warrant recusal. The same would be true of cases presenting questions as to the proper interpretation of one or more applicable statutes.

Even if it were possible to keep track of every issue presented in every case that every justice of this Court had ever litigated, supervised, or presided over, such a rule would render duly appointed justices unable to perform their constitutional function in a wide swath of cases that this Court is constitutionally authorized and statutorily mandated to hear. That outcome finds no support in the law and defies common sense. 24. Finally, it bears noting that the trial court found that the issues presented in this case were different from those presented in Con Val.

Soon after filing this case, Plaintiffs moved to consolidate it with Con Val.

The State objected, arguing, among other things, that this case "presents claims and theories different from those presented in the Con Val case," including "a theory of the State's education funding obligations under Part 4 Associate Justice Melissa Countway, New Hampshire Judicial Branch, https://www.courts.nh.gov/our-courts/supreme-court/about/justices/associate-justice-melissa­ countway. -9- II, Article 83 of the New Hampshire Constitution different from the theory advanced in the Con Val litigation." (Ex. C, State's Obj. Mot. Consolidate ,r 4.) In a margin order, the trial court (MacLeod, Jr., J.) denied the motion to consolidate "for the reasons set forth in the defendant's objection." (Ex. D, Aug. 19, 2022 Margin Order.) 25. The fact that one case may "form part of the historical background of the dispute presented" in another, or that the two cases could have been joined for purpose of trial, does not render them the same "matter in controversy." See Little Rock Sch. Dist. v. Pulaski County Special Sch. Dist., 839 F.2d 1296, 1301-02 (8th Cir. 1987). 26. Here, the procedural history reflects that two superior court judges did not believe the adequacy claims in this case sufficiently similar to warrant consolidation or to justify maintaining a stay while Con Val II was on direct appeal. This further confirms that, even under a broad conception of the phrase "matter in controversy," recusal is not appropriate.

E. Knowledge of, or a point of view on, an area of the law does not render a judge biased. 27. In arguing that Chief Justice MacDonald should be recused from this matter, Appellees focus primarily on what they believe to be overlapping legal questions raised in this litigation and in the Con Val litigation, which was pending while Chief Justice MacDonald served as Attorney General. The problem with this argument is that the fact that a prior, closed case has a common legal question shared with a case litigated by a judge prior to joining the bench has uniformly been held not to require recusal. -10- 28. "Courts have uniformly rejected the notion that a judge's previous advocacy for a legal, constitutional, or policy position is a bar to adjudicating a case, even when that position is directly implicated in the case before the court." Carter v. West Publishing Co., No. 99-11959-EE, 1999 WL 994997, at *9 (11th Cir. Nov. 1, 1999) (Tjoflat, J.) (citing numerous cases). For example, judges may hear cases concerning the proper interpretation or constitutionality of legislation even when they participated substantially in drafting and passing that same legislation prior to their appointment to the bench. See Wessmann by Wessmann v. Boston Sch. Comm., 979 F.Supp. 915, 917 (Mass. Dist. Ct. 1997) ("Indeed, Supreme Court judges have refused to disqualify themselves from passing on legislation or regulations even when, as legislators, they were instrumental in drafting the law."). 29. When faced with questions of recusal similar to those raised here, members of the United States Supreme Court have declined to recuse.

For example: Justice [Robert] Jackson participated in a case raising exactly the same issue that he had decided as Attorney • General . . . [ and] Chief Justice Hughes wrote the opinion overruling Adkins v. Children's Hospital of D. C., in spite of having written a book that seriously criticized that decision.

Id. (internal citations omitted). 30. Plaintiffs' motion to recuse Chief Justice MacDonald, as well as all other justices on the New Hampshire Supreme Court but one, effectively boils down to a claim that because these justices engaged with legal questions related to the interpretation of Part II, Article 83 of the New -11- Hampshire Constitution before becoming justices, they must recuse themselves from cases in which the interpretation of that constitutional provision is at issue. This argument is not founded in the law or sound reasoning. See generally NH Milk Dealers' Ass 'n v. Milk Control Board, 107 N.H. 335, 339 (1966) ("[B]ias in the sense of [a] crystallized point of view about issues of law or policy is almost universally deemed no ground for disqualification." ( quotation omitted)).

WHEREFORE the State of New Hampshire respectfully requests this Court deny the Plaintiffs Motion to Recuse Chief Justice MacDonald.

Date: April 2, 2026 Respectfully submitted, STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE By its attorneys, JOHN M. FORMELLA ATTORNEY GENERAL ANTHONY J. GALDIERI SOLICITOR GENERAL Isl Mary A. Triick Anthony J. Galdieri, No.18594 Solicitor General Associate Attorney General Samuel R.V. Garland, No. 266273 Deputy Solicitor General Senior Assistant Attorney General Mary Triick, No. 277277 Senior Assistant Attorney General -12- New Hampshire Dept. of Justice 1 Granite Place South Concord, NH 03301 mary .a.triick@doj.nh.gov (603) 271-3658 Certificate of Service I certify that a copy of the foregoing was sent this day to the representatives of the parties in this case via this Court's electronic filing system and will be mailed to those representatives requiring conventional service.

Date: April 2, 2026 Isl Mary A. Triick ___ _ Mary A. Triick, No.277277 Senior Assistant Attorney General EXHIBIT A THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE SUPREME COURT In Case No. 2024-0138, Steven Rand & a. v. State of New Hampshire, Chief Justice Gordon J. MacDonald on May 31, 2024, issued the following order: Through their counsel, Andru Volinsky, Natalie Laflamme, John E. Tobin, Jr., Wendy Leeker, Alice Tsier, and Aditi Padmanabhan, the plaintiffs, Steven Rand, et al., move for my recusal on a number of grounds. Attorney Volinsky avers that the facts supporting the motion are true and accurate. Sup. Ct. R. 21A. For reasons set forth below, the motion is denied.

The issue of judicial disqualification is governed by the constitution, statute, and court rule. Part I, article 35 of the New Hampshire Constitution establishes "the right of every citizen to be tried by judges as impartial as the lot of humanity will admit." RSA 492:1 (2010) provides: "A justice shall not sit in any case in which he has been concerned as party or attorney or in any appeal in which he has acted as judge in the court below, or act as attorney or be of counsel for either party or give advice in any matter pending or which may come before the court for adjudication." In 2011, New Hampshire joined many other jurisdictions in adopting the Code of Judicial Conduct (CJC). See Sup. Ct. R. 38.

The CJC consists of four canons, numbered rules under each canon, and comments that follow and explain each rule. See id., Scope, par. 1. In addition to these authorities, decisions from federal and state courts interpreting and applying CJC provisions and secondary sources can provide persuasive guidance.

Upon taking the oath of office, a New Hampshire judge is obligated to fulfill the constitution's mandate of fair and impartial justice. That solemn duty is essential to the integrity of the judiciary and upholding the rule of law under our constitutional system. From this flows two principles. First, "the law will not suppose a possibility of bias or favor in a judge, who is already sworn to administer impartial justice, and whose authority greatly depends upon that presumption and idea." Hutchinson v. Railway, 73 N.H. 271, 275 (1905) (quotation omitted); see also Richard E. Flamm, Recusal and Disqualification of Judges, § 46.1 (2018) 0udges are "ordinarily presumed to be impartial and unbiased in all matters that have come before them for disposition."). Second, a judge has a "duty to sit." As Rule 2. 7 of the CJC provides, "A judge shall hear and decide matters assigned to the judge, except when disqualification is required by Rule 2.11 or other law." (Emphasis added.) The word "shall" is mandatory, making it clear that a judge is required to hear matters properly assigned. See Rule 2.7, Comment ("Unwarranted disqualification may bring public disfavor to the court and to the judge personally. The dignity of the court, the judge's respect for fulfillment of judicial duties, and a proper concern for the burdens that m.ay be imposed upon the judge's colleagues require that a judge not use disqualification to avoid cases that present difficult, controversial, or unpopular issues.").

These principles must yield when disqualification is required. CJC Rule 2.11 (A) sets forth circumstances requiring disqualification. The plaintiffs rely on two of its five subparts, 2.1 l(A)(l) and 2.1 l(A)(S). Those subparts provide: (A) A judge shall disqualify him.self or herself in any proceeding in which the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned, including but not limited to the following circumstances: ( 1) The judge has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party or a party's lawyer, or personal knowledge of facts that are in dispute in the proceeding. (5) The judge: (a) served as a lawyer in the matter in controversy, or was associated with a lawyer who participated substantially as a lawyer in the matter during such association; (b) served in governmental employment, and in such capacity participated personally and substantially as a lawyer or public official concerning the proceeding, or has publicly expressed in such capacity an opinion concerning the merits of the particular matter in controversy; or (c) was a material witness concerning the matter.

I first address issues potentially implicating Rule 2.1 l(A)(S). The relevant facts are as follows. In 2019, Contoocook Valley School District v. State (the Con Val case) was commenced. As originally filed, the ConVal case raised claims involving the constitutional adequacy of payments from the State to local comm.unities in support of public education as well as the constitutionality of the statewide education property tax ("SWEPT''). The SWEPT-related claims were later dropped from. the case. The Con Val case is on appeal. I served as Attorney General from. April 201 7 until March 2021, at which time I assumed m.y present position. The ConVal case was commenced in March 2019. The Department of Justice has represented the defendants from. the outset, including during m.y service as Attorney General. I am. disqualified from. that case.

This case was commenced in 2022, well after I began service in m.y current role. As originally filed, this case raised claims about the constitutional adequacy of payments from. the State to local communities as well as the constitutionality of SWEPT. The case was litigated separately from the ConVal case. The SWEPT­ related claims in this case were briefed and resolved by an order on cross- motions for summary judgment. See Coalition Communities' Notice of Appeal, at p. 7, n.1 (stating that the court delayed issuing the ruling "to afford the parties an opportunity to assess how or if that order [in the Con Val case] impacts the procedure in this case" and noting that the "SWEPT issue in [Con Val] was withdrawn by the plaintiff."). In a subsequent order, the trial court granted the State's assented-to motion under Superior Court Rule 46(c)(l) to direct that its order on cross-motions for summary judgment addressing the SWEPT claims be treated as a final order for purposes of this appeal. See id. at pp. 35-36. In granting the motion, the court observed: "[W]hile the SWEPT Order pertains to­ the manner in which the [Department of Revenue Administration] collects education tax revenues from local communities, the plaintiffs' remaining claims concern the sufficiency of the education funding the State provides to local communities. Those issues implicate distinct legal questions." Id. (citations omitted). Thus, this appeal concerns the constitutionality of SWEPT.

The plaintiffs, who bear the burden of proof and must overcome a presumption of impartiality, fail to address the governing legal standards. They overlook entirely RSA 492: 1 and offer no developed argument under the CJ C's applicable text.

Turning first to RSA 492: 1, under its plain language, I conclude that disqualification is not required. This is not a "case" in which I have been "concerned as [an] attorney." As stated above, this case was commenced after I left the Attorney General's Office.

The analysis under CJC Rule 2.11 (A)(S) turns on the meaning of "matter in controversy," and, specifically, whether this case and ConVal are the same "matter in controversy." The CJC does not define this term and this court has not previously construed it. Although the CJC could have, but did not, use the word "case" instead of "matter in controversy," there is significant textual support for the proposition that the two terms are, in fact, synonymous. The CJC does define both "impending matter" ("a matter that is imminent or expected to occur in the near future") and "pending matter" ("a matter that has commenced. A matter continues to be pending through any appellate process until final disposition"). See CJC, Terminology. As those terms are used in the Rules, it appears that a "matter" is no different than a "case." See CJC Rule 2. l0(A) ("A judge shall not make any public statement that might reasonably be expected to affect the outcome or impair the fairness of a matter pending or impending in any court, or make any nonpublic statement that might substantially interfere with a fair trial or hearing."). On the other hand, some courts interpreting this term - or its federal analog- have interpreted the term more broadly. As one commentator summarizes the caselaw: "Many courts have indicated, however, that ajudge is required to recuse herself not only when the prior and past matters are precisely the same, but whenever they are sufficiently related to each other to be considered so; or, as has sometimes been said, when the prior and present matters are 'substantially related'." Richard E. Flamm, Judicial Disqualification: Recusal and Disqualification of Judges,§ 39.3 (3d ed. 2017).

Under the circumstances of this case, it is not necessary to define the precise contours of "matter in controversy'' as used in the CJC. This case was filed well after the Con Val case. The plaintiffs and counsel are different. The cases were litigated separately and proceeded on entirely different tracks. And, as the trial court observed in granting the assented-to relief under Superior Court Rule 46(c), the adequacy claims brought by the plaintiffs, and at the center of the ConVal case, present "distinct legal questions" from the SWEPT-related claims at issue in this appeal. I agree. For these reasons, I conclude that ConVal and Rand are separate, distinct and not related, much less "substantially'' so, within the meaning of CJC Rule 2. l l(A)(5).

The plaintiffs argue that disqualification is required because Con Val and Rand "overlap[]" and that there are "significant overlapping issues" between the two cases. Again, that is not the governing legal standard. However, to the extent that plaintiffs argue that disqualification is required because the issues originally raised in Con Val relating to SWEPf "overlap" with issues in this case, the argument fails. It is well established that the fact that a judge may have advocated with respect to a particular "issue," as an attorney or otherwise, is not a basis for disqualification. See N.H. Milk Dealers' Ass'n v. Milk Control Board, 107 N.H. 335, 339 (1966) ("[B]ias in the sense of [a] crystallized point of view about issues of law or policy is almost universally deemed no ground for disqualification." (Quotation omitted)); see also Carter v. West Publishing Co., No. 99-11959-EE, 1999 WL 994997, at *9 (11th Cir. Nov. 1, 1999) (Tjoflat, J.) ("Courts have uniformly rejected the notion that a judge's previous advocacy for a legal, constitutional, or policy position is a bar to adjudicating a case, even when that position is directly implicated in the case before the court.") (citing numerous cases); Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 802 F.2d 658, 659-60 (3d Cir. 1986) ("If Judges could be disqualified because their background in the practice of law gave them knowledge of the legal issues which might be presented in cases coming before them, then only the least-informed and worst-prepared lawyers could be appointed to the bench.").

Having concluded that my disqualification is not required by CJC Rule 2.11 (A)(5), I next address the plaintiffs' argument that I must disqualify myself pursuant to CJC Rule 2.1 l(A)(l) because Andru Volinsky, in his role as an Executive Councilor in 2019, voted against my first nomination as Chief Justice of this court. The motion refers to Attorney Volinsky's bases for opposing that nomination as well as statements by third parties about the nomination process.

Yet, that does not address the standard under the Rule as to a judge's personal bias or prejudice concerning a party or a party's lawyer. To that end, and pursuant to CJC Rule 2.1 l(A)(l), I represent that I am prepared to discharge my duties under the constitution and that I have no bias or prejudice for or against any of the parties or lawyers in this case. I will decide this case solely upon the facts and applicable law. See also N.H. CONST. pt. I, art. 35 Thus, under the circumstances, this case is governed by the general rule that a person's past opposition to a judge's nomination does not create a reasonable basis for questioning the judge's impartiality in cases involving that person. See Flamm, Judicial Disqualification: Recusal and Disqualification of Judges,§ 24.1, § 24.4 (collecting cases); see also Denardo v. Anchorage, 974 F.2d 1200, 1201 (9th Cir. 1992) ("Courts which have considered whether testimony regarding a judicial nomination mandates recusal have uniformly concluded that it does not."); United States v. Evans, 262 F. Supp.2d 1292, 1296 (D. Utah 2003) ("if opposition to a judicial nominee were sufficient grounds for recusal, lawyers would be in a position to manipulate the court").

Although not raised in the motion, another of the plaintiffs' attorneys, John E. Tobin, Jr., publicly supported my nomination in 2019 and, in 2017, I received an award named in his honor from a third-party organization supporting civil legal aid. The same principles apply. See In re Executive Office of the President, 215. F.3d 25, 25 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (Tatel, J.) ("Hearing a case involving the conduct of the President who appointed me will not create in reasonable minds, with knowledge of all the relevant circumstances that a reasonable inquiry would disclose, a perception that my ability to carry out judicial responsibilities with integrity, impartiality, and competence would be impaired." (quotation and brackets omitted)). To permit an attorney's unilateral conduct with respect to a judicial nomination to displace the presumption of impartiality exposes our judicial system to the potential threat of manipulation. See Evans, 262 F.

Supp.2d at 1296. This conclusion serves another important objective: encouraging robust participation by attorneys in the judicial selection process. See N.H. R. Prof. Conduct 8.2, 2004 ABA Model Rule Comment [1] (noting that assessments by lawyers are relied on in evaluating the professional or personal fitness of those being considered for appointment to judicial office and that "[e]xpressing honest and candid opinions on such matters contributes to improving the administration of justice"). . The plaintiffs also point to my status as a former officer of a "public advocacy group, the Josiah Bartlett Center," as grounds for my disqualification under CJC Rule 2.1 l(A)(l). According to the plaintiffs, the Josiah Bartlett Center is "strongly opposed to school funding adequacy and dedicated to the diversion of public education funds to private schools." The Josiah Bartlett Center is not a party in this case, and I am no longer a member or officer of that organization.

The plaintiffs' argument therefore boils down to their "their view of [my] policy preferences." Comfort v. Lynn Sch. Comm., 418 F.3d 1, 27 (1st Cir. 2005) (en bane), overruled on other grounds, Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch.

Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007). "If judges were subject to disqualification on such a basis, our judicial system would be paralyzed." Comfort, 418 F.3d at 27; see also N.H. Milk Dealers' Ass'n, 107 N.H. at 339.

Unable to demonstrate a specific basis in the CJC requiring my disqualification, the plaintiffs appear to advance a "totality of the circumstances" test in arguing that the "overall situation is controlling." I do not dispute the statement in Comment [1] to CJC Rule 2.11 that "ajudge is disqualified [under the Rule] whenever the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned, regardless of whether any of the specific provisions of paragraphs (A) ( 1) through (6) apply." That statement, however, provides no support for the plaintiffs' motion. A judge's impartiality cannot reasonably be questioned when, as in this case, none of the asserted bases for recusal would cause "an objective, disinterested observer, fully informed of the facts, [to] entertain significant doubt that justice would be done in [this] case." In the Matter of Tapply & Zukatis, 162 N.H. 285, 302 (2011) (quotation omitted).

As reflected in our constitution, the issue of disqualification lies at the heart of the integrity of the judicial system. The record of my judicial service reflects that, when required, I have concluded that my duty to sit must yield.

For the foregoing reasons, this is not such a case. A reasonable person, fully informed of the facts and the legal principles applicable to judicial disqualification, would not question my impartiality. I affirm that I have no bias in this case and will decide it on the facts and the law. The motion for my recusal is denied.

This order is entered by Chief Justice MacDonald pursuant to Rule 2 lA.

Distribution

  • Wendy Leeker, Esq.
  • Samuel R.V. Garland, Esq.
  • Natalie J. Laflamme, Esq.
  • Michael-Anthony Jaoude, Esq.
  • Lawrence P. Gagnon, Esq.
  • John-Mark Turner, Esq.
  • John E. Tobin, Jr., Esq.
  • Attorney General
  • Anthony J. Galdieri, Esq.
  • Andru H. Volinsky, Esq.
  • Abbygale Martinen, Esq.
  • Aditi Padmanabhan, Esq.
  • Alice Tsier, Esq.
  • File
  • Timothy A. Gudas,
  • Clerk
  • EXHIBITB
  • ST A TE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
  • Superior Court
  • Grafton, ss.
  • Case No. 215-2022-CV-00167
  • Steven Rand and Randvest_, Inc.,
  • 120 High land Street
  • Plymouth, NH 03264
  • Dr. Robert Gabrielli and the
  • Gabrielli F'amily Ltd. Partnership,
  • 40 Via Tranquilla
  • Concord, NH 03301
  • Jessica Wheeler Russell and Adam Russell,
  • 76 Manor Road
  • Concord, NH 03303
  • James Lewis,
  • 70 Turnberry Lane
  • Hopkinton, NH 03229
  • John Lunn_,
  • 23 Fletcher Road
  • Newport, NH 03754
  • V.
  • The State ofNew Hampshire
  • Petitioners,
  • c/o Attorney General for the State of NH
  • 33 Capitol Street
  • Concord, NH 03301,
  • Defendant.
  • FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT
  • Filed
  • File Date: 8/26/2022 11 :32 AM
  • Grafton Superior Court
  • E-Filecl Document
  • Now come the petitioners, by and through their undersigned counsel, and complain
  • against the State of New Hampshire as follows:
  • I. INTRODUCTION
  • l. This is an action in which the petitioners, all of whom own real property in New
  • Hampshire and pay local school property taxes to fund kindergarten through twelfth grade public
  • education, seek a declaratory ruling that the State of New Hampshire improperly relies upon
  • local taxpayers, including Petitioners, to raise the funds necessary to provide students with a
  • constitutionally adequate education as required by Part JI, Article 83 of the New Hampshire
  • Constitution, because the State's own funding falls far shy of that amount. As a result, the
  • funding for a constitutionally adequate public education is largely paid for by taxes that are not
  • uniform in rate as required by Part II, Article 5 of the New Hampshire Constitution.
  • 2. Petitioners also seek a permanent injunction that requires New Hampshire to
  • discontinue its unconstitutional public education funding scheme, and for such other relief as is
  • ju!,t and proper.
  • II. THE PARTIES
  • 3. Petitioner Steven Rand resides in Plymouth, New Hampshire where he owns and
  • operates Rand's Hardware, which has been located at 71 Main Street, Plymouth since 1908. Mr.
  • Rand resides at 120 Highland Street, in Plymouth, New Hampshire. Mr. Rand directly, or
  • through Randvest, Inc., owns his home, the separate property where he operates his hardware
  • store, and rental properties. Mr. Rand, or Randvest, as indicated, pays local property taxes to the
  • Town of Plymouth, New Hampshire for town taxes and for the Statewide Education Property
  • Tax ("SWEPT'), which is discussed below. He has also paid local property taxes to the Town
  • for educational purposes to pay for public kindergarten through eighth grade education in his
  • town and to pay for high school education at the Plymouth Regional High School. The real
  • property owned by the petitioners is reflected in Table A, which is attached as an appendix to
  • this complaint.
  • 4. Petitioner Dr. Robert Gabrielli resides at 40 Via Tranquilla in Concord, New
  • Hampshire. He and his wife are the sole owners of the Gabrielli Family Limited Partnership,
  • through which they own commercial real estate at 316-322 Village Street, in Penacook, a section
  • of Concord. They purchased this property, which includes retail space and apartments, in 1980.
  • Dr. Gabrielli pays local property taxes to the city of Concord, New Hampshire on the
  • commercial real estate for city taxes and for the SWEPT, which is discussed below. Dr.
  • Gabrielli has also paid local property taxes for educational purposes to the city of Concord for
  • his commercial real estate. The city of Concord transfers the SWEPT and local education tax
  • revenues to the Merrimack Valley School District to pay for public elementary, middle school
  • and high school education.
  • 5. Petitioners Jessica Wheeler Russell and Adam Russell reside in the Penacook section
  • of Concord, New Hampshire. Ms. Wheeler Russell, Mr. Russell and their family live in a home
  • in Penacook, at 76 Manor Road. Ms. Wheeler Russell and Mr. Russell have paid local property
  • taxes to the city of Concord, New Hampshire on their home for city taxes and for the SWEPT,
  • which is discussed below. Ms. Wheeler Russell and Mr. Russell have also paid local property
  • taxes for educational purposes to the city of Concord for their home. The city of Concord
  • transfers the SWEPT and local education tax revenues to the Merrimack Valley School District
  • to pay for public elementary, middle school and high school education. Although Ms. Wheeler
  • Russell is a member-at-large of the Merrimack Valley School Board, she brings this action solely
  • in her individual capacity and not as a school board member.
  • 6. Petitioner James Lewis resides in the Town of Hopkinton, New Hampshire. He
  • has owned his home at 70 Turnberry Lane for 23 years. He is the Superintendent of Schools in
  • Lempster, NH, a small rural school district, and he is a volunteer firefighter in Hopkinton. He
  • pays property taxes to the Town of Hopkinton, including the local educational tax and the
  • SWEPT, which is discussed below. The Town of Hopkinton transfers the SWEPT and local
  • education taxes it collects to the Hopkinton School District to pay for public elementary, middle
  • school and high school education for Hopkinton students.
  • 7. Petitioner John Lunn resides with his wife Meredith in Newport, New Hampshire.
  • They have owned their cape style home at 23 Fletcher Road since 1991. The Lunns pay local
  • property taxes to the town of Newport, New Hampshire, including the local education tax and
  • the SWEPT, which is discussed below. The town of Newport transfers the SWEPT and local
  • education tax revenues to the Newport School District to pay for public elementary, middle
  • school, and high school education. Meredith Lunn, 72 years old, is retired on social security and
  • John Lunn, 64, works as part-time manager of the Newport public access TV station. To
  • supplement their income the Lunns converted the second floor of their home into a rental studio
  • apartment.
  • 8. The State of New Hampshire is a governmental body that may sue and be sued for
  • declaratory and injunctive relief. The State has the unequivocal legal duty to provide a
  • constitutionally adequate public education to every educable child in the state. Further, any tax
  • used to meet this duty must be equal in valuation and uniform in rate. The State has adopted a
  • number of laws, rules, and practices designed to provide public educational services to eligible
  • children and to finance the cost of those educational services.
  • A.
  • III. THE CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES AT ISSUE IN THIS CASE
  • School Taxes Used to Provide an Adequate Public Education to New
  • Hampshire's Students Must be Equal in Valuation and Uniform in Rate.
  • 9. In 1997, the New Hampshire Supreme Court found the State's school funding scheme
  • unconstitutional and ordered the State to re-design its school funding system within 17 months.
  • Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor, 142 N.H. 462, 465 (1997) ("Claremont If') ("In this appeal
  • we hold that the present system of financing elementary and secondary public education in New
  • Hampshire is unconstitutional. To hold otherwise would be to effectively conclude that it is
  • reasonable, in discharging a State obligation, to tax property owners in one town or city as much
  • as four times the amount taxed to others similarly situated in other towns or cities.").
  • 10. With respect to taxes necessary to raise funds so the State can comply with its duty to
  • provide a constitutionally adequate education, the Court held that "[a]lthough the taxes levied by
  • local school districts are local in the sense that they are levied upon property within the district,
  • the taxes are in fact State taxes that have been authorized by the legislature to fulfill the
  • requirements of the New Hampshire Constitution." Id at 469. "Consequently, '[t]here is
  • abundant justification in fact for taking this property out of the class taxed locally, and taxing it
  • at the average rate throughout the state."' Id. (quoting Opinion of the Justices, 84 N.H. 559, 566
  • (1930)).
  • 11. The Court also explicitly held: "To the extent the State relies upon property taxes to
  • fund a constitutionally adequate public education, the tax must be administered in a manner
  • that is equal in valuation and uniform in rate throughout the State." Id. at 471 (emphasis
  • added).
  • 12. In so ruling, the New Hampshire Supreme Court stated that "[t]here is nothing fair or
  • just about taxing a home or other real estate in one town at four times the rate that a similar
  • property is taxed in another town to fulfill the same purpose of meeting the State's educational
  • duty.'' Id.
  • B. The State Has a Constitutional Duty to Provide a Public Education to New Hampshire's
  • Students.
  • I 3. The State's duty to provide a public education to the children of New Hampshire has
  • been part of our Constitution since 1784. The New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed this
  • obligation 29 years ago in Claremont School District v. Governor ("Claremont f'), 138 N .H. 183
  • (1993), when it declared that the New Hampshire Constitution obligates the State and the State
  • alone "to provide a constitutionally adequate education to every educable child in the public
  • schools in New Hampshire" and "to guarantee adequate funding." Id. The cost of providing an
  • education that meets the constitutional standard of adequacy must be funded by state taxes that
  • are equal in valuation and uniform in rate.1
  • IV. THE COMPONENTS OF THE STATE'S CURRENT EDUCATION FUNDING SCHEME
  • 14. New Hampshire's education funding system has multiple components. First, the
  • State sets an arbitrarily low level of state "adequacy aid" that does not begin to approach the
  • actual cost of a constitutionally adequate public education, and pays for only about 28% of the
  • cost of public education. N .H. DEP 'T OF EDUCATION, STATE SUMMARY REVENUE AND
  • EXPENDITURES OF SCHOOL DISTRICTS 2020-2021 (2021),
  • https://www.education.nh.gov/sites/g/files/ehbemt326/files/inline-documents/sonh/summary-of­
  • rev.-exp-fy202l .pdf.
  • 1 Petitioners focus on the lack of uniformity in tax rates in the instant complaint.
  • 15. The amount of this state aid is based on a formula that assumes that the base cost of a
  • constitutionally adequate education is $3,708.78, 2 RSA 198:40-a(II)(a), with small additional
  • enhancements, called "differentiated aid" based on the number of students who are eligible for
  • free- or reduced-price lunch (a placeholder for children in poverty), who qualify as English
  • language learners, or who receive Special Education services. RSA 198:40-a(II)(b)-(d). There is
  • also a category of differentiated aid that provides a stipend for students who score low on state
  • assessment tests if the student does not otherwise qualify for differentiated aid. RSA 198:40-
  • a(II)( e ). Table B of the Appendix sets out the amount of adequacy and differentiated aid
  • required by RSA 198:40-a.
  • 16. Like the State-funded cost of adequacy, the amounts allocated by the State to pay for
  • the various differentiated aid stipends are arbitrarily low and insufficient to pay the additional
  • costs necessary to provide the children who qualify for differentiated aid with a constitutionally
  • adequate education.
  • 17. Including the additional differentiated aid, the State provided districts during the
  • 2020-21 school year with approximately $4,597 per student3 to meet its constitutional
  • responsibility to fund adequacy, N .H. DEP'T OF EDUCATION, MUNICIPAL SUMMARY OF
  • ADEQUACY AID (2021 ), https ://www .education.nh.gov/sites/ g/files/ehbemt3 26/files/inline­
  • documents/2020-04/ad _ ed _ aid_ fy202 l.pdf, while the average per pupil cost published by the
  • New Hampshire Department of Education (NHDOE) for that same year was $18,434.21. N.H.
  • 2 The State's adequacy aid is adjusted each biennium based on changes to the Consumer Price
  • Index. RSA 198:40-d. In 2020-2021, the State's baseline adequacy grant per pupil was $3,708.78.
  • N.H. DEP'T OF EDUCATION, MUNICIPAL SUMMARY OF ADEQUACY AID (2021),
  • https://www.education.nh.gov/sites/g/files/ehbemt326/files/inline-documents/2020-
  • 04/ ad_ ed _ aid _fy2 021. pdf.
  • 3 This number is derived by dividing "Total Calculated Cost of an Adequate Education"
  • ($769,142,373.74) by "19-20 Membership ADM" (167,284.28).
  • DEP 'T OF EDUCATION, STA TE A VERA GE COST PER PUPIL AND TOTAL EXPENDITURES 2020-2021,
  • https://www.education.nh.gov/sites/g/files/ehbemt326/files/inline-documents/sonh/state-avg­
  • cpp-fy202l .pdf.
  • 18. When accounting for the costs .associated with capital expenses, transportation, debt
  • service, tuition and construction costs, 4 the average per pupil cost is $21,762.96 (approximately
  • $3,300 higher). Id.
  • 19. The Statewide Education Property Tax, which is collected and distributed locally,
  • ostensibly raises funds needed to meet the State's cost of funding an adequate education. RSA
  • 76:3. Effective July 1, 2022, the SWEPT will raise approximately 7% of the actual cost of
  • public education. 5
  • 20. In previous years, the SWEPT raised about 10% of the actual cost and is slated to
  • return to the 10% level on July l, 2023. 6
  • 21. For most towns, the modest amount raised by the SWEPT does not meet the State's
  • minimalist adequacy funding level. In these property-poor and middle-wealth communities, the
  • State's "adequacy aid" supplements the SWEPT funds to bring the total amount of state support
  • to approximately the $4,597 average adequacy cost. In property-wealthy communities, however,
  • the SWEPT raises more funds per pupil than the State's low standard for what it asserts is the
  • cost of a State-funded adequate education.
  • 4 Despite being integral to the provision of educational services, these costs are not factored into
  • the State's current funding level.
  • 5 For the two-year state budget that became effective on July I, 2021, the legislature reduced the
  • amount to be raised by the SWEPT from $363 million to $263 million, for one year only.
  • 6 At $363 million, the SWEPT accounts for approximately 10% total net revenues. See N.H.
  • DEP'T OF EDUCATION, STATE SUMMARY REVENUE AND EXPENDITURES OF SCHOOL DISTRICTS
  • 2020-202 l (2021 ), https://www.education.uh.gov/sites/ g/files/ehbemt326/files/inline­
  • documents/sonh/summary-of-rev .-exp-fy202 l .pdf.
  • 22. Since 2011, the legislature has allowed these property-wealthy communities to retain
  • the remaining revenue created by the SWEPT, to use as they see fit, either to lower their tax rates
  • or spend the funds for any other purpose.
  • 23. By far the largest source of school funding in New Hampshire is the local education
  • tax, which makes up more than 60% of total public education revenue. N.H. DEP'T OF
  • EDUCATION, STATE SUMMARY REVENUE AND EXPENDITURES OF SCHOOL DISTRlCTS 2020-2021
  • (2021 ), https://www .education.nh.gov/sites/ g/files/ehbemt3 26/files/inline­
  • documents/sonh/summary-of-rev .-exp-fy202 l.pdf. This revenue is necessary to make up the
  • huge shortfall between the level of State aid and the actual cost of educating children in New
  • Hampshire's public schools.
  • 24. Because of the great disparities in property wealth among school districts, these local
  • taxes are levied at rates that vary widely from school district to school district, thus imposing
  • disproportionate tax rates on property owners across the state.
  • 25. Almost 25 years after the Court's decision in Claremont 11, K-12 public education
  • remains primarily funded by disproportionate and inequitable local property taxes.
  • 26. No state in America relies upon local property taxes to fund public education to the
  • extent New Hampshire does. See NAT'L CTR. FOR EDUCATION STATS., THE CONDITION OF
  • EDUCATION: PUBLIC Scr-IOOL REVENUE SOURCES 3 (2020),
  • https://nces.ed.gov/programs/coe/pdf/coe _ cma.pdf ("The percentages of revenues coming from
  • local sources were highest in New Hampshire[,]" at 62%).
  • V. THE CURRENT EDUCATION PROPERTY TAX SYSTEM IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL
  • 27. Local property taxes upon which the State of New Hampshire relies to fund a
  • constitutionally adequate public education are administered in a manner that is not uniform in
  • rate throughout the state.
  • A. Because of Loopholes for Property-Wealthy Towns, the SWEPT Was and Will Again Be
  • Unconstitutional.
  • 28. The Statewide Education Property Tax (SWEPT) is a state tax, although the State
  • leaves it to local municipalities to assess, collect, and distribute the funds.7
  • 29. By statute, the legislature has directed the Commissioner of the Department of
  • Revenue Administration ("ORA") to set the SWEPT rates by issuing a warrant in December of
  • each year.
  • 30. For the 2022-2023 state fiscal year only, the legislature lowered the amount of the
  • money to be collected by SWEPT from $363 million to $263 million.
  • 31. This temporarily eliminated the surplus SWEPT revenues that property-wealthy
  • towns have previously failed to send to the State and instead have kept for themselves.
  • 32. However, as of July 1, 2023, the SWEPT will revert to its higher level and the
  • disparities and inequities outlined below will return in full force.
  • 7 The revenues generated by SWEPT never come into the State's possession. See RSA 76:3,
  • 76:8. Indeed, the State must include a footnote in its Comprehensive Annual
  • Financial Report (CAFR) to reflect that the "Statutory Fund" consisting of SWEPT is "Retained
  • Locally by Cities and Towns." N.H. DEP'TOF ADMIN. SERVS., COMPREHENSIVE ANNUAL
  • FINANCIAL REPORT 148, n.2 (2020),
  • https://www.das.nh.gov/accounting/FY%2020/FY_2020_Comprehensive_Annual_Financial_Re
  • port.pd[
  • 33. In the property-wealthy communities, a portion of the revenue from a state tax that is
  • intended to generate revenue to satisfy the State's duty to educate children across the state will
  • once again be siphoned off by these communities.
  • 34. This state revenue is absorbed into the local budgets of the wealthy towns, instead of
  • being sent to the State, to then be distributed to communities where SWEPT does not raise
  • enough revenue to fund the State's low adequacy standard.
  • 35. A smaller number of towns also engage in a tax avoidance strategy where they offset
  • the required SWEPT tax rate set by the DRA Commissioner's warrant by setting a local
  • education tax rate that is negative.
  • 36. For example, for the fiscal year ending June 2021, the SWEPT tax rate for Hale's
  • Location was $1.85/$1,000 and the local education tax rate was set at a negative $1.84/$1,000,
  • resulting in an effective combined education rate of one cent per thousand ($0.01/$1,000).
  • 37. For examples of other communities offsetting the SWEPT with a negative local
  • education tax, see Table C of the Appendix (Communities that Impose Negative School Tax
  • Rates).
  • 38. Petitioners expect this tax avoidance strategy to continue regardless of the amount of
  • revenue generated by the SWEPT.
  • 39. Because of the strategies employed by the prope1iy-wealthy towns to keep funds
  • beyond those necessary to pay for the State's purported cost of adequacy or to offset the SWEPT
  • with negative tax rates, taxpayers in wealthy towns pay lower effective rates for this state tax,
  • which violates the core constitutional principle that state taxes must be imposed at uniform rates.
  • See Opinion of the Justices, 142 N .H. 892 ( 1998) (rejecting the ABC "special
  • abatement plan" for wealthy communities); Claremont School Dist. v. Governor, 144 N.H. 210
  • ( 1999) (holding that a phased-in component of the statewide education property tax for wealthy
  • communities was unconstitutional because it resulted in varying property tax rates that were
  • unreasonable and disproportionate).
  • B. Because the State's Adequacy Aid Falls Far Short of the Cost of a Constitutionally Adequate
  • Education, Property Owners Must Make Up the Difference Through the Local Property Tax.
  • 1. The State's Adequacy Aid is Woefully Insufficient to Meet its Constitutional Responsibilities
  • 40. The Court did not define the specific components of a constitutionally adequate
  • education in any of the 10 Claremont decisions, or in any subsequent decision, instead making
  • clear that it is the legislature's responsibility to do so. The Court did, however, make clear that
  • constitutional adequacy must be determined in the context of what educational services are
  • offered by all New Hampshire schools. The Court chose a practical, expansive, and forward­
  • looking model. See Claremont I, 138 N.H. at 192 ("Given the complexities of our society today,
  • the State's constitutional duty extends beyond mere reading, writing, and arithmetic. It also
  • includes broad educational opportunities needed in today's society to prepare citizens for their
  • role as participants and as potential competitors in today's marketplace of ideas." (emphasis
  • added)); Claremont II, 142 N.H. at 474 ("A constitutionally adequate public education is not a
  • static concept removed from the demands of an evolving world ... [a] broad exposure to the
  • social, economic, scientific, technological, and political realities of today's society is essential
  • for our students to compete, contribute, and flourish in the twenty-first century.").
  • 41. The State has identified a baseline allocation per pupil, initially set at $3,450.00. RSA
  • 198:40-a (2008).
  • 42. This baseline amount has only seen de minim is adjustments over the last 15 years. In
  • 2015, the baseline was increased by approximately $100 to $3,561.27. RSA 198:40-a (2022).
  • 43. The baseline allocation per pupil is adjusted each biennium based on changes to the
  • Consumer Price Index. RSA 198:40-d.
  • 44. For 2020-2021, the State's baseline grant amounted to $3,708.78. N.H. DEP'T OF
  • EDUCATION, MlJNICIPAL SUMMARY OF ADEQUACY AID (2021),
  • https://www.education.nh.gov/sites/g/files/ehbemt326/files/inline-documents/2020-
  • 04/ad_ed_aid_fy2021.pdf.
  • 45. The arbitrarily low amount of State funding is insufficient to cover the cost of the
  • educational services and standards contemplated in the State's adequate education statute.
  • 46. Underscoring that it is appropriate to look at what other schools provide, the Court
  • also wrote: "It is basic, however, that in order to deliver a constitutionally adequate public
  • education to all children, comparable funding must be assured in order that every school
  • district will have the funds necessary to provide such education.- Imposingdissimilarand
  • unreasonable tax burdens on the school districts creates serious impediments to the State's
  • constitutional charge to provide an adequate education for its public school students."
  • Claremont II, 142 N.H. at 476 (emphasis added).
  • 4 7. Given the Court's interpretation of the constitutional responsibility to allow students
  • to "compete in the marketplace of ideas" and statement that schools must have comparable
  • funding, Petitioners contend that the cost of a constitutionally adequate education should be
  • derived from the average spending per pupil of schools across New Hampshire, with allowances
  • for different student demographics and the geography of local school districts. The cost should
  • also account for and include the cost of transportation, capital costs, and debt.
  • 48. The New Hampshire Department of Education ("NHDOE") reports the costs per
  • pupil spent by New Hampshire school districts. These reported costs are limited to non-capital
  • costs and do not include the significant costs to provide transportation to school children. The
  • average or mean cost per pupil published by the NHDOE on its website in each of the last 5
  • reporting years was:
  • 2020-21 - $18,434.21
  • 2019-20 - $16,823.88
  • 2018-19 - $16,346.45
  • 2017-18 - $15,865.26
  • 2016-17-$15,310.67
  • N.H. DEP'T OF EDUCATION, COST PER PUPIL BY DISTRICT (2017-2021),
  • https://www.education.nh.gov/who-we-are/division-of-educator-and-analytic-resources/bureau­
  • of-education-statistics/financial-reports.
  • 49. This data, and similar data, published by the NHDOE informs policymaking in the
  • state and provides the most accurate information on education costs and expenditures, as well as
  • the sources of education funding and tax rates imposed upon different districts for that purpose.
  • 50. The State has never made payments to local school districts to support the funding of
  • educational services in amounts that approach even one-third of the actual cost of providing
  • public education in New Hampshire, non-capital and capital costs included.
  • 51. The State has determined that the baseline cost of adequacy is $3,708.78 per pupil.
  • Yet no schoo I district spends as little as th is. 8
  • 52. By intentionally underfunding the cost of a constitutionally adequate education, the
  • 8 In the 2020-2021 school year, the lowest spending district, Manchester, spent more than three
  • times as much. N.H. DEP'TOF EDUCATION, COSTPERPUPILBYDISTRJCT, 2020-2021 (2021),
  • https://www.education.nh.gov/sites/g/files/ehbemt326/files/inline-documents/sonh/cpp­
  • fy202l.pdf.
  • State has shifted most of its funding responsibility to local property taxpayers, including
  • Petitioners, in violation of Part II, Article 83 and Part II, Article 5 of the New Hampshire
  • Constitution. The State's unconstitutional tax shift affects property owners who own property
  • for personal residences and affects those who own property for a business purpose, making some
  • communities less competitive economically because of disproportionately high tax rates.
  • 11. Funding an Adequate Education for which the State is Responsible with Local Property Taxes
  • is Inherently Inequitable and Unconstitutional
  • 53. The State is constitutionally mandated to provide an adequate education. Claremont
  • I, 138 N.H. at 184. The taxes imposed to fund this responsibility are state taxes. Claremont II,
  • 142 N.H. at 469. State taxes must be equal in valuation and uniform in rate across the state. Id.
  • at 471. By primarily relying on local prope11y taxes with hugely disproportionate rates because
  • of greatly varying property wealth, the State violates this precept of Part II, Article 5 of the New
  • Hampshire Constitution.
  • 54. The average equalized valuation 9 of prope11y per pupil in New Hampshire school
  • districts for the 2020-2021 school year, the last reported, was $1,346,793. N.H. DEP'T OF
  • EDUCATION, EQUALIZED VALUATION PER PUPIL, 2020-2021 (2021 ),
  • https://www.education.nh.gov/sites/g/files/ehbemt326/files/inline-documents/sonh/EVPP-FY-
  • 202l-PDF _0.pdf. This means that the school district with the average financial strength had
  • $1,346,793 in property value for each student residing in the district against which it could levy a
  • school tax.
  • 9 To "equalize" the valuation of property in a community simply means that the property is
  • assessed at l 00% fair market value, regardless of its local assessment. The New Hampshire
  • ORA performs this function for all taxable realty across the state, enabling accurate comparisons
  • of tax rates across the state.
  • 55. Statewide, equalized valuations per pupil in the 2020-2021 school year ranged from a
  • low of $523,285 per pupil in Claremont to a high of$120,861,443 per pupil in Millsfield. Id.
  • 56. For communities with at least 100 public school students in residence, the high was
  • $8,987,902 per pupil in Moultonborough. Id.
  • 57. Portsmouth had an equalized valuation per pupil of $3,399,350, just shy of three
  • times the state average. Id.
  • 58. Petitioner Steven Rand lives in Plymouth where the last reported equalized valuation
  • per pupil, for the 2020-2021 school year, was $942,652. Id. This means that Plymouth has
  • about 70% of the financial strength to raise money for its schools as the state average in New
  • Hampshire.
  • 59. As an indication of how Plymouth has lost ground over time, the equalized valuation
  • per pupil in the 2015-2016 school year was $826,496, as compared to a state average of
  • $939,001 or 88% of the average.
  • 60. Plymouth children attend high school at the Plymouth Regional High School, which
  • is a part of the Pemi-Baker Cooperative School District. The Pemi-Baker Cooperative School
  • District is made up of individual school districts that maintain their own elementary and middle
  • schools and send their children to the Plymouth Regional High School. Ashland, Ellsworth and
  • Waterville Valley also have an agreement to send high school children to the Plymouth Regional
  • High School on a tuition basis but maintain their own K-12 school district. (This collection of
  • school districts is referred to as the "Pemi-Baker Districts.")
  • 61. Each of the children who attend the Plymouth Regional High School is eligible to
  • receive the exact same educational services, regardless of the property wealth or tax rates of the
  • communities in which they reside.
  • 62. The equalized valuations for each of the Pemi-Baker Districts vary widely from
  • highs of $5,469,546 per pupil in Waterville Valley and $4,754,006 per pupil in Holderness, to
  • $942,652 per pupil in Plymouth.
  • 63. The equalized valuations per pupil for all of the Pemi-Baker School Districts are
  • presented in Table D of the Appendix. For comparison, the corresponding equalized valuations
  • per pupil for the 2015-2016 school year are also provided.
  • 64. Petitioners Dr. Gabrielli, Ms. Wheeler Russell, and Mr. Russell live or own property
  • in Penacook where they suffer a double disadvantage. Penacook's financial strength fairs poorly
  • when compared to the state average equalized valuation per pupil. Penacook also has a much
  • lower equalized valuation per pupil than the rest of the city of Concord, of which Penacook is a
  • part for all purposes except for public education.
  • 65. Petitioner James Lewis lives and pays property taxes in Hopkinton, where the
  • reported equalized valuation per pupil for the 2020-2021 school year, was $941,727, which was
  • 69.9% of the state average of $1,346,793. This means that Hopkinton has only about 69.9% of
  • the financial strength to raise money for its schools as the average school district in New
  • Hampshire.
  • 66. As an indication of how Hopkinton has lost ground over time, the equalized
  • valuation per pupil in the 2015-2016 school year was $711,379, as compared to a state average
  • of $939,001, or about 75.7% of the state average.
  • 67. Petitioner John Lunn lives and pays taxes in the Town of Newport, where the
  • reported equalized valuation per pupil for the 2020-2021 school year, was $649,873, which was
  • 48.2% of the state average of $1,346,793. This means that Newport has only about 48.2% of the
  • financial strength to raise money for its schools as the average school district in New Hampshire.
  • 68. As an indication of how Newport has lost ground over time, the equalized
  • valuation per pupil in the 2015-2016 school year was $503,931, as compared to a state average
  • of $939,001, or about 53.7% of the state average.
  • 69. The last reported equalized valuation per pupil, for the 2020-2021 school year, for
  • Penacook was $654,006, 48.6% of the state average and 57% of the equalized valuation per pupil
  • for the rest of Concord.
  • 70. Penacook has lost ground over time compared to the rest of the state. The equalized
  • valuation per pupil for Penacook in the 2015-2016 school year was $468,614, 50% of the state
  • average.
  • 71. In the following few paragraphs, Petitioners provide the Court with the last reported
  • equalized school tax rates. Petitioners set out the equalized SWEPT rate, the local equalized
  • school tax rate, and the combined equalized school tax rate (SWEPT plus local). Petitioners
  • allege that the local education property tax burden is reflected by the combined equalized school
  • tax rate.
  • 72. Petitioner Rand lives in Plymouth and Plymouth is part of the Pemi-Baker Regional
  • Cooperative School District. The rates for the Pemi-Baker Districts range from a high of
  • $15.25/$1,000 in Campton to lows of $3.33/$1,000 in Waterville Valley and $6.90/$1,000 in
  • Holderness. Plymouth has a combined tax rate of $13.69/$1,000. Table E provides the
  • education tax rates for the Pemi-Baker Districts.
  • 73. The state average combined education tax rate was $11.33 for the 2020-2021 school
  • year.
  • 74. Petitioners Dr. Gabrielli, Ms. Wheeler Russell, and Mr. Wheeler own property and
  • live in Penacook and pay school taxes to the Merrimack Valley School District. Their 2020-
  • 2021 school tax rates were $1.65/$1,000 for SWEPT and $15.09/$1,000 for local education taxes
  • for a combined total of $16.74. Concord's combined rate was $13.81/$1,000 and the state
  • average, again, was $11.33/$1,000.
  • 75. Petitioner James Lewis owns property and lives in Hopkinton and pays school
  • taxes to the Town of Hopkinton to support the Hopkinton School District. His 2020-2021 school
  • tax rates were $1.66/$1,000 for SWEPT and $16.74/$1,000 for local education taxes, for a
  • combined total of $18.40 in school taxes, compared to the state average of $11.33/$1,000.
  • 76. Petitioner John Lunn owns property and lives in Newport and pays school taxes to
  • the Town of Newport to support the Newport School District. His 2020-2021 school tax rates
  • were $1.74/$1,000 for SWEPT and $13.73 for local education taxes, for a combined total of
  • $15.57 in school taxes, compared to the state average of $11.33/$1,000.
  • 77. The source for all of the above tax rate information is a website maintained by the
  • New Hampshire DOE: N.H. DEP'TOF EDUCATION, VALUATIONS, PROPERTY TAX ASSESSMENTS
  • AND TAX RATES OF SCHOOL DISTRICTS (2020-2021 ),
  • https://www.education.nh.gov/sites/g/files/ehbemt326/files/inline-documents/sonh/values-2020-
  • revised_O.pdf. The ORA also maintains the tax rate information.
  • 78. The tax rate information provided in the foregoing paragraphs and on the State's own
  • websites establishes that taxes for schools in New Hampshire are unconstitutional in that they are
  • not uniform in rate.
  • VI. CAUSES OF ACTION
  • 79. Petitioners adopt and incorporate by reference each and every preceding paragraph as
  • if fully set forth herein.
  • 80. Petitioners seek a declaratory judgment from this Court that finds and declares the
  • following:
  • The State does not currently guarantee funding sufficient to cover the cost of an adequate
  • education. As a result, New Hampshire must rely on local school taxes to bridge the gap. These
  • local school taxes violate Part II, Article 5 of the New Hampshire Constitution because they are
  • not uniform in rate.
  • 81. Petitioners also seek permanent injunctive relief requiring New Hampshire to
  • discontinue its unconstitutional public education funding scheme because they suffer irreparable
  • harm, any harm suffered by the State is outweighed by the harm that Petitioners suffer and,
  • finally, because an injunctive ruling for Petitioners is in the public interest.
  • 82. Petitioners further seek an order, directing the State to adopt a revised cost
  • determination, which accounts for the full cost of providing constitutional adequacy to all school
  • districts and amounts to no less than the average state expenditure per pupil, with allowances for
  • demographic and geographic diversity and that includes consideration of the costs of
  • transportation, capital costs, and debt.
  • 83. Petitioners further seek attorney's fees and such other relief as this Court deems just
  • and proper.
  • VII. CLAIMS FOR RELIEF
  • A. Petitioners seek a declaratory judgment as described above;
  • B. Petitioners seek permanent injunctive relief to address the State's constitutional
  • violations;
  • C. Petitioners seek an order directing the State to revise its cost determination as
  • described above, such that it will discontinue its reliance on local prope1iy taxes to meet the
  • State's Article 83 responsibilities;
  • D. Petitioners seek an order requiring the State to pay the costs and attorney's fees in this
  • matter; and
  • E. Petitioners seek such other relief as the Court deems just and proper.
  • Dated: Concord, New Hampshire
  • August 23, 2022
  • Respectfully submitted,
  • Isl Andru Volinsky
  • Andru Volinsky, NH Bar No. 2634
  • 160 Law, PLLC
  • P.O. Box 1181, Concord, NI-I 03302
  • (603) 491-0376
  • andruvolinsky@gmail.com
  • Natalie Laflamme, NH Bar No. 266204
  • Laflamme Law, PLLC
  • 100 N. Main St, Suite 512
  • Concord, NH 0330 l
  • (603) 937-5434
  • natalie@laflammelaw.com
  • John E. Tobin, Jr., NH Bar No. 2556
  • 60 Stone Street
  • Concord, NH 03301
  • (603) 568-0735
  • jtobinjr@comcast.net
  • Gregory Litile*
  • Education Law Center
  • 60 Park Place
  • Suite 300
  • Newark, NJ 07102
  • (973) 624-1815
  • glittle@edlawcenter.org
  • Joshua D. Weedman*
  • Michael-Anthony Jaoude*
  • Alexandra Zegger*
  • White & Case LLP
  • 1221 Avenue of the Americas
  • New York, NY 10020
  • (212) 819-8200
  • *pro hac vice pending
  • Appendix to Complaint
  • Table A. Real Property Owned by Petitioners
  • Owner Street Use of Property Paid Local Paid
  • Address Town SWEPT
  • Taxes Taxes
  • Randvest 67-71 Main Rand's Yes Yes
  • Street Hardware,
  • Plymouth Commercial
  • and Residential
  • rental units
  • Steven 120 High Personal Yes Yes
  • Rand Street, Residence
  • (RS Rand Plymouth
  • Revocable
  • Realty
  • Trust)
  • Randvest 15 Chase Commercial Yes Yes
  • Street, and Residential
  • Plymouth Rental
  • Randvest 17 Railroad Commercial Yes Yes
  • Square, Rental
  • Plymouth
  • Randvest 463 Daniel Residential Yes Yes
  • Webster Rental
  • Hwy,
  • Plymouth
  • Gabrielli 316-322 Commercial Yes Yes
  • Family Village and Residential
  • Limited Street,
  • Partnership Concord
  • Jessica 76 Manor Personal Yes Yes
  • Wheeler Road_, Residence
  • Russell and Concord
  • Adam
  • Russell
  • James 70 Personal Yes Yes
  • Lewis Turnberry Residence
  • Lane,
  • Hopkinton
  • John Lunn 23 Fletcher Personal Yes Yes
  • Road, Residence
  • Newport
  • Paid Local Subject
  • Education to
  • Taxes Business
  • Taxes
  • Yes Yes
  • Yes No
  • Yes Yes
  • Yes Yes
  • Yes Yes
  • Yes Yes
  • Yes No
  • Yes No
  • Yes No
  • Table B. Adequacy and Differentiated Aid pursuant to RSA l 98:40-a 10
  • Category Amount
  • Cost of an Adequate Education $3,708.78
  • Differentiated Aid- Free- or Reduced-Price $1,854.38
  • Lunch
  • Differentiated Aid - English Language $725.63
  • Learner
  • Differentiated Aid- Special Education $1,995.21
  • Differentiated Aid - Low Test Scores $725.63*
  • *Only available if doesn't receive other Differentiated Aid.
  • 1 o N .H. DEP'T OF EDUCATION, MUNICIPAL SUMMARY OF ADEQUACY AID (2021 ),
  • https://www.education.nh.gov/sites/g/files/ehbemt326/files/inline-documents/2020-
  • 04/ad _ ed _aid_fy2021.pdf.
  • Table C. Communities that Impose Negative School Tax Rates 11
  • District SWEPT rate per $1,000 Local Education Tax rate
  • per $1,000
  • Parens "( )" indicate
  • negative rate
  • Carroll County $1.85 ($1.84)
  • Hale's Location $1.85 ($1.84)
  • Coos County $1.71 ($0.61)
  • Cambridge $1.68 ($1.65)
  • Dix Grant $1.66 ($1.66)
  • Dixville $1.60 ($0.47)
  • Millsfield $1.80 ($0.16)
  • Odell $1.73 ($1.73)
  • Pinkhams Grant $1.93 ($1.93)
  • Success $1.69 ($1.69)
  • Wentworth Location $1.70 ($1.68)
  • State Average $1.70 $9.63
  • 11 N .H. DEP'T OF EDUCATION, VALUATIONS, PROPERTY TAX ASSESSMENTS AND TAX RATES OF
  • SCHOOL DISTRICTS (2020-2021 ),
  • https://www.education.nh.gov/sites/g/files/ehbemt326/files/inline-documents/sonh/values-
  • 2020-revised_ 0.pdf.
  • Table D. Equalized Valuations per Pupil for Pemi-Baker Districts
  • District 2020-2021 12 2015-2016 13
  • Ashland $1,284,172 $1,083,870
  • Campton $1,122,326 $891,811
  • Ellsworth $1,862,840 $964,886
  • Holderness $4,754,006 $2,889,731
  • Plymouth $942,652 $826,496
  • Rumney $1,529,129 $1,018,964
  • Thornton $1,582,475 $1,188,142
  • Waterville Valley $5,469,546 $8,946,204
  • Wentworth $1,179,294 $983,255
  • State Average $1,346,793 $939,001
  • 12 N .I-I. DEP'T OF EDUCATION, EQUALIZED VALUATION PER PUPIL, 2020-2021 (2021 ),
  • https :/ /www .educati on.nh. gov/ sites/ g/files/ ehbemt3 26/files/inLine-documents/sonh/EVPP-FY -
  • 2021-PDF_0.pdf.
  • 13 N.H. DEP'TOF EDUCATION, EQUALIZED VALUATION PER.PUPIL, 2015-2016 (2016),
  • https://www.education.nh.gov/sites/g/files/ehbemt326/files/in1ine­
  • documents/equal_pupil15 _16.pdf.
  • Table E. Tax Rates for Pemi-Baker Districts14
  • District Local Education SWEPT Rate/$1,000 Combined
  • Rate/$1,000 Education Tax
  • Rate/$1,000
  • Ashland $11.89 $1.62 $13.51
  • Campton $13.43 $1.82 $15.25
  • Ellsworth $9.12 $1.58 $10.70
  • Holderness $5.43 $1.47 $6.90
  • Plymouth $11.93 $1.76 $13.69
  • Rumney $12.93 $1.50 $14.43
  • Thornton $11.48 $1.65 $13.13
  • Waterville Valley $1.44 $1.89 $3.33
  • Wentworth $11.02 $1.81 $12.83
  • State Average $9.63 $l.70 $11.33
  • 14 N.H. DEP'T OF EDUCATION, VALUATIONS, PROPERTY TAX ASSESSMENTS AND TAX RATES OF
  • SCHOOL DISTRICTS (2020-2021 ),
  • https ://www.education.nh.gov/ sites/ g/files/ ehbemt3 26/files/inline-documents/ sonh/val ues-
  • 2020-revised _ 0.pdf.
  • Certificate of Service
  • 1 hereby certify that a true and exact copy of this Amended Complaint has been served
  • upon the State of New Hampshire this 26th day of August 2022, by way of the Court's electronic
  • filing and service system.
  • Isl Natalie J Laflamme
  • Natalie J. Laflamme
  • EXHIBITC
  • THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
  • Filed
  • File Date: 7/19/2022 5:16 PM
  • Grafton Superior Court
  • E-Filed Document
  • GRAFTON, SS. SUPERIOR COURT
  • Steven Rand, et al.
  • V.
  • The State of New Hampshire
  • Docket No. 215-2022-CV-00167
  • OBJECTION TO MOTION TO CONSOLIDATE
  • OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, FOR SPECIAL ASSIGNMENT
  • The State ofNew Hampshire, by and through counsel, the New Hampshire Attorney
  • General's Office, objects to the Plaintiffs' Motion To Consolidate Or, In The Alternative,
  • For Special Assignment. In support thereof, the State says as follows:
  • 1. The Plaintiffs, four individual taxpayers and two corporate entities, move to
  • consolidate this education funding case with an education funding case brought by
  • seventeen school districts that has been pending in superior court in another county since
  • March 13, 2019 (Contoocook Valley School District, et al. v. State of New Hampshire, et
  • al., Docket No. 213-2019-CV-00069) (the "Con Val case").
  • 2. The parties in the Con Val case have progressed substantially into the
  • discovery phase of the case and are presently in the process of conducting depositions.
  • Fourteen of these depositions have been scheduled and will take place from later July
  • through August. The plaintiffs in the Con Val case have already disclosed an expert, and
  • the defendants are in the process of gathering the discovery necessary to do the same.
  • Discovery in the ConVal case is scheduled to close on November 2, 2022, with trial
  • scheduled for April 2023.
  • 3. This case, by contrast, is in its infancy. Counsel for the State accepted service
  • of this case on July 6, 2022. The State has until August 5, 2022 to answer or otherwise
  • plead. The case will not be structured until the pleadings are closed.
  • 4. This case also presents claims and theories different from those presented in
  • the Con Val case. This case presents tax claims and theories under Part II, Article 5 of the
  • New Hampshire Constitution that are not squarely presented in the Con Val litigation. This
  • case also appears to present a theory of the State's education funding obligations under
  • Part II, Article 83 of the New Hampshire Constitution different from the theory advanced
  • in the Con Val litigation. As a result, it is far from clear at this juncture to what extent this
  • action will have legal and factual issues in common with the Con Val action.
  • 5. The State will need to have an adequate opportunity to develop discovery in
  • this case and, in the ordinary course, would likely put this case on a one-year trial track.
  • Though counsel for the State and counsel for the Plaintiffs have discussed the possibility
  • of expediting this matter to some degree, that will only be possible to the extent both sides
  • are comfortable with the theories underpinning the claims and defenses and the universe
  • of facts each side intends to rely on to support those claims and defenses. It will, at a
  • minimum, require that the parties conduct some measure of initial discovery and exchange
  • expert reports. Consolidating this case with the Con Val case would unnecessarily inject
  • unrelated factual disputes and legal theories into this case, hindering (if not precluding) the
  • parties and, ultimately, the Court from efficiently identifying and resolving the legal and
  • factual disputes this case presents. To the extent consolidation occurs, it is hard to conceive
  • how the State could complete all potential discovery and pre-trial motion practice within
  • the next four months in order to keep the Con Val litigation on its current trial schedule.
  • 6. The State also disagrees with the Plaintiffs' contention that this case will
  • involve "the same facts, witnesses, and evidence, including public data informing
  • education costs in New Hampshire and tax rates imposed to finance those costs." Pls.' Mot.
  • 19. While some state witnesses may be the same, the Plaintiffs in this case are not witnesses
  • in the Con Val litigation, and it does not appear that the seventeen school districts in the
  • Con Val case will be witnesses in this case. There will presumably be witnesses related to
  • tax data and information in this case that will not be involved in the Con Val case.
  • Additionally, the Plaintiffs have suggested that they will disclose at least one expert in this
  • case, who presumably is not involved in the Con Val case and who will produce expert
  • reports and opinions different from those involved in the Con Val case. The differences
  • between the two cases in these regards are likely to be significant.
  • 7. Additionally, because the claims and theories advanced in each case are
  • different, consolidating these matters will substantially complicate trial by requiring the
  • State to defend against, and the Court to ultimately resolve, what are functionally two
  • separate lawsuits at the same time.
  • 8. In short, the Con Val litigation is sufficiently different and sufficiently far
  • along to make consolidation at this juncture problematic and prejudicial to the State in both
  • cases.
  • 9. The State therefore objects to consolidating this matter with the ConVal
  • matter.
  • 10. The State also objects to having this case specially assigned to a specific
  • superior court judge in a county where venue does not lie.
  • 11. While plaintiffs typically have some ability to choose the forum and venue
  • in which they will proceed, our legal system presumes that the assignment of a particular
  • judge to a case will be random unless a case is filed in a forum in which only a single judge
  • presides.
  • 12. Maintaining the random assignment of judicial officers is an important
  • feature of our system, which assures the public that cases are assigned and heard on an
  • impartial and neutral basis. Cf Trump v. Committee on Ways and Means, US. House of
  • Representatives, 391 F. Supp. 3d 93, 97 (D.D.C. 2019) (construing local court rule
  • requiring random assignment of cases); Tripp v. Executive Office of President, 196 F.R.D.
  • 201,202 (D.D.C. 2000) ("The fundamental rationale for the general rule requiring random
  • assignment of cases is to ensure greater public confidence in the integrity of the judicial
  • process. The rule guarantees fair and equal distribution of cases to all judges, avoids public
  • perception or appearance of favoritism in assignments, and reduces opportunities for judge­
  • shopping. ").
  • 13. That a particular judge has heard more of a specific type of case than other
  • judges cannot override this important feature of the state judicial system. All superior court
  • judges are qualified and required to sit on the cases over which they have jurisdiction and
  • are not recused. No mechanism exists within the New Hampshire Superior Court Rules to
  • have a particular case assigned to a particular superior court judge, particularly a superior
  • court judge who does not sit in a county where venue exists in the case. Further, while
  • seeking to ensure that similar legal issues are approached consistently may be an
  • understandable impulse, "conformity for its own sake is neither necessary nor desirable for
  • the [lower courts], because differences in opinion have the effect of ventilating important
  • legal questions and creating a background against which the Supreme Court can ultimately
  • resolve an issue for the [State] as a whole." Walker v. O'Brien, 216 F.3d 626, 634 (7th Cir.
  • 2000).
  • 14. Accordingly, if consolidation with another case is not appropriate, this case
  • should not be specially assigned to the judge overseeing that case and should instead
  • proceed in the normal course.
  • WHEREFORE, for all the above reasons, the defendant respectfully requests this
  • Court enter an order:
  • A. Denying the Plaintiffs' Motion To Consolidate Or, In The Alternative, For
  • Special Assignment; and
  • B. Granting such further relief as the court deems just and equitable.
  • Date: June 6, 2022
  • Respectfully submitted,
  • THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE,
  • By its Attorney
  • JOHN M. FORMELLA
  • ATTORNEY GENERAL
  • /s/ Lawrence P. Gagnon
  • Samuel R.V. Garland, Bar# 266273
  • Assistant Attorney General
  • Lawrence P. Gagnon, Bar #271769 Attorney
  • New Hampshire Dept. of Justice
  • Civil Bureau
  • 33 Capitol Street
  • Concord, NH 03301
  • (603) 271-3650
  • samuel.r .v .garland@doj.nh.gov
  • lawrence.p.gagnon@doj.nh.gov
  • CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
  • I hereby certify that on this 19th day of July, a copy of the foregoing was served via the
  • court's electronic filing system to all counsel of record.
  • /s/ Lawrence P. Gagnon
  • Lawrence P. Gagnon
  • EXHIBITD
  • STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
  • Superior Court
  • Grafton, ss.
  • Case No. 215-2022-CV-00167
  • Steven Rand and Randvest, Inc.,
  • 120 Highland Street
  • Plymouth, NH 03264
  • Dr. Robert Gabrielli and the
  • Gabrielli Family Ltd. Partnership,
  • 40 Via Tranquilla
  • Concord, NH 03301
  • Jessica Wheeler Russell and Adam Russell,
  • 76 Manor Road
  • Concord, NH 03303
  • Petitioners,
  • V.
  • The State of New Hampshire,
  • Defendant.
  • MOTION TO CONSOLIDATE
  • OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, FOR SPECIAL ASSIGNMENT
  • Filed
  • File Date: 7/8/2022 3:46 PM
  • Grafton Superior Court
  • E-Filed Document
  • NOW COME Petitioners Steven Rand and Randvest, Inc., Dr. Robert Gabrielli and the
  • Gabrielli Family Limited Partnership, and Jessica Wheeler Russell and Adam Russell, by and
  • through their undersigned counsel, and respectfully move to consolidate these proceedings with
  • Contoocook Valley School District, et. al v. State of New Hampshire, et. al ("Con Val"), No. 213-
  • 2019-CV-00069 (N.H. Super. Ct. Mar. 13, 2019), currently pending before the New Hampshire
  • Superior Court on remand or, in the alternative, to specially assign this matter to the Honorable
  • David Ruoff, the judge supervising the Con Val case. In support of this motion, Petitioners state
  • as follows:
  • 1. The above-captioned action is brought on behalf of New Hampshire taxpayers
  • against the State of New Hampshire.
  • 2. Con Val was brought on behalf of four New Hampshire school districts against the
  • State of New Hampshire and other state governmental actors. The other state governmental
  • actors were subsequently dismissed, and other school districts added.
  • 3. Both actions arise out of the constitutional duties imposed upon the State of New
  • Hampshire, by Part II, Article 5 and Part II, Article 83 of the New Hampshire Constitution.
  • 4. In Con Val, the petitioners allege that the amount of the State's adequacy aid (RSA
  • 198:40-a(II)(a)) is insufficient, specifically challenging the purported cost of transportation,
  • student-teacher ratios, teacher and staff benefits, and certain on-site operations like food and
  • custodial services. According to the petitioners, insufficient funding for these components of the
  • cost calculation gives rise to a system of unconstitutional reliance on local taxes.
  • 5. In the above-captioned action, Petitioners are taxpayers principally challenging a
  • system of funding for public education that relies on taxes which are not uniform in rate,
  • including but not limited to the statewide education property tax ("SWEPT"). Beyond the
  • unconstitutional administration of SWEPT, Petitioners additionally challenge the local education
  • taxes that districts must self-impose in order to make up the large difference between the State's
  • adequacy aid and the cost of providing adequacy to New Hampshire's students.
  • 6. Ultimately, both actions seek relief from the system of disproportionate and
  • unconstitutional taxation that persists in New Hampshire as a result of the State's failure to fund
  • the cost of an adequate education.
  • 7. These actions will involve resolution of common issues, including whether the
  • taxes imposed upon New Hampshire taxpayers violate the State Constitution, whether the State's
  • current funding contribution is sufficient to provide constitutional adequacy and, if not, the
  • revised cost that the State must pay to satisfy its constitutional obligations.
  • 8. To the extent that these cases present any non-duplicative issues, Petitioners
  • believe those issues are based on undisputed facts and can therefore be resolved as a matter of
  • law through an expedited motion for summary judgment. To the extent that any issues of fact
  • remain after that motion, the remaining issues would be duplicative of the facts at issue in the
  • Con Val trial in April 2023.
  • 9. The consolidation of these cases would conserve judicial resources, as these
  • actions will involve consideration of the same facts, witnesses, and evidence, including public
  • data informing education costs in New Hampshire and the tax rates imposed to finance those
  • costs.
  • 10. Should the Court deny Petitioners' request for consolidation, Petitioners
  • alternatively request that this Court assign the above-captioned action to Judge David Ruoff
  • based on his breadth of knowledge and experience concerning relevant issues resulting from his
  • presiding over the Con Val case for over three years. Based on the foregoing, Petitioners believe
  • that special assignment to Judge Ruoff would conserve judicial resources. Judge Ruoff's
  • familiarity with these common issues would ensure expeditious resolution of Petitioners' claims.
  • 11. Counsel to Petitioners in the above-captioned action have conferred with counsel to
  • the petitioners in Con Val, Attorney Michael J. Tierney, and with counsel for the State, Assistant
  • Attorney General Samuel Garland, both of whom object to the requested relief.
  • WHEREFORE, Petitioners respectfully request that this Honorable Court consolidate the
  • cases named herein and schedule the cases for a joint trial in April 2023; or in the alternative,
  • assign the above-captioned action to Judge David Ruoff.
  • Dated: July 8, 2022
  • Upon review of the plaintiffs' motion, the
  • defendant's objection and the plaintiffs
  • replication, the court determines that a
  • hearing in unnecessary. The motion is
  • Denied for the reasons set forth in the
  • defendant's objection.
  • Honorable Lawrence A. Macleod, Jr:
  • August 19, 2022
  • Respectfully submitted,
  • Isl Natalie J. Laflamme, Esq.
  • Natalie Laflamme, NH Bar No. 266204
  • Laflamme Law, PLLC
  • 100 N. Main St, Suite 512
  • Concord, NH 03301
  • (603) 937-5434
  • natalie@laflammelaw.com
  • Certificate of Service
  • I hereby certify that a true and exact copy of this Motion has been served upon counsel
  • for the Con Val petitioners and counsel for the State this 8th day of July, 2022 by way of the
  • Court's electronic filing and service system.
  • Clerk's Notice of Decision
  • Document Sent to Parties
  • on oa,1912022
  • Isl Natalie J. Laflamme, Esq.