Gleason v. Sawyer

contended, that the instructions to the jury were incorrect; first, in that they were told to consider “ the manner and circumstances in which the receipt was given, and the conversation which took place at the time, to assist them in determining whether the plaintiff signed the receipt from mistake or misapprehension.”

The plaintiff offered no evidence whatever in relation to the receipt, made no attempt to show a mistake, fraud or surprise in the transaction, nor was there any fact or circumstance in or about the case, raising even a presumption of misapprehension. If such had really existed, it is to be made out by as clear and forcible proof as would make a defence to a note of hand; — or such as would induce a court of equity to set aside a contract. Mere suspicions, or inferences, or arguments are not to invalidate a receipt; nor should the jury be sent on a voyage of discovery to hunt up circumstances by which they may avoid it. The authorities go to the extent of permitting a receipt to be explained by oral testimony, or impeached for fraud, mistake or surprise; and we contend, that this is the utmost limit to which the rule extends.

“If the receipt had been in terms more explicit than it is, it would be open to explanation. I mean that kind of explanation not directly contradictory to, but consistent with it.” Per Spencer, J., in M’Kinstry v. Pearsall, 3 Johns. 318. “ The true view of the subject seems to be that such circumstances as would lead a court of equity to set aside a contract, such as fraud, mistake, or surprise, may be shown at law to destroy the effect of a receipt.” Per Williams, J., in Puller v. Crittenden, 9 Conn. 406, cited in 1 Greenl. Ev. § 305, note. “ A receipt must be considered as evidence of payment, unless impeached for fraud.” Phelan v. Crosby, 2 Gill, 462, found in 6 II. S. Digest, 894, § 21.

“ A receipt in Ml may be opened, if it be unfairly obtained.” Lawrence v. Schuylkill Hav. Co. 4 Wash. C. C. Rep. 562; Ensign v. Webster, 1 Johns. Ca. 145. “ Receipts may always be explained by oral testimony.” Brooks v. White, 2 Met. 288. “ When a party has acknowledged in writing, that money has been paid, and a mistake is afterwards alleged, parol evidence may be received to correct it, but such proof must be very clear. Cogens v. Pooser, 1 Spears, 325, found in 4 U. S. Dig. 734, § 1772.

“ There can be no doubt, that a receipt in full, when the person who gave it was under no misapprehension and can complain of no fraud or imposition, is binding upon him; and therefore he is not at liberty to show that the receipt was given to defraud creditors, and that in fact no money had passed between the parties.” Per Lord Ellenborough, in Alner v. George, 1 Camp. 393.

“ A receipt in full of all demands, when given with complete knowledge of all the circumstances, is a conclusive bar to the action; and the party giving it should not be allowed to rip up the transaction, which has been so concluded.” Per Lord Kenyon in Bristoiu v. Eastman, 1 Esp. Rep. 173.

Lord Ellenborough asserts the same in Henderson v. Wild, 2 Camp. 562. See, also, 3 Stark. Ev. 1276, (ed. of 1826.) “A receipt may be rebutted by proof of mistake or fraud.” Story on Contracts, 410, § 674.

2d. The Court erred in directing the jury to consider the fact, that the defendant showed no receipt, but the receipt in full for the intermediate payments subsequent to the receipt for twenty-five dollars, as a circumstance from which they might infer that the payments had not been made.

It is the usual practice, among all classes of persons, to give and receive receipts “ for one dollar,” (or some nominal sum,) “in full of all demands,” on the settlement of long accounts; and the presumption arising from this practice would certainly create an impression in favor of the validity of this receipt; and require extra proof that the intermediate payments had not been made. The presumption of law would be the same. “ If a 8* man give a receipt for the last rent, the former is presumed to be paid.” 3 Stark. Ev. 1272, (ed. of 1826); Brewer v. Knapp, 1 Pick. 337. “ A receipt for $1,00, in full of a certain note, is prima facie evidence of full payment of the note.” Paige v. Perno, 10 Yerm. 491.

3d. The Court erred in instructing the jury to consider as an improbable circumstance, and one that might properly impeach the receipt, the fact that former payments should leave just three dollars due.

The evidence did not show that any fraction of a dollar was due on the plaintiff’s account, and three dollars was as likely a balance as any other sum. But we contend, that the receipt was conclusive, even though given for a less sum than was actually due, unless given through mistake. “A receipt in full, intended so to be, and when the creditor had the means of ascertaining the amount of his claim, will be held to operate as such, though the claim be larger in amount than the receipt.” Kolbroolc v. Blodgett, 5 Yerm. 520. “If by agreement and without mistake a receipt in full be given, it is conclusive, though less than the amount due.” JOmric v. Gilbert, Wright, (Ohio,) 764. Each of these suggestions must have operated on the minds of the jury to the disadvantage of the defendant. They effectually broke down the barriers, which the law, (even as laid down by the Court in this trial,) had raised for the protection of the defendant. The Court, it is true, told the jury “ that the burden of proof lay on the plaintiff to impeach the receipt; ” but what force could this declaration have, when in the next breath they are told, “ that the length of time, (twenty nine days,) between the completion of the work and the date of the receipt,” might be considered as a ground of impeachment ?

4th. The Court should have charged as requested by the defendant on the trial; and we rely on 9 Conn. 406; 2 Gill,' 462; 1 Spears, 325; 1 Camp. 393; 1 Esp. R. 173; 2 Camp. 562; 4 Wash. C. C. R. 562; 1 Johns. Ca. 145, cited and abstracted above, to sustain the point.

“ A receipt in full is not conclusive, though strong prima evidence of entire payment.” Ried v. Ried, 2 Harr. 5; Bobbin v. Perry, 2 Dev. 247; State v. Robinson, 1 Rich. 32.

The direction that the jury might weigh the evidence in the case, and. determine whether the whole of the plaintiff’s demand had been paid, was clearly wrong; because there was no evidence in the case of a proper character to be submitted to the jury, to authorize them to reject the receipt. There was no attempt made to show that the account had not been fairly liquidated and closed by the parties; nor was there a particle of evidence tending to impeach the receipt for fraud, mistake or surprise.

II. As to the second point raised in the case, “ that there was no sufficient evidence to overcome, destroy or avoid the plaintiff’s receipt in full,” we think that an examination of the facts, as reported, must convince every one that the verdict is against evidence.

The plaintiff proved his account, and rested his case; the defendant then put in his receipt in full, and proved that “ the parties were together in the afternoon,” — “ that they requested the witness to write a receipt,” — “ that when ashed if it was to be a receipt in full, both of them, or one of them in the presence of the other, said yes,” — and11 that the plaintiff then signed it as written.” This is all the evidence touching the receipt; and it certainly goes strongly to sustain it. We submit, therefore, that the verdict is palpably against evidence, and should be set aside.

The single question raised by this case relates to the amount and character of the evidence upon which it is competent for a jury to find the fact that money was not paid, against the evidence of a receipt admitting the payment of a small sum in full of all demands and accounts.

It is, of course, everywhere admitted, that a receipt in full of all demands, is primé fade evidence that all such demands have been paid; just as a receipt for a specific sum is privid facie evidence of the payment of that sum.

Evidence, which a jury is bound to regard, and to govern themselves by, if it stands uncontradicted and unimpeached, is primé facie evidence. And this is the rule in relation to receipts. The jury are bound by their oaths to give credence to a receipt and to find their verdict upon it as upon a fact proved; unless there is found other evidence, or other circumstances, which lead their minds to a different result, and in their judgment outweigh the receipt. We are not aware that there is in this respect any difference between the case of a receipt and the case of any other primd fade evidence. It is to be overbalanced by other evidence laid before the juryj but they are to judge when the one scale or the other preponderates, and there is no rule, which can be laid down for their government as to either the kind or quantity of evidence, which ought to outweigh such written admission.

Cases are cited to us, which seem to hold, that a receipt can only be impeached “ if unfairly obtained,” or “ for fraud,’’ or upon “ such circumstances as would lead a court of equity to set aside a contract, such as fraud, mistake, or surprise”; “ that proof to correct a receipt must be very clear; ” and “ that a receipt can only be explained by oral testimony, or impeached for fraud, mistake, or surprise.” We think the language of these cases is to be understood with reference to the circumstances of the particular cases then before the court.

We understand the law to be, that all receipts may be explained and impeached on the ground of fraud, mistake, or surprise; and that they may be contradicted and disproved. The fact admitted by the receipt may be simply shown to be otherwise, and that maybe done by any evidence calculated to satisfy the minds of the jury, either by direct proof, or by circumstances tending to the same result.

The law is laid down in Cowen & Hill’s Notes to 1 Phil. Ev. 381, (Van Cott’s ed.) thus: “ Receipts are not only impeachable for fraud, but any mistake may be shown, so may any erroneous or false statement in them, though designed by the parties. In a word they may always be contradicted, varied or explained by oral testimony.” The cases collected and cited by them, fully sustain their statement. If evidence is introduced casting a suspicion upon the correctness of a receipt, it may be supported by proof of the circumstances under which it was given, and we agree, that where a receipt in full is given upon a distinct agreement to compromise all claims upon certain terms, and such a receipt is given in pursuance of the adjustment so made, it can be impeached only on the ground of fraud 0c imposition. So where it is shown, that “ a receipt in full of all demands is given with complete knowledge of all the circunb stances,” it is held conclusive; but it is apparent it is so held, not because there is any legal objection to contradicting the receipt, but because such evidence either disproves the evidence against the receipt, or shows such a state of agreement, that the incorrectness of the receipt is not material.

The evidence submitted to the jury in the present case proved clearly, that the only payment made upon the occasion of the receipt being signed, was of the sum of three dollars mentioned in it. That there was no settlement then made between the parties, and nothing was said on that subject. The evidence left it entirely uncertain, whether the receipt was read by or to the plaintiff. The receipt was written by the witness who was asked to write a receipt for three dollars. He asked if the re-' ceipt was to be in full, and one or both of the parties said “ yes.” And he then, putting his own construction upon his own words, in full, wrote a receipt for three dollars in full of all demands and accounts to the date; though not one word had been said about any demand or account between the parties except this three dollars. This evidence entirely negatived the inference, which might have been drawn from the receipt alone, that there had been a settlement between the parties, and that this three dollars was paid as the balance.

The considerations, which were suggested to the jury, seem to us to be precisely those which would naturally arise upon the evidence, and such as the jury would be naturally influenced by, and we see nothing in the charge which does not seem to us to be entirely correct and proper.

The charge, which the judge was requested to give, was not such as we have been accustomed to hear. To have remarked to the jury, that the receipt produced was plenary evidence that the whole debt had been paid, would be going beyond the law, if plenary is understood to mean more than the appropriate legal and technical phrase used by the judge, primé facie evidence. The rest of the desired charge was almost identical in its terms with the charge at first given and repeated by the judge, with the exception of the strong terms used by the counsel, which were calculated, if productive of any effect, to mislead the jury, by giving them the impression, that some different rule prevailed in this case from that which governs juries ordinarily in civil cases; the preponderance of the evidence, or the balance of probability.

We think justice will be done to the parties-by