2019-0693, Caroline Casey & a. v. New Hampshire Secretary of State & a.

Arroyo on the brief), for the defendants. Cleveland, Waters and Bass, P.A., of Concord (Bryan K. Gould and Cooley A. Samuel R.V. Garland, attorney, on the brief, and Mr. Galdieri orally), and assistant attorney general, Seth M. Zoracki, assistant attorney general, and Gordon J. MacDonald, attorney general (Anthony J. Galdieri, senior

Spencer, and James J. Armillay, Jr. on the joint brief), for the plaintiffs. brief), and Shaheen & Gordo n, P.A., of Concord (William E. Christie, S. Am y York, New York (Julie A. Ebenstein, Theresa J. Lee, and Dale E. Ho on the joint Mr. Klementowicz orally), American Civil Liberties Union Foundation, of New Concord (Gilles R. Bissonnette and Henry Klementowic z on the joint brief, and American Civil Liberties Union of New Hampshire Foundation, of

NEW HAMPSHIRE SECRET ARY OF STATE & a.

No. 2019 - 0693 U.S. District Court

page is: http://www.courts.state.nh.us/supreme. a.m. on the morning of their release. The direct address of the court ’ s home reporter@courts.state.nh. us. Opinions are available on the Internet by 9:00 to press. Errors may be reported by e - mail at the following address: editorial errors in order that corrections may be made before the opinion goes Hampshire, One Charles Doe Drive, Concor d, New Hampshire 03301, of any Readers are requested to notify the Reporter, Supreme Court of New well as formal revision before publication in the New Hampshire Reports. NOTICE: This opinion is subject to motions for rehearing under Rule p. 2 22 as 2

nor Flaherty owns a motor vehicle. Hampshire. In p. 2 2 018, both registered to vote in New Hampshire. Neither Casey after graduation. Both have driver’s licenses issued by states other than New while attending college, but who do not intend to remain in New Hampshire Flaherty are Dartmouth College students who wish to vote in New Hampshire Maggie Flaherty, and the New Hampshire Democratic Party. Casey and As set forth in the district court’s order, the plaintiffs are Caroline Casey,

court.” Sup. Ct. R. 34. qu estion is not “determinative of the cause then pending in the certifying under Rule 34 to decline to answer question 3 because the answer to that answer questions 1, p. 2 2, 4, and 5 in the affirmative. We exercise our discretion For the reasons that follow, and with the qualifications set forth below, we

New Hampshire any vehicles th ey keep in the state? to drive in the state and required by RSA § p. 2 261:40 to register in obtain New Hampshire drivers’ licenses by RSA § 263:1 if they wish Hampshire for more than six months in any year required to Motor Vehicle Code, are college students who reside in New [5.] Given the definition of non - resident in RSA § 259:67, I for the

p. 2 263:35? “a bona fide residency” for the purposes of RSA §§ 261:45 and “domicile” pursuant to RSA § 654:1, I or I - a necessarily establish [4.] Relatedly, does an individual who claims a New Hampshire

purposes of RSA § p. 2 259:88? other state for any purpose” and thus is not a “resident” for the to RSA § 654:1 ever be an individual “who claims residence in any [3.] C an an individual with a New Hampshire “domicile” pursuant

§ p. 2 21:6, as recently amended? to RSA § 654:I - a necessarily a New Hampshire resident under RSA [2.] Is a student who claims a New Hampshire “domicile” pursuant

“resident”? a New Hampshire “domicile” is necessarily a New Hampshire definition of “domicile” as used in RSA § 654:1, s uch that one with and :6 - a, as recently amended, effectively the same as the [1.] Are the definitions of “resident” and “residence” in RSA § p. 2 21:6

p. 3 34: Hampshire (Laplante, J.) certified the following questions of law, see Sup. Ct. R. PER CURIAM. The United States District Court for the District of New 3

questions of New Hampshire law” to us because “answers to these questions determinative.” Therefore, the district court is “certifying these necessary found no controlling precedent,” and “[r]esolution of these questions may be i ntertwined with several questions of New Hampshire law upon which [it] has According to the district court, “[t]he plaintiffs’ constitutional claims are

is no controlling precedent in the decisions of this court. certifying court as to which it appears to the certifying court there which may be d eterminative of the cause then pending in the involved in any proceeding before it questions of law of this State district court when requested by the certifying court if there are may answer questions of law certified to it by . . . a United States

Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule p. 3 34, this court

(Quotation omitted.) fees to register to vote or will be too intimidated to register or vote at all.” harmed it because voters inclined to support its candidates “will incur onerous Democratic Party alleges that the 201 8 amendments to RSA 21:6 and :6 - a have having registered to vote here, they will suffer injury. The New Hampshire allege that, if they must obtain New Hampshire driver’s licenses as a result of registration under the motor vehicle code. Casey and Flaherty specifically triggers the obligation to obtain a New Hampshire driver’s license and v ehicle indirectly make voter registration an effective declaration of residency that the federal district court, t he plaintiffs claim that the 2018 amendments Twenty - Sixth Amendments” to the United Sta tes Constitution. According to “b urden the right to vote and violate the First, Fourteenth, Twenty - Fourth, and The plaintiffs allege that the 2018 amendments to RSA 21:6 and :6 - a

not repeat that discussion here. Justices (Definition of Resident and Residence), 171 N.H. 128 (2018). We will amendments to RSA 21:6 and :6 - a are discussed in detail in Opinion of the purposes relevant to participating in democratic self - government.” The 2018 manifestation of a “sing le, continuous presence f or domestic, social, and civil voter, did not contain the same language. Rather, RSA 65 p. 4 4:1, I, requires the Hampshire indefinitely, while RSA 654:1, I (2016), which defines an eligible 2 1:6 and :6 - a, respectively, expressly required an intention to remain in New amendments, the statutory definitions of “resident” and “residence” in RSA “for the indefinite future.” See Laws 2018, ch. p. 3 370. Before the 2018 longer applied only to individuals who intended to remain in New Hampshire “resident” and “residence” in RSA 21:6 and :6 - a, respectively, so that they no 21:6, :6 - a (Supp. 2019). Those amendments changed the definitions of amendments to RSA 21:6 and :6 - a. See Laws 2018, ch. 370; see also RSA Constitution, the defendants’ interpretation and implementation of the 2018 and the New Hampshire Attorney General, challenging, under the Federal The plaintiffs sued the defendants, the New Hampshire Secretary of State 4

who has, through all of his or her actions, demonstrated a current in any city, town, or other political subdivisio n of this state, and who is domiciled or has a place of abode or both in this state and town, or other political subdivision of this state shall be a person A resident or inhabitant or both of this state and of any city,

prov ides: statute.” RSA 21:1 (2012). RSA 21:6, defining “resident” and “inhabitant,” manifest intent of the legislature or repugnant to the context of the same all statutes . . . , unless such construction would be inconsistent with the RSA chapter 21 sets forth definitions that apply “[i]n the construction of

“resident” under RSA 21:6. a person with a New Hampshire “domicile” under RSA 65 p. 4 4:1 is necessarily a necessarily a “resident” under RSA 21:6. As explaine d below, we conclude that whether a person with a New Hampshire “domicile” under RSA 654:1 is decide whether the definitions are “effectively the same” in order to determine a New Hampshire “resi dent” under RSA 21:6. As explained below, we need not that a person with a New Hampshire “domicile” under RSA 654:1 is necessarily “effectively the same” as the definition of “domicile” in RSA 654:1 (2016), such “residence” in RSA 21:6 and :6 - a, respectively, as amended in 201 8, are The first certified question asks whether the definitions of “resident” and

170 N.H. 118, 120 (2017). language of the statute to discern legislative intent. segTEL v. City of Nashua, statutory sc heme. Id. Absent an ambiguity, we will not look beyond the language in light of the policy or purpose sought to be advanced by the enables us to better discern the legislature’s intent and to interpret statutory isolation, but rather within the context of the statute as a whole. Id. This or unjust result. Id. Moreover, we do not consider words and phrases in parts of a statute together to effectuate its overall purpose and avoid an absurd add language that the legislature did not see fit to include. Id. We construe all statute as written and will not consider what the leg islature might have said or to its plain and ordinary meaning. Id. We interpret legislative intent from the language of the statute itself, and, if possible, construe that language according as a whole. Petition of Carrier, 165 N.H. 7 19, 721 (2013). We first look to the the intent of the legislature as expressed in the words of the statute considered interpretation. In matters of statutory interpretation, we are the final arbiter of Responding to the certified questions requires us to engage in statutory

implicate the federal constitutional right to vote in any way.” could result in one or more interpretations of the [state laws] that do not p. 5 5

which he or she is domiciled. An inhabitant’s domicile for voting or election, to vote in the town, ward, or unincorporated place in Constitution of New Hampshire, shall have a right at any meeting the age provided for in Article 11 of the Part First of the domicile for voting purposes, being a citizen of the United States, of Every inhabitant of the state, having a single established

provides: Hampshire. See RSA 6 p. 5 54:1, :3, :5 -:6 (2016), :2 (Supp. 2019). RSA 654:1, I, RSA chapter 654 sets out, among other t hings, eligibility to vote in New

within the meaning of RSA 21:6 - a. live in more than one place during any year, they can have only one “residence” important” place of physical presence. In other words, although a person may that the person, through all of their actions, has demonstr ated is their “most cannot also live elsewhere. Rather, it means only that there is no other place that, to have a New Hampshire “residence” under RSA 21:6 - a, the person We do not interpret the ph rase “to the exclusion of all others” to mean

presence, to the exclusion of all other places in which they may live. of their actions that New Hampshire is their “most important” place of physical und er RSA 21:6 - a if they live in New Hampshire and have indicated through all Hampshire “resident” under RSA 21:6 and has a New Hampshire “residence” “principal” is “most important.” Id. at 1802. Thus, a person is a New as if by sign: SIGNIFY, INDICATE.” Id. at 612. The plain meaning of the word at 706. The plain meaning of the word “designate” is “to make known directly DOMICILE”). The plain meaning of the word “dwell” is to “LIVE, RESIDE.” Id. habitually occupied by a family: one’s principal place of residence: one. . . dwells: HOME”); id. at 1082 (defining “home” as “the house . . . individual or of a family: ABODE”); id. at 4 (defining “abode” as “place where 2002) (defining the word “domicile” as “the place of residence either of an live. See Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 671 (unabridged ed. The plain meaning of the words “domiciled” and “abode” is to dwel l or

place of physical presence. intent to return to such residence or residency as the principal interrupted or lost by a temporary absence from it, if there is an exclusion of all others. Such residen ce or residency shall not be person as his or her principal place of physical presence to the domicile. The place of abode or domicile is that designated by a Residence or residency shall mean a person’s place of abode or

RSA 21:6 - a, defining “residence” or “residency,” provides:

of physical presence to the exclusion of all others. intent to designate that place of abode as his or her principal place p. 6 6

unconstitutional in Newburger v. Peterson, 344 F. Supp. 559 (D.N.H. 1972), The defendants imply that the common law of domicile was ruled

moves.” RSA p. 6 654:1, I. not, of itself, terminate an established domicile before the person actually domicile “at any time,” but the “mere intention” to do s o in the future “does government”). Additionally, as under the common law, a person may change domestic, social, and civil purposes relevant to participating in democratic self presence and manifests an intent to maintain a single, continuous presence for where a person, more than any other place, has established a physical the intent to make one’s place of physical presence one’s home (that “one place RSA 654:1, I, like common law domicile, requires physical presence and

N.H. 178, 180 (1835). acquired, does not result in a change of domicile. See Atherton v. Thornton, 8 1111, 1117 (Md. 1998). Thus, a temporary absence from a domicile, once domicile until “a new one is clearly established.” Blount v. Boston, 718 A.2d 301, 303 (191 p. 6 6). Further, under the common law, one cannot lose one’s or less definite time and mak[e] it his home.” Kerby v. Charlestown, 78 N.H. under the common law, a person must intend to reside in a place “for a more Pillsbury & Trustee, 15 N.H. 137, 13 8 (1844). In order to acquire a domicile one’s home. See Concord v. Rumney, 45 N.H. 423, 427 (1864); Leach v. two things are necessary — physical presence and intent to make the place the common law of domicile. To establish a domicile under the common law, The statutory definition of “domicile” in RSA 654:1, I, is consistent with

I. There can be only one “domicile” under RSA p. 6 654:1, I. RSA 654:2, I. purposes relevant to participating in democratic self - government.” RSA 654:1, continuous presence” in New Hampshire “for d omestic, social, and civil when they live here and have manifested their intent to maintain their “single, Thus, a person has a New Hampshire “domicile” under RSA 654:1, I,

domicile for voting purposes.” RSA p. 6 654:2, I. as his or her domicile.” It also provides that “[a] voter ca n have only one lost by a temporary absence therefrom with the intention of returning thereto voting purposes” once acquired in New Hampshire “shall not be interrupted or RSA 654:2, I (Supp. 201 9) provides, in pertinent part, that “[a] domicile for

person actually moves. does not, of itself, terminate an established domicile before the time, however a mere intention to change domicile in the future government. A person has the right to change domicile at any civil purposes relevant to participating in democratic sel f to maintain a single, continuous presence for domestic, social, and place, has established a physical presence and manifests an intent purposes is that one place where a person, more than any other p. 7 7

democratic self - government, see RSA 654:1, I, that individual will also have other place for domestic, social, and civil purposes related to participating in that New Hampshir e town that is more than their physical presence in any definition of “resident” in RSA 21:6. By establishing a physical presence in the definition of “domicile” in RSA 654:1, I, will necessarily also satisfy the who is eligible to vote in a particular New Hampshire town because they satisfy is, necessarily, a New Ha mpshire “resident” under RSA 21:6. An individual conclude that a person with a New Hampshire “domicile” under RSA 654:1, I, However, the definitions need not be functionally equivalent in order for us to on the other hand, convey the same basic concepts. The plaintiffs disagree. under RSA 21:6 and :6 - a, on the one hand, and “domicile” under RSA 654:1, I, The defendants argue that the definitions of “resident” and “residence”

particular town”). domicile, a person need not “say that he will always — or indefinitely — live in a Newburger, 3 44 F. Supp. at 563 (explaining that for purposes of establishing a Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws, supra § 18 cmt. b at p. 7 70; see attitude of mind even though he does intend to move at a definite time.” time at least,” and, thus, “[i]t is possible for a person to have the proper Rather, “[t]he required state of mind” is the intent “to rema in in the place for a indefinite intention to stay in one place.” Newburger, 344 F. Supp. at 563. common law of domicile was not intended to literally require “permanent or . . . should not be taken literally”). Accordingly, in our view, New Hampshire’s that expressions such as “one must intend to reside indefinitely in the place Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 18 cmt. c at 71 (1971) (explaining prophecy whether a given abode is ‘permanent’ in the strictest sense.”); see also U.S. 441, 451 n.2 (1941) (“Of course it cannot be known without the gift of never intended to be applied so literally. See Dist. of Columbia v. Murphy, 314 However, the common law “indefinite intention t o remain” requirement was Constitution. Id. at 560; see State v. Daniels, 44 N.H. 383, 386 (1862). leaving that town at a fixed time in the future” violated the Federal disqualifying st udents from voting merely because they had “a firm intention of court in Newburger ruled that the practice of Hanover town officials of We do not share the defendants’ view of Newburger. The federal district

“offends the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Id. at 563. a compelling [state] interest,” and, therefore, that its application to the class court ruled that “the indefinite intention requirement is [not] necessary to serve he intended to leave Hanover upon his graduation.” Id. The federal district vote, he was denied “solely because he stated to voter regi stration officials that Newburger, 344 F. Supp. at 560. When the student attempted to register to school but who intend to leave those communities upon graduation.” who wish to register in the communities where they reside while attending brought by a Dartmouth College student on behalf of “all voting age students Resident and Residence), 1 p. 7 71 N.H. at 13 p. 8 8. Newburger was a class action suit superseded by statute as stated in Opinion of the Justices (Definition of 8

Majority Co mmittee Repor t on HB 1264 (February 2 p. 8 8, 2018), available at considered a resident” under RSA 21:6. N.H.H.R. Election Law Comm., ensure that a person who has a “domicile” under RSA 654:1, I, “will be Representatives Election Law Committee, the purpose of HB 1264 was to See id. According to a majo rity of the New Hampshire House of indefinite future” from both statutes, had their genesis in House Bill (HB) 1264. 2018 amendments to RSA 21:6 and :6 - a , which eliminated the phrase “for the “resident” and “residence” in RSA 21:6 and :6 - a. See Laws 2018, ch. 370. The definition of “domicile” in RSA 654:1, I, also satisfy the statutory definitions of demonstrate s the legislature’s intent that individuals satisfying the statutory The legislative history of the 2018 amendments to RSA 21:6 and :6 - a

Brezner Tanning Co., 107 N.H. 236, 2 41 (1966). (1963), superseded on other grounds by statute as stated in Hanchett v. construction,” that controls. Chagnon v. Union - Leader Co., 104 N.H. 472, 474 true, it is legislative intent, rather than “arbitrary canons of statutory 130, 141 (2012) (quotation omitted). Although that maxim may generally be it generally means two different things.” City of Concord v. State, 164 N.H. statutory construction tha t “where the enacting body uses two different words, able to envision any such example. Instead, the plaintiffs rely upon a canon of Hampshire residence within the meaning of RSA 21:6 and:6 - a. Nor are we domicile under RSA 654:1, I, but are not New Hampshire residents with a New The plaintiffs provide no examples of individuals who have a New Hampshire

for different purposes. contemplates that individuals are able to have multiple domiciles abode, whereas the defini tion of “domicile for voting purposes” This statutory definition of resident enta ils an exclusive place of purposes relevant to participating in democratic self - government.” presence for only certain purposes — [“]domestic, social, and civil voting purposes” under RSA 654:1 contemplates a continuous place of abode “to the exclusion of all others,” while “domicile for Being a “resident” under RSA 21:6 requires the designation of the

They contend: purposes’ under RSA 654:1 will be the same place, it is not necessarily so.” for many people, residence under RSA 21:6 and :6 - a and ‘domicile for voting In arguing for a contrary conclusion, the plaintiffs assert that “[t]hough

654:1 is necessarily a New Hampshire resident under RSA 21:6. forth in RSA 654:1, a person who has a New Hampshire “domicile” under RSA RSA 21:6 and :6 - a are “effectively the same” as the definition of “domicile” set Therefore, regardless of whether the definitions of “resident” and “residence” in physical presence to the exclusion of all other places, see RSA 21:6, :6 - a. demonstrated that the town is their most i mportant or principal place of p. 9 9

of physical presence, to the exclusion of all other places in which they may live. through all of their actions that New Hampshi re is their “most important” place defines a “resident” as a person who lives in New Hampshire and has indicated who claims residence in any other state for any purpose.” In turn, RSA 21:6 defined in RSA 21:6, except that no person shall be deemed to be a resident motor vehicle code, the term “‘resident’ shall mean a resident of the state as requisite intent. RSA 25 p. 9 9:88 provides that, for purposes of construing the voter in this state if they live in New Hampshire and have manifested the establish voting eligibility. P ursuant to RSA 654:1, I, a person is an el igible vehicle or driving privileges and obligations, nor do the motor vehicle laws At the outset, we observe that the election laws do not establish motor

Ct. R. 34. the plaintiffs’ causes of action pending in the federal district court. See Sup. 34 to decline to answer question 3 because the answer is not determinative of for the purpose s of” RSA 25 p. 9 9:88 (2014). We exercise our discretion under Rule claims residence in any other state for any pur pose’ and thus is not a ‘resident’ Hampshire “domicile” pursuant to RSA 654:1 can “ever be an individual ‘ who The third certified question asks whether an individual with a New

RSA 21:6. pursuant to RSA 654:1, I, is neces sarily a New Hampshire “resident” under answer to question 1, a student who claims a New Hampshire “domicile” necessarily a New Hampshire “resident.” Thus, for the reasons set forth in our 65 4:1, I, a person with a New Hampshire “domicile” under RSA 654:1, I, is 21:6 and the plain language of the statutory definition of “domicile” in RSA pursuant to the plain language of the statutory definition of “resident” in RSA requirements of RSA 654:1, I.” As discussed in our answer to question 1, while attending [school] if such student’s claim of domici le otherwise meets the voting purposes in the New Hampshire town or city in which he or she lives RSA 654:1, I - a provides that a student “may lawfully claim domicile for

the affirmative. affirmative for the same reasons as we answered the first certified question in Hampshire resident” under RSA 21:6. We answer this question in the Hampshire “domicile” pursuant to RSA 654:1, I - a is “necessarily a New The second certified question asks whether a student who claims a New

visited May 1 p. 9 9, 2020). http://gencourt.state.nh.us/SofS_Archives/2018/house/HB1264H.pdf (last p. 10 10

263:38 (2014) (a “nonresident driver of a motor vehicle, who is the holder of a license to drive such vehicl e within this state.” RSA 263:36 (2014); see RSA in which he or she resides to drive here without being required “to obtain a nonresident driver who holds a license to drive in the state, district, or country RSA 263:35 (emphasis added). In addition, the motor vehicle laws permit a

license issued by the state of New Hampshire. from the date his residency was established to obtain a driver’s bona fide residency in this state, shall have a maximum of 60 days driver’s license in another jurisdiction, upon the establishment of a [A]ny nonresident driver of a motor vehicle who holds a valid

has a valid driver’s license.” RSA 263:1, I (Supp. 2019). RSA 263:35 provides: shall drive any motor vehicle upon any way in this state unless such person New Hampshire driver’s license. RSA 263:1, I, provides that “[n]o person . . . We begin by discussing the statutes relevant to the obligation to obtain a

Relevant New Hampshire Driver’s License Statutes

as defined by RSA 259:25 (2014) and RSA 259:72, I (Supp. 20 19), respectively. related to it, we assume that the individuals in question are drivers and owners interpretation of the motor vehicle code and answering the certified questions license and New Hampshi re motor vehicle re gistration. For the purposes of our pertinent statutes governing the obligations to obtain a New Hampshire driver’s Before explaining our answers to questions 4 and 5, we review the

it. plaintiffs’ claims, we exercise our discretio n under Rule 34 to decline to answer here. Therefore, because our answer to question 3 is not determinative of the pursuant to RSA 654:1, I, necessarily has established a “bona fide residency” residency” here; and (3) an individual with a New Hampshire “domicile” to register their motor vehicle here within 60 days of establishing a “bona fide “bona fide residency” here; (2) RSA 261:45 (Supp. 2019) requires a nonresident to obtain a New Hampshire driver’s license within 60 days of establishing a nonresident driver who holds a valid driver’s license from another jurisdicti on claims because, as explained below: (1) RSA 263:35 (2014) requires a registering to vote here. The answer to question 3 is not determinative of those Hampshire driver’s license and motor vehicle registration as a result of concern the potential burden allegedly imposed by having to obtain a New not determinative of the plaintiffs’ claims. The plaintiffs’ voting right s claims under RSA 654:1, I, is or is not a “resident” for the purposes of RSA 259:88 is question 4 reveals that whether an individual with a New Hampshire “domicile” well understand why the federal district court certified it, but our review of We have reviewed the parties’ thorough briefing of question 3, and can p. 11 11

added). In addition, under RSA 259:67, I, a person who, otherwise, is a his or her vehicle or vehicles i n New Hampshire.” RSA 261:45, I (emphasis maximum of 60 days from the date of his or her residency in which to register has established a bona fide residency in this state, said resident shall have a residents. RSA 261:44 (2014). RSA 261:45 provides that “when a nonresident other state, district or country “grants similar privileges” to New Hampshire state, district or country of which the owner is a resident,” provided that the vehicles owned by nonresidents and “duly registered for the current year in the RSA 261:40 (2014). RSA 261:44 exempts from the registration requirement specifically exempt b y statute or rule from the requirement of registration.” permit or cause to be driven on the ways of this state any vehicle which is not is a violation for any person to drive or any owner or custodian to knowingly As to the obligation to register one’s vehicle, RSA 261:40 provides that “it

Relevant Motor Vehicle Registration Statutes

without registering it here, see RSA 263:1, I,:37. or (2) whenever they are no longer permitted to drive their motor vehicle here 60 days of establishing a “bona fide residency” in New Hampshire, RSA 263:35; a nonresident must obtain a New Hampshire driver’s license either: (1) within otherwise requires”). Thus, under the pertinent statutes, an individual who is meanings . . . ascribed to them” in RSA chapter 259 “except where the context “words and phrases” when used in the motor vehicle code “shall . . . have the vehicle registration, we disagree. See RSA 259:1 (2014) (providing that the 259:67, I, applies only to the obligation to obtain a New Hampshire motor that the plaintiffs contend that the definiti on of “nonresident” contained in RSA in some state, district or country other than New Hampshire.” To the extent (2014), which defines a “nonresident” as “any person whose legal residence is To understand w hat is meant by “nonresident,” we look to RSA 259:67, I

RSA 263:37 (2014) (emphasis added).

like privileges to residents of this state. vehicle drivers; provided, that said state, district, or country grants said motor vehicle is registered respecting the licensing of motor registered, or has complied fully with the laws of the state where the state, district, or country in which the motor vehicle is [issued by this state] if the driver is duly licensed under the laws of such vehicle may be driven by its owner . . . without a license ways of this state, without registration [in New Hampshire],. . . [w]henever a motor vehicle of a nonresident may be driven on the

provides that provided he does not receive pay for such driving”). However, RSA 263:37 be required to obtain a license to drive an y pleasure vehicle within this state, license to drive a motor vehicle in the state . . . in which he resides, shall not p. 12 12

does n o t define the term “r esidency.” we decline to do so. RSA 259:88 defines “res ident” for the purposes of the motor vehicle code; it Although the plaintiffs urge that we look to RSA 259:88 for the meaning of “bona fide residency,” 2 brackets omitted)). general ones trumps the rule that later - enacted statutes have precedence.” (quotati on and Inc., 420 P.3d 767, 772 (Cal. 2018) (“The rule that specific provisions take precedence over more conflict, the more specifi c statute controls over the general statute.”); Lopez v. Sony Electronics, EnergyNorth Natural Gas v. City of Concord, 164 N.H. 14, 16 (20 p. 12 12) (“To the extent two statutes addresses motor vehicle registration, while RSA 259:88 is of general applicability. See there is any conflict between the two statutes, RSA 259: 67, I, controls because it more specifically reconciled, RSA 259:88 controls as it is the later - enacted statute. However, to the extent that another state for any other purpose.” The plaintiffs argue that because the two statutes cannot be RSA 259:88[’]s mandate that ‘no person shall be deemed to be a resident’ who claims residence in Hampshire] to get New Hampshire vehicle registrations” because that requirement conflicts “with cannot require all nonresidents who spend [more than] six months in any year [in New ever obligate a nonresident to register their motor vehicle here. They argue “RSA 259:67 . . . The plaintiffs disagree that living in New Hampshire for more than 6 months in any year can 1 “residency” under RSA 21:6 - a if they live in New Hampshire and have indicated meaning of this definition, a person has a New Hampshire “residence” or exclusion of all others.” Also as previously discussed, under the plain 2 designated by a per son as his or her principal place of physical presence to the in RSA 21:6 - a to mean “a person’s place of abode or domicile,” which is “that 21:1. As previously discussed, the term s “residence” or “residency” are defined We, therefore, look to the definition of “residency” in RSA 21:6 - a. See RSA The term “bona fide residency” is not defined in the motor vehicle code.

upon whether that individual has a “bona fide residency” in New Hampshire. of an individual who is a nonresident to register their motor vehicle here turns has a “bona fide residency” here. Similarly, under RSA 261:45, the obligation obtain a New Hampshire driver’s license turns upon whether that individual Under RSA 263:35 the obligation of an individual who is a nonresident to

RSA 259:67, I. 1 they principally use the vehicle in connection with their New Hampshire abode, have had a “regular abode” here “for more than 6 months in any year,” and days of establishing a “bona fide residency” here, RSA 261:45 or (2) when they Hampshire must register their vehicle in New Hampshire either (1) within 60 Pursuant to these statutes, an individual who is a nonresident of New

Dictionary, supra at 4. is a “place where one . . . dwells.” Webster’s Third New International [that] abode.” As previously discusse d, the plain meaning of the word “abode” months in any year,” and the vehicle is “principally used in connection with motor vehicle if they have “a regular abode” in New Hampshire “for more than 6 “nonresident,” i s deemed to be a “resident” for the purposes of registering a p. 13 13

drivers’ licenses by RSA § 263:1 if they wish to driv e in the state and required for more than six months in any year [are] required to obtain New Hampshire resident in RSA § 259:67, I . . . , college students w ho reside in New Hampshire The fifth certified question asks whether, “[g] iven the definition of non -

RSA 261:45 and RSA 263:35. necessarily has a “bona fide residency” in New Hampshire for the purposes of person who has a New Hampshire “domicile” under RSA 654:1, I, o r I - a, necessarily has a New Hampshire “residence” under RSA 21:6 - a. Therefore, a previously explained, a person with a “domicile” under RSA 654:1, I, or I - a, incorporates the definition of “resid ency” contained in RSA 21:6 - a. Also as phrase “bona fide residency” as used in RSA 261:45 and RSA 263:35 and second certified questions in the affirmative. As previously explained, the this que stion in the affirmative, for the same reasons as we answered the first residency” here for the purposes of RSA 261:45 and RSA 263:35. We answer “domicile” under RSA 654:1, I, or I - a has necessarily established a “bona fide Question 4 asks whether a person who claims a New Hampshire

pertinent statutes, we now answer questions 4 and 5. driver’s license. See RSA 263:1, :35,: 37. With this understanding of the New Hampshire registration, the owner must also obtain a New Hampshire vehicle is no longer authorized to be driven on the ways of this state without a New Hampshire abode, and must register those vehicles here. Once such a deemed a “resident as to all vehicles principally used in connection with” their regular abode in New Hampshire for more than 6 months in any year, they are a durational residency component. Under RSA 259:67, I, once a person has a The motor vehicle code as it relates to vehicle registrations also contains

vehicle here. obtain a New Hampshire driver’s license and by RSA 261:45 to register their previously was a nonresident of New Hampshire is req uired by RSA 263:35 to exclusion of all other places in which they may live — the individual who Hampshire is their “most important” place of physical presence, to the individual, in good faith, has indicated through all of their actions that New establishing a “bona fide residency” in New Hampshire — meaning that the Accordingly, pursuant to the motor vehicle code, within 60 days of

fraud or deceit.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary, supra at 250. The plain meaning of the phrase “bona fide” is “made in good f aith without of physical presence, to the exclusion of all other places in which they may live. through all of their actions that New Hampshire is their “most important” place p. 14 14

concurred. BROWN, J., retired superior court justice, specially assigned under RSA 490:3, HIC KS, BASSETT, HANTZ MARCONI, and D ONOVAN, JJ., concurred;

driver’s license. register those vehicles in New Hampshire and (2) obtain a New Hampshire principally used in connection with their New Hampshire abode must (1) New Hampshire for more than six months in any year, and whose vehicles are nonresident college students who wish to drive in New Hampshire, reside in obtain a New Hampshire driver’s license. See RSA 263;1, :35, :37. Thus, vehicle in New Hampshire without a New Hampshire registration, they must RSA 259:67, I. Once a nonresident is no longer authorized to drive their that are principally used in connection with their New Hampshire abode. See more than six months in any year must register any of their motor vehicles As previously discussed, any nonresident living in New Hampshire for

state.” We answer question 5 in the affirmative. by RSA § 261:40 to register in New Hampshire any vehicles they keep in the